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In his Transcendental Deductions of the categories, Kant 
purports to show that we have the right to employ our basic a 
priori concepts of a thing in general, e.g. the concept of causality, 
in cognition of the objects of experience. In Kant’s view, these 
concepts can thus be applied to observable phenomena. On the 
other hand, his Deductions deny us any cognition of things as 
they are in themselves, independently of our experience. These 
arguments ground not only his theoretical philosophy but his 
practical philosophy as well, in that they leave room for the pos-
sibility of freedom of the will. 
This dissertation presents a new elucidation of the Deduc-
tions by giving emphasis on Kant’s account of perceptual aware-
ness. I argue that we can understand the Deductions by placing 
Kant’s account of perceptual awareness in its historical context. I 
show that Johann Tetens’ criticism of Christian Wolff’s account 
of perception had a crucial influence on Kant’s account, and that 
by giving attention to this influence we can understand the design 
of the Deductions, which establish the objective validity of the 
categories to objects of experience by showing that perceptual 
awareness is possible only through the same a priori rules that are 
represented generally in the categories. 
 











Kant pyrki osoittamaan kategorioiden transsendentaalisil-
la deduktioillaan, että olemme oikeutettuja käyttämään perustavia 
a priori -käsitteitämme, esimerkiksi kausaliteetin käsitettä, koke-
muksen objekteja koskevassa kognitiossamme. Kantin käsityksen 
mukaan näitä käsitteitä voidaan soveltaa havaittavissa oleviin 
ilmentymiin. Toisaalta hänen deduktionsa rajaavat oliot sellaisena 
kuin ne ovat itsessään, kokemuksestamme riippumatta, kogniti-
omme ulkopuolelle. Kantin argumentit ovat paitsi hänen teoreetti-
sen filosofiansa myös hänen käytännöllisen filosofiansa perusta, 
sillä ne jättävät tilaa tahdonvapauden mahdollisuudelle. 
Tässä väitöskirjassa pyrin valaisemaan Kantin deduktioita 
nostamalla esiin hänen käsityksensä havaintotietoisuudesta. Väi-
tän, että voimme ymmärtää deduktiot asettamalla Kantin käsityk-
sen havaintotietoisuudesta historialliseen kontekstiinsa. Osoitan, 
että Johann Tetensin esittämällä kritiikillä Christian Wolffin ha-
vaintokäsitystä kohtaan oli ratkaiseva vaikutus Kantin havainto-
käsitykseen ja että huomioimalla tämän vaikutuksen voimme 
ymmärtää hänen deduktionsa, joissa hän osoittaa kategorioiden 
objektiivisen pätevyyden kokemuksen objekteihin nähden osoit-
tamalla, että havaintotietoisuus edellyttää ne samat a priori -
säännöt, jotka representoidaan yleisesti kategorioissa. 
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Human reason has the peculiar fate in one of its cognitions 
that it is burdened with questions which it cannot dismiss, 
since they are given to it as problems by nature of reason it-
self, but which it also cannot answer, since they transcend 




This is how Kant begins the Preface to the 1781 edition 
(the A edition) of his Critique of Pure Reason. The unhappy situ-
ation to which reason has been doomed is called metaphysics, and 
it concerns questions regarding the existence of God, freedom of 
the will and immortality of the soul. These questions haunt us and 
yet reason cannot answer them. 
The only way out of this conundrum, Kant thinks, is to 
assume the task of self-knowledge. Reason must “institute a court 
of justice, by which reason may secure its rightful claims while 
dismissing all its groundless pretensions.”
2
 This is the task of his 
critique of pure reason, and its starting-point is transcendental 
idealism, a theory Kant presents in the Transcendental Aesthetic 
of the Critique. Transcendental idealism claims that space and 
time are not things in themselves but forms of our intuition. Eve-
rything that can come before our senses is in space and time. 
Consequently, the objects we perceive are mere appearances and 
not things in themselves. They are empirically real but transcen-
dentally ideal. 
                                                     
1
 A VII. References to the Critique of Pure Reason follow the standard 
practice of indicating A edition (1781) and/or B edition (1787) pagina-
tion. All other references to Kant’s works are by volume and page num-
ber of the Academy edition (Ak.) of Kant’s Gesammelte Werke. Transla-
tions follow the Cambridge University Press editions of the Works of 
Immanuel Kant (general editors Paul Guyer and Allen Wood). 
2
 A XI. 
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On this foundation Kant institutes his court of justice 
which will, as he boldly asserts, solve all metaphysical problems. 
The most important task of this court is to determine what and 
how much understanding and reason can cognize free of all expe-
rience. Since the use of understanding and reason is based on 
concepts, he must first prove that there are a priori concepts that 
apply to the objects of experience. This he sets out to accomplish 
in the Transcendental Deduction of the pure concepts of the un-
derstanding. 
These concepts, the categories, are the a priori concepts 
on which the use of reason is based. That these concepts must be 
a priori is, Kant maintains, beyond doubt. If reason is to cognize 
anything at all, its basic concepts must be a priori. Take the con-
cept of cause for example. It asserts a necessity that cannot be 
drawn from experience, so in order to be able to use this concept 
legitimately we have to prove that there are objects that corre-
spond to it. Such a proof would show the objective reality of the 
concept, but that is not Kant’s only concern. He also wants to 
investigate whether it could be proved that all possible objects 
that can come before our senses obey the laws of nature. In other 
words, he wants to investigate whether all physical phenomena 
are subject to that necessity and whether the action of mental 
beings in the world of sense is causally determined. In the Tran-
scendental Deductions Kant thus aims to show that the categories 
ground our rightful claims about the world, but he also aims at 
determining the limits of our knowledge. The task couldn’t be 
more important. Kant thinks that a deduction of the categories 
will put us in a position to answer the most fundamental questions 
of human existence: What can I know? What should I do? What 









It is an age-old problem of theories of visual perception 
that spatial properties such as distance, shape and size cannot be 
represented in the sense organ itself and that the representation of 
these properties thus presupposes an act of apprehending the rep-
resentation produced by the sense organ. The perception of a cir-
cle oblique to the line of sight serves as a good example: although 
an ellipse is projected on the retina, what we perceive is a slanted 
circle. Thus, our experience of objects in a three-dimensional 
world cannot be explained solely by means of the immediate 
mental representation produced by an image projected on the 
retina. 
This suggests that the objects we perceive are, at least to 
some extent, of our own making. Taking this fact into account is 
essential in attempting to prove the objective validity of our basic 
a priori concepts. We therefore have to make sure that we under-
stand how Kant thought that the mid is active in perception, and 
that question has its roots in the development of the theory of 
vision. 
The Islamic natural philosopher Alhazen (or Ibn al-
Haytham, c. 965–1039) seems to be the first to have presented an 
intromissionist visual theory (according to which something pro-
ceeds from the object to the eye and not from the eye to the air) 
that not only applied geometrical optics but also gave an account 
of the psychology of vision.
3
 Alhazen’s theory is a two-stage 
theory, according to which the two-dimensional data provided by 
the eye and carried by the optic nerves is apprehended by a facul-
                                                     
3
 Ibn al-Haytham, Optics. See also Hatfield and Epstein, “Sensory 
Core”, 367–371. 
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ty of sense – the last sentient or ultimum sentiens – through an act 
that enables us to perceive three-dimensional objects. What is of 
particular interest to us here is that according to Alhazen, our 
vision of objects necessarily involves mental operations. Book I 
of his Optics is an account of the physical and physiological con-
ditions of vision, which do not concern us here, but book II deals 
with those mental operations that are necessary for seeing ob-
jects.
4
 Although the present study is not about visual perception, 
understanding the nature of those mental operations required for 
representing physical objects is a key issue in understanding 
Kant’s Transcendental Deductions. 
The introduction of mental operations in a theory of vi-
sion is a consequence of taking an intromissionist approach to the 
physics of vision. In an extramissionist theory there is no need to 
explain how the soul can represent the forms of particular objects 
of vision, because according to such a theory vision occurs 
through the extremities of the ray issuing from the eye and ending 
at the object. An intromissionist theory, by contrast, has more 
explaining to do, as Alhazen notes: 
 
[I]f vision takes place by means of a form which passes from 
the visible object to the eye, and if the form occurs within the 
eye, then why does sight perceive the object in its own place 




Alhazen’s answer was that vision is not accomplished 
solely by what he called pure sensation, namely light as such and 
colour as such, but “by means of discernment and prior 
knowledge”.
6
 Let us take a glance at what this means. 
                                                     
4
 See Sabra, “Sensation and Inference”, 161. 
5
 Ibn al-Haytham, Optics, 149. 
6




Alhazen’s view is that pure sensation alone does not yield 
any state of consciousness.
7
 The effect of the light in the eye is 
“of the nature of pain”, and the lights “are all of the same kind 
and they vary only by more or less”.
8
 Alhazen concludes that a 
perception of an object cannot be reached by pure sensation alone 
and that the ultimum sentiens perceives the forms of visible ob-




All objects of vision are for Alhazen properties of physi-
cal bodies. Of the properties that inhere or occur in bodies the 
sense of sight perceives only colour and light by pure sensation, 
whereas perception of all other visible properties requires appre-
hension by the faculty of judgement (virtus distinctiva) through 
acts of comparison, discernment and inference. Discernment takes 
place when the ultimum sentiens perceives the forms of the visi-
ble objects, and these forms are produced in the eye by the forms 
of colours and lights of the visible objects. Thus, apprehension is 
an act of the faculty of judgement and it is grounded on the per-
ception of the forms of sensations, i.e. of forms that are produced 
in the eye and differ from the form of the objects. The perception 
of three-dimensional objects is thus made possible through the act 
of apprehension by the faculty of judgement. The true forms of 
visible objects we perceive by means of the co-operation of the 
eye and judgement. When the subject moves her eye over the 
whole surface of the object, her sense gains a succession of per-
ceptions, which the judgement can discern and compare with 
similar, known properties. As a result, the subject will gain all 
properties belonging to the object, and the structure of the whole 
object that is made up from them will be formed in the imagina-
                                                     
7
 Sabra, “Sensation and Inference”, 173–174. 
8
 Ibn al-Haytham, Optics, 84. Alhazen notes that pains that do not dis-
turb the organ are mild so that they are not felt and the subject does not 
judge them as pains on account of their mildness. 
9
 Ibn al-Haytham, Optics, 88–89. 
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tion. The form of that object will remain in the soul and take 
shape in the imagination.
10
 
Alhazen gave a detailed account of the action of the fac-
ulty of judgement in producing the true form of visible objects. 
He begins his analysis by considering how sight perceives the 
similarity of two individual objects. The objects have the same 
form and the perception is of those two objects and of their simi-
larity. However, the similarity of the forms is not the same as 
these forms themselves or either of the objects. Nor does the eye 
produce a third form that the sense of sight could perceive. The 
similarity of the two objects, Alhazen notes, is their agreement in 
respect of a certain property and the existence of that property in 
each of them. He concludes that perception of similarity is due to 
an act of comparing: 
 
Consequently, the similarity of the two forms can only be 
perceived by comparing one of them with the other and per-
ceiving in each of them that property in respect of which they 
are similar. And since the sense of sight perceives similarity, 
and there does not exist in the eye a third form from which 
similarity can be perceived, and similarity is perceptible only 
by comparing the two forms one with the other, then the sense 
of sight perceives the similarity of two forms only by compar-




The conclusion from this is that the sense of sight’s per-
ception of similarity and dissimilarity of forms is not by pure 
sensation, but rather by comparing the forms it perceives by pure 
sensation. In like manner, the sense of sight’s perception of the 
similarity and dissimilarity of colours and lights, as well as of the 
outlines and structures of the forms of visible bodies, is due to 
                                                     
10
 Ibn al-Haytham, Optics, 138–140 and 209–211. See also Sabra, “Sen-
sation and Inference”, 169–171. 
11




acts of distinguishing and comparing. Even the perception of two 
similar colours, say two greens, of which one is brighter than the 
other, requires a distinguishing between these colours and a 
judgement (distinctio) that they are of the same kind.
12
 
The important conclusion here is that perception of visi-
ble objects involves inference, and Alhazen thinks that perception 
by recognition (comprehensio per cognitionem) plays a major 
role in this inferential action. It is only by recognition that sight 
perceives what a visible object is. By recognition Alhazen refers 
to perception of the similarity of two forms, 
 
namely the form which the sight perceives of the visible ob-
ject at the time of recognition, and the form it perceived of 
that object or of a similar one in a first instance, or in earlier 





Based on this, it is obvious that recognition is not possi-
ble without remembering, and it is thus not perception by pure 
sensation but through a kind of inference. However, this inference 
is distinct from all other inferences, for it does not occur as a re-
sult of inspecting all properties in the form but through perception 
of signs. When sight perceives one of the properties in the form, 
while remembering the first form, it recognizes the form. This 
explains why this inference occurs in an extremely short interval 
of time and typically goes unnoticed. The shape or size of a body, 
among other properties of visible bodies, is usually perceived 
extremely quickly the perceiver not being aware of having per-
ceived them by inference and judgement, because the faculty of 




                                                     
12
 Ibn al-Haytham, Optics, 126–127. 
13
 Ibn al-Haytham, Optics, 129. 
14
 Ibn al-Haytham, Optics, 130–131. 
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Recognition can be of an individual object or of a species. 
In the case of an individual object, recognition occurs as a result 
of comparing the subject’s present perception of the form of the 
object with the form it has previously perceived from it. In the 
case of a species, recognition occurs as a result of comparing the 
form of the object with that of similar individuals of the same 
species. Interestingly, the universal form required for the latter 
kind of recognition is of empirical origin. Universal forms are 
produced in the soul for the species of visible objects and they 
take shape in the imagination. The appearance and shape, and 
possibly colour and some other properties, are common to all 
individuals of a species while individuals differ in respect of par-
ticular properties which are also visible. As the sight repeatedly 
perceives the individuals of one species, the universal form in that 
species will be repeatedly presented to it together with the differ-
ence between the particular forms of those individuals. From the 
difference between particular forms that accompany the universal 
forms the soul will perceive the universal form of that species.
15
 
Thus, through the distinguishing and comparing action of 
the faculty of judgement the soul gains the skill of perceiving 
visible objects. The soul receives from the surrounding physical 
world nothing except colour as such and light as such. Perception 
of objects thus requires action of the faculty of judgement. Even 
the perception of the quiddity of colour depends on distinguishing 
and comparing. Alhazen thought that it is in the nature of man to 
judge and to make inferences and that he or she always discerns 
and compares things with one another naturally without effort and 
exercise of deliberate thought. He says that it can be shown that a 
child constantly makes inferences without knowing what an in-




                                                     
15
 Ibn al-Haytham, Optics, 240. 
16




However, recognition is not the only kind of inference 
made in perception, and indeed, since recognition presupposes 
repetition and since all we receive from the outside world is col-
our as such and light as such, judgement and inference beyond 
recognition is needed to get the process of perceiving visible ob-
jects started.
17
 Nevertheless, perception of what visible objects are 
is due to recognition of forms: 
 
It is on these forms that the sentient relies in perceiving what 
the visible objects are, because perception of what they are is 
due only to recognition, and recognition results from compar-
ing the form presently perceived by sight with the form that 
has been fixed in the soul by the forms of objects already 
seen, and from likening the presently perceived form to one 




On the other hand, conclusions of syllogisms are also 
perceived by the faculty of judgement, and also these inferences 
can occur without awareness of the act of judgement. Alhazen 
asks us to consider someone saying, “How effective this sword 
is!”, and notes that a listener will immediately understand that the 
sword is sharp. This must, according to Alhazen, be due to the 
universal premise “Every effective sword is sharp”.
19
 
Now, the manner of perception in these inferences, where 
the inference itself is not noticed, is only accessible to us through 
a second inference, which cannot occur at the moment of percep-
tion. This second inference is not an inference that can be per-
formed extremely quickly, and it is thus an inference that we can 
deliberately make.
20
 In this way Alhazen builds a theory of visual 
perception that presents the faculty of judgement as a capacity 
                                                     
17
 Ibn al-Haytham, Optics, 130 and 137. 
18
 Ibn al-Haytham, Optics, 214. 
19
 Ibn al-Haytham, Optics, 131. 
20
 Ibn al-Haytham, Optics, 135. 
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operating in not only conscious inferences but also in inferences 






In this study, my aim is to make intelligible Kant’s Tran-
scendental Deductions of the categories in the two editions of the 
Critique of Pure Reason (the A and B edition). The purpose of 
these Deductions is to prove the objective validity of the pure 
concepts of the understanding. In other words, Kant’s aim is to 
prove that we are justified in applying these concepts to the ob-
jects we perceive. Perception itself is not Kant’s main concern, 
but without knowing what Kant thought perception to be, there is 
no hope of making the Deductions intelligible. Although Alha-
zen’s theory was by Kant’s time outdated (if also well known), 
there is something persisting in Alhazen’s thoughts, and we may 
benefit from placing Kant’s account of perception within a long 
tradition of thinking about perception. 
To express the matter somewhat anachronistically, Alha-
zen thought that the impressions, which the subject receives 
through the sense of sight cannot by themselves produce percep-
tion of visible objects. Rather, the mind must act on the form that 
these impressions take in the subject and it must produce, with the 
aid of imagination, objects of vision through unnoticed acts of 
distinguishing and comparing. It is only through this activity that 
we can perceive physical bodies. Now, if we disregard what the 
form of these impressions in this theory is, Kant would have 
agreed fully with Alhazen. Although developments during the 
seven hundred years separating these two intellectuals forced 
Kant to take a very different view on the relation between our-
selves and the objects we perceive, he still thought that perception 




imagination. Kant was also able to make understandable the un-
noticed action of the mind required for perception. However, he 
was forced to accept that we really do not know what the proper-
ties of things outside the mind are, and so he left the understand-
ing and reason to the playground where the mind itself makes 
their objects out of the impressions of the senses. 
This retreat to a mere empirical realism was an answer to 
a problem that a theory like that of Alhazen must face: How can 
we be sure that we represent correctly the form of objects outside 
the mind? Kant’s answer is that we cannot, but neither is there 
any particular need for this, as the objects of our representations 
are nevertheless empirically real. In what follows, we should re-
strict our attention to the phenomenal world and, more important-
ly, to the mind that represents this world. 
Now, as Kant took the view that the mind itself must pro-
duce the form of the objects it perceives, we may ask whether he 
also thought, as Alhazen did, that it is the faculty of judgement 
that produces the objects of perception. If he did, we could as-
sume that his task of proving the objective validity of the catego-
ries is thereby made easier, for then the operations of the under-
standing in making judgements and inferences – and reasoning in 
general – would be reducible to the same acts that the perception 
of objects requires. It has indeed been the dominant view of Kant 
scholars that the categories are already involved in mere percep-
tion.  However, there have also been those suggesting that we 
should not take Kant as claiming that all our cognition is concep-
tual.
21
 I shall try to show that by paying more attention to histori-
cal considerations than what has been customary in Kant litera-
ture, his Deductions can be made intelligible without assuming 
that our perception is conceptual, although, as we shall see, we 
                                                     
21
 See, e.g., Hanna, “Kant and Nonconceptual Content”; Hanna, “Kanti-
an Non-conceptualism”; Allais, “Non-Conceptual Content”. 
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need to be very careful with what we mean by the word ‘percep-
tion’. 
In order to understand the Deductions, we need to under-
stand what perception is in Kant. On the other hand, the Deduc-
tions become the criterion for the correctness of one’s interpreta-
tion of Kant’s view on perception. Kant does not put much effort 
in explaining his account of perception, and textual evidence may 
support various interpretations. For this reason, one cannot be 
sure that her interpretation of Kant’s account of perception is the 
correct one unless it reveals the secrets of the Deductions. In this 
respect, the conceptualist reading seems to have the advantage, 
for, as I already noted, a reduction of the operations of the under-
standing to those of perception is a convincing strategy for inter-
preting the Deductions. In Kant’s case, this would mean that ap-
perception is involved already in perception. However, there are 
reasons not to accept this approach. First, Kant says very clearly, 
that objects can appear to us without the functions of the under-
standing and that the categories “do not represent the conditions 
under which objects are given in intuition”.
22
 Secondly, if apper-
ception were already involved in perception, Kant’s view would 
have been a revolutionary one, and nevertheless he does not give 
any indication of this supposed revolution. Finally, I think that if 
Kant really thought that apperception is involved in perception, 
this would ascribe an exceedingly strong consciousness to percep-
tual awareness. This point cannot be made fully clear until later, 
but by considering the kinship between Kant's theory on the one 
hand, and Alhazen's theory on the other, I may perhaps clarify it 
to a point. Alhazen thought that we perceive what a visible object 
is only by recognition (per cognitionem). In the 18
th
 century, phi-
losophers would have made a distinction within Alhazen’s con-
cept of recognition so that it would contain the concepts of mere 
reproduction and recognition. According to this distinction, the 
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latter would refer to the subject’s consciousness of the sameness 
of a perceived representation with a reproduced representation. 
According to this early modern conception, recognition requires 
apperception whereas mere reproduction, which was thought to 
follow the laws of association, does not. Alhazen's per cogni-
tionem obviously does not discriminate between these two kinds 
of reproduction but it does include both of them. Now, if mere 
reproduction requires being accustomed to perceiving objects, as 
Alhazen and Kant thought, and if this requires a more arduous 
action of apprehending spatial properties of objects in early child-
hood, then the latter can hardly be thought to involve appercep-
tion. However, if apperception were a condition of perception, it 
would indeed have to involve apperception, and self-
consciousness would thus be directed at the raw data of the im-
pressions rather than on our perceptual consciousness of objects. 
I do not think that this is how Kant thought, but I do see 
how interpretations along these lines have become popular, for, as 
we shall see, Kant does think that the acts through which percep-
tual awareness becomes possible are sensed through inner sense, 
which in the Wolffian school was thought to be the same as ap-
perception. Prior to the first Critique, Kant himself had used this 
term as a synonym for apperception. If he still did, apperception 
would indeed seem to be involved already in mere perceptual 
awareness. 
But things had changed. Kant thought that significant 
philosophical progress had been made since the time of Christian 
Wolff (1679–1754),
 23
  and I will argue that he no longer thought 
that apperception and inner sense are the same at all. In fact, I 
think that the correct understanding of Kant’s account of inner 
sense is the key to understanding both his account of perception 
and the Deductions of the categories. Understanding the nature of 
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sensibility thus becomes a focal point in the task of understanding 
the Deductions. 
So let us take a preliminary glance at the faculty of inner 
sense. Kant was not in the habit of postulating things, but even he 
had to start somewhere, and his starting-point is that the mind is 
receptive. This receptivity can sense both outer and inner activity. 
Hence, we have inner as well as outer sense. This is the basis 
from which he builds his theory of cognition – a theory which, as 
is befitting for a philosopher of first class, will turn out to be very 
simple, although understanding it will require much work. 
Now, when Kant wants to proceed from the basis that we 
have both inner and outer sense, this means that we are no longer 
interested in different modes of receiving sense data from outside 
the mind. Our sense organs belong to the physical realm, and 
Kant thinks that the physical is nothing but appearance. Thus, the 
mind’s ability to sense is what must provide the starting-point for 
Kant’s investigation. At the same time, this division between 
outer and inner sense enables us to generalize the basis of Alha-
zen’s theory of vision: we receive impressions through outer 
sense, but these impressions cannot represent any object by them-
selves. Rather, the mind itself has to act on these impressions, and 
we can represent an object only through mental action. 
In this picture, if consciousness of any kind presupposes 
inner sense, then it follows that we cannot be conscious of our 
impressions as such, just as Alhazen thought that we cannot be 
conscious of light as such and colour as such. For through the 
inner sense we sense only the mind’s own activity, not what it has 
received through outer sense. This means that we have to make a 
distinction between impressions on the one hand and sensations 
on the other, of which only the latter are conscious representa-
tions. And Kant makes just the sort of distinction. 
In chapter 1 we shall see that this is Kant's starting-point, 
namely that the mind is both active and passive and that there is a 




the mind receives impressions, through the inner sense it becomes 
conscious of its own activity and, through this activity, of the 
representations it has received through outer sense ordered in the 
a priori form of space. For us the soundness of this position 
seems far from evident, but Kant considered it to be evident 
enough, so that he thought he could proceed from it without feel-
ing the need to provide the reader with any justification for it. The 
basis his assumed reader was supposed to have for understanding 
Kant's whole work is thus very different from ours, and I should 
therefore provide my reader with an introduction that makes her 
or him prepared to accept the soundness of Kant’s starting-point. 
For this end, I will here try to outline the relevant shifts of philo-





Alhazen's theory was well known to René Descartes 
(1596–1650), whose explanation of the physiology of vision is 
essentially the same as Alhazen’s. But unlike Alhazen’s theory, 
Descartes’ philosophy had a sharp distinction between the body 
and the mind. In Descartes’ theory, the motions in the nervous 
system produce sensations in the mind.
24
 According to Descartes, 
in visual perception our sensations of light and colour are caused 
immediately by the force and manner of the movements in the 
brain that affect the soul, but the apprehension of shape and size 
requires psychological processes and involves judging.
25
 In other 
words, just as Alhazen, also Descartes thought that the perception 
of the shape and size of objects requires judgement or inference. 
Descartes elaborates this further in Objections and Replies where 
he distinguishes among three grades of sense activity: “the imme-
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diate stimulation of the bodily organs by external objects”, “the 
immediate effects produced in the mind as a result of its being 
united with a bodily organ” and “the judgements about things 
outside us which we have been accustomed to make from our 
earliest years – judgements which are occasioned by the move-
ments of these bodily organs.”
26
 The second and third grades both 
belong to mental events, but the second grade typically goes un-
noticed, because the judgement or inference we make about the 
object occurs “at great speed because of habit, or rather we re-
member the judgements we have long made about similar objects; 
and so we do not distinguish these operations from simple sense-
perception.”
27
 Because of this, the third grade, although it de-
pends solely on the intellect, is commonly assigned to the senses, 
whereas in truth nothing more than the perception of the light and 
colour should be referred to the sensory faculty.
28
 Thus, what 
Alhazen called judgement by recognition, is an integral element 
in Descartes’ theory as well. 
 Although Descartes thought that body and mind interact, 
he thought that the mind is a separate substance and its principal 
attribute is thought, of which we possess two modes: the percep-
tion of the intellect and the operation of the will.
29
 The perception 
of the intellect includes sensory perception as well as imagination 
and pure understanding.
30
 By making a clear distinction between 
body and mind, Descartes is of course an important link between 
Alhazen and Kant, but according to Descartes, what is distinctive 
of thought is that thought is always conscious, and by making 
conscious thought a defining characteristic of the mind, Descartes 
perhaps left a more limited heritage for Kant than we might ex-
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It is easy to see that if our perception of objects involves 
an unnoticed act of thought and if thought is always conscious, 
this poses a problem. Indeed, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–
1716) remarks that the Cartesian view that thought is always con-
scious does not reflect what the mind or soul, or a monad, essen-
tially is.
32
 According to Leibniz, a monad’s “passing state which 
involves and represents a multitude in the unity or in the simple 
substance, is nothing other than what one calls perception, which 
should be distinguished from apperception, or consciousness”.
33
 
He thought that changes in these states of a monad originate from 
an internal principle, and he called the principles of change appe-
titions. Appetitions are monad’s tendencies to go from one per-
ception to another, i.e. the action of the internal principle of the 
monad.
34
 Thus, for Leibniz, perception constitutes the essence of 
the mind, and change can only take place through inner action. 
At this point it may be useful to consider Kant’s own 
philosophical development. The New Elucidation, which ap-
peared in 1755, is a distinctively Leibnizian work, but even at the 
start of his career Kant did not want to accept Leibniz’s theory of 
pre-established harmony, according to which there is no real in-
teraction between substances. According to the young Kant, a 
change in the state of a substance requires a connection with other 
substances.
35
 He argues that motion in a world is what makes 
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change possible. In substance itself there is nothing that can make 
the substance change its state, but the external motion can trigger 
a change by giving rise to a new determining ground. This ground 
will have to be in the essence of the substance itself, but it cannot 
arise without a connection with other substances.
36
 Kant was thus 
struggling to make room for outer affection in a Leibnizian 
framework. One might say that as a rationalist, Kant thought that 
a change in the mind’s representative state cannot be determined 
through inner action but necessarily involves both inner and outer 
action. 
As Kant grew out of rationalism, he began to take more 
seriously the role of outer action in the determination of the state 
of the mind. Outer action does after all, he thought, affect the 
mind to the extent that this affection alone produces a manifold of 
representations. However, the role of inner action in Kant’s ma-
ture view is by no means rendered insignificant, for he thought 
that outer sense cannot by itself produce perceptions, if by per-
ception one means a manifold of representations in one represen-
tation. In other words, it cannot afford us composites. 
Kant's definition of perception in his Stufenleiter is remi-
niscent of Leibniz's view in that it gives Perzeption a notably 
broad scope: sensations as well as cognitions are called Perzep-
tionen.
37
 On the other hand it equates Perzeptionen with con-
scious representations, and in this respect his view is different 
from that of Leibniz. But this is not surprising as Kant has depart-
ed from the view that outer action does not provide the mind with 
a manifold of impressions. Now, as Leibniz thought that percep-
tions are a manifold, or a multitude, in the simple, Kant must 
provide an answer to the question of how the mind can get a man-
ifold in one representation from a mere manifold. His view is that 
what differentiates manifoldness in one representation from the 
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mere manifold, is consciousness. Thus, conscious representations 
are called Perzeptionen. 
We may now return to the problem of visual perception. 
We already saw with Alhazen that one is led to conclude that 
conscious visual perception requires an act through which the 
form of objects is apprehended and that the first products of the 
affection through outer sense are not conscious. Now, if we bring 
Alhazen's problem of visual perception to the mental realm, as 
George Berkeley (1685–1753) did, and conclude that our vision 
can detect only light and colour, then the gravity of the problem 
increases. For then we can no longer make the act of apprehen-
sion rely on the two-dimensional form received from the sense 
organ. It will have to be concluded that neither the idea of space 
nor figures – not even flat or plane figures – can be received 
through the sense of sight. And according to Berkeley, they can-
not be received through outer sense at all.
38
 
Kant thought that Berkeley’s dogmatic idealism is “una-
voidable if one regards space as a property that is to pertain to 
things in themselves.”
39
 The Transcendental Aesthetic removes 
this threat by asserting the transcendental ideality of space, but 
still the problem remains: how do we perceive the space in ob-
jects? If, in the case of vision, outer sense provides the mind only 
with light as such and colour as such, how do we perceive col-
oured parts of spaces? It would be too hasty to conclude that Kant 
could give a satisfying answer to this question solely by the claim 
that space is the form of outer sense. This answer alone would not 
explain how we perceive lighted and coloured parts of space, for 
light as such and colour as such cannot bring with them represen-
tations of shapes. However, it does open a new path to answering 
the problem by providing a form on the basis of which the form 
of objects can be apprehended. Whereas Alhazen thought that the 
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form of objects is apprehended on the basis of the two-
dimensional form provided by the eye, Kant thinks that it is ap-
prehended on the basis of the three-dimensional space of our out-
er sense. It is interesting that although also according to Leibniz's 
account space is ideal, Kant thought that Leibniz's view that phys-
ical bodies are prior to space is a mistake worse than the mistake 
of holding space to be real and prior to physical bodies. Space 





Berkeley’s conclusion that through our outer sense we 
cannot receive even ideas of flat or plane figures is a devastating 
one, and it led him to deny the existence of the material world. 
Thomas Reid 1710–1796) thought that Berkeley and David Hume 
(1711–1776) had brought philosophy into danger. This is how 
Reid describes the situation: 
 
The second [Hume] proceeds upon the same principles, but 
carries them to their full length; and as the Bishop undid the 
whole material world, this author upon the same grounds, un-
does the world of spirits, and leaves nothing in nature but ide-





According to Reid’s analysis, the ideal system is to blame 
for this absurdity, and he abandons the theory of ideas altogether.  
Reid attacks the view that we perceive things only by 
means of mediating ideas, which are images of objects. He con-
tends that the skeptic should not stop at the conclusions Berkeley 
and Hume had drawn but advance even further: 
 
                                                     
40




I affirm that the belief of the existence of impressions and 
ideas, is as little supported by reason, as that of the existence 




The belief in impressions and ideas is thus a mere hy-




Reid’s alternative solution is a theory of immediate per-
ception. According to Reid, we perceive the objects themselves 
rather than ideas that refer to those objects. This account of per-
ception is founded on a new conception of sensation, where sen-
sation is considered to be an act of the mind. Smelling, for in-
stance, is “an act of the mind, but is never imagined to be a quali-
ty of the mind.”
43
 Our sensations and perceptions are, according 
to Reid, necessarily conscious, and when our perception ceases, 
nothing remains of the sensation.
44
 As Manfred Kühn notes, 
Reid’s account of sensation can be understood only through his 
theory of perception, because sensations in isolation would be 
nothing to us.
45
 Let us take a brief look at this theory. 
Reid thinks that our sensations are accompanied by cer-
tain beliefs: in actual perception of an object it is accompanied by 
a belief of the presence of the object whereas in remembering an 
object the sensation is accompanied by a belief of its past exist-
ence. In the mere imagination of an object the sensation is not 
accompanied by a belief at all and the imagination is a simple 
apprehension.
46
 In remembering a past sensation the sensation, 
rather than any idea of it, is the immediate object of the imagina-
tion. In smelling, for instance, the sensation compels the belief of 
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What Reid wants to do is to reverse the prevailing con-
ception that the simple apprehension is prior to belief, judgement 
or knowledge: 
 
So that here, instead of saying, that the belief or knowledge is 
got by putting together and comparing the simple apprehen-
sions, we ought to say, that the simple apprehension is per-
formed by resolving and analysing a natural and original 
judgment. And it is with the operations of the mind, in this 
case, as with natural bodies, which are indeed compounded of 
simple principles or elements. Nature does not exhibit these 
elements separate, to be compounded by us; she exhibits them 
mixed and compounded in concrete bodies, and it is only by 




In this conception, “our sensations are not images of mat-
ter, or of any of its qualities”.
49
 They are not resemblances of any 
of the qualities of bodies, and they have no object distinct from 
the act itself. Nevertheless, perception “hath always an object 
distinct from the act by which it is perceived”.
50
 Our perceptual 
consciousness thus begins with complex perception, and it is only 
through reflection that we can separate our subjective sensations 
from the objective perceptions. Extension and shape among other 
requisites of our perception of bodies do not originate from our 
sensations. Sensations only suggest those qualities.
51
 Thus in the 
case of hardness, our sensation does not resemble the hardness of 
                                                     
47
 Reid, Inquiry, 28f. 
48
 Reid, Inquiry, 29f. 
49
 Reid, Inquiry, 92. 
50
 Reid, Inquiry, 168. 
51




an object, it is only the medium that suggests the latter. The sen-
sation itself is, Reid claims, “a species of pain”.
52
 
One may compare this with Alhazen’s view that in visual 
perception the effect of the light in the eye is of the nature of pain. 
Remember that in Alhazen the perception of an object of vision 
depends on an act through which the ultimum sentiens apprehends 
the form of the object by using pure sensation, which is of the 
nature of pain, and the form that the subject’s eye provides. I not-
ed above that there is a certain similarity between this and Kant’s 
view, the difference being, of course, that in Kant the form need-
ed for apprehension is the three-dimensional form of outer sense. 
Now, since it had become obvious to Kant, that the early modern 
approach to the problem of perception through ideas was less than 
successful, we need to see if Reid’s positive account, according to 
which our sensations, as mental acts, are not objective representa-
tions but rather presuppose perception, or consciousness, of ob-
jects, could in any way have helped Kant in forming his theory of 
perception. 
Manfred Kühn has argued that Reid’s philosophy had a 
substantial effect on German philosophy and that Kant himself 
could not have avoided knowing the Scots in great detail.
53
 I be-
lieve that Kühn is right in claiming that Kant was influenced by 
Reid, although this influence, as Kühn seems to be ready to ad-
mit, was largely mediated through Johann Tetens (1736–1807). 
As Kühn notes, Tetens took Reid’s criticism very seriously and 
tried to improve the theory of ideas on the basis of this criticism. 
He agreed with Reid that the mind is both passive and active in 
perception, and he also agreed that sensations do not resemble the 
sensed objects. But Tetens’ investigations penetrated deeper into 
the mind than Reid’s, and his aim was to uncover what lies be-
hind the act of perception. According to Reid, there is much that 
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remains hidden to us in the act of perception, but Tetens thinks 
that by observing the mind we can still reveal a great deal about 
it. In other words, Tetens aimed to reveal what lies behind con-
sciousness. 
Tetens’ philosophy is built upon a new conception of in-
ner sense. I aim to show that this conception allowed Kant to 
answer the question that he had failed to pay attention to in the 
Dissertation: what is the ground of the relation between our rep-
resentations and their objects? Kant’s answer to this question is 
based on Tetens' revision of the theory of ideas (which was yet to 
be developed at the time of the Dissertation). The new conception 
of inner sense explains how our conscious representations in per-
ception (or, as the terminology was not fixed, in Tetens, our sen-
sations and ideas) can be modifications of the mind, which Reid 
had denied. It also explains how our perception of objects can still 
be immediate and how our conscious representations can contain 
a manifold in one representation. Whereas Reid accepted only 
material impressions, i.e. bodily impressions, Tetens claims that 
the existence of mental impressions is not a hypothesis but a fact 
that can be verified by observing the mind. Our consciousness of 
objects requires that these impressions are acted upon, and this 
action is sensed through our inner sense. 
Although Tetens proceeds from an empirical standpoint, 
as a German philosopher his revision of the theory of ideas can be 
best understood as a revision of Wolff’s philosophy. Like Reid, 
Wolff accepted only bodily impressions but Reid’s criticism is 
just as much targeted against Wolff as it is against the empiricists. 
According to Wolff, a representation of an object in-
volves two mental acts: the act of perception, through which the 
representation arises, and the act of apperception, through which 
the mind becomes conscious of the representation, and conse-




idea, insofar as it is considered in a relation to the object.
54
 The 
cognition of an object is thus mediated through an idea. Tetens is 
sympathetic to the view Kant had proposed in the Dissertation, 
according to which space and time are intuitions, and like Kant, 
he also criticises the Wolffian view that apperception arises from 
the clarity of partial representations.
55
 According to Tetens, the 
representation of an object is not yet an idea of it, and the repre-
sentation itself can be clear without consciousness of it. An idea, 
according to Tetens, is a conscious representation, and he equates 
it with what Reid calls a perception.
56
 Kant, on the other hand, 
will go even further and drop all talk of ideas in perception. For 
him ideas are concepts which go beyond the possibility of experi-
ence, and neither our cognition of the objects of perception nor of 
experience involves ideas.
57
 Notwithstanding, both involve modi-
fications of the mind (which belong to inner sense) and mental 
acts on these modifications, these mental acts being represented 
through inner sense. 
Tetens developed an original view on sensibility, which 
differs from all earlier accounts. In my opinion, it is this theory on 
which Kant builds a generalized and modern version of Alhazen’s 
theory of perception, according to which objects of perception are 
apprehended by a faculty (or, rather, faculties) of the mind by 
using mental impressions and the form of our sensibility. When 
we understand this theory, we are in a position to understand how 
Kant thinks he can prove that our pure concepts are objectively 
valid for all possible perception. 
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One sometimes gets the impression that commentators 
think that it is advisable not to look too closely on what Kant 
says, either because he does not always mean what he says or 
because he tends to get confused from time to time.
58
 I shall not 
take this advice. On the contrary, I think we should look very 
closely on what Kant says, and I think that the Critique is a co-
herent and well written book. When one gets confused while 
reading Kant, I think it is fair to assume that the more likely 
source of confusion is the reader’s shortcomings than those of the 
writer. In any case, it has been my principle in studying Kant that 
when something seems incomprehensible, I should work harder to 
make it comprehensible. I think that this can be achieved through 
understanding the roots of Kant’s philosophy. In my opinion, it is 
impossible to gain adequate understanding of Kant’s philosophy 
without understanding Wolff’s philosophy. It is imperative that 
we understand what needed to be changed in Wolff’s philosophy, 
and in order to understand that, we need to have some kind of 
understanding of what that philosophy was. Kant of course as-
sumed that his reader knew it by heart. Unfortunately, Wolff’s 
philosophy is not a very popular subject today, and reading Kant 
may in fact be something like reading a foreign language without 
a vocabulary. 
On the other hand, Kant was not the only one who 
thought that Wolff’s philosophy needed to be revised. Tetens was 
one of those colleagues whom Kant respected as a philosopher, 
and Tetens had already made headway in revising Wolff’s philos-
ophy. Kant could thus build on that work and as he was making a 
contribution to a discussion that was already going on, he felt no 
need to explain every move as if he was writing to a student who 
had no knowledge of the subject. Kant’s contemporaries did not 
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understand the book, so perhaps he relied on this too much. But if 
he did rely on it too much, where does this fact leave us? Perhaps 
we should consider ourselves as students with no knowledge of 
the subject. 
This is why I have chosen to concentrate more on those 
philosophers who influenced Kant’s thought than on commen-
taries on Kant. Colin McLear has recently suggested that both the 
conceptualist and the non-conceptualist readings of Kant’s ac-
count of perceptual content have widely been built on the wrong 
assumption that states of perceptual awareness have intentional 
content.
59
 I argue the same here, and because I think that com-
mentators have erred in this fundamental assumption, my discus-
sion on secondary literature will be limited in the main body of 
this study. I will refer to secondary literature only when I feel that 
doing so will help us understand what Kant means. In my opin-
ion, discussing secondary literature merely for the sake of show-
ing that there is such literature would be counterproductive, as I 
think it would distract the reader in a subject that is difficult 
enough as it is. That is why I postpone discussion on secondary 
literature until we have read through the Deductions and the 
Schematism. In the final chapter I will then show how I think that 
my interpretation solves problems other commentators have en-
countered. 
In chapter 1, I will first present Tetens’ criticism on 
Wolff’s philosophy. Tetens thought that it is a mistake to think 
that sensations are objective representations, and in section 1.1 I 
explain how he proposed that the Wolffians should change the 
way they think about representations. As Reid had shown, in ex-
plaining the possibility of representing an object, one has to view 
the mind both as active and passive. The possibility of represent-
ing an object depends on the receptivity of the mind, but sensa-
tions alone cannot produce a representation of an object without 
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mental activity. In section 1.2, I will present Tetens’ account on 
sensibility, and we will see how he thought that in order to be 
active, the reproductive faculty (imagination) must be grounded 
on a productive faculty which produces sensible abstractions. On 
the basis of what I have here said about Alhazen’s theory, it will 
be easier, I hope, for the reader to see that if we accept the fact 
that receptivity alone cannot provide us with representations of 
objects, that commits us to a certain logic of thinking about the 
mental activity required for cognition. We will later learn that 
understanding the possibility and the requirements of the empiri-
cal reproducibility of appearances is vital to understanding the 
Deductions, and Kant clearly took it for granted that his reader 
understands this issue. This is the key to understanding what Kant 
says about the synthesis of reproduction in imagination in the A 
Deduction, but unfortunately Kant does not explain the problem 
because it, as such, does not belong to transcendental philosophy. 
He clearly expects the reader to be familiar with the logic behind 
Alhazen’s and Tetens’ considerations. The reason why I have 
dealt so extensively with Alhazen’s theory in this introduction is 
that understanding the problem of empirical reproducibility is a 
requirement for understanding the Deductions. In chapter 1 my 
aim is to address this issue in a preliminary manner through 
Kant’s Schematism. I will first show that both Tetens and Kant 
thought that the reproducibility of appearances presupposes gen-
erality, although it does not presuppose concepts, and in section 
1.3 I will show how we might be able to understand Kant’s 
Schematism on the basis of Tetens’ theory of sensible abstrac-
tions. I will also consider a view which one commentator has put 
forward regarding how Kant should have thought about empirical 
apprehension in the light of modern science. I claim that how he 
should have thought about empirical apprehension is how he ac-
tually did think about it, and that his theory of perception might 




Chapter 2 deals with the Transcendental Aesthetic, and in 
it we start going through Kant’s text systematically. I will follow 
the A edition text of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analyt-
ic of Concepts leaving out of discussion only the parts that do not 
contribute anything substantial to the aim of understanding the 
Deductions. I will quote sentence by sentence those sections of 
Kant’s text that I find most important. Quoting from here and 
there would allow one to cheat by leaving out the passages that do 
not fit the picture one would like to draw. It has been difficult for 
commentators to find an interpretation that does not contradict 
what Kant says even in these short parts of the Critique. My aim 
is to improve the situation and show that Kant’s text is coherent. 
Like Tetens in his Versuche, also Kant aims in the Tran-
scendental Aesthetic to convince Wolffians of the need to change 
their conception of sensibility. This change requires terminologi-
cal changes, and in his untitled introduction to the Transcendental 
Aesthetic Kant introduces the basic terminology in a manner that 
should be acceptable to his reader. My aim in section 2.1 is to 
explain the background against which we should read this intro-
duction, and explain why he uses terms like ‘intuition’ and ‘ap-
pearance’. In section 2.2 I will present very briefly what Kant 
thinks time and space are. I will not go into details of the Tran-
scendental Aesthetic, because the deduction of the concepts of 
time and space is not my concern here. What I will do is to show 
the importance of Kant’s view that time is the form of inner 
sense. As it is the new conception of inner sense that is decisive 
in understanding not only what space and time are, and how they 
are represented, but in understanding the Deductions as well, we 
must put emphasis in understanding this conception. In section 
2.3 I explain how Kant’s account of inner sense differs from the 
Wolffian conception. 
In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant proves the objective 
validity of the pure a priori concepts of space and time. We have 
two kinds of pure a priori concepts: space and time as concepts of 
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our sensibility, and the categories as concepts of the understand-
ing. The conclusion of this proof is thus in itself important, be-
cause it says that the concepts of space and time necessarily apply 
to everything that can come before our senses. However, Kant 
also needs this conclusion in the B Deduction, and in order to 
understand how it helps to prove the objective validity of the cat-
egories, we need to understand Kant’s conception of inner sense. 
In section 2.4 my aim is to explain why Kant had to change his 
view on inner sense from the view he had held in the Inaugural 
Dissertation. Kant realized that there has to be a link between the 
sensible and the intellectual. In the end, this comes down to the 
fact that mere receptivity cannot produce a representation of an 
object. In fact, the mind must be active in producing not only the 
representation of an object but the object as well. Elucidating this 
active role of the mind in cognition is a major theme in this study. 
In this section, I will provide reasons for thinking that Kant saw 
Tetens’ conception of inner sense as a solution to the problem of 
the ground of the relation between representation and object. 
Although I have here stressed the importance of the cor-
rect understanding of Kant’s view on perceptual awareness, we 
cannot make sense of this view on the basis of the Transcendental 
Aesthetic alone. I expect that in the course of reading this mono-
graph the reader will, at times, want to object to how I interpret 
Kant’s text thinking that my evidence is merely circumstantial. I 
ask the reader to be patient, and to withhold her or his judgment. 
One may take my claim that we should interpret Kant through 
Tetens’ account of inner sense as a mere hypothesis. At the end of 
this monograph the reader may then judge whether the hypothesis 
should be accepted or not. My claim is that on this hypothesis 
both the Deductions and the Schematism become intelligible, and 
that it can be sufficiently confirmed. It is, however, the Schema-
tism that will give us the last piece of information needed for 
understanding how Kant thought of sensibility, and I postpone 




Chapter 3 discusses the Metaphysical Deduction of the 
categories, in which Kant aims to show that the necessary unity of 
judgements is also the unity which the categories give to the syn-
thesis of imagination. In section 3.1, I will present a detailed dis-
cussion on the beginning of Kant’s introduction to transcendental 
logic. In this introduction, we will not only learn what transcen-
dental logic is but also gain important information of the elements 
of cognition. Most importantly, we will learn that an appearance 
is a pure intuition. In section 3.2, we will see what the logical use 
of the understanding in judging is and how judgements are related 
to concepts. In 3.3, I will then present an interpretation of the 
Metaphysical Deduction. The purpose of the Metaphysical De-
duction is to show that the synthesis of the understanding at dif-
ferent levels has the same source of unity: the categories. In my 
interpretation of this proof, I stress the importance of realizing 
that the understanding is not involved in producing mere percep-
tual awareness at all. Thus, we learn that an appearance, being a 
pure intuition, requires a pure manifold and a pure synthesis, but 
it does not require the use of categories. 
In chapter 4 we will turn our attention to what a transcen-
dental deduction of the categories is and consider some historical 
aspects related to Kant’s Transcendental Deductions. In section 
4.1, we will see why a transcendental deduction is necessary, and 
how it differs from an empirical deduction. A transcendental de-
duction is necessary because the appearances are independent 
from thought, and the Metaphysical Deduction tells us only that 
we use the categories when we think about the appearances, not 
that we are justified in doing so. In order to get a better under-
standing of the problem, I will, in section 4.2, explain how Tetens 
thought that the functions of the understanding are reducible to 
the act of perception. A reduction of this sort would provide the 
key to proving the objective validity of the categories, and in sec-
tion 4.3 I will suggest that Tetens’ analysis of the cognitive facul-
ties can help us to understand the overall setting of the Transcen-
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dental Deductions. However, there is a fundamental disagreement 
with Kant and Tetens on how sensibility and understanding are 
related to each other. In contrast to Tetens’ view, Kant thinks that 
the ground of unity in thinking differs from the ground of unity in 
perceptual awareness, and this makes things more complicated for 
Kant. According to Kant, apperception provides the ground of 
unity in thinking. In the subsection before the Subjective Deduc-
tion, as it appears in the A edition, Kant explains that appercep-
tion, together with sense and imagination, is an original cognitive 
capacity, and in section 4.4 I will discuss this subsection. The 
original capacity of apperception has not been analysed at all up 
to this point, but now Kant reveals that it is apperception, as an 
original capacity, that is behind the third requirement for cogni-
tion of an object. The unity required for thought thus springs from 
an independent faculty, and Kant disagrees with Tetens and Wolff 
on this crucial point. In section 4.5, I will consider a criticism of 
Wolff’s account of apperception presented before Kant, which 
may help to understand how Kant’s theory criticises Wolff’s theo-
ry. 
In chapters 5–7, I will discuss the Deductions: first the 
Subjective and the Objective Deduction in the A edition, and then 
the one in the B edition. In these three Deductions Kant analyses 
the transcendental act required for cognition, the original faculties 
of cognition and its synthetic unity. I agree with Corey W. Dyck, 
who has argued that the Subjective Deduction is a contribution to 
the debate on the fundamental force of the soul. Kant’s adherence 
to Tetens’ claim that we must assume several fundamental cogni-
tive forces can be seen not only from the Subjective Deduction 
but from the Objective Deduction in the A edition as well. The B 
Deduction, on the other hand, aims to establish the connection 
between sensibility and understanding in Wolffian terms. The 
Deductions thus approach the objective validity of the categories 
from different perspectives. However, they are perfectly compati-




can benefit from comparing them. In fact, I think that only after 
reading all the Deductions we are in a position to understand 
them. In my opinion, the Deduction in the B edition is the better 
written than the A Deduction, and the B Deduction also incorpo-
rates well with the beginning of the Critique where Kant’s aim is, 
as I read it, to show a Wolffian reader how the Leibnizian-
Wolffian conception on sensibility must be changed. On the other 
hand, Kant did not rewrite the Schematism, which appears after 
the Deduction chapter, so it is written to follow the A Deduction. 
The Schematism explains how images are possible, but since 
Kant does not even mention images in the B Deduction, it would 
be very difficult, or even impossible, for a present-day reader to 
understand the Schematism without reading the A Deduction. I 
will briefly discuss the Schematism in chapter 8. 
I will begin with the Subjective Deduction in Chapter 5. 
In section 5.1, I explain how the Subjective Deduction is related 
to the Metaphysical Deduction. We learn that the understanding is 
not an original faculty, and that there are only three original ca-
pacities: sense, imagination and apperception. These capacities all 
have both an empirical and a transcendental use, and in the Sub-
jective Deduction Kant analyses the three empirical uses as three 
different syntheses. In subsections 5.2 through 5.4, I explain how 
Kant thinks that the cognition of objects is grounded on the tran-
scendental uses of sense, imagination and apperception. We will 
see that mere apprehension of appearances requires transcenden-
tal reproduction of imagination and that cognizing them through 
concepts requires transcendental apperception, because only tran-
scendental apperception can provide the necessary unity required 
for cognizing an object in thought. I shall argue that while the 
transcendental unity of apperception gives unity to all subordina-
tion of representations, it does not give unity to coordination of 
representations. Coordinative synthesis gets its unity from the 
transcendental use of sense. Thus, although appearances stand 
under the categories, the categories are not involved in represent-
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ing them. I elaborate the distinction between subordination and 
coordination in section 5.5, and in section 5.6 I explain how the 
conclusion of the Subjective Deduction can be interpreted in two 
different ways. I suggest that the Subjective Deduction may not 
reach the level of proof Kant is ultimately after in the Objective 
Deduction. 
The Objective Deduction will be analysed in chapter 6. 
First, I explain how the approach to the objective validity of the 
categories differs in this Deduction from that in the Subjective 
Deduction. The Objective Deduction is an inquiry into the rela-
tion of our cognition to its object from the side of the object, but 
as the object itself is a modification of the mind, the inquiry still 
concerns something in the subject, although it is not subjective. 
The Objective Deduction is an analysis of empirical apperception, 
which has form and matter. The Deduction is divided in two 
parts. Kant first proceeds from the form of empirical conscious-
ness and then from its matter. In section 6.2, I examine the for-
mer, i.e. the top-down part, where Kant explains what the faculty 
of understanding is. Also the B Deduction contains a top-down 
part, and it is essentially the same in the A Deduction, so I will 
examine them together as far as it is possible. Kant argues that 
pure apperception grounds empirical apperception, and his analy-
sis shows that pure apperception can yield empirical cognition 
only through the synthesis of pure imagination. The unity of ap-
perception in relation to the transcendental synthesis of imagina-
tion is the pure understanding, and the understanding has a neces-
sary relation to appearances by means of the categories. 
The bottom-up part is different in the two Deductions. In 
the bottom-up part of the A Deduction Kant considers how empir-
ical apperception gets its matter, and this I examine in section 6.3. 
We shall find out that the impressions of the senses can turn into 
experience only by means of pure imagination. Kant can then 




pend on the functions of the understanding, stand under the cate-
gories. 
In the B Deduction Kant does not have to discuss how the 
matter of empirical cognition is put together, because his argu-
ment rests on formal considerations. However, in order to show 
that the two editions are compatible, I will in chapter 7 first com-
pare the top-down part with what Kant has said in the Subjective 
Deduction. We shall see that in both editions, Kant explains how 
the understanding can be seen either as a faculty of thought or as 
a faculty of cognition. As a faculty of thought, the understanding 
is a faculty of performing an intellectual synthesis by means of 
which we can think an object. However, cognition requires a de-
termination of sensibility through the understanding as a faculty 
of cognition. This determination requires a sensible synthesis, and 
the B Deduction shows that the unity in coordination is the same 
unity that is required for subordination, but applied to sensible 
intuition. Hence, everything that can be represented in space and 
time, stands under the categories. 
My aim in chapter 7 is to present the argument of the B 
Deduction in a preliminary manner, and I will return to the B 
Deduction in chapter 9 after a short chapter on the Schematism, 
where my aim is to spell out the difference between images and 
perception. This difference and Kant’s solution to the problem of 
heterogeneity between the categories and appearances becomes 
intelligible when we understand how Kant thinks that the act of 
the understanding in producing perception is directed at the 
schema of imagination, which produces the corresponding image. 
The Schematism allows us to have a deeper understanding of the 
bottom-up part in both the A Deduction and the B Deduction, and 
understanding the distinction between images and perception will 
help us to get a fuller grasp of the B Deduction in chapter 9. 
In chapter 9 my aim is to discuss the interpretation of the 
Deductions to which my hypothesis about the origin of Kant’s 
conception of inner sense leads. I will both elaborate on what that 
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interpretation is, and assess its plausibility by discussing the B 
Deduction in more detail. My purpose is to show, based on the 
discussion on the Schematism, how Kant thought that he could 
prove that all possible appearances, i.e. not only our conscious 
appearances, but appearances themselves, i.e. everything that can 
come before our senses, stand under the categories. The problem 
of objective validity can be formulated in various ways, but I 
focus on this formulation presented in § 26 of the B Deduction. 
In assessing the credibility of my interpretation, it is use-
ful to compare it with other interpretations. In chapter 9, I discuss 
the interpretations of Béatrice Longuenesse, Henry E. Allison and 
Dieter Henrich arguing that by adopting my interpretation of what 
Kant means by inner sense, we can solve the problems these in-
terpretations create. In section 9.1 I will discuss the structure of 
the Deduction as a single proof in two steps. I will defend the 
view that Kant proves the objective reality of the categories in § 
24, and the objective validity in § 26. In the Deduction, Kant first 
proves the objective reality of the categories by analysing the two 
components of the act of the understanding in cognition: the intel-
lectual synthesis and the figurative synthesis. This forms the top-
down part of the Deduction, and in it Kant shows that the under-
standing can determine sensibility. By means of the bottom-up 
part he then proves the objective validity of the categories by 
showing that the representations of sensibility are necessarily 
determinable by means of the understanding. I argue that my in-
terpretation of the role of inner sense in Kant’s theory of cogni-
tion draws a coherent picture of the Deduction. Where the other 
interpreters see Kant as falling into error, I see the interpreters as 
misconceiving Kant’s view on inner sense. 
Kant’s argument for objective reality will be discussed in 
section 9.2, and his argument for objective validity in section 9.3. 
However, before addressing Kant’s argument for the objective 
validity of the categories, I want to explain the fundamental prob-




essentially, a rethinking of Wolff’s philosophy. His purpose is 
first to correct the Leibnizian-Wolffian account of sensibility in 
the Transcendental Aesthetic, and then to show how this changes 
the way one should think about cognition. 
In the end, the Deduction turns on the question of the 
possibility of representing composites – a question also Wolff 
was keen to answer. In section 9.3.1 I will explain how the Tran-
scendental Aesthetic changes the way Kant tackles that question. 
Kant no longer thinks that sensibility is a confused mode of repre-
senting simple things, and he must find a fresh view on what im-
ages, i.e. representations of composites, are. In order to clarify 
this further, I will compare Kant’s view with that of Locke. I will 
explain how I think Kant opposes Locke’s view that sensibility 
offers us ideas of objects. In section 9.3.3, then, we will see how 
Kant’s view on what images are enables him to rethink the differ-
ence between mere images and empirical apperception. These 
considerations pave the way for discussing the crucial step in 
Kant’s argument. I argue that once Wolff’s erroneous view on 
sensibility has been corrected, a Wolffian reader should accept 
Kant’s reasoning. Hence, Kant’s argument does not rely on Te-
tens’ empirical considerations. In fact, chapters 1–8, and even 
sections 9.1 and 9.2 could be seen as a rather extensive introduc-
tion to my interpretation of the Deductions. According to that 
interpretation, the new conception of inner sense enabled Kant to 
make the necessary revisions to Wolff’s philosophy so that he 




1. AESTHETICS EMPIRICALLY CONSIDERED 
1.1. The Debate on the Concept of Representation 
 
Tetens’ Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre 
Entwickelung was published in 1777, so it was written during the 
Kant’s so-called silent decade. The book opens with a criticism of 
Wolff’s and Leibniz’s conception of representations. In order to 
understand this debate, we should first take a look at Wolff’s em-
pirical psychology. In his Psychologia empirica (§ 20) Wolff 
defines the soul as “the being that is in us conscious of itself and 
of other things outside itself”.
60
 The key terms through which 
Wolff outlines the soul’s capacity to represent objects – cogniz-
ing, perception and apperception – are defined in three consecu-
tive sections (§§ 23– 25). According to these definitions, cogniz-
ing is an act of the soul through which the soul is conscious of 
itself and of other objects outside itself. Perception is a mental act 
through which an object is represented to the soul, and appercep-
tion is consciousness of the soul’s own perceptions. The soul’s 
defining activity, being conscious both of itself and of other 
things, is thus called cognizing, and we cognize things through 
perceptions and through being conscious of our own perceptions. 
Cognition of objects is thus for Wolff mental action. In 
empirical psychology, the soul’s activity can be analysed into 
different faculties, which include sense, imagination, memory, 
attention and reflection. But as Wolff thought that the soul is a 
simple substance, he accordingly thought that fundamentally 
there is only one force, through which the soul acts, namely the 
force (or power) to represent: “We find in the soul nothing but 
one force to represent the world […] and this force is what per-
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sists in it and what makes it a thing subsisting for itself”.
61
 This 
position was based on Leibniz’s theory of simple substances, 
which Leibniz called monadology, according to which there is 
nothing else in the monads but perceptions, i.e. representations of 
composites in the simple, and appetites, i.e. internal principles of 
change.
62
 According to Wolff, apperception, which for him is an 
essential element of thought, or cognition, is not an independent 
act but rather depends on the consciousness of objects and on the 
mental act of distinguishing.
63
 In other words, without the act of 
perception through which the soul represents an object, and the 
act of distinguishing, there could be no apperception. Metaphysi-
cally speaking, there is only one cognitive force, and this force to 
represent is, according to Wolff, the nature of the soul.
64
 As a 
corollary to this metaphysical position, he thought that every rep-
resentation represents something in the world. In other words, 




The view that every modification of the soul is an objec-
tive representation has the odd consequence, as Tetens points out, 
that all emotions, desires and passions are representations, just as 
the ideas of the sun, of a horse or of a man are. This was not 
something Tetens was willing to admit, and he urged for a more 
intelligible characterization of representations.
66
 In Wolff every 
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perception mirrors the state of the whole world in its entirety, and 
in order to explain this he had to make a distinction between im-
mediate and mediate perceptions.  Tetens chose a different ap-
proach and wanted to narrow down the scope of the concept of 
representation. According to Tetens, a characteristic mark of 
those modifications of the soul, that are representations, is that 
they hold before us immediately other things and objects and that 
the latter can be cognized through these modifications, when we 
use them as images. Immediacy is for Tetens the first characteris-
tic mark of representations, and the first preliminary characteriza-
tion of representations in the Versuche is that a representation is a 




In trying to get to the bottom of what representations real-
ly are, Tetens makes use of an empirical method. Two things 
concerning his method require attention.  He emphasizes that he 
wants to base everything on observations and that he wants to 
avoid making any hypotheses.
68
 I take that the express statement 
of his plan to avoid hypotheses is, at least in part, an allusion to 
Reid’s philosophy: Tetens wants to make it clear that Reid’s at-
tack on ideas and impressions as mere hypotheses is taken into 
account, and that he will not be subject to such criticism. Con-
cerning Tetens’ empirical approach it should be noted that his 
empiricism is directed at the observation of the mind. By making 
use of his own distinction between an inquiry into the objects 
through their representations and an inquiry into those representa-
tions themselves, his method can be described as an empirical 
observation of the mind’s own representations, modifications and 
acts. In other words, his aim is to reveal the nature of representa-
tions by making empirical observations of what goes on in the 
mind. As I will try to show later, it would be a mistake to dismiss 
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Tetens’ efforts as useless in understanding Kant’s philosophy by 
labelling those efforts as merely empirical. While it is true that 
Kant emphasizes the importance of a transcendental method as 
opposed to an empirical one, it is at the same time important to 
understand that the distinction should not be taken to imply that 
there is a transcendental method that could do without empirical 
observations of the mind. The difference is perhaps more like the 
one between hockey skates and a stick in scoring a goal: without 
the stick you will never score, but without the skates you will 
never be in a position to use your stick. My suggestion is, if you 
allow this clumsy metaphor, that Tetens sharpened the skates for 
Kant. 
Tetens thinks that we need to begin by making observa-
tions of what goes on in the mind, and through observations we 
know that the soul has a receptive nature and that it thus has im-
pressions produced by outside causes, but on the other hand we 
also know that it is active and exercises its own powers. It can 
change its own state as well as be active in relation to corporeal 
things.
69
 This provides the starting point for Tetens’ analysis of 
human cognition. His aim is to lay down uncontroversial observa-
tional facts and to see what can be inferred from them without the 
aid of hypotheses. His purpose is not to say that receptivity and 
activity are necessarily representational, but rather that this is 
what we know based on observations: the soul is receptive on the 
one hand and active on the other hand. In this respect, his start-
ing-point is the same as Kant’s, although Kant’s inquiry is tran-
scendental and his is empirical. 
According to Tetens, the changes in the soul, whether 
they are caused by external things or by the soul itself, leave cer-
tain permanent effects or imprints (bleibende Wirkungen, Folgen 
oder Spuren) on the soul, and these imprints have different rela-
tions between themselves, just as their causes do, so that there is 
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an analogy between these imprints and their causes. Different 
changes leave different imprints on the soul.
70
 Tetens proceeds to 
note that there must be such imprints even if they are not recol-
lected or reproduced. Even if I do not think about the moon at a 
given moment, I do have an imprint produced by the impression 
of the moon that I can renew without intuiting the moon again. 
Now, it is these imprints – produced by our modifications and 
capable of being reproduced – that constitute our representations, 
and Tetens concludes that it is precisely this relation to other an-
tecedent modifications that is essential to representations.
71
 
This analysis reveals a feature of representations that may 
surprise the reader. For Tetens, representations do not refer to 
outside objects but to the soul’s own modifications. All represen-
tations, including those arising from corporeal objects, represent 
previous states of the soul. As Tetens thinks that the impressions 
we receive through the senses are not representations at all, his 
view is a form of sensationism, a position that the sensations pro-
duced by outside objects are nonreferential. Kant too was a sensa-
tionist, so it is useful to take a still closer look at Tetens’ findings 
on the nature of representations. 
The first original representations are sensible representa-
tions (Empfindungsvorstellungen). “They are images or represen-
tations, as one gets them from the sensation of things, and they 
represent the things as they are sensed.”
72
 When these representa-
tions are later reproduced without the sensation being present, 
they can still have the same characteristics that they had before 
and they can therefore still represent things as these things were 
sensed. Tetens calls the first sensible representations aftersensa-
tions (Nachempfindungen). They originate during the sensations 
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and they are preserved in the soul. This observation leads Tetens 
to draw a distinction between two uses of the word ‘sensation’: 
the aftersensations are in fact what the philosophers call sensa-
tions, and the sensations proper are not sensations according to 
the philosophical usage of the term.
73
 
Tetens provides us with an example. In visual perception, 
e.g. when we look at the moon, a mental impression originates in 
the soul and we feel it. We do not know how this mental process 
begins but it is important not to confuse the physiological process 
with the mental process. The physiological process is unimportant 
in this context and it is the mental impression that provides the 
starting-point for Tetens’ analysis of the cognitive capacities of 
the soul.
74
 When we feel the impression, we have a sensation, in 
this case of the moon, but this is not yet the representation of the 
moon. The sensation stays in us for a while even when the light 
rays no longer enter the eyes, and when this occurs we have an 
aftersensation or a sensation as a representation. The moment 
when the mind reflects the moon is the moment when we have the 
aftersensation. A conscious sensation, i.e. a perception with con-
sciousness, does not arise at the moment of the first impression 
but rather when we have the aftersensation.
75
 The existence of 
mental impressions is thus not a mere hypothesis, but on the other 
hand, impressions are not representations, and we must make a 
distinction between sensing and representing. 
So, sensations proper are not representations, and we are 
not conscious of sensations in this signification of the word. What 
we are conscious of is the aftersensation that is caused by the 
sensation, and this, the sensation as a representation, is what 
philosophers mean when they speak about sensations. Tetens’ 
thoughts bear a resemblance here to those of Kant, but before 
considering this in detail, it is first important to note the differ-
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ence in terminology between Kant and Tetens. For Kant represen-
tation in general is the genus that has under it the representation 
with consciousness, which Kant calls a Perzeption. A Perzeption 
that refers solely to the subject as a modification of its state is a 
sensation. An objective Perzeption, on the other hand, is a cogni-
tion, which in turn can be either an intuition or a concept.
76
 We 
can see here that Kant adopts Wolff’s use of the word ‘representa-
tion’ in the sense that for him mental states are representations – 
be it that they represent or not. But what is interesting in regard to 
Tetens’ analysis summarized above is that Tetens and Kant share 
the same concern: we must not let every modification of the soul 
be seen as an objective representation. In reflection 695 Kant 
illustrates the problem that had also troubled Tetens: 
 
Leibniz takes every sensation of certain objects for cognitions 
of them. But since beings, who are not the cause of the object 
through their representations, must first in a certain way be 
affected by the objects so that they can arrive at a cognition of 
the objects’ presence, the sensation must certainly be the con-





Now contrary to Tetens, Kant is not interested in the em-
pirical niceties of the perceptual process. In the Stufenleiter, to 
which I referred above, he does not deal with unconscious repre-
sentations at all, and the sensations proper are for Tetens uncon-
scious. Accordingly, sensations are for Kant “what philosophers 
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call sensations” and he says that they refer solely to the subject, 
just as Tetens thinks they do. What is at issue here is that we must 
internalize the reference of sensations, because otherwise the 
route to speculative philosophy will turn out to be a dead end, as 
the failure of the British Empiricism had shown. For Kant the 
crucial distinction here is that between cognition of an object and 
mere affection through sense: 
 
The most important difference in everything that belongs to 
our representations is between that which is a cognition of an 
object and that which concerns solely the way the subject is 
affected through the presence of the object, and that belongs 




Through this distinction an analysis of the act through 
which we arrive at a cognition of an object becomes all the more 
important. While sensations are modifications of the mind, they 
cannot arise without a mental act, and if mere affection cannot 
provide us with a representation of an object outside our represen-
tations, then it is essential for us to analyse the mental activity and 
the capacities involved in cognition. I will now try to explicate 
Tetens’ theory of mental activity in cognition. 
 
1.2. Tetens on Sensing and Representing 
 
Tetens approaches cognitive action through sensibility. 
He thought that in addition to those sensations that are produced 
by outside causes the soul has representations of its own inner 
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changes, and he argues that we have sensations of these inner 
changes in the same manner in which we have sensations of the 
changes produced by outside causes. In other words, we have 
inner sense in a true meaning of the word. 
Here is how the argument goes. Tetens points out that at 
the same moment that we are conscious of a thing, we cannot 
think that we are conscious of that thing, because we cannot be 
conscious of our being conscious of it. In other words, we cannot 
reflect our own reflecting on a thing at the same moment that we 
are reflecting on the thing in question. The reason for this is that 
our soul’s faculty of thinking (Denkkraft) is occupied in the act of 
distinguishing.
79
 As the faculty of thinking is already occupied, 
we cannot use it to reflect our own activity of reflecting. The 
same applies to judging and reasoning as well: the action ex-
cludes the possibility of simultaneous reflecting on the action. 
Tetens concludes that the soul’s action must occur first and re-
flecting on it not until after the action.
80
 
This leads Tetens to think that every action of the faculty 
of thinking has an immediate effect on the representation of the 
object of the action. This effect can be sensed and the sensation of 
the action can have an aftersensation we can reflect upon. We 
have, accordingly, sensible representations of our own activity of 




But if one holds the view that sensible representations 
always refer to the soul’s own modifications and that we never-
theless have inner and outer sense as two different sources of 
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those representations, one will have to explain how it is that we 
differentiate between outer objects and ourselves.  Tetens thinks 
that this difference has its ground in the way our thought is 
formed by our reflection. Because our sensible representations are 
related to previous modifications of the soul and because there is 
an analogy between the representations and those modifications, 
the former can give images or signs (Bilder oder Zeichen) of the 
latter. But they also refer us to other objects. And given that there 
are sensations of the inner sense as well as outer sense, there turns 
out to be a difference in how these representations refer. Repre-
sentations of inner sense refer to our own inner changes and rep-
resentations of outer sense to external causes of sensations. In the 
case of inner sense, the representation is taken to be either a rep-
resentation of an intuition, which has preceded the representation, 
or a representation of the self, whereas in the case of outer sense 
the representation is taken to be a representation that represents an 
intuited object for us. The difference is in the kind of judgment 
we make of the representation.
82
 
The outline of Tetens’ view on sensible representations is 
thus that sensible representations always refer to the soul’s own 
modifications and that the difference between sensible representa-
tions of outer and inner sense is due to the difference in the action 
of the soul’s faculty of thinking when it reflects on them. From 
this we can see that thinking and sensing are for Tetens closely 
intertwined. Whereas in Wolff’s Psychologia empirica the soul’s 
cognitive capacity is neatly divided into lower and higher capaci-
ties – the former containing sense, imagination, the power of 
feigning and memory, and the latter containing attention and re-
flection – things are more complicated for Tetens: the faculty of 
thinking is already active in the very first operations of percep-
tion. As we know, Kant rejected the Wolffian distinction between 
lower and higher faculty of cognition, so it is obvious that he 
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shared with Tetens at least the view that there is a need to recon-
sider the role of sensibility and understanding in cognition. Now 
we should see if closer inspection on Tetens’ efforts could in fact 
help us to understand how Kant thought that we should reconsider 
the distinction. In order to do this, it might prove useful to take a 
brief look at Tetens’ view on representational activity in isolation 
and for now withhold examining his view on the faculty of think-
ing. We will return to the latter after we have examined how Te-
tens’ thoughts on sensibility changed the way Kant thought about 
sensibility. 
Tetens thought that the soul’s representational activity 
can be divided into three distinct activities. The first of these is 
the act through which we take up the original representations 
from the sensations and preserve the aftersensations in the soul. 
This is called perception. The second act is the act through which 
the sensible representations can be reproduced so that they can be 
perceived with consciousness. This is called imagination. The 
third act allows us to form new simple representations from the 
material provided by the sensible representations. Tetens calls this 
the faculty of feigning. These three capacities exhaust the soul’s 
representational activity, but in addition to this, our cognitive 




Tetens’ thoughts on the action of imagination and on the 
faculty of feigning turn out to be interesting in regard to Kant. 
Imagination is for Tetens only a reproductive capacity – it is not a 
capacity through which we could combine representations. The 
law of association gives us only a rule according to which one 
idea can follow another. It does not determine a whole sequence 
of representations and it does not contain the law of the faculty of 
feigning, which plays a crucial role in Tetens’ analysis of the 
soul’s representational activity. The faculty of feigning enables us 
                                                     
83
 Tetens, Versuche, 104–107. 
Aesthetics Empirically Considered 
49 
 
to form sensible abstractions, without which we could not, ac-
cording to Tetens, have representations of empirical objects. 
The ability to form sensible abstractions is the most im-
portant of the functions of the faculty of feigning. Tetens guides 
us to thinking about this ability by considering how a manifold 
can be represented in one representation. When we form a sensi-
ble representation, e.g. of a tree, we have to form representations 
of its parts – of the trunk, its branches and leaves. The parts them-
selves are objects that we have to grasp (fassen) through separate 
acts of our sensibility. We have to move our eyes in order to have 
visual impressions of separate branches or to move our hand to 
have tactile impressions of them. The impression of the tree has 
therefore something distinguishable in it.
84
 
But this is not the only manner in which a manifold can 
be in one representation. Tetens notes that there is also an inten-
sive manifoldness in the representations of the individual parts of 
a sensible representation. A leaf, for example, is in motion and 
has a shape and colour. This leads him to an important discovery: 
 
The same simple sensation in which we grasp the colour gives 
us also the impression of motion. These two sensations con-





The reader will, I presume, wonder how a representation 
containing colour and motion can be said to be a simple represen-
tation. Indeed, this needs to be explained. 
Tetens argues that the imagination cannot be the source 
of our ability to perceive unities containing a manifold. In the 
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case of our representation of a leaf we have a representation that 
contains motion and the colour green. Tetens reasons that at least 
one of these representations must have occurred previously in 
another sensation, because otherwise we would not be able to 
distinguish them in the combined representation of a leaf. What 
makes motion and the colour green distinguishable from each 
other is that motion has occurred in a sensation which did not 
contain the colour green and vice versa. According to Tetens we 
can observe that similar impressions, representations and images 
coalesce into one representation which consists in them and 
which becomes a representation that stands out from the rest of 
the perceptual data. This combination of similar representations is 
a necessary condition of what he calls general abstractions or 
distinguishable characteristics. There could not be any distin-
guishing without a combination of similar representations. Be-
cause experience teaches us that individual sensations, e.g. green 
colours of a given body, are never exactly alike, Tetens concludes 
that the faculty of feigning produces our general images, which 
consist of a manifold of impressions that, when viewed separate-
ly, are not exactly like the general image.
86
 
Tetens holds that the imagination uses these general rep-
resentations in its operations. They serve as images through 
which new sensations will be interpreted in the perceptual process 
and they become sensible appearances (Scheine). The appearance 
of the figure can be transferred to another subject of a different 
colour and the appearance of the colour to another figure. For the 
imagination, every appearance is a complete thing and its opera-
tions depend on the kind of abstractions it has available. The ap-
pearance of a leaf can indeed be analysed into appearances of 
motion, figure or colour but none of the latter can exist in the 
imagination until appearances subsisting for themselves have 
been produced out of them; and this is done by the faculty of 
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 In other words, the mere ability to associate represen-
tations could not produce cognition. As Kant would say, this abil-
ity would remain hidden in the interior of the mind, and for Te-
tens the necessary faculty supporting the faculty of imagination is 
the faculty of feigning. 
Tetens’ point can be illustrated by an example. An ap-
pearance of a green triangle is not the same as an appearance of a 
green square. But neither is the appearance of the colour green the 
same as the green in the appearances of the green triangle or the 
green square. Green squares and triangles can be represented 
without the appearance of the colour green as an appearance of a 
complete thing, but without the latter the imagination cannot re-
produce the appearance of either the green triangle or the green 
square on the occasion of, say, a green circle. In order to be able 
to do this the faculty of feigning has to compare different green 
figures and produce the appearance of green colour, and only 
after this will the reproduction of the appearance of some green 
coloured figure be possible on the occasion of the colour green. 
So, although a green leaf in motion is a composite representation 
of figure, colour and motion, it does not follow that it cannot be 
simple for us. The idea is that a representation that is in itself 
composite, can be a simple representation for our consciousness, 
because it is grasped through one act of feeling and conscious-
ness, in which no manifoldness is distinguished. In such a case, 




Apperceptibility requires, according to Tetens, distin-
guishability in an image. Tetens agrees here with Kant who had 
suggested in the Dissertation that the Leibnizian-Wolffian view 
of sensibility as a confused mode of representation is erroneous. 
Tetens argues that clarity in an idea presupposes clarity in the 
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image, of which the idea is made. To illustrate this, he considers 
the representation of sunlight. The representation is simple alt-
hough the light contains a manifold of spectral colours. As the 
spectral colours are not distinguishable in the image, our apper-
ception cannot bring more clarity to the idea of sunlight. Thus, 
clarity and distinctness in an image is a precondition of clarity 
and distinctness in an idea, and our representations are images of 
objects only insofar as they are clear and distinct. This view can 
perhaps be best understood in comparison with Wolff. 
According to Wolff, a mental image is a sensible idea, i.e. 
an objectively considered compositional representation in sim-
ple.
89
 Tetens’ aim is to modify Wolff’s view so as to be able to 
evade Reid’s attack on mental impressions and ideas, and this is 
done by divorcing images from ideas. Although images represent 
objects, they become ideas only by reflection, which contains the 
thought: “There is an object.”
90
 According to this view, animals 
do have images of objects but they do not have ideas of them, as 
the latter requires apperception.
91
 
Thus, the mere animal-like perception of objects without 
reflection or apperception, involves general images produced by 
the faculty of feigning. In the above example of the green leaf, 
this object is represented differently once the faculty of feigning 
has produced the general image of the colour green. The impres-
sion of green colour becomes united with the general image of 
this colour, and the impression appears differently from how it 
would appear without the possession of the general image.
92
 Mere 
reproduction, i.e. association of representations, requires these 
general images, and images can be clear and distinct, although 
they do not involve an act of apperception. This implies that the 
animal-like state (in which according to Leibniz we spend three 
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quarters of the time) does not involve ideas. The cognitive state of 
an animal is not yet the state which Reid would call perception, so 
Tetens’ theory is not susceptible to Reid’s attack. Thus, Tetens 
has presented an original theory in which mental impressions do 
not represent objects and in which the mere representing of ob-
jects does not involve ideas. 
Now, although Tetens’ approach is empirical instead of 
transcendental, he does face the same question that Kant does: 
how does cognition arise from a mere manifold of impressions. 
Tetens’ empirical answer is that the ability to distinguish one 
character (Zug) from another in a composite representation pre-
supposes that similar representations have previously been united 
by the productive faculty (the faculty of feigning). Tetens is reluc-
tant to call this activity comparing but admits that it can be so 
called.
93
 If one wants to call it by this name, then the conclusion 
is that general images presuppose a comparing activity of the 
mind, and this comparing is where our cognition has its roots. 
This answer does, however, pose a new question of the origin of 
the first composite representations. It seems that Tetens’ empiri-
cal method is incapable of penetrating the mind deep enough in 
order to provide an answer to this question, but I think his exam-
ple of the green leaf in motion tells us that he was not unaware of 
the question. In this example, we have a manifold consisting of 
green colour, shape and motion. Tetens notes that in geometrical 
images the imagination has a supply of representations with 
which we can combine our general images.
94
 It seems obvious 
that without the ability to represent shapes the process leading to 
cognition could not begin. Time would seem to be a source of 
new general images as well. However, it is important to observe 
that these required spatial and temporal representations cannot be 
general images of spaces or times. We will see later that Kant’s 
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transcendental approach can further illuminate this problem and 
also provide an answer to it. 
It is easy to see that Tetens’ general images have a con-
nection to Kant’s Schematism. According to Tetens, general sen-
sible representations provide the matter for our concepts.
95
 Alt-
hough Tetens’ analysis is limited to empirical and pure sensible 
concepts and thus leaves out pure concepts of the understanding, 
which for Kant’s Schematism are the most important ones, it nev-
ertheless does illuminate what schemata are for Kant. Kant’s po-
sition is that empirical or pure sensible concepts are always im-
mediately related to a schema and not to an image. Despite the 
introduction of schemata, there is no significant difference of 
opinion between Tetens and Kant here. The fundamental idea is 
that the mere (empirical) reproduction of appearances must in-
volve generality although it does not involve concepts. But for 
Kant’s purposes it is important to look behind the images through 
a transcendental inquiry, which can explain the possibility of the 
very first sensible representations, in which a manifold is repre-
sented in one representation. In due course, we shall see that con-
sciousness of objects does indeed, according to Kant, begin with 
representing parts of space containing an empirical manifold and 
that the possibility of a conceptual representation of an object 
presupposes a productive faculty of producing images. The dis-
tinction between mere images and what Tetens and Reid call per-
ception is decisive in understanding how Kant thought he could 
prove the objective validity of the categories by making the nec-
essary changes to Wolff’s philosophy. I discuss this in chapter 9. 
At this point, however, my aim is to make intelligible the general 
idea of the Schematism for introductory purposes. After that, we 
will be ready to turn our attention to the Transcendental Aesthet-
ic. 
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1.3. Kant’s Schematism and Tetens’ Sensible Abstracta 
 
Tetens’ claim that images can be general makes sense. 
Seeing a Rottweiler may arouse fear in a person even if that per-
son has never seen a Rottweiler before. Perhaps the person has 
had a frightening confrontation with a Doberman, and the image 
of the Rottweiler becomes associated with that incident. The as-
sociation would obviously be impossible without some kind of 
generality in our representations, and nevertheless the association 
of representations does not necessarily involve concepts, which 
are general representations. The fact that the association of repre-
sentations would be impossible without general representations is 
the rationale behind Tetens’ introduction of general images. For 
Kant, however, it is important to distinguish between schemata 
and images. Images themselves, he maintains, cannot be general. 
It is the schemata that make images possible that are. A schema is 
a product of our productive faculty, which according to Kant is 
the productive imagination. 
So how does Kant think the schemata work? Consider 
representing a dog. By means of the schema of a dog our imagi-
nation can represent a four-footed animal in general: 
 
The concept of a dog signifies a rule in accordance with 
which my imagination can specify the shape of a four-footed 
animal in general, without being restricted to any single par-
ticular shape that experience offers me or any possible image 




The rule signified by this concept is the schema of a dog. 
We should not let the fact that Kant speaks about schemata of 
concepts lead us to think that these schemata depend on concepts 
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 Kant does indeed consider his Schematism 
from the perspective of concepts and apperception (the Schema-
tism chapter is located after the transcendental deduction of the 
categories), but he makes clear that the “schema is in itself always 
only a product of the imagination”.
98
 Apperception, therefore, 
plays no part in the production of a schema, and we will do well 
to keep this in mind.
99
 Thus, in the case of the schema of a dog, 
the schema must be learned from experience (in the non-technical 
signification of the word) before we can form a concept of a 
dog.
100
 This means that in representing a dog we use the schema 
of a dog for the production of a shape (Gestalt) of this four-footed 
animal. 
Interpreted in this way, schemata are already involved in 
mere animal-like perception of objects. But before making sense 
of what this means, let us approach the Schematism from the 
view-point of apperception, i.e. from that of concept application. 
Jonathan Bennett has proposed that by his Schematism Kant in-
tended to offer a general theory of concept application.
101
 On his 
claim that the Schematism is a general theory, I agree: it is not 
limited to the application of the categories. But what does the 
theory explain? According to Bennett, it explains “how we are 
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able to recognize, classify, describe”, and that Kant’s explanation 
for this is that a mental image aids us in deciding whether, for 
instance, a dog one sees can legitimately be called a dog. 
102
 Ben-
nett then complains that this does not help much, as we would 
then face the same problem as we initially faced with the concept. 
It would have to be explained how the object can be classified 
with the image and how the image can be classified with other 
dogs. However, I think Bennett misrepresents what the theory is 
supposed to be about. The Schematism is not intended to discuss 
rules for concept-application. Indeed, as also Bennett notes, Kant 
denies that this is even possible.
103
 We will thus have to look 
elsewhere for the purpose of the Schematism. 
In order to understand what the theory is about we need 
to understand what the problem is, and as the problem lies in the 
heterogeneity between objects and concepts, we need to under-
stand the nature of that heterogeneity. Here is how Kant describes 
the homogeneity requirement: 
 
In all subsumptions of an object under a concept the represen-
tations of the former must be homogeneous with the latter, 
i.e., the concept must contain that which is represented in the 
object that is to be subsumed under it, for that is just what is 





Now, general logic is founded on the relation of subordi-
nation. In the judgement “All dogs are animals” there is no prob-
lem regarding homogeneity, because the concept of a dog is con-
tained under the concept of an animal. The problem first arises 
when an intuition, particularly an appearance, is to be subsumed 
under a concept, for an appearance cannot be contained in a con-
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cept. For Kant, concepts are rules, and the rule describing those 
(possible) things that we classify as dogs is contained in the rule 
describing those things that we classify as animals, but the singu-
lar representation of my dog, a modification of my mind, is not a 
rule and it cannot be contained in the concept of a dog. When I 
greet my dog, and think that she is a dog, I subsume an appear-
ance under the concept of a dog, and it is the possibility of this 
kind of a subsumption that Kant must be able to explain. Not that 
there is any practical need for this, for our empirical concepts are 
drawn from our intuitions and we form judgements of appearanc-
es all the time. We do not need any guidance for being able to 
subsume appearances under concepts, and teaching this would 
even be impossible. The legitimacy of my calling our four-footed 
companion a dog is never questioned – or if it is, this bears no 
scientific significance. 
On the other hand, the legitimacy of using the categories 
is in need of a proof. Furthermore, the possibility of the applica-
tion of the categories to appearances needs explaining (in other 
words, a transcendental doctrine of the power of judgement is 
necessary), for the categories contain nothing empirical, and as 
we shall see, the explanation of the possibility of the application 
of the categories explains the application of empirical concepts as 
well. As a preliminary consideration, we can here approach the 
matter from the empirical perspective. 
From the above quote, we can see that the question of 
subsumption of appearances under concepts is a question of con-
tainment and content. The obvious question then is: what is the 
nature of the content of the appearances? In order to answer this 
question, we need to leave the discussion of the application of 
concepts for a moment and consider the schemata from the view-
point of sense and imagination, i.e. from that of perception. 
Michael Pendlebury has argued that the possession of a 
schema involves a preconceptual capacity for synthesis and that 
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the schemata are thus distinct from concepts.
105
 The idea of a pre-
conceptual capacity for synthesis can, according to Pendlebury, 
be made intelligible if we take note of the fact that in themselves 
our intuitions (empirical intuitions, it should be added) have no 
content: 
 
For example, in order for one of an agent’s intuitions to have 
the content triangle, i.e., in order for it to represent something 
as a triangle, he must at some inchoate level be disposed to 
place it in a certain similarity-class of actual and possible in-
tuitions all of which, from a conceptual point of view, could 
be described as intuitions of triangles. I do not mean to sug-
gest here that he should be able to think about and classify all 
the relevant intuitions in the same way, but only that he 
should be disposed to respond to them in appropriately simi-
lar ways. Likewise, in order for his intuition to have the con-
tent green, it is necessary for him to be disposed in the same 
primitive way to “place” it in another similarity class of intui-
tions, all members of which will represent green.
 106 
 
Pendlebury continues by making three points on which I 
agree fully, but with one reservation: I think we need to be very 
careful on what is meant by ‘content’.
107
 I will here summarize 
the points Pendlebury makes and compare them with what we 
have learned from Tetens. 
First, Pendlebury notes that without the groupings the 
content is impossible. The groupings are not based on the recog-
nition
108
 of antecedently existing contents. Concerning this point, 
one will recall that according to Tetens, the image of a triangle or 
of the colour green is produced from synthetic representations but 
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is not identical with the relevant partial representations of these 
synthetic representations. It is a new representation, which makes 
possible the association of representations (and the disposition to 
respond to triangles or green colours in appropriately similar 
ways). 
Pendlebury’s second point is that the groupings are not 
simply given. The matter of intuition could be grouped in an in-
definite variety of ways, e.g. my empirical intuition does not de-
termine my grouping of the colour green. For us the basic con-
tents appear as given but this is because the processes which yield 
these groupings and contents are not directly accessible to con-
sciousness. In the Tetensian framework this is because all con-
sciousness, even the most elementary kind where no apperception 
is involved, is represented in inner sense, from which it follows 
that not the action of the mind itself but only its product can be 
directly accessible to us. It is noteworthy that Kant describes the 
imagination as “a blind but indispensable function of the soul, 
without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we 
are seldom even conscious”, and that the schematism is “a hidden 
art in the depths of the human soul”.
109
 As Pendlebury notes, what 
is given as such, i.e., not phenomenologically given, as Peter 




Third, our grouping-dispositions must involve something 
which goes beyond our intuitions, because the intrinsic properties 
of our intuitions cannot determine the contents of our intuitions. 
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As we have seen, according to Tetens our grouping-dispositions 
are produced by the productive faculty, which he calls the faculty 
of feigning. 
From these remarks Pendlebury infers that the groupings 
underlying the contents of our intuitions are not found but made 
and that they are spontaneous syntheses. Further, he argues that 
having a concept presupposes having a schema and that schemata 
are preconditions of the subsumption of intuitions under concepts. 
His point is that a schema is needed for concept application, be-




I hope I have made it obvious that how Pendlebury inter-
prets the role of schemata is compatible with and supported by the 
reading that Kant’s Schematism was influenced by Tetens’ theory 
of sensible abstractions. Both on Pendlebury’s grounds and on the 
hypothesis that Kant was influenced by Tetens we arrive at the 
conclusion that without pre-conceptual schemata the appearances 
would not have the content needed for subsumption. Now we 
must consider how this helps to solve the problem of heterogenei-
ty.  
Pendlebury thinks that Kant was unable to assess correct-
ly what the content of appearances is like. I want to argue that 
Kant had a much more sophisticated understanding of the ques-
tion of the content of an appearance than Pendlebury realizes. 
This is because Tetens’ view on sensibility, which Kant adopted, 
brings with it a new conception of representational content that is 
designed to avoid the pitfalls of “the way of ideas” that Reid had 
criticised. Had Kant not taken into account Tetens’ innovative 
approach to perceptual representation, all his efforts would have 
been doomed to fail. But he did take it into account and went 
even further. Hence, according to Kant, our sensible representa-
tions are not ideas. This is clearly stated in his Stufenleiter, ac-
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cording to which only those concepts that do not refer to objects 
of possible experience, can be called ideas.
112
 One could express 
Kant’s view on perceptual awareness by saying that there is no 
intentional content in our intuitions. The modern philosophical 
discussion on intentionality derives from Franz Brentano (1838–
1917). In his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt Brentano 
maintains that every mental phenomenon has the characteristic of 
intentional inexistence of an object.
113
 In other words, every men-
tal phenomenon has reference to a content, or, direction to an 
object. By the word ‘representation’ Brentano understands the act 
of representing, not the object represented.
114
 Taking this into 
account one could claim that Kant endorses a similar view, be-
cause he thinks that the act of representing produces an undeter-
mined object (an appearance). However, the claim I wish to make 
clear in the course of this study is that there is, according to Kant, 
no direction to an object in perceptual awareness. In Kant, the act 
is not directed to an object of representation but to the representa-
tion which, by means of the act, represents and object. I will be in 
a position to explain this in more detail after explaining my inter-
pretation of Kant’s conception of inner sense. I bring this up here 
in order to draw attention to the importance of understanding 
Kant’s view on the nature of the content of representations in 
perceptual awareness. Kant’s view is that the act of representing 
is not directed at an object. Rather, it produces an object. 
When we understand correctly how Kant uses the word 
‘idea’, many puzzles will be solved and many supposed ambigui-
ties and inconsistencies in Kant’s text cleared. Let us take the 
following passage from Pendlebury for an example: 
 
Kant equates “the subsumption of intuitions under pure con-
cepts” and “the application of a category to appearances [i.e., 
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to empirical objects]” (my emphasis). This is a little mislead-
ing, for subsumption and application are different kinds of re-
lation. Notwithstanding Kant’s frequently lax use of the term 
(as in the first sentence of the Schematism), subsumption is a 
relation between representations and representations (where 
“representations” are ideas, which include both concepts and 
intuitions). Application, on the other hand, is a relation be-




The Stufenleiter is a sketch showing what an idea is and 
what it isn’t. According to that sketch, an idea is a conscious rep-
resentation but not a subjective representation. It is an objective 
representation but not an intuition. Thus, contrary to how Wolff 
thought, the prior act of cognition does not produce an image that 
could be considered objectively as an idea. An idea is a concept 
but not an empirical concept. Not even a pure concept of the un-
derstanding, Kant insists, can be called an idea. It is a concept of 
reason. What I want to propose is that we should take the Stufen-
leiter seriously. According to Kant, there are no ideas involved in 
the subsumption of appearances under concepts, and the sub-
sumption really is concept application. At this point it will suffice 
to refer to the Stufenleiter, according to which our intuitions are 
not ideas, and to the fact that Kant made a distinction between 
apperception and inner sense, which indicates that in the Critique 
Kant no longer thought of inner sense in Wolffian terms. It is thus 
obvious that neither his conception of ideas nor of inner sense 
was conventional. Now, since Tetens’ 
 philosophy is founded on a new conception of ideas and 
inner sense, it is certainly reasonable to try to see whether there 
might be a connection between Tetens and Kant here. My purpose 
above has been to show that how Pendlebury interprets Kant’s 
account of the schemata of empirical concepts is compatible with 
the assumption that Kant’s view was influenced by Tetens. Now 
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we should see what implications this supposed influence would 
have. 
Let us consider for a moment what it is that we receive 
through mere receptivity of impressions. To simplify matters let 
us consider visual affection. Our outer sense provides the mind 
with impressions of light and colour in space. We may refer to 
this as empirical intuition.
116
 When we intuit an empirical object, 
we represent it by means of the empirical intuition we have 
through outer affection. Now, we may ask what qualities the em-
pirical intuition contains. It will suffice to give a negative answer: 
it does not contain any of the qualities of the object. Kant as well 
as Tetens could be seen as responding to the following challenge 
by Reid: 
 
From whence then come those images of body and of its qual-
ities into the mind? Let philosophers resolve this question. All 




In order to illustrate this, let us think of the most funda-
mental quality of our outer perception: shape. There is no shape 
in the empirical intuition resulting from outer affection (in the 
impressions in space). In visual perception, i.e. in the act, the 
empirical intuition does of course represent its object (or objects), 
but the object itself is a modification of the mind, more precisely 
of inner sense, which means that all outer objects are represented 
in inner sense (in other words, objects of outer sense are repre-
sented in inner sense). From this it follows that we do not per-
ceive empirical intuitions. We perceive objects. This could be 
illuminated by Reid’s notion of visible figure, by which he means 
the figure projected on the retina. Reid notes that “we have never 
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been accustomed to make visible figure an object of thought”
118
 
and that it requires a special and rare skill to become conscious of 
this figure.
119
 Although what I here refer to by ‘empirical intui-
tion’ does not contain any figure, Kant’s (as well as Tetens’) posi-
tion is the same as Reid’s in the sense that what we are conscious 
of is not what we sense outwardly. 
Before leaving these preliminary thoughts, we should 
consider the Schematism from yet one perspective. In the exam-
ple of the dog Kant uses the German word Gestalt, which could 
be translated also as ‘pattern’, and indeed Tetens’ general sensible 
abstractions and Kant’s schemata touch the issue that in modern 
cognitive science is called pattern recognition. Peter Krausser has 
claimed that Kant was more right than he could have known when 
he said that the schematism is “a hidden art in the depths of the 
human soul”.
120
 By this Krausser means to say that Kant was 
simply ignorant of the problem of pattern recognition: 
 
To put it simply and without disguising the naïvité of Kant in 
this point, he seems to have held that what we think in [em-
pirical and pure sensible concepts] we can see (intuit) when 




By the accused naivety Krausser means that Kant did not 
understand that the relevant patterns, e.g. the shape of a dog, can-
not be just given through our senses. The truth is, however, quite 
the opposite. This is precisely what is implied by Kant’s discus-
sion of the preconditions of the rule of empirical reproduction of 
representations. Kant notes that the law of reproduction 
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presupposes that the appearances themselves are actually sub-
ject to […] a rule, and that in the manifold of their representa-
tions an accompaniment or succession takes place according 
to certain rules; for without that our empirical imagination 
would never get to do anything suitable to its capacity, and 
would thus remain hidden in the interior of the mind, like a 




In other words, the empirical reproduction of representa-
tions presupposes schemata, through which images of objects first 
become possible. We shall see that what Kant has in mind in the 
above text goes beyond the question of the possibility of appre-
hending shapes and concerns transcendental preconditions of 
apprehension, but nevertheless, his position is that empirical ap-
prehension presupposes pure apprehension and that the shape of a 
dog, for instance, cannot be just given. 
These considerations suggest that the mere representing 
of an object cannot occur without mental action. It is crucial to 
the correct understanding of Kant’s theory of cognition that we 
understand the preconditions of representing an object, which is a 
modification of the mind in inner sense, and of reproducing it 
emprically. This modification arises by virtue of an act, which is 
why we represent the object in inner sense. The act will always 
involve rules, and the question I would like to ask the reader to 
keep in mind is this: does the mere representing of objects neces-
sarily involve a priori rules? 
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2. THE TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC 
2.1. Kant’s Introduction to the Transcendental Aesthet-
ic 
 
The content of our representations and the subsumption 
of intuitions under concepts are key issues in this monograph. 
Understanding the Deductions requires a clear understanding of 
the content of different kinds of representations and of the possi-
bility of subsuming intuitions under concepts. However, before 
we can discuss those issues, we will have to take a look at Kant’s 
Transcendental Aesthetic. In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant 
sets out to investigate one of the two stems of the capacity for 
cognition: our sensibility. The Transcendental Aesthetic is the 
first part of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements and it opens 
with an untitled introduction (A 19/B 33 – A 22/B 36). This in-
troduction lays the foundation not only to the Transcendental 
Aesthetic but to the whole Critique, and I will here go through it 
step by step. 
Kant approaches sensibility through the immediacy of in-
tuition: 
 
In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition 
may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediate-
ly to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as 




In the language of the 18
th
 century German philosophy 
those mental acts that produce representations having a reference 
to objects were called cognitions, and as the Critique is concerned 
with objective representation, cognition and our capacity for cog-
nition is the proper object of Kant’s inquiry. There were differing 
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conceptions of the nature of cognition. In Wolff’s philosophy, the 
representations produced by cognition are either notions or ideas, 
whereas according to Tetens, as we have seen, we find empirical 
evidence of mental representations that refer to objects but never-
theless are not yet ideas.
124
 These differences aside, it was widely 
agreed that cognitions are or at least involve acts through which 
objects become represented in the mind. In Wolff's philosophy 
activeness is built into the system, but also to the more empirical-
ly minded philosophers cognition was active. Locke had indeed 
thought that the mind was at least “for the most part” passive in 
receiving simple ideas, but as we saw in the introduction, this 
view had turned out to be a disaster. To say the least, Kant would 
have nothing to do with such a view, for it would leave the door 
open to scepticism. If we were just passively to receive represen-
tations of objects, it would be impossible to prove that our basic 
concepts are objectively valid. 
We must first consider how the above passage relates to 
Wolff’s philosophy. As I already mentioned, according to Wolff, 
cognition is an act of the soul, which provides the soul with either 
a notion or an idea of a thing.
125
 A notion is a general representa-
tion and it cannot refer to an object immediately, but senses do 
furnish us with immediate representations. According to Wolff, 
the simple apprehension of a thing consists in intuiting the thing 
either through sense or imagination, so when we do not yet make 
judgements about objects we merely intuit them, and in intuiting 
the representation is in an immediate relation to its object.
126
 
Thus, Kant begins his revolution with a statement that should be 
acceptable to a Wolffian. He abstracts from how it is seen that a 
cognition refers to its object, so his statement is not restricted to 
any particular theory of cognition. He also abstracts from the 
mode of cognition. The cognition may be merely sensible or it 
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may involve concepts, and it may involve any combination of 
sense, imagination and apperception whatsoever, but regardless of 
the manner of referring and the means to achieve it, that through 
which it is in immediate relation to its object, is called intuition. 
This first statement thus provides an uncontroversial basis by 
means of which Kant can begin to guide the reader into thinking 
about our sensibility correctly. He thinks that the prevalent con-
ception of sensibility needs to be revised but the reader, a Wolffi-
an presumably, must accept the basic assumption from which to 
commence the analysis, and the assumption is that our act of 
thought must be directed at an immediate representation of the 
object of cognition. 
Kant suggests that all cognition involves intuiting, be-
cause all thought is directed to intuition as its end. A Wolffian 
would be ready to admit this, as also Wolff thought that concep-
tual cognition depends on intuitive cognition.
127
 Without an im-
mediate element our thought would not reach objects and the act 
would not be cognition. As Kant had stated in the Dissertation, 
“thinking is only possible for us by means of universal concepts 
in the abstract, not by means of a singular concept in the con-
crete.”
128
 What this means is that mere conceptual thought cannot 
be cognition, and the immediate intuition is thus an essential ele-
ment of all cognition. 
In this way, the reader is directed to thinking about our 
sensibility in terms of immediacy. But as our acts of cognition 
may or may not be conceptual – this is what Kant’s reader would 
presume – we should ask whether the intuition is also supposed to 
refer to a cognition and thus to an act. This is a delicate matter. 
Although what is being analysed here is an act, the intuition itself 
cannot be an act, for then our thought would be directed at an act, 
and we would have two simultaneous acts one of which would be 
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directed at the other, which is clearly impossible.
 
To this it might 
be objected that cognition may be mere intuition and that in that 
case there would be no act involved in cognition. However, even 
in mere intuiting there is for Kant always a non-objective intui-
tion at which the act is directed. I will explain later what this 
means. Another possible objection might be raised on the basis 
that in the Stufenleiter intuition is said to be a cognition. If cogni-
tion is an act, then intuition must be an act as well. This is certain-
ly true, but nevertheless it holds, that in this quoted passage intui-
tion cannot be cognition. Thus, it seems that by ‘intuition’ Kant 
may refer to the act of cognition or to a modification of the mind. 
Later we will see that this is indeed the case. 
In fact, we can see here not only an uncontroversial 
statement about the need of an immediate representation for con-
ceptual cognition, but also a definition. A Wolffian would call the 
result of intuiting an idea, but this would be as unacceptable for 
Kant as it had been for Tetens. Therefore, he decides to call the 
result of the act of intuiting by the name of intuition. No harm in 
doing that, of course. One may define the terms as it pleases, and 
later Kant will show that intuition, the modification, cannot be an 
idea. 
Interestingly, although the subject-matter here is sensibil-
ity, we get the impression that by ‘cognition’ Kant refers to con-
ceptual cognition only. It is stated that our thought as a means is 
directed to intuition as its end, and even though we are here deal-
ing with a non-conceptual element of cognition, Kant's interest 
lies in conceptual cognition, and it is noteworthy that even in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic Kant is concerned primarily with 
thought, not with intuiting as such, and his aim is to prove the 
objective validity of the concepts of space and time. His analysis 
thus begins from our thought as cognition. 
Next, Kant explains how intuition takes place: 
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This [intuition], however, takes place only insofar as the ob-
ject is given to us; but this in turn, <at least for us humans,> is 
possible only if it affects the mind in a certain way. The ca-
pacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way 




Here Kant makes three interrelated points. As intuition is 
that through which cognition is in an immediate relation to its 
object, from the view-point of conceptual cognition there cannot 
be intuition without an object, and Kant expresses this by saying 
that the object must be given. As we saw in the previous section, 
‘given’ can be taken in more than one sense. Since there is no 
argument suggesting that Kant means that the objects are literally 
given as such – and considering the history of the theories of per-
ception outlined in the Introduction, this would be an odd claim
130
 
– it is natural to take ‘given’ here to mean given for thought.
131
 
This interpretation is also supported by how he uses the term 
elsewhere. In the Dissertation Kant uses the word ‘given’ as 
meaning given to either analysis or synthesis.
132
 According to 
Jäsche Logic,
133
 thought is cognition through concepts, the matter 
of concepts is the object, and the matter of the judgment “consists 
in the given representations that are combined in the unity of con-
sciousness in the judgment”.
134
 Ultimately discursive thought 
must rely on intuitions, because the matter of concepts cannot be 
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given through concepts but only through intuitions. Thus, objects 
are given only through intuitions, but here we are approaching 
intuitions from the view-point of thought, and it holds that the 
intuition takes place only insofar as the object is given to us. Kant 
is thus approaching sensibility through this fact. 
The next step in the above passage is the claim that an ob-
ject can be given to us only if it affects the mind in a certain way. 
Again, we can see that Kant is here not trying to spell out a con-
sidered view on outer affection. He does not even touch the issue 
of the distinction between phenomena and noumena. He only 
states (from the view-point of thought) that objects can be given 
only through affection. The capacity to receive representations 
through affection is then named sensibility. 
Here Kant’s claim is potentially controversial as the read-
er might favour the view that there is no genuine interaction be-
tween the soul and other substances, but on the other hand, Kant 
can expect the reader to agree that at this point statements con-
cerning noumena should be withheld. Even Wolff thought that 
considerations of empirical psychology must precede considera-
tions of rational psychology.
135
 Even though Kant’s inquiry, a 
transcendental inquiry as it is, does not belong to empirical psy-
chology, it nevertheless must have a starting-point in what we 
observe in ourselves. I thus take Kant to be saying essentially the 
same as what Tetens says when he starts his series of observations 
concerning the nature of representations by claiming that the soul 
is both active and passive.
136
 We do observe in ourselves that we 
are affected by objects, and we may call our capacity to be so 
affected our sensibility. 
Kant locates the capacity to be affected by objects in the 
mind. In the Psychologia empirica Wolff defines the faculty of 
sense as the faculty of perceiving external objects, which induce 
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changes in our sensory organs.
137
 For Kant this reaches out too 
far. We are not concerned with bodily impressions, or material 
impressions as Reid calls them, but with outer affection in the 
mind. Intuiting is possible, Kant says, only insofar as the object 
affects the mind in a certain way. Kant is here following in Te-
tens’ footsteps. It is the mind and its capacity to be affected that is 
under investigation. Thus, when Kant is approaching sensibility 
through immediate representing, he is not, like Wolff, considering 
an act of intuiting the data of bodily impressions but the result of 
affection in the mind. The focus here is on a logical distinction 
between intuitions and concepts. Consequently, it is not the act 
but the result of immediate representing that is under considera-
tion, and this is manifested in calling the result an intuition – not 
an idea, as Wolff would call it. 
The logical distinction between sensibility and under-
standing can now be declared: 
 
Objects are therefore given to us by means of sensibility, and 
it alone affords us intuitions; but they are thought through the 
understanding, and from it arise concepts. 
 
Kant has now introduced the concept of an intuition to the 
reader. By doing so, he has lead the reader to the distinction be-
tween sensibility and understanding, which can be characterized 
in several ways. According to Jäsche Logic Kant says that the 
distinction between intuitions and concepts is called logical, 
whereas the distinction between receptivity and spontaneity is 
called metaphysical.
138
 The approach to sensibility is thus here a 
logical approach, and the issue of activity and passivity is set 
aside. Above, sensibility was characterized as the capacity to be 
affected by objects, i.e. through receptivity, so in the opening 
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sentences of the Transcendental Aesthetic the distinction between 
sensibility and understanding is approached both through the log-
ical and the metaphysical distinction. However, receptivity is 
mentioned here only in passing, and the focus is on a logical dis-
tinction between intuitions and concepts. 
The logical distinction is, of course, the one in terms of 
which a Wolffian is accustomed to view the faculty of cognition. 
In Wolff’s philosophy sensibility is the lower cognitive faculty 
and it is the faculty of perception. In his Psychologia empirica 
Wolff defines perception as that mental act through which an 
object is represented to the soul.
139
 Thinking, on the other hand, 
involves apperception, through which the mind is conscious of its 
own perceptions, and it thereby involves both perception and 
apperception.
140
 Kant had already noted in the Dissertation that 
Wolff’s characterization of sensibility as an indistinct way to 
cognize things in themselves is a mistake. For Wolff, says Kant, 
the distinction between what is sensitive and what belongs to the 
understanding is only a logical distinction, and by this distinction 
Wolff has done a disservice to philosophy.
141
 Now, if Kant’s own 
distinction, the distinction between intuitions and concepts, is also 
a merely logical one, it seems that it alone cannot do a notable 
service to philosophy unless it provides us with a basis that will 
help us to understand the “character of phenomena and noume-
na”, from which Kant had felt that the Wolffian distinction had 
turned men’s minds away. We should thus expect the distinction 
between intuitions and concepts to be only a preliminary charac-
terization of the distinction between sensibility and understand-
ing. 
Although the utility of this distinction is limited, it is the 
one we should start with. It is the one that leads us to the differ-
ence in the nature of the representations of sensibility and under-
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standing, but at the same time we need to realise that this distinc-
tion does not take into account the difference in the spontaneity 
required for producing intuitions and concepts. It has been noted 
so far that sensibility is the capacity to acquire representations 
through affection but it has not yet been considered whether there 
are more than one capacity of affection. It has been said that ob-
jects are given to us by means of sensibility, but the purpose of 
this remark was merely to point out that intuitions and concepts 
are different kinds of representations. By means of concepts no 
object can be given, and through intuitions nothing can be 
thought. 
To the end of the first paragraph Kant adds a summary of 
what has been said so far. 
 
But all thought, whether straightway (directe) or through a 
detour (indirecte), must ultimately be related to intuitions, 
thus, in our case, to sensibility, since there is no other way in 
which objects can be given to us. 
 
This is the general requirement of all human cognition. 
Our conceptual cognition has a wide range reaching from plain 
assertions like “That rock is heavy” to complex scientific claims 
concerning nature. In thinking concepts are combined to concepts 
in judgments, and judgments in turn can be combined to infer-
ences. Our thought can be very abstract, but ultimately, if the 
thought is to have an object and thus to be counted as a cognition, 
it must be related to intuitions. 
So how would Kant’s reader react to his opening? It 
seems that Kant can expect his reader not to reject it. He has 
asked the reader to think of sensibility as that in us through which 
cognition is in an immediate relation to its object. Through this 
capacity objects are given to thought through the way we are af-
fected by objects. A Wolffian should have no trouble accepting 
this, but nevertheless, we have seen marks of a departure from 
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Wolff, for cognizing an object has not been defined as acquiring 
ideas or notions, as it is in Wolff,
142
 but intuitions and concepts. 
Kant can now move on to introduce the central terminol-
ogy: 
 
The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, in-
sofar as we are affected by it, is sensation. That intuition 
which is related to the object through sensation is called em-





As we saw in chapter 1.1, the terminology relevant to an 
inquiry into the capacity of cognition was not fixed in the 18
th
 
century German philosophy. The above terms are, however, rela-
tively uncontroversial given Kant’s starting-point. If sensibility is 
viewed as a capacity of being affected by an object, then the ef-
fect on the capacity for representation would be called sensation 
(Empfindung). The very first effects of affection would of course 
be called impressions (Eindrücke), but as Kant is concerned with 
thought and consequently with conscious representations (i.e. 
with Perzeptionen
144
), they are not discussed here. 
Further, if the immediate element of objective representa-
tion is called intuition, then it would be appropriate to call an 
intuition that is related to an object through sensation an empirical 
intuition. Even appearance (Erscheinung) was not an unknown 
term. Tetens makes use of this term when he discusses Kant’s 
conception of space in the Inaugural Dissertation. Tetens equates 
Vorstellungen der Dinge in der Erscheinung (rerum phaenome-
norum) with sinnlichen Schein dieser Dinge, and complains that 
the concept of space is often used inappropriately as a real repre-
sentation of things and their characteristics, i.e. applied to things 
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that cannot be objects of sensible representations (like souls), 
whereas it should be applied solely to these appearances.
145
 An 
appearance thus is an object represented through affection. 
What Kant has said so far is that intuition requires that 
the object is given to us and that this is possible only when the 
object affects the mind in a certain way. Now, a word of caution 
is in order here, for if appearance is an object of an empirical 
intuition and sensibility alone affords us intuitions, then one could 
gather from this that we cannot be affected by things like other 
souls, for they are not appearances, as Tetens points out, but 
things that appear to us in appearance. But Kant is of course not 
taking a metaphysical position here but rather trying to spell out a 
starting-point which the reader could accept. However, we may 
also note in passing that he is careful not to say that the object is 
the cause of our sensations. Rather, he says that we are affected 
by the object, and the effect of this affection is sensation. And 
now that the starting-point has been spelled out, the word ‘object’ 
gets a new meaning in the context of the Aesthetic. It is an ap-
pearance, an object of an empirical representation that refers im-
mediately to it. The object is said to be an undetermined object, 
which means that it is not determined by the understanding 
through concepts. This is wholly in line with the prevalent view 
of Kant’s time. 
The basic terminology relevant to an inquiry into cogni-
tion, as far as sensibility is concerned, has now been set, and Kant 
can turn his attention to the object of cognition, i.e. appearance. 
 
I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation 
its matter, but that which allows the manifold of appearance 
to be intuited as ordered in certain relations I call the form of 
the appearance. Since that within which the sensations can 
alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot itself be 
in turn sensation, the matter of all appearance is only given to 
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us a prosteriori, but its form must all lie ready for it in the 
mind a priori, and therefore be able to be considered sepa-




The crucial point here is that the form of appearance must 
have an a priori origin. Kant’s justification for this claim is that 
the sensations cannot be ordered in something that itself in turn is 
a sensation. Whereas the matter is given to us a posteriori, the 
form “must all lie ready for it in the mind a priori”. This claim is 
a refinement of Tetens’ position according to which we can sense 
or feel immediately only what is absolute.
147
 According to Tetens, 
the relative can only be thought, and the thought of a relation is 
an ens rationis.
148
 We should keep in mind that for Tetens the 
word ‘thinking’ has a very broad meaning, and his claim here is 
not that all representations of relations require conceptual think-
ing. Having concepts of relations presupposes that the relations 
are first represented without concepts, which requires action of 
the power of thinking (through the faculty of feigning).
149
 Also 
Kant thought that representing relations requires mental action, 
but here we are interested only in the fact that we can sense only 
the matter, and that that which allows the matter to be intuited as 
ordered in certain relations must lie in the mind a priori. Again, 
Kant is approaching sensibility through a logical distinction here. 
The spontaneity required for representing appearances is not un-
der investigation. Hence, in the above claim Kant is not interested 
in particular relations in objective representations but in the form 
that makes those relations possible. 
Because of this a priori origin we can turn our attention 
from the objects back to the mind that has the representation of an 
object. If the form of the object, i.e. that in which what corre-
                                                     
146
 A 20 / B 34, translation modified. 
147
 Tetens, Versuche, 191–192. 
148
 Tetens, Versuche, 192 and 276. 
149
 Tetens, Versuche, 276–277. 
The Transcendental Aesthetic 
79 
 
sponds to sensation is ordered, is not given to us a posteriori but 
is imposed to the object by the mind, then we can set out to inves-
tigate our a priori sensibility, because apart from sensation, which 
belongs to sensibility, there must be an a priori element (which 
also belongs to sensibility) in our intuition of the object. 
Kant calls this a priori element by the name of pure intui-
tion: 
 
I call all representations pure (in the transcendental sense) in 
which nothing is to be encountered that belongs to sensation. 
Accordingly the pure form of sensible intuitions in general is 
to be encountered in the mind a priori, wherein all of the 
manifold of appearances is intuited in certain relations. This 
pure form of sensibility itself is also called pure intuition. 
 
Kant illustrates what the pure intuition is with the follow-
ing: 
 
So if I separate from the representation of a body that which 
the understanding thinks about it, such as substance, force, 
divisibility, etc., as well as that which belongs to sensation, 
such as impenetrability, hardness, color, etc., something from 
this empirical intuition is still left for me, namely extension 
and form. These belong to the pure intuition, which occurs a 
priori, even without an actual object of the senses or sensa-
tion, as a mere form of sensibility in the mind. 
 
It is important to note that the representation of a body is 
not an example through which we can understand what a priori 
intuition is. Instead, what is here taken into consideration, is what 
kind of determinations this representation has. Kant instructs us to 
leave out that which the understanding thinks a priori in this rep-
resentation. That includes substance, force and divisibility. When 
we do that, what we have left of this representation, includes a 
posteriori determinations such as impenetrability, hardness and 
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colour. Although these may be conceptually determined in the 
representation, these determinations have their origin in sensation. 
But even when we leave out all determinations of this kind, there 
still remains (as sensations must be ordered in certain relations) 
“extension and form”, and these belong to pure intuition. 
What Kant means by form is not the shape of a body but 
rather the form that first makes possible the representation of an 
object of an empirical intuition (and also its shape, as it will turn 
out). This is confirmed by the statement that the form occurs “a 
priori, even without an actual object of the senses or sensation”. 
Thus, we may also conclude that through mere affection, i.e. 
without mental action, no shape and consequently no outer object 
can be represented. 
Now, this form can be made an object of scientific inves-
tigation: 
 
I call a science of all principles of a priori sensibility the 
transcendental aesthetic. There must therefore be such a sci-
ence, which constitutes the first part of the transcendental 
doctrine of elements, in contrast to that which contains the 
principles of pure thinking, and is named transcendental logic. 
 
This science would then be based on a logical distinction 
between sensibility and understanding, and it would have as its 
object the a priori element of sensing. 
 
In the transcendental aesthetic we will therefore first isolate 
sensibility by separating off everything that the understanding 
thinks through its concepts, so that nothing but empirical intu-
ition remains. Second, we will then detach from the latter eve-
rything that belongs to sensation, so that nothing remains ex-
cept pure intuition and the mere form of appearances, which 
is the only thing that sensibility can make available a priori. 
In this investigation it will be found that there are two pure 
forms of sensible intuition as principles of a priori cognition, 
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namely space and time, with the assessment of which we will 
now be concerned. 
 
The design of this introduction to the science of transcen-
dental aesthetic is elegant. It begins with an analysis of a concep-
tion of cognition which anyone could accept. It states that concep-
tual cognition necessarily involves both a mediate and an imme-
diate element and that only through the immediate element an 
object can be given for cognition. For us this means affection 
through sense. The immediate element is labelled intuition. 
Next it is stated that in our cognition the element pro-
duced by affection is called sensation and that the intuition con-
taining sensations is called an empirical intuition. The object of 
this kind of cognition is termed appearance. There are also non-
empirical cognitions, which nevertheless must, of course, involve 
intuitions, but this is not taken into consideration here, just as 
concepts and spontaneity were set aside above. 
It is then argued that when we leave out sensation from 
the intuition, there remains a form, which must be a priori. Kant 
calls this element pure intuition, and the empirical intuition thus 
contains a pure intuition. The science of transcendental aesthetic 
studies the principles of our a priori sensibility, from which the 
pure intuition originates. In the science of transcendental aesthet-
ic, we investigate the mere form of intuition, and this form con-
sists in time and space. 
Now, the discussion of time and space as pure intuitions 
originates from Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation, where it is argued 
that time and space are formal principles of the sensible world.
150
 
Kant’s position in the Critique is, however, not exactly the same 
as in the Dissertation. In the letter to Herz of February 21
st
, 1772, 
Kant admits that in the Dissertation he could not explain how our 
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representations can be related to their objects.
151
 In the Critique 
he explains this, and important changes have to be made to his 
earlier view. We should now examine what these changes are. 
 
 
2.2. Time and Space 
 
In the Inaugural Dissertation Kant had argued that time 
and space are a priori, that they are singular representations and 
that they are pure intuitions.
152
 These claims are now restated in 
the Transcendental Aesthetic. However, one vitally important 
aspect of his account was yet to be developed when Kant wrote 
the Dissertation. What has changed in the Transcendental Aes-
thetic is that time is now declared to be the form of inner sense. In 
the Dissertation, the distinction between outer and inner sense is 
not even mentioned in the discussion of time, but here it is stated 
right in the beginning of the section on space: 
 
By means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we repre-
sent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all as in space. 
[…] Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, or 
its inner state, gives, to be sure, no intuition of the soul itself, 
as an object, yet it is still a determinate form, under which the 
intuition of its inner state is alone possible, so that everything 





My aim here is not to assess whether Kant was right or 
wrong in arguing that space and time are a priori forms of our 
sensibility. I will rather try to bring forth what Kant makes out of 
this conclusion. The Transcendental Aesthetic is not designed 
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merely to state the transcendental ideality of time and space. Its 
findings are needed when we move on to the Transcendental Ana-
lytic, where we are no longer conducting an investigation based 
on a merely logical distinction between sensibility and under-
standing. For this purpose, it is useful to view the Transcendental 
Aesthetic against the background of the Dissertation. 
Let us first go through the claims that are common to 




1) The representations of time and space are not drawn 
from experience. Representing something as outside me and out-
side one another on the one hand or succession and simultaneity 
on the other presuppose space and time respectively. 
2) The representations of time and space are singular, not 
general. There is only one space and one time, and things are 
represented in time and space, not under general concepts of time 
and space. Different spaces can only be understood as parts of 
one and the same unique space; different times only as parts of 
one and the same time. 
3) Time and space are pure a priori intuitions. 
4) Concepts of time and space are objectively valid in re-
gard to appearances but the application to appearances is the only 
legitimate use of them. 
The objective validity of the concepts of time and space 
has thereby been shown, but this is not the sole purpose of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic. In it space is declared to be the form 
not only of outer intuition but of outer sense. Similarly, time is 
said to be the form of inner intuition and of inner sense. In the 
Dissertation, by contrast, Kant speaks much more vaguely about 
time and space as forms of our sensibility. Kant does point out 
that whereas the concept of space concerns the intuition of an 
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object, time “concerns the state, especially the representative 
state.”
155
 By this remark Kant refers to the use of these concepts 
by the understanding. He goes on to note that “space is also ap-
plied as an image to the time itself”. These claims are reiterated in 
the Transcendental Aesthetic, but this time his point is put in 
more sophisticated terms: 
 
Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the 
intuition of our self and our inner state. For time cannot be a 
determination of outer appearances; it belongs neither to a 
shape or a position, etc., but on the contrary determines the 
relation of representations in our inner state. And just because 
this inner intuition yields no shape we also attempt to remedy 
this lack through analogies, and represent the temporal se-




It is obvious that in the Dissertation Kant did not think 
that time is the form of inner sense. He had discovered that time 
and space are pure a priori intuitions but he did not yet know how 
to prove the objective validity of pure a priori concepts of the 
understanding. Now, in the Critique we can see that answering 
this riddle required him to conduct a more thorough inquiry to the 
mind, and this is what we see already in the Transcendental Aes-
thetic. The Transcendental Aesthetic is not just a separate section 
dealing with the form of our sensibility. We should rather see it as 
a step in the argument for the objective validity of the categories, 
and a crucial point of this part of the Critique is that time is the 
form of inner sense. 
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2.3. Time and Inner Sense 
 
For a present-day reader, the doctrine of inner sense is not 
an easy doctrine to comprehend. We are not accustomed to think-
ing that the mind can sense itself. Sensing for us means outer 
sensing through our physical organs. 
But we should keep in mind that it is the mind that is un-
der investigation, not the body. Our sense-organs are only appear-
ances and our awareness of these organs does not bring us any 
closer to the mental aspect of sensing. If we turn our attention to 
the mind and accept, as Kant did, that the mind is both active and 
passive, then there should be no mysticism involved in the con-
clusion that sensing can be both outer and inner. Perhaps it is odd 
that we can sense our own activity, but it certainly is no less odd 
that we can sense activity that is not our own. So, if we are affect-
ed by things outside ourselves and if that through which this oc-
curs in our mind is called sense, wouldn't it be natural to call that 
through which we are affected by ourselves a sense as well? I 
think it would, and so did Kant and Tetens. 
But let us first see if we can understand Kant’s view on 
inner sense any better on the basis of his introduction to the Tran-
scendental Aesthetic. I have argued that Kant can expect a Wolff-
ian not to reject his starting-point. Now although Wolff does not 
use the term 'inner sense' in his Psychologia empirica, it does 
occur in Logica (§ 31), where it is stated that the mind as it were 
perceives itself through inner sense, when it is conscious of what 
occurs in itself.  Baumgarten uses the term to denote the ability to 
represent the state of one's soul. According to Baumgarten, we 
have sensations not only through outer sense but through the in-
ner sense as well, which he calls consciousness in the strictest 
sense.
157
 So even to a Wolffian it would not be an odd claim to 
say that we have an inner sense. In the Wolffian use of the term, 
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however, inner sense is synonymous with apperception, as apper-
ception is reflection on the soul's representations. Kant still ad-
hered to this view when he wrote the Dissertation but in the Cri-
tique his view has changed. To see how it has changed, let us see 
once again what Wolff says about mental action involved in cog-
nition. 
According to Wolff cognition involves two acts. The first 
act, which is called perception, produces a representation of an 
object. This representation he calls an idea. The second act re-
quired for cognition is the act of apperception which is an act of 
the understanding. Perception is thus not the representation of an 
object but the act that produces this representation. Now, accord-
ing to Wolff the representation that results from the act of percep-
tion is a confused representation of an object. Distinctness is 
brought to the representation through an act of the understanding. 
This is where Kant thought that Wolff’s account is pro-
foundly mistaken. In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant accuses 
the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy for doing great harm to the 
investigations of the nature and origin of our cognitions in con-
sidering the distinction between sensibility and understanding as 
merely logical.
158
 In his view, it is transcendental. According to 
his revised view, the distinction between sensibility and under-
standing does not concern the form of distinctness and indistinct-
ness but origin and content. Kant had complained about this mis-
take already in the Dissertation but at that time he did not yet 
know how he could prove the objective validity of the pure a 
priori concepts of the understanding. Finding an answer to this 
question required him to internalize the relation of the representa-
tion to its object, and this in turn brought with it a view on mental 
action that differs from the view endorsed by Wolff.
159
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It is impossible to explain the nature of this change ade-
quately on the basis of the Transcendental Aesthetic alone. This is 
because the Transcendental Aesthetic itself is founded on a mere-
ly logical distinction between sensibility and understanding. Tak-
en in isolation, its purpose is to show that time and space are pure 
a priori intuitions and that the concepts of time and space are 
objectively valid in regard to appearances, but not in regard to 
things in themselves. However, we can make some provisional 
observations here without getting too much ahead of ourselves. 
Kant says that because the inner intuition yields no shape 
we have to represent the temporal sequence through a line pro-
gressing to infinity.
160
 By this Kant of course refers to the use of 
the understanding when it thinks about time, and the point is that 
in this use the representation of time is only possible by means of 
outer intuition, space. Now, in the Analytic Kant claims that a 
representation of space requires a temporal act, i.e. it requires 
time, “for as contained in one moment no representation can ever 
be anything other than absolute unity.”
161
 A representation of 
space can never be an absolute unity (a point can only be repre-
sented as a limit), and so we face the situation that a representa-
tion of time presupposes a representation of space, and a repre-
sentation of space presupposes time. Obviously, this is possible 
only if the time presupposed by the representation of space is not 
a representation of time, and this can help us to understand how 
Kant thought that Wolff’s account on mental action in cognition 
needs revising. 
Kant’s position entails that a representation of time pre-
supposes two acts. On the one hand, it presupposes a representa-
tion of space (a line progressing to infinity), on the other hand this 
latter representation has to be thought as a representation of time. 
Now, it is Kant’s position that also in an empirical representation 
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of an outer object the shape of the appearance has to be produced 
through a mental act. If we are then to think this appearance 
through the understanding, we will have to perform another act, 
which will be directed at the appearance. On the face of it, this is 
just what Wolff thought: cognition requires both an act of percep-
tion and an act of the understanding (apperception), but if we look 
closer, Kant’s view is radically different. 
According to Wolff, what the perception produces is an 
idea of an object, but according to Kant it is the object of an em-
pirical intuition, i.e. the appearance, that is produced by the act of 
perception, not an idea of it. The empirical intuition does of 
course have an a priori form, but the mind does not have to act in 
order to place the sensations, i.e. the matter of the empirical intui-
tion, in the form. Rather, the act of perception consists in using 
this representation to represent an empirical object. Now if the 
mind is able to produce this object, the object itself will have to 
be a modification of the mind. And this is indeed confirmed by 
Kant in the Analytic.
162
 How the mind produces the appearance 
can be discussed only on the basis of what Kant says in the Ana-
lytic, and my purpose in making this preliminary remark is only 
to draw attention to the importance of the correct understanding 
of Kant’s conception of inner sense and to the fact that a further 
development had occurred since the writing of the Dissertation in 
Kant’s opposition to Wolff. And now that he has the answer to 
the question of the ground of the relation between representation 
and its object, he is able to state more precisely what is wrong in 
Wolff’s logical distinction between sensibility and understanding. 
The true distinction is transcendental, meaning that it concerns 
the origin and content of representations, and in order to under-
stand what this means we need to consider the metaphysical dis-
tinction between sensibility and understanding, i.e. the distinction 
between receptivity and spontaneity. As we have seen, Kant 
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thought that through mere receptivity there can be no cognition 
whatsoever, because the form of outer sense cannot by itself give 
us anything more than extension. It cannot give us the shape of 
objects. It cannot give us appearances. Time has now been de-
clared to be the form of inner sense, and as it is the a priori condi-
tion of all appearance in general,
163
 all cognition presupposes 
mental action. Whereas for Wolff inner sense was only another 
name for apperception – an as-it-were-sense – for Kant it is now a 
condition of appearances: without inner sense the mind could not 
represent what it perceives. Kant has also dropped the use of the 
word ‘idea’: in the Dissertation, he still made use of the term, but 
in the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic of Concepts 
there are no philosophically relevant occurrences of it. As we saw 
already with Tetens, these developments go hand in hand: if the 
representations that outer affection produces in us are not objec-
tive representations, they cannot be ideas. 
 
 
2.4. The Need for Inner Sense: From the Inaugural 
Dissertation to the Critique 
 
We have now seen that Kant’s views on sensibility had 
changed after the Dissertation, and before moving on to the Ana-
lytic, we should consider what had happened between the Disser-
tation and the Critique. In the Dissertation Kant had complained 
that Wolff erroneously saw the distinction between sensibility and 
understanding as logical and stated that in truth they differ in 
kind. His position was that the concepts of space and time are 
valid only in regard to the sensible world and that although these 
concepts are a priori they nevertheless are acquired concepts. At 
that time, his position was that they are not acquired “by abstrac-
tion from the sensing of objects” but “from the very action of the 
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mind, which coordinates what is sensed by it”.
164
 Cognition, as far 
as it is subject to the laws of sensibility, is cognition of the phe-
nomenal world, but our cognition is not limited to this. Our intel-
lect can provide us with rational cognition of things as they are, 
i.e. of the noumenal world.
165
 This is possible through the real use 
of the understanding by means of its pure concepts.
166
 Kant also 
thought that the concepts of the pure understanding (concepts of 
existence, necessity, substance and cause) are acquired concepts: 
they are abstracted from the laws inherent in the mind.
167
 
Tetens did not accept Kant's position. In his Über die 
allgemeine speculativische Philosophie Tetens suggests that we 
should distinguish transcendent concepts from those concepts that 
represent either physical or immaterial beings.  The transcendent 
concepts would be such that they pertain to what is common both 
to the sensible and to the intellectual. As to the question of an 
exhaustive list of these concepts he is uncertain. The concepts of 
reality, substance and cause he counts among those concepts, and 
he seems to think that Kant may be right in claiming that the con-
cept of space is not a transcendent concept. According to Tetens, 
the task of a transcendent philosophy consists in the observation 
of the human understanding, its modes of thought (Denkarten), its 
concepts and their origin. Above all, realization of the transcend-
ent concepts is called for. 
Tetens thought that all general concepts are ultimately de-
rived from sensations. On the face of it this seems contrary to 
what Kant thinks, but Tetens distinguishes between two classes of 
sensations: inner and outer. Through outer sensations we sense 
bodies and their characteristics, through inner sensations we sense 
ourselves, our thought, our will etc. If a concept is derived from 
inner sensations alone, the concept is a representation of an intel-
                                                     
164
 Ak. 2:406, § 15. 
165
 Ak. 2:392, § 4. 
166
 Ak. 2:394, § 6. 
167
 Ak. 2:395, § 8. 
The Transcendental Aesthetic 
91 
 
lectual object, and if a concept is derived from outer sensations, 
the scope of the concept is limited to material objects. Our reflec-
tion can, however, reveal something that is common to both clas-
ses and thus arrive at the transcendent concepts. 
Tetens thus thinks that his conception of inner sense as a 
genuine source of sensations can provide a link between the sen-
sible and the intellectual. Lambert had pointed out to Kant shortly 
after the publication of the Dissertation that such a link was to be 
sought for. If there were no interchange between the sensible and 
the intellectual, Lambert noted, the concepts of metaphysics 
would not apply to phenomena. 
168
 In the letter to Herz, Kant had 
to admit that he had not taken into account the question of how a 
representation can relate to its object. In particular this was a 
problem for the pure a priori concepts of the understanding. How 
can they be in conformity with sensible representations when they 
are not drawn from experience? Mathematical concepts do not 
pose such a problem, because in mathematics we produce the 
representations of the objects of cognition.
169
 
In the Transcendental Analytic it will now be revealed 
that the new conception of inner sense enables Kant to answer 
this question and also to give an answer to the question of the 
possibility of transcendent concepts. The Transcendental Aesthet-
ic has thus given us not only the distinction between intuitions 
and concepts but also explained the nature of our receptivity. 
Kant has concluded that through mere receptivity no object can 
be represented. The intuitions we receive through outer sense 
(impressions in space) can of course be said to be representations 
of those objects that affect the mind, but these intuitions are not 
ideas. They are not cognitions of those objects and they do not 
result in consciousness of those objects. We can cognize only 
appearances, but these objects cannot be represented without 
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mental action, which in turn has its sensible conditions in the pure 
form of inner sense. 
Perhaps this can be clarified further by considering 
Kant’s puzzlement expressed in the letter to Herz. Kant considers 
two possible cases of the ground of the relation between represen-
tation and object. He says that when the representation contains 
nothing but the way in which the subject is affected by the object, 
it is easy to see how a representation can be in conformity with its 
object.
170
 Already in the Dissertation Kant had concluded that our 
sensible representations do not resemble the object that has 
caused them, but there is still a conceivable relation between 
them. Here, in the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant began by con-
sidering the object that affects the mind, and we saw that the 
“passive”
171
 representation resulting from this affection is not yet 
a cognition. Later we will learn (as we have already anticipated) 
that it doesn’t even enter our consciousness, so this case of the 
relation between representation and object is of no use to us. 
The other case where Kant thinks that the relation be-
tween representation and object would be conceivable is the case 
in which the representation produces the object by being active 
with regard to the object.
172
 This would be the case with the di-
vine understanding, but as our intellect is not an intellectus arche-
typus, Kant says that he is unable to see how our pure intellectual 
concepts could have such a relation to objects. Kant’s puzzlement 
continued until he saw that Tetens’ philosophy does indeed pro-
vide the basis for an answer. Our intellect is, to be sure, not an 
intellectus archetypus because we do not have an intellectual 
intuition. But our understanding does have the ability to use our 
sensible intuition for producing objects. Thus, the answer requires 
an investigation of the spontaneity involved in cognition, and here 
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in the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant has presented the necessary 
requirement of our receptivity for this end. All our cognition re-
quires mental action and all our cognition is represented in the a 
priori form of time. But Kant has, of course, also offered a proof 
for the objective validity of the concepts of space and time: they 
apply to appearances but not to things in themselves. In other 
words, by claiming that there is no legitimate transcendental use 
of those concepts, Kant has provided a partial answer to the ques-
tions Tetens had put forward in the Speculativische Philosophie, 
and indeed in a very Tetensian spirit. In the Transcendental Ana-





3. THE METAPHYSICAL DEDUCTION 
3.1. Introduction to Transcendental Logic 
 
Manfred Kühn has argued that Kant’s project of provid-
ing a transcendental deduction of the categories, as an answer to 
the question of how it can be shown that the categories have pos-
sible objects,
173
 is originally motivated by Wolff’s view that we 
must be able to show that our concepts are possible concepts. 
Wolff thought that in the case of arbitrary concepts – i.e. of con-
cepts whose possibility is not evident through experience, because 
they are not derived either directly from sensation or from the 
concepts of particular things by abstraction – we must show that 
these concepts have possible objects.
174
 According to Kühn, it 
was Lambert who raised the question of a proof for the possibility 
of arbitrary concepts in the context of a priori knowledge.
175
 
Lambert was confident that complex concepts can be analysed 
into simple concepts, and he thought that a list of those simple 
concepts that are a priori and the representation of which shows 
at the same time their possibility, can be given. These concepts 
can be called basic concepts. 
Tetens was not convinced that Lambert’s list (or, in fact 
Locke’s list, as Lambert draws his list from Locke) of basic a 
priori concepts is the correct one, and he question whether others 
should accept the list as well.
176
 The general concern then is: how 
can we be sure of any list that it is the correct one? Kant’s first 
task in the Transcendental Logic is to answer this question. He 
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plans not only to find the basic concepts but also to prove that his 
list is the correct one.  
Transcendental philosophy is concerned with the origin 
and content of our representations, so origin and content will also 
be the concern of transcendental logic. Since general logic does 
not deal with the content of our concepts at all, Kant has some-
thing very peculiar in mind when he speaks about transcendental 
philosophy as logic. And as it is logic that we are dealing with in 
the Transcendental Analytic, we need to remind ourselves that we 
are inquiring into cognition in the strict sense, i.e. into cognition 
based on concepts. Our concepts have a certain content, and our 
cognition has its origin in the understanding. 
There are two kinds of objective representations: intui-
tions and concepts. As logic deals with concepts, transcendental 
logic is based on the logical distinction between sensibility and 
understanding. I emphasized in the previous chapter that in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic Kant’s focus is on the logical distinc-
tion between sensibility and understanding, and that the mental 
action necessary for cognition is not his concern in that part of the 
Critique. Although Kant’s Introduction (A 50/B 74 – A 64/B 88) 
to the Transcendental Logic is not yet the place to consider men-
tal action, the metaphysical distinction between sensibility and 
understanding gains momentum in it. In the opening paragraph (A 
50–51/B 74–75) of his Introduction Kant offers a preliminary 
account of the relation between cognition and its elements, there-
by introducing us to the problem of the content of our concepts. 
This paragraph will provide us with very important information, 
and I will be more thorough in commenting this paragraph than I 
will be in commenting the rest of the Introduction. 
However, at this stage Kant is still trying to point the 
reader to the right direction, and this is not yet the place to reveal 
the true nature of spontaneity. Instead, the dichotomy between 
receptivity and spontaneity is expressed in terms of impressions 
and concepts: 
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Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the 
mind, the first of which is the reception of representations 
(the receptivity of impressions), the second the faculty for 
cognizing an object by means of these representations (spon-
taneity of concepts); through the former an object is given to 
us, through the latter it is thought in relation to that represen-




In this passage sensibility and understanding are ap-
proached from their extremities: from impressions on the one 
hand and from concepts on the other. Impressions were not dis-
cussed at all in the Transcendental Aesthetic, but they are what 
we receive through outer affection. For Kant, as well as for Te-
tens, impressions are mental impressions, not material as they 
were for Reid and Wolff, and this Kant confirms in the above 
passage by saying that the receptivity of impressions is a funda-
mental source of the mind. A natural way to interpret the role of 
impressions would be to assume that they are non-conscious rep-
resentations without which apprehension would be impossible, 
and that through them an appearance is given to thought. 
We may compare the above statement – in which the re-
ception of representations is equated with receptivity of impres-
sions – with the Transcendental Aesthetic where Kant said that 
the “effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar 
as we are affected by it, is sensation”.
178
 We already saw that this 
was an introductory note stated for the purpose of introducing the 
subject-matter to the reader. There is nothing wrong with it, as 
long as we do not take it to express a considered view on sensibil-
ity, but it will be in need of refining, because it does not distin-
guish between phenomena and noumena and it does not distin-
guish between inner and outer sense, or conscious and non-
conscious representations. Now that our sensibility has been di-
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vided into inner and outer sense, Kant is able to put the matter in 
more precise terms. Because sensations are conscious representa-
tions and because they are represented in inner sense, they require 
spontaneity. Impressions are thus the only effects of mere recep-
tivity. Concepts are the other extreme, and through the spontanei-
ty of concepts the object is thought. Kant will have more to say 
about the role of spontaneity in simple apprehension of appear-
ances, but here the gulf between impressions and concepts is not 
yet taken into scrutiny. Note that by the remark in parentheses in 
the above passage Kant seems to be saying that the object is a 
mere modification of the mind, thus indicating the departure from 
the way of ideas. 
Although Kant has not mentioned intuition here, he nev-
ertheless makes a quick move to contrasting concepts with intui-
tions: 
 
Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all 
our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition corre-
sponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts 




We are thus again faced with the logical distinction be-
tween sensibility and understanding. But how are these two dis-
tinctions related to each other? To answer this, we need to con-
sider how impressions are related to intuitions. The first thing to 
note is that the impressions as such are not intuitions. They are, of 
course, ordered in a form in reception, and the resulting represen-
tation is an intuition, but our thinking is not directed at this result 
of outer affection: it is directed at the given object, and this object 
is an intuition, as Kant suggests above. From the Transcendental 
Aesthetic we have learned that the given object is a spatiotem-
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 represented immediately in inner sense. It is at this 
intuition that our thought is directed, not at the empirical intui-
tion, so what is given to thought is the object. Again we see that 
thought is not directed at an idea of an object but at the object 
itself, i.e. at a modification of the mind. 
In the Transcendental Aesthetic we were concerned with 
intuitions, and here the interest lies in our concepts, i.e. in mediate 
representing. Since 'cognition' is here taken in its strict sense, 
signifying thought of objects, it necessarily involves both an im-
mediate and a mediate element, and here the latter is taken into 
scrutiny. 
We have already seen that there are pure intuitions that 
contain the form of intuiting, and now it is stated that there are 
also pure concepts: 
 
Both are either pure or empirical. Empirical, if sensation 
(which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is con-
tained therein; but pure if no sensation is mixed into the rep-





This terminology is already familiar to us, but consider 
what Kant said in the Transcendental Aesthetic: “I call that in the 
appearance which corresponds to sensation its matter”.
182
 Here it 
is said that sensation itself is the matter of sensible cognition. 
Cognition, which is an act, thus uses sensation in representing the 
object but the appearance itself does not contain sensations. 
Based on what we have found out so far, we can now 
make the following conclusions: The empirical intuition does 
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contain sensation and it is related to the appearance, which is its 
object. The appearance itself is an intuition but it does not contain 
the sensation through which it is represented. It contains some-
thing that corresponds to sensation. The object must therefore be 
a pure representation, and representing an appearance is an a pri-
ori affair although it is not possible without sensation. Neverthe-
less, cognition does use sensation as its matter in the act of think-
ing its object. One cannot overemphasize the importance of un-
derstanding this correctly, because in the Transcendental Deduc-
tions we need to know what Kant means by empirical intuition. 
Thus, we need to keep in mind that cognition in the strict sense 
requires sensation and empirical intuition but the appearance does 
not contain anything empirical. 
In order to be absolutely sure that we understand the 
meaning of the terms ‘sensation’ and ‘appearance’ correctly, let 
us use the above quotes from the Aesthetic and the Analytic as 
our guide: 1) An intuition is empirical if sensation is contained 
therein. 2) The appearance contains something that corresponds to 
sensation. 3) Sensation is the matter of sensible cognition. If we 
take these remarks seriously, we come to the conclusion that an 
appearance is an intuition but not an empirical intuition, and that 
an empirical intuition contains sensations whereas an appearance 
does not. 
At the face of it, this may seem strange, but when we 
keep in mind what Kant has said in the Transcendental Aesthetic, 
a closer look will clarify the possible obscurity. His new concep-
tion of the object given to thought would not be possible without 
a new conception of representing and inner sense. Kant’s view is 
not that we receive ideas of objects through outer sense, and he 
adopts Tetens’ solution to Reid’s challenge by thinking that we 
receive through outer sense mental impressions that are not ideas 
of objects. When the mind acts on the resulting intuition, it is able 
to represent appearances, which it then can think by acting on the 
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resulting intuition. Kant’s solution is more sophisticated than 
Tetens’ but the basic idea is the same. 
Perhaps I should try to illustrate this with an example. 
Consider perceiving an animal with a camouflage; say a gecko, 
which blends perfectly into the background. Maybe you first see 
the gecko and then lose sight of it, although you know that the 
animal has not gone anywhere and that you are just unable to 
locate it. You have the same sensations as you did before but you 
do not perceive the object you did a moment ago. If you can then 
spot the animal again, nothing empirical has changed in your 
intuition. What has changed is what you do with your empirical 
intuition. If you cannot grasp the outline of the animal, you do not 
perceive it, despite the fact that you do have the necessary empiri-
cal matter for representing the appearance. 
What I hope this example shows is that one has to act in 
order to represent the shape of the object of perception, in this 
case the gecko. If this is so, then it is obvious that the act is di-
rected at the a priori intuition and that the subject is affected by 
this act. When you spot the animal again, your inner state is mod-
ified, and yet there is no change in outer affection. Thus, while it 
is true that you cannot represent an appearance without an empiri-
cal intuition, it is possible to have an empirical intuition without 
representing an appearance. Representing an appearance requires 
an act, and the act changes the intuition you represent in inner 
sense. 
Our sensations thus “suggest”, as Reid would say, the ob-
jects of perception. Reid’s influence is evident here, for the em-
pirical intuition, which contains the sensations, represents the 
object immediately without an idea. But on the other hand, for 
Kant the appearance is transcendentally ideal, and it is dependent 
on mental impressions. This makes his position fundamentally 
different from Reid’s common sense account. 
What, then, is the relation of conscious sensations to non-
conscious mental impressions? Here we can see the influence of 
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Tetens. Remember that inner action is needed for the apprehen-
sion of an appearance, and that the appearance itself is not com-
posed of the matter of empirical intuition: it does not contain any-
thing empirical. Nevertheless, without outer affection, i.e. without 
impressions, the apprehension would, of course, be impossible. 
Now, as we saw in section 1.1, Tetens argued that our sensations, 
although subjective in nature, depend on objective representa-
tions. This is also Reid’s position, but unlike Reid, Tetens thought 
that we need mental impressions for objective representations. Let 
me present Tetens’ view through Kant’s terminology. According 
to Tetens, an empirically reproducible representation of the colour 
green presupposes the production of an image of this colour. In 
other words, green impressions are not empirically reproducible 
representations, but the sensation of green is. On the other hand, 
impressions cannot be made into sensations directly. The produc-
tion of an image of green presupposes a representation of a green 
object. As we saw, Tetens thought that the distinguishability of 
the green colour of a leaf from the motion of the leaf presupposes 
that at least one of these representations has previously occurred 
in connection with some other representation. Thus, an empirical-
ly reproducible sensation cannot be contained in an appearance, 
and the objective representation of an appearance is prior to the 
subjective sensation. 
This view is not surprising, considering the historical 
context. Like Wolff, Tetens thinks that distinguishing objects is 
prior to distinguishing the self, i.e. that consciousness of the self 
depends on consciousness of objects. As we shall see later, Tetens 
thinks that the higher acts of cognition are reducible to the very 
same acts which produce images, so sensations too should be 
dependent on representing objects. In other words, the distin-
guishability of an object is prior to the distinguishability of a sen-
sation. 
We therefore get from impressions to sensations only 
through representations of objects. The distinction between im-
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pressions and sensations is important to Kant, because empirical 
reproducibility entails generality: one cannot associate a present 
empirical representation with a past representation unless one is 
capable of abstraction. Abstraction, on the other hand, presuppos-
es composites, and reproducibility therefore presupposes the abil-
ity to represent a manifold in one representation. In other words, 
reproducibility presupposes consciousness (but not self-
consciousness). Sensations and appearances can be empirically 
reproduced, impressions cannot. 
We shall see later how empirical reproducibility is rele-
vant to transcendental philosophy. Here it will suffice to under-
stand that cognition proper is directed at the object of apprehen-
sion, and that this object is in itself a pure intuition.  
Pure intuitions and pure concepts thus have a parallel 
function of providing the form of representation in cognition. 
Representing an object and thinking an object depend on pure 
intuitions and pure concepts respectively: 
 
Thus pure intuition contains merely the form under which 
something is intuited, and pure concept only the form of 
thinking of an object in general. Only pure intuitions or con-





It is in pure a priori representations that Kant’s interest 
lies, and pure representations contain merely the form of cogni-
tion. There has been an important development in the first para-
graph of the introduction. We now know that the appearances we 
represent in our inner sense are not empirical intuitions but pure 
intuitions. They are pure intuitions, which contain only the form 
under which something can be represented. I emphasize the three 
words here, because they are essential in our task of understand-
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ing how a transcendental deduction can prove that the categories 
– pure concepts – can be valid for everything that can come be-
fore our senses. The answer depends on the correct understanding 
of what our appearances contain. In other words, for the purpose 
of understanding the Transcendental Deductions, we need to un-
derstand correctly the nature of the pure act of representing some-
thing. It is also noteworthy that it is said to be under the form 
contained in pure intuitions that something is represented, be-
cause nothing can be represented under the forms of our senses, 
i.e. time and space. What time and space contain is represented in 
time and space, not under them. 
In the second paragraph Kant turns our attention to the 
origin of cognition: 
 
If we call the receptivity of our mind to receive representa-
tions insofar as it is affected in some way sensibility, then on 
the contrary the faculty for bringing forth representations it-




We are now moving to the metaphysical distinction be-
tween sensibility and understanding. I already noted above that 
neither the logical nor the metaphysical distinction reveals the 
true nature of sensibility and understanding, which concerns 
origin and content. This is also manifested in the formulation of 
Kant’s statement: if we call our receptivity sensibility, then the 
spontaneity is the understanding. Kant will now guide the reader 
to the science of the spontaneity of our mind. This science has 
both a metaphysical and a transcendental strand, and the latter 
will reveal the true nature of the distinction between sensibility 
and understanding. 
First Kant states that our cognition (in the strict sense of 
the word, as it is logic, that we are dealing with here) cannot be 
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mere thought but necessarily involves both intuitions and affec-
tion on the one hand, and concepts and spontaneity on the other: 
 
It comes along with our nature that intuition can never be oth-
er than sensible, i.e., that it contains only the way in which we 
are affected by objects. The faculty for thinking of objects of 
sensible intuition, on the contrary, is the understanding. Nei-
ther of these properties is to be preferred to the other. Without 
sensibility no object would be given to us, and without under-
standing none would be thought. Thoughts without content 
are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. 
 
Sensibility and understanding are thus separate faculties 
that nevertheless must co-operate in cognition. In order to be able 
to understand their co-operation, we must investigate their rules: 
 
It is just as necessary to make the mind’s concepts sensible 
(i.e., to add an object to them in intuition) as it is to make its 
intuitions understandable (i.e., to bring them under concepts). 
Further, these two faculties or capacities cannot exchange 
their functions. The understanding is not capable of intuiting 
anything, and the senses are not capable of thinking anything. 
Only from their unification can cognition arise. But on this 
account one must not mix up their roles, rather one has great 
cause to separate them carefully from each other and distin-
guish them. Hence we distinguish the science of the rules of 
sensibility in general, i.e., aesthetic, from the science of the 




The science of the rules of the understanding, of course, 
is logic, and in transcendental logic we are interested in the form 
of thinking an object in general, i.e. in the content of pure con-
cepts. After this paragraph Kant moves to consider the science of 
the rules of the understanding. There is no need to go through the 
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remainder of the Introduction in detail, and I will here present 
only the main points. 
Logic is first divided into general and particular logic. 
General logic abstracts from all content of cognition and consid-
ers only the form of thinking in general, whereas particular logic 
contains the rules for correctly thinking about a certain kind of 
objects.
186
 Kant considers the possibility that there might be a 
distinction between pure and empirical thinking of objects. If 
there is such a distinction, then there is also a particular logic that 
concerns the pure thinking of objects: 
 
In this case there would be a logic in which one did not ab-
stract from all content of cognition; for that logic that con-
tained merely the rules of the pure thinking of an object 
would exclude all those cognitions that were of empirical 
content. It would therefore concern the origin of our cogni-





This particular logic would be called transcendental logic, 
because transcendental cognition is one by means of which we 
cognize that and how certain representations are applied or possi-
ble entirely a priori.
188
 Transcendental logic would determine the 
origin, the domain, and the objective validity of pure a priori 
cognition of the understanding and reason.
189
 This logic is divided 
into analytic and dialectic, of which the Transcendental Analytic 
“expounds the elements of the pure cognition of the understand-
ing and the principles without which no object can be thought at 
all”.
190
 Kant goes on to note that the Transcendental Analytic is 
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the logic of truth. General logic cannot provide a general criterion 
of truth, because truth concerns the content of cognition, and gen-
eral logic abstracts from all content of cognition.
191
 Whereas gen-
eral logic considers only the form, in transcendental logic, form is 
not the concern, just as in the Transcendental Aesthetic it was not 
the form of pure intuition (which is the business of geometry and 
pure mechanics) but the origin and content of representations that 
was investigated. Transcendental aesthetic is the science of the a 
priori conditions of receptivity, transcendental analytic is the 
science of the a priori conditions of spontaneity. The Transcen-
dental Analytic, then, investigates the origin and content of our 
pure a priori concepts of the understanding. 
After this guide to the science of transcendental analytic 
Kant can proceed to the task of finding the categories.  
 
 
3.2. The Logical Use of the Understanding 
 
The key to finding the pure a priori concepts of the un-
derstanding and proving their objective reality and validity is the 
analysis of mental activity. Up to this point discussion on mental 
activity in cognition has been limited and Kant has concentrated 
on the logical distinction between sensibility and understanding. 
In the Transcendental Aesthetic mental activity was not analysed 
at all. Although apprehension necessarily involves mental action 
in Kant, the proper place to analyse it was not in the Aesthetic, as 
it does not deal with perceptual awareness but with the a priori 
conditions of receptivity, so in that part of the Critique it was 
merely noted that time is the form of inner sense. From this fact it 
is evident that the awareness of our own mental activity must 
have some connection with time (note that this view is the only 
significant new development in the Aesthetic as compared to the 
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Dissertation). Tetens did indeed start his own analysis of mental 
activity from perception and proceeded from there to concepts, 
judgements and inferences, but his analysis is ”subjective and 
empirical” whereas Kant's is ”objective and transcendental”, as 
Kant puts it in one of his reflections.
192
 If an analysis of mental 
activity is to provide an answer to the question regarding the rela-
tion between pure a priori concepts and the objects of sensibility, 
then we should start this analysis from the understanding, not 
from sensibility. 
The place to start is the list of our basic concepts. The 
Analytic aims at finding all pure elementary concepts of the un-
derstanding, and the Analytic of Concepts is an analysis of the 
faculty of understanding itself.
193
 This Analytic will therefore 
reveal the true nature of the distinction between sensibility and 
understanding, and this cannot be achieved by distinguishing 
between receptivity of impressions and spontaneity of concepts. It 
concerns origin and content. Kant states the aim of this analysis in 
the following:  
 
We will therefore pursue the pure concepts into their first 
seeds and predispositions in the human understanding, where 
they lie ready, until with the opportunity of experience they 
are finally developed and exhibited in their clarity by the very 
same understanding, liberated from the empirical conditions 




In this prospectus, it is hinted that just as time and space, 
the categories too are acquired concepts, so in this respect Kant’s 
position has not changed from the Dissertation. The first seeds 
and predispositions (Keime und Anlagen) of these concepts lie 
ready in the human understanding, (we may compare this with the 
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remark that the form of the appearances “must all lie ready for it 
in the mind a priori”)
195
 so that the very same understanding can 
develop them and exhibit them in their clarity. Just as the first 
seeds of our representations of space and time, namely the forms 
of outer and inner sense, are not yet representations of space and 
time, let alone concepts of space and time, the first seeds of the 
categories are not concepts. The concepts will have to be acquired 
on the occasion of experience. 
However, mere observation of these concepts arising on 
the occasion of experience is not the method of transcendental 
philosophy. It will rather have to seek its concepts in accordance 
with a principle, and the key to fulfilling this task is the absolute 
unity of the understanding.
196
 Here again Kant can expect his 
reader to agree. As I have noted, according to Wolff the soul is a 
simple substance, so the claim that the understanding, a faculty of 
the soul, is an absolute unity, would hardly raise objections by the 
Wolffians. 
Kant begins the Transcendental Analytic by considering 
the logical use of the understanding. He says that until now he has 
explained the understanding only negatively as a non-sensible 
faculty. And as there can be no human intuition that would be 
independent of sensibility, the understanding is not a faculty of 
intuition. The conclusion then is that the cognition of human un-
derstanding is cognition through concepts. Now, Kant says that 
whereas sensible intuition rests on affections, concepts depend on 
functions, and by a function Kant understands “the unity of the 
action of ordering different representations under a common 
one.”
197
 Concepts are thereby contrasted with intuitions in regard 
to their ground. Concepts have their ground on the spontaneity of 
thinking; sensible intuitions have theirs on the receptivity of im-
pressions. Through an analysis of this ground of spontaneity Kant 
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will now argue that we are able to find the categories according to 
a principle, so that we can be certain that these concepts, and 
these alone, are the basic concepts of the pure understanding. This 
is what he calls a Leitfaden to the discovery of all pure concepts 
of the understanding.
198
 Let us now analyse this argument. 
Kant begins his argument by stating that the only use of 
concepts is the use of judging by means of them, which is, of 
course, the view of logic, where judgements are formed by com-
bining concepts, and inferences are made by combining judg-
ments. Next, he states that both concepts and judgements are me-
diate representations of objects; only intuitions can be immediate-
ly related to their objects. Judgements and concepts are therefore 
representations of representations. In order to understand why this 
is brought up we need to remind ourselves that we are now deal-
ing with transcendental logic. General logic abstracts from all 
relation of cognition to its object and considers only the logical 
form in the relation of cognitions to one another, but in transcen-
dental logic the focus is on the origin and content of cognition. 
Transcendental logic concerns “the origin of our cognitions of 
objects insofar as that cannot be ascribed to the objects”.
199
 In 
regard to this origin we must consider the manner in which cogni-
tion refers to its object, and in concepts and judgements this ref-
erence is mediate. This manner of reference can be put as follows: 
 
In every judgment there is a concept that holds of many, and 
that among this many also comprehends a given representa-




What Kant has in mind here is based on the distinction 
between what Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole called the com-
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prehension and extension of a universal idea. The comprehension 
of an idea consists in “the attributes that it contains in itself, and 
that cannot be removed without destroying the idea.”
201
 The com-
prehension of the idea of a triangle, for example, contains exten-
sion, shape, three lines etc. To the extension of an idea, on the 
other hand, belong “the subjects to which this idea applies.”
202
 
For example, the idea of a triangle in general has under its exten-
sion all the different species of triangles. In The Jäsche Logic 
Kant refers to this distinction by distinguishing between the con-
tent and the extension of concepts: 
 
Every concept, as partial concept, is contained in the repre-
sentation of things; as ground of cognition, i.e., as mark, 
these things are contained under it. In the former respect eve-




It is the extension of a concept, i.e., concept as ground of 
cognition that will interest us here. Kant elaborates this further in 
The Jäsche Logic: 
 
As one says of a ground in general that it contains the conse-
quence under itself, so can one also say of the concept that as 
ground of cognition it contains all those things under itself 
from which it has been abstracted, e.g., the concept of metal 
contains under itself gold, silver, copper, etc. For since every 
concept, as a universally valid representation, contains that 
which is common to several representations of various things, 
all these things, which are to this extent contained under it, 
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Now, Kant argues that all judgements are functions of 
unity among our representations: “instead of an immediate repre-
sentation a higher one, which comprehends this and other repre-
sentations under itself, is used for the cognition of the object, and 
many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one.”
205
 
Kant’s example is the judgement “All bodies are divisible.” The 
concept of divisible is related to other concepts, but in this 
judgement it is particularly related to the concept of body (it is 
stated that the concept of divisible contains the concept of body 
under it). The concept of body, in turn, is related to “certain ap-
pearances that come before us” (these appearances are under the 
concept of body).
206
 The judgement is, therefore, a representation 
of a representation. 
Now, in forming a judgement we have to perform an act 
in which we bring unity to different representations, in our exam-
ple to the concepts of divisible and body. This, however, can only 
be done if we have the material ready for such an act. The concept 
of body is in itself a unity, and this unity has to be brought to this 
representation through an act in the same manner as we bring 
unity to the judgement. Both concepts and judgements thus rest 
on functions of the understanding. 
On the other hand, all acts of the understanding can be 
reduced to judging. For consider the concept of body in the above 
example. Kant notes that as predicates of possible judgements, 
concepts “are related to some representation of a still undeter-
mined object.”
207
 The concept of body is a concept “only because 
other representations are contained under it by means of which it 
can be related to objects.”
208
 The concept of body is therefore a 
predicate for a possible judgement, e.g., “Every metal is a body.” 
Obviously, the same reasoning applies here as above: both the 
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possible judgement and the concept of metal require a function of 
the understanding. The understanding can therefore be represent-
ed as a faculty for judging, and all functions of the understanding 
can be found if one can find all functions of unity in judgements. 
We may now compare Kant’s conclusion with Tetens’ 
view on mental action. Tetens began his analysis of cognitive 
action from perception and concluded that all higher cognitive 
acts can be reduced to the act from which perception arises. Now 
we see that also Kant thought that a reduction of cognitive acts is 
possible, but his starting-point for this reduction is in the under-
standing and in its ability to form judgements. As he thinks that 
general logic has already advanced to such a high level of perfec-
tion, he thinks that he is in a position to give an exhaustive list of 
logical functions in judgements, through which then the functions 
of the understanding can be represented. 
 
 
3.3. Subsumption and the Categories 
 
I will omit discussion on § 9,
209
 where Kant presents the 
table of judgements. My interest here lies more in the structure of 
Kant’s argumentation than in the details, so I will present neither 
the table of judgements nor that of the categories. What matters to 
us at the present context is not so much what the categories are 
but how they can be found. 
Now, Kant notes that whereas in general logic one ab-
stracts from all content, in transcendental logic we are concerned 
with the relation of the representation to its object. In other words, 
we must take into account that at some point our mediate repre-
sentations must have an immediate relation to an object. The 
question then arises: How does one subsume objects under con-
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cepts? How do I form a judgement that, e.g., that pen on top of 
my copy of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft is black? The pen is an 
appearance and appearances are intuitions, not concepts. Kant 
thinks that the answer to this question will reveal a connection 
between the categories and the form of judgement. 
In order to solve the problem of subsumption, Kant will 
have to answer two questions. The first of these questions is: what 
is given to thought, i.e. what is the content of the appearances? 
The second question is: what is the content of our concepts? As 
he is approaching the problem from the side of the understanding, 
it is the latter of these questions that Kant will answer first. How-
ever, I will, perhaps a bit annoyingly, keep the issue of the con-
tent of the appearances alive by reminding the reader of it now 
and then. I will do so because it is vitally important to understand 
correctly what is said in section 10, and because I think that Kant 
expected his reader to keep the issue in mind. 
The section begins as follows: 
 
As has already been frequently said, general logic abstracts 
from all content of cognition, and expects that representations 
will be given to it from elsewhere, wherever this may be, in 
order to transform them into concepts analytically. Transcen-
dental logic, on the contrary, has a manifold of sensibility that 
lies before it a priori, which the transcendental aesthetic has 
offered to it, in order to provide the pure concepts of the un-
derstanding with matter, without which they would be with-




In general logic we abstract from the content of represen-
tations but in transcendental logic we deal with the content of our 
pure concepts. Based on what Kant has said so far, I concluded 
above that the apprehension of an appearance requires an act and 
that although this act must use empirical matter, representing an 
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appearance rests on acting on pure intuition. In the above quote 
Kant says that transcendental logic has a “manifold of sensibility 
that lies before it a priori”. This pure a priori manifold is what 
must be acted on in order for us to be able to represent an appear-
ance. But again we must be patient and postpone our discussion 
on this act. At this point we are not yet interested in what is given 
to thought through sensibility – and how it is given – but in the 
content of the pure concepts of the understanding. 
These concepts would be without any content were it not 
for the pure manifold of sensibility, but the mind must act on the 
pure manifold in order to cognize an object: 
 
Now space and time contain a manifold of pure a priori intui-
tion, but belong nevertheless among the conditions of the re-
ceptivity of the mind, under which alone it can receive repre-
sentations of objects, and thus they must always also affect 
the concept of these objects. Only the spontaneity of our 
thought requires that this manifold first be gone through, tak-
en up, and combined in a certain way in order for a cognition 




It is here that Kant first takes spontaneity into scrutiny, 
and the spontaneity required for cognition is termed synthesis. 
Synthesis will be dealt with in greater detail at a later stage, but 
here its introduction serves the purpose of discovering the link 
between the function of the understanding in forming judgements 
on the one hand, and in relating concepts to objects on the other. 
In the second paragraph of § 10 Kant will explain, in an introduc-
tory manner, what synthesis is. 
Synthesis is first defined in general terms: 
 
By synthesis in the most general sense, however, I understand 
the action of putting different representations together with 
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As I noted in the Introduction, in the Leibnizian-Wolffian 
philosophy perceptions are representations of composites in the 
simple, and Wolff thought that even our sensations are of this 
nature.
213
 Here Kant defines synthesis in general as that act 
through which a manifold of representations is put together and 
comprehended in one cognition. We have learned earlier that 
appearances are represented in inner sense and that all cognition 
thus necessarily involves an act. We have also learned that the 
understanding through its concepts represents a manifold in one 
cognition. Now it is said that the act through which a manifold is 
represented in one cognition is synthesis. This statement is ex-
pressed in very abstract terms, and based on what Kant has said 
so far, his reader would, I think, be inclined to think that like 
Wolff, Kant is making a general statement that cognition in the 
broad sense necessarily involves synthesis. Without synthesis 
cognition would be without content. We may here also note that 
synthesis, being a mental act, affects inner sense, and our con-
sciousness of the manifold is thus represented in inner sense.  
Now, the manifold that gets to be represented in one cog-
nition need not be empirical: 
 
Such a synthesis is pure if the manifold is given not empiri-
cally but a priori (as is that in space and time). 
 
Pure synthesis can be taken either in the broad or strict 
sense. Consider my example of the gecko: it is obvious that in 
perceiving the gecko, the representation of its shape requires a 
pure synthesis, because in it a pure manifold of space is repre-
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sented in one cognition. But again, here the interest lies not in the 
appearances and their content but in the content of our concepts, 
and in particular in the content of the pure concepts of the under-
standing. Thus, although representing an appearance requires a 
pure synthesis, we now concentrate on the pure synthesis required 
for concepts. 
Next Kant explains that the content of concepts must 
originate from synthesis: 
 
Prior to all analysis of our representations these must first be 
given, and no concepts can arise analytically as far as the con-
tent is concerned. The synthesis of a manifold, however, 
(whether it be given empirically or a priori) first brings forth 
a cognition, which to be sure may initially still be raw and 
confused, and thus in need of analysis; yet the synthesis alone 
is that which properly collects the elements for cognitions and 
unifies them into a certain content; it is therefore the first 
thing to which we have to attend if we wish to judge about the 
first origin of our cognition. 
 
The origin of our pure concepts of the understanding 
therefore lies in pure synthesis. As synthesis is mental action, this 
origin has to do with our mental faculties, and although the origin 
as such is not yet our concern, Kant will have to make a prelimi-
nary distinction concerning the origin of our cognition: 
 
Synthesis in general is, as we shall subsequently see, the mere 
effect of the imagination, of a blind though indispensable 
function of the soul, without which we would have no cogni-
tion at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious. Yet to 
bring this synthesis to concepts is a function of the under-
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Here Kant makes the distinction between the broad and 
narrow sense of the word ‘cognition’, which shows that he does 
indeed use the term in a similar way than Wolff does.
 215
 It also 
shows that synthesis in general does, as I have suggested, have in 
its scope mere perceptual awareness. Synthesis in general is said 
to be the mere effect of the imagination, and without the synthesis 
of the imagination, as we have concluded, there would be no cog-
nition at all – no representation of objects. Accordingly, the un-
derstanding is not involved in the synthesis required for represent-
ing appearances. It is only the job of bringing this synthesis to 
concepts that is left to the understanding, and it provides cogni-
tion in the proper sense. 
Kant thinks that by discovering a link between the logical 
function of the understanding in judgements and the function in 
connecting our intuition with thought, we can find the categories 
in accordance with a principle. His argument for this is brief, and 
he presents it before any painstaking analysis of the different fac-
ulties of the mind. Presumably then, not much will be needed for 
understanding his point. Let us, then, first consider what has been 
said so far: First of all, the Transcendental Aesthetic has shown 
that time and space are a priori intuitions and that although we 
are affected by objects outside us through our receptivity, this 
receptivity alone does not provide us with representations of ob-
jects. Rather, the mind must be active in representing appearances 
in order to be able to represent their spatial and temporal charac-
teristics. Kant has criticized Wolff for considering the distinction 
between sensibility and understanding as merely logical. In his 
view, it is transcendental and does not concern merely the form of 
distinctness and indistinctness. On the other hand, Kant has not 
given us any reason to think that he does not subscribe to the 
standard view according to which sensibility gives us representa-
tions of objects through an act, and according to which the under-
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standing is the ability to think these objects through apperception. 
On the contrary, when we look closely on what Kant says, we see 
that although representing an appearance does indeed require a 
pure synthesis, this synthesis is not a synthesis of the understand-
ing. So when we are now about to see how he thinks that the un-
derstanding can relate its thought to objects of sensibility, we 
should assume that he thinks that the understanding has empirical 
objects given independently of any functions of the understanding 
through a synthesis of the imagination. In fact, Kant makes a dis-
tinction between synthesis in general, which is the mere effect of 
the imagination, and what he calls bringing this synthesis to con-
cepts, which pertains to the understanding. By means of the latter, 
he says, this synthesis first provides cognition in the proper sense. 
We may thus safely conclude that the synthesis required for per-
ceptual awareness is a mere effect of the imagination, and that 
thinking the appearances requires that this synthesis is brought to 
concepts. If the synthesis were not brought to concepts, the con-
cepts, as mediate representations, could never refer to the objects 
of sensibility. 
Kant has now given us the necessary introduction to the 
Metaphysical Deduction. We have learned that the action of syn-
thesis is a requirement of all cognition. Synthesis has been divid-
ed into empirical and pure synthesis. Our interest lies in pure syn-
thesis. As to the origin of synthesis it has been said that synthesis 
in general is the mere effect of the imagination. However, we are 
currently interested in the synthesis which brings content to our 
concepts. In particular we are interested in the origin of the con-
tent of our pure concepts, and Kant has said that bringing synthe-
sis to concepts is the work of the understanding. We should thus 
expect that pure synthesis of the imagination gives pure concepts 
their content but cannot as such yield those concepts. Pure con-
cepts require that the pure synthesis of imagination is brought to 
concepts, and this is the work of the understanding. 
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We should thus investigate how the understanding does 
bring pure synthesis to concepts: 
 
Now pure synthesis, generally represented, yields the pure 




We have seen that the ability to represent appearances re-
quires a pure synthesis, but this synthesis is not a synthesis gener-
ally represented. It is a pure synthesis of some particular a priori 
manifold. When we abstract from that manifold and represent the 
synthesis itself, we have a general representation of a pure syn-
thesis, hence a concept. Now we need to consider the nature of 
this generally represented pure synthesis:  
 
By this synthesis, however, I understand that which rests on a 
ground of synthetic unity a priori; thus our counting (as is es-
pecially noticeable in the case of large numbers) is a synthesis 
in accordance with concepts, since it takes place in accord-
ance with a common ground of unity (e.g., the decad). Under 





Kant uses counting as an example, and indeed, e.g., my 
thought that Kant died at the age of 79 presupposes a synthesis of 
units of ten. The unity in the unit of ten is an a priori synthetic 
unity and my thought would not be possible without this pure 
concept (the concept of number belongs to the category of all-
ness). 
Let me try to illustrate with an example what Kant tries to 
say. Suppose that I discover small holes in the ground, say 20 of 
them, and that I see an oak tree nearby with acorns under it. Sup-
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pose further that I want to drop one acorn in each hole. If I want 
to pick up as many acorns as there are holes in the ground I need 
to think. Instinct could drive me or an animal of some other spe-
cies to pick acorns and drop one in each hole, but it would be 
impossible to count the number of the holes and get as many 
acorns without thinking, for I can see 20 acorns without thinking, 
but I cannot intuit how many there are exactly – I cannot intuit 
their number. If there were 3 or 4 holes I, or some other animal, 
might succeed in the task without counting (without self-
conscious a priori synthesis, that is), but not with 20 acorns. In 
mere intuition I could not even differentiate between the possible 
perceptions of 21 and 20 acorns. Now, if I want to count the 
number of the acorns, what do I do? I consciously add the per-
ceived units (the acorns) one by one and order them in my 
thought to units of ten. This act, however, presupposes a pure 
concept of number, so this concept is the ground of the unity of 
the a priori synthesis involved. It is important to understand the 
difference between the two kinds of pure syntheses. According to 
Kant, the appearances, i.e. the acorns, are products of synthesis, 
and my representation of the acorns presupposes a synthesis of an 
a priori manifold, because they are spatiotemporal objects. Rep-
resenting them thus presupposes a pure synthesis in time and 
space, but my thought that there are 20 of them requires a new 
synthesis that presupposes the concept of number. 
I think we are now in a position to understand what Kant 
means by bringing the synthesis of imagination to concepts. Con-
sider the above example. The act of counting does not affect the 
empirical intuition through which the appearances are represent-
ed, and it leaves these appearances unaltered. In other words, my 
perceptual awareness remains the same when I count the acorns. 
Instead, in the act of counting I take the appearances, which are 
modifications of the mind, and form a new representation by 
means of a representation of the synthetic unity of number, thus 
by means of a pure concept. The perception of 20 acorns is not a 
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representation of these acorns as 20 acorns. The latter is only 
possible as a thought and it requires a pure synthesis of imagina-
tion, when I consciously add together the acorns in my thought, 
one by one. But this thought also requires a pure concept of num-
ber, which provides the ground of unity to the synthesis, and it 
presupposes that the empirical intuition is brought to concepts by 
bringing the synthesis of imagination to concepts. 
In the example of perceiving the gecko we saw that per-
ceiving an appearance depends on a pure synthesis through which 
we grasp the shape of the object. The appearance is a representa-
tion of a manifold in one representation. Each acorn is likewise a 
representation of a manifold in one representation, and I can per-
ceive their multitude in one representation. These representations 
require a pure synthesis without which I would perceive nothing: 
I would merely have impressions in space through outer sense 
without any objects and without any cognition. When I exercise 
the pure synthesis I represent appearances in inner sense and my 
sensibility is thus affected by my action, but the empirical matter 
is nowise affected by it. Through mere intuiting, however, I could 
never effect a representation of 20 acorns. Thus, those 20 appear-
ances must now be gone through, taken up, and combined in a 
certain way in order to make that cognition of them, as Kant will 
later describe the process. This synthesis is likewise pure but it 
does not make use of the pure manifold of space in the way the 
pure synthesis required for representing appearances does. This is 
evident from the difference between representing the multitude of 
(20) acorns in mere intuition and representing 20 acorns in 
thought. The synthesis in the latter uses the appearances but it 
yields something that the mere synthesis of appearances in space 
could not, and it consequently is a different kind of act. 
The difference between these syntheses is that the synthe-
sis of thought rests on a ground of some synthetic unity. The 
number ten is a pure concept and a synthetic unity. When I repre-
sent two units of ten, this representation rests on the a priori 
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ground of the synthetic unity of ten. This synthetic unity is a pure 
synthesis generally represented and it gives us the pure concept of 
the number ten. Under this concept, then, the unity in the synthe-
sis of the manifold becomes necessary. The difference between a 
pure synthesis (of imagination) in intuition on the one hand and 
the pure synthesis in thought on the other is that only the latter 
presupposes a synthesis generally represented. The former may 
rest on a priori synthetic unities, as we can see from the example 
of the intuition of a multitude of acorns. Representing an acorn 
presupposes an a priori synthetic unity, because without the sin-
gular representation of a pure manifold of space I could not repre-
sent an acorn (as was illustrated in the case of the gecko).
218
 
However, pure synthesis in intuition does not rest on a ground of 
synthetic unity a priori, because it is not a synthesis generally 
represented. It is only under a pure concept that the unity in the 
synthesis of the manifold becomes necessary. The representation 
of 20 acorns necessarily involves a pure synthesis in which two 
units of ten are added together. This synthesis is not a blind syn-
thesis: it not only effects a unity of representation but also pre-
supposes a pure synthetic unity. When I see a bunch of acorns and 
want to find out how many there are, I take as the ground of my 
counting the pure synthetic unity (of ten), without which my 
counting would be impossible.  By merely adding (blindly) one 
acorn to another I would not find out the number of them. 
Now we can perhaps understand more clearly the differ-
ence between the empirical intuition and its object. When I count 
acorns my counting is occasioned by the empirical data. The 
counting itself is a pure synthesis and the acorns provide the em-
pirical matter to which I ascribe my thought of 20 units. Likewise, 
when I represent an acorn, the pure synthesis is occasioned by the 
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sensations I have. The object itself contains something that corre-
sponds to my sensations and I ascribe my sensations to this object 
(without sensation the pure synthesis would be empty, and with-
out the acorns, my thought of 20 units would be empty). I see 
brown acorns but the acorns themselves are not brown, and how-
ever clear and distinct my sensation might be, it never could pro-
duce a representation of an acorn. 
We have thus advanced from synthesis in general to pure 
synthesis, and from pure synthesis to pure synthesis generally 
represented. Now we must look into what the role of pure con-
cepts in cognition. This is discussed in the next paragraph: 
 
Different representations are brought under one concept ana-
lytically (a business treated by general logic). Transcendental 
logic, however, teaches how to bring not the representations 




Kant puts emphasis on the words unter in the former sen-
tence, and auf in the latter. There are thus two contrasts Kant 
wants to communicate: The first is that unlike in general logic, in 
transcendental logic we do not deal with the relation of represen-
tations and concepts but with the pure synthesis of representations 
and concepts. The second is that unlike in general logic, in tran-
scendental logic we bring something to concepts, not under one 
concept. 
Unfortunately, Guyer and Wood translate both unter and 
auf  to ‘under’, which destroys Kant’s message. When we bring 
something to a concept, the concept will contain that something in 
it, not under it. As is noted in Jäsche Logic, the more a concept 
contains under it, the less it contains in itself, and conversely.
220
 
Consequently, if the pure concepts contain in themselves only the 
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pure synthesis generally represented, much will be contained 
under them. This we see in the following passage: 
 
The first thing that must be given to us a priori for the cogni-
tion of all objects, is the manifold of pure intuition; the syn-
thesis of this manifold by means of the imagination is the 




What Kant means by this is that the joint sphere of our 
pure concepts is the whole of possible objects of cognition, and 
we are thus seeking the a priori requirements of cognition of all 
objects. And as it is logic we are here dealing with, ‘cognition’ 
refers to cognition in the proper sense. The manifold of pure in-
tuition and its synthesis are sufficient a priori conditions of cog-
nition in the broad sense, and for this we need receptivity and 
imagination, but the understanding is needed for cognition of 
objects in the proper sense. 
We thus have two of the requirements for cognition in the 
proper sense in place. Sense provides us with the pure manifold, 
and imagination effects synthesis. Kant told us above that pure 
synthesis generally represented yields a pure concept under which 
unity in the synthesis of the manifold becomes necessary.
222
 This 
leads us to the third a priori requirement for the cognition of all 
objects: 
 
The concepts that give pure synthesis unity, and that consist 
solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity, 
are the third thing necessary for cognition of an object that 
comes before us, and they depend on the understanding.
223
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For cognition in the proper sense, we need a unity of syn-
thesis that the act itself produces. In other words, in order to think 
an appearance, we need a pure concept which contains a neces-
sary synthetic unity. Now the question becomes, how does the 
understanding give unity to pure synthesis? The key to answering 
this question is the unity of the understanding: 
 
The same function that gives unity to the different representa-
tions in a judgement also gives unity to the mere synthesis of 
different representations in an intuition, which, expressed 




It is based on an analytical unity that the extension of the 
concept of body is included in the extension of the concept of 
divisible, but the thought that all bodies are divisible involves 
something more, namely uniting these concepts in the form of 
judgement. This is evident from the fact that the judgements “All 
bodies are divisible” and “Something divisible is body” do not 
express the same thought, although they are based on the same 
analytical unity. This synthetic unity of a judgement, when it is 
expressed generally, is the pure concept of the understanding, in 
this case the relation being that of inherence and subsistence. 
Note that the same a priori synthesis is required also for the mere 
intuiting of an appearance. Thus, my intuition in which brown 
colour inheres in the appearance of an acorn, is produced through 
the same pure synthesis through which I think that all bodies are 
divisible. The inherence in mere intuition is not, of course, a 
product of a concept, but the concept expresses generally the syn-
thesis through which it is represented.  
We saw earlier that both concepts and judgments rest on 
functions of the understanding, and that all acts of the understand-
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ing are reducible to judging. Consider again this passage from A 
68/ B 93: 
 
So in the judgement, e.g., “All bodies are divisible,” the con-
cept of the divisible is related to various other concepts; 
among these, however, it is here particularly related to the 
concept of body, and this in turn is related to certain appear-
ances that come before us. 
 
Now we have learned that the subsumption of all appear-
ances under concepts depends on the same function of the under-
standing on which the judgments we make depend. The unity by 
means of which certain appearances can be subsumed under the 
concept of body is the same unity by means of which we form the 
judgment “All bodies are divisible”. Subsumption of appearances 
under concepts thus depends on pure concepts of the understand-
ing, which have now been traced back to judgments through a 
transcendental inquiry: 
 
The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of 
the very same actions through which it brings the logical form 
of a judgement into concepts by means of the analytical unity, 
also brings a transcendental content into its representations by 
means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in 
general, on account of which they are called pure concepts of 
the understanding that pertain to objects a priori; this can 
never be accomplished by general logic. 
 In such a way there arise exactly as many pure con-
cepts of the understanding, which apply to objects of intuition 
in general a priori, as there were logical functions of all pos-
sible judgments in the previous table; for the understanding is 
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In this way Kant has accomplished the first task of tran-
scendental logic. He has sought the pure concepts of the under-
standing in accordance with a principle and found them. Tetens’ 
challenge has thus been met. There is no longer any cause to ask 
whether it is just this list of concepts and no other that exhibits the 
basic concepts of the understanding. Kant has derived his list of 
pure concepts of the understanding according to a principle from 
the unity of the understanding, and he is confident that his list is 
exhaustive and correct. But this accomplishment is only the first 
step in Kant’s transcendental logic. He still has to answer the 
question that Tetens puts forth immediately after the first one: are 
they real ideas, which correspond to objects? And even further: 
will the theory that is built upon them be transcendent, in other 
words will it be applicable to non-sensible beings?
226
 In Tetens’ 
words, the first task is now the realization of these concepts, i.e. 
the task of showing that they correspond to real objects, and the 
second task is to determine the limits of their application. 
Before we move on to these questions, I should try to 
clarify further what has been said in the Metaphysical Deduction 
and how it should be interpreted. First of all, an objection may be 
raised against my reading that Kant's claim that a function gives 
unity to mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition 
indicates that he does after all think that the categories are in-
volved in mere perceptual awareness. But consider the example of 
counting acorns. The perceived acorns are indeed products of 
synthesis, but the act of counting requires another pure synthesis 
in intuition and this synthesis brings a transcendental content into 
the representations of the understanding. In fact, if Kant did mean 
that the function gives unity to the synthesis through which per-
ceptual awareness becomes possible, there would be no need for a 
further proof of the objective reality of the categories. The mere 
fact that we do think about appearances would prove that the cat-
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egories apply to them. But as one should expect, this is not the 
case, and as we shall shortly see, Kant thinks that “intuition by no 
means requires the functions of thinking.”
227
 
In my opinion, the difficulties which talented commenta-
tors have encountered in reading Kant, stem from the fact that 
Kant has been viewed as writing to a faceless prosperity. It has 
not been realized that ideas play no role in the Analytic of Con-
cepts. The Metaphysical Deduction becomes intelligible when we 
interpret Kant as thinking that perceptual awareness does not have 
intentional content and that we do not represent objects through 
ideas. Kant thinks that we act on the intuition given through our 
outer sense and sense this action through our inner sense. Accord-
ing to this conception, mental action can be directed at the object 
of representation, and the object can thus be used for representing 
another object. However, as I noted in section 1.3, the act by 
means of which we are acquainted with appearances does not 
contain direction toward an object. It is directed at the intuition 
containing a manifold of impressions and an a priori manifold of 
space. By means of the act, this intuition represents the appear-
ance, which is a modification of inner sense. An act of the under-
standing can then be directed at the appearance. An act of synthe-
sis is required for representing acorns, and another act of synthe-
sis is required for thinking their number. Only the latter kind of 
synthesis has been the object of scrutiny in the Metaphysical De-
duction, and in it Kant has concluded that in the act of thinking, 
the very same function that we use in judging gives the necessary 
unity to synthesis in intuition. 
Thus, the Metaphysical Deduction is by no means a series 
of bald assertions that cannot be made intelligible without the 
Transcendental Deduction, as Allison claims.
228
 Nor is there a 
circularity in which the findings of the Transcendental Deduction 
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are presupposed in the Metaphysical Deduction, as Longuenesse 
thinks.
229
 It is quite the opposite. The Metaphysical Deduction is a 
carefully thought and well written piece of argument, in which 
our spontaneity is isolated (on account of which it may be called a 
metaphysical deduction) and then distinguished into synthesis of 
the imagination on the one hand, and synthesis of the understand-
ing on the other. The latter synthesis is then taken into scrutiny 
and it is concluded that it requires concepts which consist solely 
in the representation of the necessary synthetic unity required for 
cognition in the proper sense. 
The unity of the action that yields these concepts can then 
be traced back to judgments. This argument is based on the meta-
physical distinction between receptivity and spontaneity, and it 
does not yet reveal the true nature of the understanding. Kant has 
not yet even mentioned apperception, which in the Transcenden-
tal Deduction is revealed to be the source of the unity, but there 
has not been any need for this either. Thus, the argument of the 
Metaphysical Deduction stands on its own, and it does not depend 
on the analysis that will be carried out in the Transcendental De-
duction. The assumptions for the argument are first of all that 
cognition requires a unity of a manifold and secondly that ulti-
mately the understanding is a unity. These assumptions are not 
hard to accept for an 18
th
 century philosopher, and the third one, a 
new conception of sensibility, has been argued for earlier in the 
Critique. When these assumptions are understood, all that is 
needed is attention to detail, and the argument is fairly easy to 
follow. 
 
                                                     
229




4. FROM THE METAPHYSICAL DEDUCTION TO THE 
TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION 
4.1. Preliminary Considerations 
 
An important thing to note concerning the Metaphysical 
Deduction is that it has left the question of the content of the ap-
pearances entirely open. When it was said that the function of the 
understanding gives unity to the synthesis of different representa-
tions in an intuition, it was not meant that by this the appearances 
are produced. Indeed, the application of this synthesis requires 
that there are appearances given to thought. The Metaphysical 
Deduction concerns the origin and content of the object of 
thought, not of the object of intuiting, and what Kant has shown 
in it is only that the categories are necessary for subsuming ap-
pearances under concepts. Therefore, although Kant has shown 
that the understanding necessarily uses the categories when it 
thinks about the appearances, it is obvious that the Metaphysical 
Deduction does not guarantee that the appearances themselves 
conform to the categories. It might as well be an illusion that the 
categories seem to apply to the appearances. The categories there-
fore need to be realized, i.e., Kant needs to show that they have 
real objects. 
In other words, the question is quid iuris; do we have the 
right to apply the categories to appearances? It is a question of the 
legitimacy of their use. Kant calls that through which the question 
of the legitimacy of the use of concepts can be answered, their 
deduction, and states that the use of a priori concepts always re-
quires such a deduction, because proofs from experience are not 
sufficient for the lawfulness of their use.
230
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Regarding the use of the concepts of space and time, a 
transcendental deduction was easy to achieve. Because objects 
can appear to us only by means of the pure forms of sensibility, 
space and time contain a priori the conditions of the possibility of 
objects as appearances, and the synthesis in them is thus objec-
tively valid. The sensible, however, is independent of the intelli-
gible, so things are more difficult regarding the categories: 
 
The categories of the understanding, on the contrary, do not 
represent to us the conditions under which objects can be giv-
en in intuition at all, hence objects can indeed appear to us 
without necessarily having to be related to functions of the 
understanding, and therefore without the understanding con-
taining their a priori conditions. Thus a difficulty is revealed 
here that we did not encounter in the field of sensibility, 
namely how subjective conditions of thinking should have ob-
jective validity, i.e., yield conditions of the possibility of all 
cognition of objects; for appearances can certainly be given in 




I concluded earlier that Kant does subscribe to the stand-
ard view of cognitive action, according to which cognition in the 
proper sense requires two acts, intuiting and thinking. Here my 
interpretation of Kant's view on the role of the function of the 
understanding in cognition, which I offered in the previous chap-
ter, is confirmed to be correct, for Kant says that “appearances 
can certainly be given in intuition without functions of the under-
standing”.  Kant thinks that the function of the understanding is 
required only for cognition in the proper sense, in which it gives 
the necessary unity to pure synthesis through the pure concepts of 
the understanding. This is evident, because he admits that appear-
ances do not require functions of the understanding although they 
do require a synthesis of a pure manifold. A function is the unity 
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of the action in ordering different representations under a com-
mon one, and the categories are concepts that give unity to the 
pure synthesis, so Kant's position is that appearances are given in 
intuition without the use of the categories. 
In the Metaphysical Deduction Kant showed us that all 
action of the understanding, even the act of subsuming appear-
ances under concepts, can be traced back to the act of judging. 
However, this is not enough to show that the categories, which 
are necessary for subsumption, have possible objects. The con-
cept of cause, for instance, could be “a mere fantasy of the 
brain”.
232
 This concept expresses a necessary connection between 
appearances, and it cannot arise empirically, but nothing that the 
Metaphysical Deduction has taught us can assure us of the validi-
ty of the thought of necessary connection between appearances. 
Although the categories provide the synthesis with a necessary 
unity, the necessity they offer could be a merely subjective neces-
sity.  
Kant makes a distinction between an empirical and a 
transcendental deduction. A transcendental deduction is an expla-
nation of the way in which concepts can relate to objects a priori. 
An empirical deduction, on the other hand, shows how a concept 
is acquired through experience and reflection on it. To seek an 
empirical deduction of the categories would be futile, because 
they have not borrowed anything from experience. Therefore, 
Kant concludes that if a deduction of these concepts is necessary, 
it must be transcendental.
233
 
On the other hand, Kant does not deem empirical consid-
erations to be unimportant. Although an empirical deduction 
would be impossible for the categories, an empirical investigation 
does have its merits even regarding the categories: 
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Nevertheless, in the case of these concepts, as in the case of 
all cognition, we can search in experience, if not for the prin-
ciple of their possibility, then for the occasional causes of 
their generation, where the impressions of the senses provide 
the first occasion for opening the entire power of cognition to 
them and for bringing about experience, which contains two 
very heterogeneous elements, namely a matter for cognition 
from the senses and a certain form for ordering it from the in-
ner source of pure intuition and thinking, which, on the occa-
sion of the former, are first brought into use and bring forth 
concepts. Such a tracing of the first endeavors of our power of 
cognition to ascend from individual perceptions to general 
concepts is without doubt of great utility, and the famous 





The point Kant is making here is that the method used by 
those philosophers inspired by Locke (Tetens for instance) cannot 
provide an answer to the question of the objective reality of the 
basic concepts of the understanding. So regarding Tetens’ own 
question of the realization of the basic concepts, we can conclude 
that his approach is doomed to fail. We should not, however, con-
clude that this makes his work unimportant. Indeed, Kant clearly 
thought that Tetens had made important discoveries that are even 
necessary for the deduction of the categories and that Tetens had 
provided the ground from which this deduction can be made, but 
the deduction itself needs to be transcendental and it cannot be 
carried through empirically. 
What Kant has to do in a transcendental deduction is to 
explore the gulf between impressions and concepts. In the Meta-
physical Deduction it was said that the imagination is what effects 
synthesis and that in thinking the understanding gives unity to this 
synthesis, from which arises concepts. Now Kant has to examine 
how the faculty of imagination effects synthesis and how the un-
derstanding gives unity to synthesis. 
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This will require an investigation which does not rely 
merely on observation, because through observation of the mind 
we can reveal only what appears through inner sense. In a tran-
scendental deduction we therefore need to learn about the action 
of the faculties behind inner sense. As I mentioned earlier, Wolff 
thought that there is a single fundamental cognitive force that acts 
through various cognitive faculties. The faculties are for Wolff 
active potencies
235
 that explain why it is possible for the soul to 
perform certain actions, but in themselves the faculties do not 
provide a sufficient reason for the actuality of action. For the lat-
ter a force needs to be postulated.
236
 Now, sensibility and under-
standing are faculties, but it will turn out that they are not original 
faculties and that in transcendental logic we need to analyse these 
faculties further. Kant needs to look behind those faculties in 
order to show the objective validity of the categories, but he can-
not do this in the same way Wolff had done. What Wolff had 
neglected was an inquiry into the origin and content of our repre-
sentations. He had proceeded from the simplicity of the soul, 
which provided the basis for the unity of cognition. Kant, on the 
other hand, must approach the problem of unity from the side of 
cognition, and here we may benefit from taking a glance at Te-
tens’ thoughts on faculties and cognitive forces. For also Tetens 
approached the problem of unity from the side of cognition, and 
although Tetens’ method relied on observation, he did also make 
inferences from his observations. Tetens was well aware of the a 
priori element of cognition. From that element, Kant must con-
tinue to what is transcendental, and we may benefit from taking a 
look at what Tetens’ position was. 
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4.2. Tetens on Cognitive Forces 
 
In chapter 1 I gave an overview on Tetens’ account of 
perceptual awareness. According to Tetens, feeling or sensing is 
the first requirement for cognition but it only gives us sensations 
that we can represent, nothing more. Through the faculty of rep-
resentation, which is the second requirement, we represent those 
sensations by forming images, but in Tetens’ theory the third 
requirement for cognition, the faculty of thinking, is inseparable 
from the faculty of representing in the sense that in forming a 
representation of an empirical object we have to make use of our 
ability to combine our perceptual data into a representation of the 
object. Only when all these three simple ingredients of the human 
cognitive power work together will cognition arise. 
Tetens’ analysis of the faculty of representation lists the 
same faculties that are included in Wolff’s lower faculty of cogni-
tion: imagination, the power of feigning and memory. However, it 
is easy to see that for Tetens the faculty of thinking, Wolff’s 
higher faculty of cognition, cannot be separated from the faculty 
of representation. In Wolff thinking arises from apperception 
through reflecting (i.e. comparing and distinguishing) on percep-
tions (i.e. consciousness of objects) which brings clarity to the 
manifold of representation. According to Tetens, by contrast, 
there would be no perceptions to be apperceived had the faculty 
of thinking not first combined the manifold of sensations into 
representational images. Thinking is, in fact, in his view already 
involved in perceiving. When we perceive something, there arises 
in us a thought of a relation between things, and the perceived 
object is distinguished from the rest of the sensible data. Perceiv-
ing is a form of judging and this separates it from mere feeling, 
which has as its object only the absolute in things. As the absolute 
can only be felt and represented, and the relative can only be 
thought, Tetens concludes that we will have to assume that per-
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ceiving is an expression of a fundamental force, the force of 
thinking.  
Wolff’s conception of cognition thus needs refining. In 
Wolff cognition requires apperception and perception, the latter 
being consciousness of a given object. Apperception is dependent 
on perception and perception in turn on distinguishing. Tetens’ 
point is that we would not be able to distinguish anything without 
the ability to combine sensations to general images because dis-
tinguishing involves a thought of a relation, and we cannot have a 
thought of a relation unless our mind itself has first combined the 
sensible data. This is because what we get from the senses alone 
is totally without relations. And if the mind cannot perceive rela-
tions, it can in fact perceive nothing at all. We therefore have to 
assume three separate fundamental cognitive forces: the force of 
feeling, the force of representing and the force of thinking. Not 
only is there a multiplicity of cognitive faculties but also a multi-
plicity of underlying forces. This at least is what we have to as-
sume when we are conducting an inquiry into the origin of cogni-
tion – strictly speaking, Tetens is inclined to the view that there is 
a single fundamental cognitive force that acts in three different 
directions at varying intensity.
237
  What concerns us here is that 
we need these three simple ingredients to explain how cognition 
is possible. Cognition is first possible when all of these three fun-
damental forces act together: “[T]hen [the impressions] are per-
ceived distinguished impressions, that is, impressions with which 
a thought connects through the force of thinking that they are 
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According to Tetens, the force of thinking expresses itself 
in distinguishing, in perceiving, in relating things to other things 
and in judging and reasoning. He thinks that all higher acts of 
thinking can be explained through an analysis of perceiving. Hav-
ing a thought that a branch is part of a whole tree, or that a house 
is next to a tower, or that the sun enlightens the day, requires not 
only having mere representations of these objects but having per-
ceived, distinguished representations of them. In order to be able 
to think that the branch is part of the whole tree one must first 
distinguish the branch and the whole tree and then think of the 
relation between them.
239
 Perceiving can be analysed into two 
acts: into prominent exhibiting and into thinking of the distin-
guishing characteristic.
240
 Thinking, on the other hand, is a com-
bination of relating and perceiving. When we think a relation, e.g. 
that two things are different from each other, we perceive the 
“relation itself, the distinguishing, comparing action of the 
soul”.
241
 This applies to all relations, e.g. the relation of the causal 
connection, of a predicate to a subject or of coexistence. Accord-
ing to Tetens, a complete thought of a relation between two things 
contains the following three simple acts: 1. the differentiating of 
one of the representations, 2. the differentiating of the other repre-
sentation, 3. the relating of these representations to each other.
242
 
All thinking is thus in the end perceiving. 
However, there are expressions of these acts of thought 
even before any perception of objects. In fact, Tetens thinks that 
the first acts of thought are prior to all distinguishing of objects. 
As a thought of a relation is an ens rationis that is produced by a 
force of the soul through which it compares representations which 
occupy our mind, this action will have as an effect a change in the 
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soul that will leave an imprint on it.
243
 We can thus make the fol-
lowing distinction: 
 
It is one thing to declare things to be identical or different 
from each other, and another thing to represent this thought, 
abstract from it, separate what is common to several relational 
thoughts and to pull out a general concept of this relational 




Every act of thought leaves an imprint on the soul that we 
can represent through inner sense, and these imprints can in turn 
become objects for thinking. In this way, the same acts of thought 
can occur at different levels. The first acts of thought, the “origi-
nal” relational thoughts, occur at an unconscious level, but by 
renewing the same acts of thought at higher levels the mind can 
develop representations to a point where perception and, after 
that, apperception become possible. These original thoughts in-
clude what Kant calls a priori intuitions, namely time and space, 
as well as thoughts of the causal relation, the relation of a predi-
cate to a subject and the relation of coexistence.
245
 However, 
these pre-perceptual thoughts are not concepts but acts whose 
effects we can feel. Through these acts arise representations of 
these acts, representations of relations, ideas of relations and fi-
nally concepts of relations.
246
 This view resembles Kant’s theory 
of the epigenesis of reason, which I will discuss later. 
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4.3. Kant’s Agreement and Disagreement with Tetens 
 
We saw earlier that already in the Inaugural Dissertation 
Kant thought that the categories are acquired concepts, but in that 
text Kant did not – indeed he could not – explain exactly how 
they are acquired. It seems that Tetens’ work helped him to ex-
plain this. 
Tetens’ answer is presented already in the Speculativische 
Philosophie. Leibniz had amended the famous dictum nil est in 
intellectu, quod non ante fuerit in sensu by adding: excepto intel-
lectu.
247
 Tetens thought that there is no need for this amendment, 
because the concepts of the understanding have their origin in our 
inner sensations, through which we can feel our own acts of 
thought. Tetens makes this remark in the context of a discussion 
regarding time and space, and he suggests that the concept of 
space is drawn not from outer sensations through abstraction but 
from the act of sensing several things next to each other. Accord-
ing to Tetens, the concept of a space in general (von einem Raum 
überhaupt) is a universal concept whereas the concept of space as 
the whole of space is a singular idea. Time, in like manner, has its 
origin in the act of sensing, but unlike space, time has its matter in 
inner as well as in outer sensation.
 248
 Tetens clearly was indebted 
to Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation there, but it seems that now in 
the Critique Kant, in turn, is indebted to Tetens, for Tetens pro-
vides the link between inner sense and the pure a priori concepts 
– the concepts of space and time and the categories. Tetens had 
proposed that the basic concepts are concepts of any possible 
understanding. If this is true and if these concepts are acquired 
concepts, as Tetens thought they are, then we must conclude that 
the mind acts according to universal rules. These rules we can 
then bring to concepts and thus acquire concepts that reflect how 
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the mind thinks. Tetens’ transcendent concepts could be described 
as concepts for thinking objects in general, for as we saw above, 
he thought that these concepts are valid both for the sensible and 
the intellectual. 
Interestingly, however, we can see now that Kant's ac-
count of cognitive action differs substantially from Tetens' ac-
count in one crucial respect. If the basic concepts are acquired 
concepts and nevertheless necessary for thinking objects in gen-
eral, then Kant must think that there is something fundamentally 
wrong in Tetens' conception of cognitive activity, for if there 
weren't, showing that the thinking of objects necessarily presup-
poses these concepts should at the same time be a sufficient de-
duction of them. Let us try if we can locate Tetens’ error. 
Tetens thought that all cognitive acts can be reduced to 
the act of perceiving, but Kant denies that this is the case. If 
showing that thinking necessarily presupposes pure a priori con-
cepts is not a sufficient deduction of these concepts, then in 
Kant's terms either the pure manifold, its synthesis, or the unity of 
this synthesis differs in intuition and thought. There are thus three 
possible candidates for the location of Tetens’ error. The pure 
manifold, however, clearly must be the same in intuition and 
thought: otherwise we could not think our intuitions. On the other 
hand, if the syntheses were to differ, it would seem to be impossi-
ble for the understanding to think the objects of sensibility, so 
ultimately only one potential candidate remains: the concepts that 
give the pure synthesis unity. Kant's view, then, seems to be (and 
this will be confirmed later) that the ground of unity in thinking is 
different from the ground of unity in intuition. Otherwise, since 
the categories are acquired concepts, the function of the under-
standing could be reduced to the a priori conditions of perception, 
as Tetens thought. 
Now, what Kant has to show in the Transcendental De-
duction is that despite this fundamental difference between the 
acts of intuiting and thinking, the objects of sensible intuition 
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“must accord with the conditions that the understanding requires 
for the synthetic unity of thinking”. In other words, Kant has to 
show that although the appearances are independent of the cate-
gories, they nevertheless must be such that the categories apply to 
them. That they do is not evident without a deduction: 
 
For appearances could after all be so constituted that the un-
derstanding would not find them in accord with the conditions 
of its unity, and everything would then lie in such a confusion 
that, e.g., in the succession of appearances nothing would of-
fer itself that would furnish a rule of synthesis and thus corre-
spond to the concepts of cause and effect, so that this concept 
would therefore be entirely empty, nugatory, and without sig-
nificance. Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our 





Kant insists that our experience of the regularity of ap-
pearances cannot prove the objective validity of the concept of 
cause and effect (or any of the other categories), because this 
concept “must either be grounded in the understanding complete-
ly a priori or else be entirely surrendered as a mere fantasy of the 
brain.”
250
 Appearances simply cannot provide a rule according to 
which the succession of appearances is necessary.  
Kant and Tetens are both committed to the view that the 
act of representing an object produces the object of an empirical 
representation by combining (or synthesising) the non-relational 
matter given to us through our receptivity of impressions. This 
empirical object consists in a modification represented in the 
mind, and this modification, in turn, has to be acted on, if we are 
to think this object. Senses provide us with a manifold of repre-
sentations but combining this manifold is a spontaneous action of 
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the mind without which no cognition could arise. This is a posi-
tion Kant and Tetens were forced to take as they both wanted to 
avoid (empirical) idealism and scepticism. Tetens clearly consid-
ered Hume’s sceptical challenge to be just as important and just 
as much in need of an answer as Kant did. And Tetens did indeed 
make an effort to answer Hume. The crux of his answer is that 
Hume did not take into account that in a causal relation we do 
consider the effect as depending upon the cause, and this is some-
thing that the mere association of ideas is insufficient to explain. 
The judgment of the understanding through which we declare 
objects as depending on other objects could not arise if the causal 
connection of ideas were nothing but a subjectively necessary 
association of the imagination.
251
 In fact Tetens had already gen-
eralized Hume’s problem: he thought that the causal connection is 
only an example of a relation between objects, and the general 
question is how the force of thinking can bring about relations 
between objects. For Kant the generalized question is a question 
of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements. 
Nevertheless, on the nature of the act of thought Kant 
disagrees with Tetens. According to Tetens, our thinking of ob-
jects arises when we distinguish ourselves from the objects we 
perceive. Kant thinks that this Wolffian conception of appercep-
tion must be altered, and now we must see how. 
 
 
4.4. Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the 
Categories 
 
Kant is now ready to tackle the question that he was una-
ble to answer in the Dissertation: how is the relation between a 
representation and its object possible? The answer is twofold: 
                                                     
251
 Tetens, Versuche, 316–317. For a more detailed discussion on Te-
tens’ answer to Hume see Manfred Kühn’s “Hume and Tetens”. 
From the Metaphysical Deduction to the Transcendental Deduction 
143 
 
There are only two possible cases in which synthetic repre-
sentation and its objects can come together, necessarily relate 
to each other, and, as it were, meet each other: Either if the 
object alone makes the representation possible, or if the repre-
sentation alone makes the object possible. If it is the first, 
then this relation is only empirical, and the representation is 
never possible a priori. And this is the case with appearances 
in respect of that in it which belongs to sensation. But if it is 
the second, then while the representation in itself (for we are 
not here talking about its causality by means of the will) does 
not produce its object as far as its existence is concerned, the 
representation is still determinant of the object a priori if it is 




Sensation in itself is a subjective representation but it is a 
representation that cannot be produced by the mind itself; it is 
made possible by something outside the power of representation. 
But in the case of outer representing the subjective sensation can 
be used as the matter of a synthetic representation in producing an 
appearance. In this appearance its matter, that which belongs or 
corresponds to sensation, is made possible through an object (out-
side our power of representation) alone, and this in the representa-
tion (in the appearance) is related empirically to the object outside 
our power of representation. 
However, in the Transcendental Deduction we are con-
cerned with the relation that an a priori representation can have to 
an object, and this is only possible when the representation alone 
makes its object possible. In this case the representation makes its 
object possible in the sense that through it alone the cognition is 
possible. Now, cognition is possible under two conditions: 
 
But there are two conditions under which alone the cognition 
of an object is possible: first, intuition, through which the ob-
ject is given, but only as an appearance; second, concept, 
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An intriguing question is evoked by this remark: does 
Kant speak of one or two objects here? Both interpretations seem 
to be possible. Consider the first case, namely intuition. The ap-
pearance is made possible through a representation, which Kant 
calls an empirical intuition. This intuition has both a matter and a 
form. Its form is a priori, and it is the condition under which 
alone the cognition of the appearance is possible.  This condition, 
as Kant notes, has been proved to “lie in the mind a priori as the 
ground of the form of objects.” In other words, the a priori form 
of an empirical intuition is the ground of the object of this empiri-
cal intuition, and this is how the a priori intuition makes possible 
the object of an empirical intuition, as an appearance. 
But what about the second case? What does an a priori 
concept make possible? Kant says that through it “an object is 
thought that corresponds to this intuition”, but what does the word 
“intuition” here refer to? The only instance of this word in the 
preceding sentence denotes the intuition, through which the ap-
pearance is given, but if this were meant, the concept would make 
possible the appearance, and this would be in contradiction with 
the standard view of cognition to which Kant has clearly commit-
ted himself. In this case there would be only one object, the ap-
pearance, and both the a priori intuition and the a priori concept 
would be conditions under which this object is represented. This, 
however, cannot be what Kant means, because he thinks that intu-
ition does not depend on the functions of the understanding. 
It will be revealed shortly that Kant means by the word 
“intuition” the appearance. The appearance itself is an intuition, 
and through an a priori concept an object is thought that corre-
sponds to the appearance. There are thus two objects: the appear-
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ance that is intuited, and an object that is thought. The latter ob-
ject is not an intuition, but rather corresponds to the intuited ap-
pearance. Now Kant asks whether this object has an a priori con-
dition, just as the appearance does: 
 
The question now is whether a priori concepts do not also 
precede, as conditions under which alone something can be, if 
not intuited, nevertheless thought as object in general, for 
then all empirical cognition of objects is necessarily in accord 
with such concepts, since without their presupposition noth-




We saw earlier that our thinking of objects presupposes 
pure a priori concepts, but we also saw that this thinking does not 
affect the appearances we perceive. When I think that the heat in 
a room is caused by a hot oven, my thought does not alter any-
thing in the appearances. Nevertheless, thinking does add some-
thing to these appearances, namely a connection that they do not 
have in mere intuition. It is true that even without the ability to 
think, I could be accustomed to connecting the heat of the room 
with a hot oven, but this would be mere association of appearanc-
es. That kind of connection would, of course, be useful to me, 
because through association I could learn to avoid touching the 
hot oven when I feel that the room is warm. However, this con-
nection would be merely conscious, not self-conscious. It would 
not be thinking.  
Suppose now that in my perceptual awareness the heat of 
the room has always occurred together with a hot oven, but that 
now the heat is due to some other factor. If I accidentally touched 
the oven, I would be surprised that it is cold. If I were a creature 
not endowed with an understanding, this occurrence would mere-
ly affect my faculty of imagination. If from now on the room 
would be warm without the oven being hot, I would cease to as-
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sociate the heat of the room with a hot oven, but I would not be 
conscious of this change. However, since I do have the ability to 
think, and since I would expect the heat of the room to be caused 
by a hot oven, I would start wondering why the room was warm 
despite the oven being cold. Perhaps I would observe that the sun 
shines through the window or that a central heating system has 
been installed to the building. It is this kind of consciousness that 
Kant would call experience. 
Experience is not a mere play of our representations; in 
experience we play with our representations. And now we have to 
ask, whether or not this play is mere fiction. In considering this 
question we need to remind ourselves that whereas the appear-
ances we represent are mere intuitions, thinking of those objects 
involves both intuition and concept: 
 
Now, however, all experience contains in addition to the intu-
ition of the senses, through which something is given, a con-
cept of an object that is given in intuition, or appears; hence 
concepts of objects in general lie at the ground of all experi-
ential cognition as a priori conditions; consequently the ob-
jective validity of the categories, as a priori concepts, rests on 
the fact that through them alone is experience possible (as far 




 In this quote Kant expresses the fundamental idea of the 
Transcendental Deduction: that there is a distinction between 
animal-like perception and human experience. To be able to un-
derstand this distinction correctly, we need to understand what 
kind of objects the appearances are. The appearances are objects 
of an empirical intuition. These objects are intuitions and they are 
given, although through an act of synthesis, to the mind as its 
modifications. They are thus pure intuitions and they require a 
pure manifold of sense and a pure synthesis of imagination. Expe-
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rience, however, contains something more: “a concept of an ob-
ject that is given in intuition, or appears”. It is useful to see the 
concept as an act – as something through which the appearance 
can be grasped – and what Kant means here can be expressed by 
the Latin verb concipio or the German begreifen: the act through 
which the intuitions are thought as objects. Kant's claim is that 
experience, in which the appearances are connected to each other, 
is only possible when we think the appearances through concepts 
of objects in general. What this means is that an object of experi-
ence is not an appearance. As we have already seen, it is through 
the appearance that the object of experience is represented, and 
this representing presupposes pure a priori concepts. 
Kant is now in a position to state the principle according 
to which a transcendental deduction of all pure concepts (con-
cepts of time and space and the pure concepts of the understand-
ing) must be carried through: 
 
The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts there-
fore has a principle toward which the entire investigation 
must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized as 
a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences (whether 




After this passage Kant points out that these concepts are 
therefore necessary for experience, and because of this the unfold-
ing of the experience in which they are encountered is merely 
their illustration and not a deduction, for the unfolding would 
leave them contingent. Kant calls this necessary relation of the 
pure concepts to possible experience an original relation.
257
 
The unfolding (die Entwickelung) Kant speaks of is what 
Tetens had done with our experience. It is thus, once again, point-
ed out that by using the empirical method, upon which Tetens 
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among others relied, a deduction of the categories is not possible. 
However, we are now about to see that Tetens’ inquiry into the 
action of the mind in cognition provides Kant with a firm ground 
from which a transcendental inquiry into the sources of cognition 
can be carried through. Kant has no trouble accepting Tetens’ 
thesis that our experience is something that can be unfolded. Ex-
perience presupposes given appearances, which in turn presup-
pose sensations. All of these presuppose mental action so that 
even sensations are not simply given to us. What is given to us as 
such is mental impressions. Tetens has done a great service to 
philosophy but his work is not enough to prove that the categories 
are objectively real concepts, even though we now have found 
those concepts in a systematic manner. We shall see that by mak-
ing minor changes to Tetens’ findings Kant is able to provide a 
transcendental deduction of them. In the Transcendental Aesthetic 
Kant was already able to prove that the concepts of space and 
time are conditions under which objects can appear, so these a 
priori concepts are objectively valid. Now he will make an effort 
to show that the categories are conditions under which objects can 
be thought. 
In the A edition Kant ends this section with a paragraph 
that was omitted from the B edition. In this paragraph Kant says 
that there are “three original sources (capacities or faculties of the 
soul), which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experi-
ence, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of 
the mind, namely sense, imagination, and apperception.”
258
 Kant 
continues to note that each of these faculties have both an empiri-
cal and a transcendental use. The transcendental use is concerned 
solely with form and is possible a priori. Kant reminds us that the 
transcendental use of sense has been discussed in the Transcen-
dental Aesthetic. From this we can see that that part of the Cri-
tique has a dual function. It has provided a transcendental deduc-
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tion of the concepts of space and time, but it has also shown that 
our receptivity has an a priori form. Our faculty of sense has an 
empirical use which provides us with matter of cognition, but it 
also has a transcendental use, which grounds what Kant calls “the 
synopsis of the manifold a priori through sense”.
259
 What this 
means is that we are not able to receive the empirical matter in 
any other form than space (and time). 
However, in the Transcendental Aesthetic cognitive ac-
tion was not analysed at all. It is now time to try to understand the 
nature of this action, and this is achieved by understanding the 
nature of the faculties of imagination and apperception. On these 
faculties are grounded “the synthesis of this manifold [a priori] 




What we have learned so far is that empirical cognition, 
in the proper sense, presupposes two acts. First of all, it presup-
poses an act of intuiting, through which an object is represented, 
but merely as appearance. Secondly, cognition presupposes an act 
of begreifen, through which an object of experience is represent-
ed. In the standard view of cognition, the former act would be 
called perception and the latter would be called apperception. We 
must carefully distinguish between these two acts. However, as 
Kant had to change the Wolffian conception of sensibility, he had 
to make changes within the two-act theory, and in order to avoid 
confusion I shall refer to the act of intuiting as the prior act, and 
to the act of apperception as the posterior act of cognition. Wolff 
uses these expressions and they are unambiguous.  This distinc-
tion becomes important at this point because for Kant appercep-
tion is not the same as the posterior act of cognition. Kant thinks 
that the original relation of the pure concepts to possible experi-
ence can be investigated through investigating the act of apper-
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ception in cognition, but before we move on to the Transcenden-
tal Deduction of the categories, we should take a brief look at a 
theory of apperception that was presented before Kant’s Critique. 
 
 
4.5. A Theory of Apperception before Kant’s Critique 
 
Kant thought that the source for the unity of the manifold 
in cognition proper lies in the original apperception. This is the 
crucial element needed for the Transcendental Deduction of the 
categories that Tetens failed to understand. However, even Kant’s 
doctrine of original apperception was not something unheard of. I 
noted earlier that Tetens accepted Wolff’s view that apperception 
is dependent on perception, but interestingly, Tetens refers in his 
Versuche to a criticism against Wolff’s account of apperception 
offered by Johann Bernhard Merian, who introduces a conception 
of apperception anticipating Kant’s critical view of the self.
 261
 
Tetens endorses Merian’s view of the impossibility of simultane-
ous reflecting on one’s own reflecting, but he does not share 
Merian’s views on apperception.  I will now try to explain the 




Merian wrote two papers on apperception that were origi-
nally published in 1749 in French. A German translation of both 
of these papers became available in 1778,
 
soon after the publica-
tion of Tetens’ Versuche.
 263
 Merian argues against Wolff’s view 
on the consciousness of objects as depending on reflecting and 
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distinguishing. Let us first identify the object of this criticism: 
Wolff thought that thinking requires both perception and apper-
ception. However, apperception is not an independent act of the 
soul but rather depends on the soul’s representational activities. 
For Wolff consciousness of the self is dependent on conscious-
ness of objects, and the latter is dependent on distinguishing ob-
jects. Distinguishing, in turn, depends on comparing, and conse-
quently on reflecting, since to reflect something is to compare a 
manifold of things and to distinguish one representation from 
another. Finally, Wolff thinks that memory is required for con-
sciousness, because in order to compare thoughts we will have to 
be able to remember that we have had them before.
264
 According 
to Wolff, consciousness of the self depends on comparing and 
distinguishing the objects of thought, because when we do not 
observe the difference between objects (when our thoughts are 
obscure) we do not distinguish objects and thus we do not distin-
guish the difference between the self and the objects. 
Merian builds his theory of apperception on an analysis 
of the knowledge of one’s own existence. Wolff had presented the 
Cartesian cogito ergo sum argument in a syllogistic form: What-
ever thinks, exists. I think. Therefore, I exist. Merian thinks that 
Wolff’s mistake lies in stating the conclusion in the minor prem-
ise, because “I think” is equivalent to “I exist thinking”. He does 
agree with Wolff that the certainty of one’s own existence is of 
the highest kind, but he thinks that this certainty cannot rest on an 
argument. Merian argues that knowledge of one’s own existence 
cannot be derived from reflection, because the conscium sui 
through reflection would have to be either immediate or mediate. 
The conscium sui cannot arise from immediate reflection because 
an immediate reflection is the act of remembering a representa-
tion, and if the act of reflection contains the conscium sui, it is 
because the conscium sui was already contained in the object of 
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reflection. On the other hand, the conscium sui cannot arise 
through mediate reflection either, because this would presuppose 
a relation between selfhood and a given thought A, and since we 
have supposed that this thought is separate from the conscium sui, 
we would need the aid of abstraction to establish this relation and 
thus we would have to conclude that reflection provides us with 
an abstract notion of the conscium sui, which is ridiculous. 
Merian concludes that since the knowledge of one’s own 
existence is certain and since we cannot know our own existence 
through reflection or reasoning or any other mediate way, we 
must know it immediately through apperception. Merian distin-
guishes between apperception of objects, or ideas in the mind, 
and apperception of one’s own existence and argues that a think-
ing being that only apperceives itself is thinkable but a thinking 
being that apperceives only an object without the conscium sui is 
not. The apperception of one’s self is therefore essential to a 
thinking being. But it is important to note that the apperception 
cannot apperceive the apperception itself. What we apperceive, 
according to Merian, is our existence, not the self insofar as it 
apperceives. 
Merian’s notion of apperception shows interesting simi-
larities to Kant’s thoughts on apperception. As Udo Thiel has 
pointed out,
265
 Merian regarded the apperception of one’s own 
existence as an independent act that is logically prior to all other 
thoughts. It is an “original” act that makes possible all other 
thought, and although Merian believes that the self is a mental 
substance, his view on the “original apperception” does not com-
mit him to the view that the thinking self is a mental substance. 
There thus seems, as Thiel points out, to be an interesting connec-
tion between Merian and Kant regarding the limits of Rational 
Psychology. What interests us here, however, is that Merian ar-
gued against Wolff that apperception must be prior to the faculty 
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of distinguishing. For to distinguish A from B is to apperceive 
that A is not B and B is not A, and this would be impossible if 
one did not apperceive A and B.
266
 To be conscious of the self is 
not the same as to have perceptions: it is rather the case that ap-
perception of ideas presupposes an ad-apperception or co-
apperception of one’s own existence.
267
 
Kant must have had at least a superficial acquaintance 
with Merian’s thoughts, because Tetens refers to him in the Ver-
suche. I think it is plausible to assume that Kant did read Merian, 
but even if he did not, Kant’s notion of apperception can be un-
derstood through Merian as a criticism against Wolff’s (and Te-
tens’) notion of apperception. The crucial element of Kant’s theo-
ry of cognition that Tetens missed is the role of original appercep-
tion in giving unity to the synthesis of the manifold of representa-
tions. Although Tetens had read Merian, he did not see the two-
fold character of apperception – the transcendental apperception 
that is prior to cognition and the empirical apperception that is 
“[t]he consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determina-
tions of our state in internal perception”.
268
 Tetens only acknowl-
edged the empirical apperception. 
However, Tetens did agree with Merian on the point that 
second order awareness (an awareness of one's own awareness) 
cannot be simultaneous with first order awareness. But here we 
need to be careful on how this thought is incorporated into Te-
tens’ theory of inner sense. As Henry Allison reports, T. D. Wel-
don suggests (as does also Robert Paul Wolff) that there is a con-
nection between Kant’s and Tetens’ conception of inner sense.
269
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Although in my view Allison’s interpretation of the role of inner 
sense in Kant’s theory is mistaken, he does offer an apt criticism 
against the sort of connection Weldon proposes. As Allison points 
out, Weldon locates the connection in Tetens’ claim that a second 
order awareness cannot be simultaneous with the first order 
awareness but must rather come after the first order awareness. 
Weldon's interpretation is that inner sense for Kant contains past 
acts of awareness and that the initial awarenesses are objects in 
space. 
Weldon seems not to have taken into account Kant’s the-
ory of apperception in comparison to Tetens’ theory. And indeed 
Tetens’ adherence to the Wolffian theory of apperception as con-
sciousness of perceptions and thus awareness of awareness can be 
deceiving. For Tetens all mental activity is in the end action of the 
faculty of thinking, and the point Weldon mentions therefore is 
indeed of the utmost importance for Tetens. This is because, ac-
cording to Tetens, awareness is action of the faculty of thinking, 
and as the mind is a unity, it cannot exercise this force simultane-
ously in different actions. This is what leads Tetens to thinking 
that the mind has to build up its representations gradually by af-
fecting the representations and consequently sensing these affect-
ed representations through inner sense and affecting them again. 
This is the only way the mind can form first general images, then 
conscious ideas and later concepts and judgements. But, as I hope 
I have made clear, neither Tetens nor Kant thought that we first 
have empirical awareness of outer objects through outer sense and 
then awareness of this awareness through inner sense. 
Kant thus shares with Tetens the view that cognition is a 
result of a continuous process of inner affection and inner sensing 
and that inner sense is not to be taken as a capacity to reflect or 
mirror ideas but literally as a sense through which mental action 
appears to the mind itself. He also agrees with Tetens that Wolff 
was wrong in assuming that a single cognitive force could work 
through various cognitive faculties. But in the Transcendental 
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Deduction, where Kant must investigate cognitive action behind 
the faculties, the ideas Merian had brought up become vitally 
important. We will do well to keep in mind how Merian thinks 
that Wolff is mistaken in his conception of the role of appercep-





5. THE SUBJECTIVE DEDUCTION 
5.1. Introduction 
 
We are now ready to turn our attention to the Deductions. 
In the Preface to the first edition of the Critique Kant states that 
the Transcendental Deduction of the categories has “two sides”: 
 
One side refers to the objects of the pure understanding, and 
is supposed to demonstrate and make comprehensible the ob-
jective validity of its concepts a priori; thus it belongs essen-
tially to my ends. The other side deals with the pure under-
standing itself, concerning its possibility and the powers of 
cognition on which it itself rests; thus it considers it in a sub-
jective relation, and although this exposition is of great im-
portance in respect of my chief end, it does not belong essen-
tially to it; because the chief question always remains: “What 
and how much can the understanding and reason cognize free 





The latter side of the Deduction Kant calls the Subjective 
Deduction. There are thus not only two sides of one deduction but 
two deductions. As to the exact location of the Subjective Deduc-
tion in the Analytic, Kant remains silent, and the subject has 
aroused controversy. It may, I think, be argued that the Subjective 
Deduction proper takes place with the discussion of the three 
syntheses (pages A 94–A 110). However, as the Subjective De-
duction is an inquiry into the original sources of cognition, I take 
this name here in a broader sense as referring to the whole of the 
second section of the Deduction chapter. I think this is a very 
natural interpretation of the location of the Subjective Deduction: 
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the first section is an introduction; the second section presents the 
Subjective Deduction and the third section the Objective Deduc-
tion. The short introduction (on page 94) to the Subjective Deduc-
tion was already discussed above, so we need not discuss it here. 
In it we were told that our task is to understand the nature of the 
transcendental use of imagination and apperception. 
Kant begins the second section by considering the nature 
of a priori concepts. In the Metaphysical Deduction Kant ex-
plained that there are three requirements for our cognition of ob-
jects: a pure manifold, a pure synthesis and pure a priori con-
cepts. In the introduction to the Deductions he said that there are 
three original cognitive capacities: sense, imagination and apper-
ception. It is obvious that sense provides the pure manifold while 
imagination effects its synthesis. Categories are the a priori con-
cepts that provide this pure synthesis its unity in thought, and the 
subjective ground of this unity is the capacity of apperception. 
The Subjective Deduction is an inquiry into the a priori 
grounds for the possibility of experience, and Kant first notes that 
the a priori concepts must, although they cannot contain anything 
empirical, be nothing but a priori conditions of possible experi-
ence. This is because in order to have a content and to be related 
to an object of possible experience, without which they would not 
be concepts through which something could be thought, these 
concepts must consist of elements of possible experience. With-
out this relation to possible experience, a priori concepts could 
never arise in thinking, and nothing would be thought through 
them. Now, Kant says that if we can prove that by means of the 
categories alone an object can be thought, that would be a suffi-
cient deduction of these a priori concepts.
 271
 This is the plan of 
the Subjective Deduction. 
This plan is carried out through an inquiry into the sub-
jective sources of cognition. Kant said in the introduction that 
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these sources have both an empirical and a transcendental use and 
that in the Deduction we are concerned with the transcendental 
use. Kant now reiterates this: 
 
But since in such a thought there is more at work than the 
single faculty of thinking, namely the understanding, and the 
understanding itself, as a faculty of cognition that is to be re-
lated to objects, also requires an elucidation of the possibility 
of this relation, we must first assess not the empirical but the 
transcendental constitution of the subjective sources that 





Kant draws an important distinction here. He says that in 
cognition, i.e. in a thought that is related to an object, there is 
more at work than merely the faculty of thinking. Cognition is not 
empty thought but presupposes that our thought is related to an 
object in intuition, and this is why through mere analysis of the 
faculty of understanding a deduction of its pure a priori concepts 
cannot be accomplished. On the other hand, the understanding is 
in need of an analysis, as a faculty of cognition, because as a fac-
ulty of cognition it is necessarily related to objects, and we must 
analyse how this relation is possible. Thus, in order to show that 
the pure concepts of the understanding are necessary for objective 
thought, we must inquire into the transcendental use of the sub-
jective sources of cognition. 
It is noteworthy that on page A 94, where Kant states that 
there are three original sources of cognition which cannot be de-
rived from any other faculty of the mind, he does not offer any 
argument supporting his claim. This reflects the difference be-
tween his and Tetens’ projects. Tetens went through great pains to 
show that by observing the mind we find that there are three fun-
damental cognitive forces and thus genuinely independent cogni-
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tive faculties that must cooperate in cognition. Kant, on the other 
hand, just throws the list of original capacities in front of us with-
out any empirical observations of the mind. Moreover, his list 
differs from Tetens’ list, and it therefore cannot be based on Te-
tens’ observations. So where does the list come from? Answering 
this question becomes easier when we remember that Tetens’ 
empirical observations were connected to the problem of the unity 
of a manifold. For Wolff, this was not a problem because he 
thought that the soul is a simple substance acting through a single 
force, but Tetens and Kant are approaching cognitive faculties 
(and forces) from the side of experience, and they must explain 
how cognition gets its unity. Now, Tetens’ view on the interplay 
between the basic cognitive forces was that the force of thinking 
must be active in mere consciousness of objects before appercep-
tion, which arises – in a Wolffian fashion – through the same act 
of distinguishing through which perception arises. Kant, on the 
other hand, adopted Merian’s position of apperception as an orig-
inal capacity, so in his view mere consciousness of objects must 
arise independently of apperception. 
Bearing these thoughts in mind we begin to see the justi-
fication of Kant’s list of original cognitive faculties. As Tetens 
had already noted, cognition presupposes a combination of a 
manifold, and this manifold must be represented as one represen-
tation. Clearly the manifold is provided by sense, and as the Tran-
scendental Aesthetic shows, it not only provides an empirical 
manifold but an a priori manifold as well. In addition to this, the 
manifold must be “gone through, taken up, and combined in a 
certain way”.
273
 This is what Kant terms synthesis, and since syn-
thesis is the business of the imagination, it is only natural that 
imagination should be counted among the original faculties. 
What about the unity then? Regarding intuition, i.e. the 
mere consciousness of objects (consciousness in the broad sense), 
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the question of unity is as unproblematic for Kant as it is for 
Wolff. Although this unity cannot be grounded on the simplicity 
of the soul (with a single cognitive force), Kant has argued that 
there is only one time and space, and since the synthesis in intui-
tion is a synthesis in time and space, the effect of synthesis has a 
unity by virtue of the transcendental use of sense. Regarding con-
sciousness in the narrow sense, however, the answer is not obvi-
ous. Kant has shown in the Metaphysical Deduction that the cate-
gories provide the unity of synthesis in cognition proper, but how 
they do that, is yet to be explained. Regarding that question, Kant 
has just stated that apperception is an original cognitive faculty 
and the missing piece in the puzzle. In the Subjective Deduction 
Kant now examines how this faculty gives unity to synthesis. 
The question now becomes, how can we conduct an in-
quiry into the transcendental use of these faculties? Kant’s answer 
is: by analysing synthesis: 
 
If every individual representation were entirely foreign to the 
other, as it were isolated and separated from it, then there 
would never arise anything like cognition, which is a whole 
of compared and connected representations. If therefore I as-
cribe a synopsis to sense, because it contains a manifold in its 
intuition, a synthesis must always correspond to this, and re-
ceptivity can make cognitions possible only if combined with 
spontaneity. This is now the ground of a threefold synthesis, 
which is necessarily found in all cognition: that, namely, of 
the apprehension of the representations, as modifications of 
the mind in intuition; of the reproduction of them in imagina-
tion; and of their recognition in the concept. Now these direct 
us toward three subjective sources of cognition, which make 
possible even the understanding and, through the latter, all 
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In the Subjective Deduction, then, the objective reality of 
the categories is approached through the metaphysical distinction 
between receptivity and spontaneity of the mind. It is important 
here – as we are about to assess the arguments of the Deductions 
– to understand that only the three original sources or faculties of 
the mind, namely sense, imagination and apperception, are inde-
pendent faculties or capacities. The faculties of sensibility and 
understanding, by contrast, can be derived from other sources, 
and the distinction between them can be made in more than one 
way, depending on how we want to approach the mind. The facul-
ty of understanding can be viewed as the faculty of thought, and 
in this sense it is mere apperception, but if it is viewed as a facul-
ty of cognition, the faculty of imagination must be considered 
together with the faculty of apperception. Sensibility, on the other 
hand, can be considered as mere receptivity of sense, but as a 
faculty of representing appearances it includes the imagination as 
well, for receptivity can make cognitions possible only if com-
bined with spontaneity. 
Now, spontaneity is the ground of a threefold synthesis. 
Synthesis, in turn, is a mere effect of the imagination, and imagi-
nation is thus involved in three different syntheses: of the appre-
hension, reproduction and recognition of representations. The 
analysis of these effects of the imagination will direct us to the 
three subjective sources of cognition, namely the transcendental 
use of the faculties of sense, imagination and apperception. It is 
important to realize that Kant approaches synthesis from the side 
of experience. Like Tetens, he is analysing our cognition, and the 
three syntheses are listed according to the empirical products of 
the act of synthesis. The product of apprehension is an intuition, 
the product of reproduction an imagination and the product of 
recognition a concept.  
If we look at the two editions of the Critique, we find that 
Kant mentions quite a few different syntheses, and it is difficult to 
know whether each term has a unique referent. Kant clearly had a 
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tendency to write in a manner that raises questions as to the pre-
cise relations of the terms used. In the Nova dilucidatio, for in-
stance, he introduces nine different determining grounds and does 
not adequately explain their meaning to the reader. Here we face 
the same difficulty, and yet the correct understanding of Kant’s 
whole system depends on the correct understanding of his account 
of synthesis. For this reason, I think I should mention in advance 
that although the Subjective Deduction is built on a division be-
tween different syntheses of imagination, it is only the empirical 
use of imagination that allows such a division, and the analysis of 
the empirical syntheses will direct us to the transcendental use of 
imagination. This use is an original source of cognition both as 




5.2. The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition 
 
Kant begins his treatment of the syntheses with a general 
remark: 
 
Wherever our representations may arise, whether through the 
influence of external things or as the effect of inner causes, 
whether they have originated a priori or empirically as ap-
pearances – as modifications of the mind they nevertheless 
belong to inner sense, and as such all of our cognitions are in 
the end subjected to the formal condition of inner sense, 
namely time, as that in which they must all be ordered, con-
nected, and brought into relations. This is a general remark on 
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We saw earlier that it is Kant’s view that the mere repre-
senting of appearances does not involve the use of the categories 
and that it is independent of apperception. Kant says very clearly 
that he does not endorse the standard view according to which 
apperception is synonymous with inner sense. Inner sense is not 
the same as apperception.
276
 If they were, it would now be evident 
that perceptual awareness would involve apperception, because 
all our representations belong to inner sense. However, Kant 
thought that the Wolffian use of the term – the use to which he 
himself had once adhered – should be corrected. His position is 
that the appearances do not require the functions of the under-
standing, and in this respect his position is the same as Tetens’: 
all consciousness presupposes inner sense but all consciousness is 
not self-conscious. 
Bearing this remark in mind, we can turn to the empirical 
synthesis of apprehension: 
 
Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however 
would not be represented as such if the mind did not distin-
guish the time in the succession of impressions on one anoth-
er; for as contained in one moment no representation can ever 




This is an extremely important remark, and we will later 
see that this claim plays a leading role in the B Deduction as well. 
It says that time (which is the form of inner sense) is a require-
ment of all apprehending. Indeed, this was already suggested in 
the Transcendental Aesthetic. It is uncontroversial that represent-
ing an object requires that a manifold be represented (Wolff 
would have agreed on this), and based on the Transcendental 
Aesthetic we know that representing a manifold is not the same as 
representing the manifold as a manifold. Thus, the empirical in-
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tuition through which the object is represented cannot represent 
the object by itself without action on the part of the subject, be-
cause the latter representation entails that the manifold is repre-
sented as a manifold. In the light of what has been said so far, we 
know that the empirical intuition provided by outer sense merely 
contains the data required for representing an appearance and that 
the prior act produces the appearance. In other words, the data 
does not determine the appearance: based on the same infor-
mation different appearances can be produced, and the object thus 
depends on the act. 
It may be useful to consider the above quote in the light 
of the Stufenleiter, according to which Perzeption is either intui-
tion or concept. As we are here concerned with the synthesis of 
apprehension, we are dealing with intuitions. Now, Kant says that 
every intuition contains a manifold. Empirical intuitions thus 
contain a manifold, but they are not Perzeptionen, because they 
do not contain a manifold represented as a manifold. They are 
thus not conscious representations and they do not contain any of 
the qualities of the objects they represent, because they arise 
through mere receptivity. Kant is now finally analysing the activi-
ty involved in cognition, and his first step is to argue that in the 
action required for intuiting a manifold as a manifold the mind 
must distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on one 
another. We shall shortly see what this means but let us first look 
at how Kant continues: 
 
Now in order for unity of intuition to come from this manifold 
(as, say, in the representation of space), it is necessary first to 
run through and then to take together this manifoldness, 
which action I call the synthesis of apprehension, since it is 
aimed directly at the intuition, which to be sure provides a 
manifold but can never effect this as such, and indeed as con-
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Apprehension produces a manifold as a manifold from a 
mere manifold thereby producing a unity. Cognition requires a 
synthesis aimed directly at an intuition that does not contain uni-
ty, i.e. to the empirical intuition of outer sense. An empirical intu-
ition contains a manifold, because every intuition contains a man-
ifold, but without a synthesis it can never effect this manifold as 
contained in one representation. Now, an object of intuition does 
contain (or is) a unity, and the synthesis of apprehension produces 
an object which is itself an intuition – Kant mentions a represen-
tation of space as an example. This object, unlike the empirical 
intuition, is “one intuition”. It is represented in inner sense, and it 
is a modification of the mind.  
From the above two quotes we can conclude that no intui-
tion can be an absolute unity, because every intuition contains a 
manifold. In other words, one cannot represent anything simple in 
space or time.
279
 This is a Wolffian position, as Wolff thought that 
we can represent only composite things as outside us.
280
 Kant thus 
agrees with Wolff that simple things are entirely different from 
composite things.
281
 This position is already familiar to us (all 
conscious representations are unities containing a manifold) but 
now Kant has drawn attention to the fact that not every intuition 
is a unity. Moreover, apprehension is ultimately directed at such 
an intuition, although not necessarily, of course, because we do 
apprehend objects also by combining conscious representations. 
Here, however, Kant is concerned with the most fundamental 
elements of apprehension as a requirement of cognition in gen-
eral. Even the most rudimentary conscious representations are 
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unities containing a manifold, and Kant now makes two claims, 
namely that 1) without synthesis consciousness is impossible, and 
2) consciousness depends on time, the form of inner sense. Before 
trying to figure out how this is relevant to the argument of the 
Subjective Deduction, perhaps we should illustrate what appre-
hension is with an example.  
Representing an appearance presupposes that the mani-
fold, i.e. the information contained in the empirical intuition, is 
collected, and this act is temporally extended. This can be easily 
understood if we consider perceiving an object of considerable 
size, say, the Lost Monarch, a Coast Redwood almost 100 meters 
in height. In fact, as this tree is surrounded by other huge trees, it 
cannot be perceived by just taking a look at it from a distance. 
One will have to look at it from different angles and view its 
crown and its trunk separately. Now suppose that I first look at 
the trunk and then move my eyes and look at the crown. There are 
then two representations A and B in a temporal sequence, and my 
mind must be able to connect these representations so that they 
are represented as representations of the same object. 
Let us pause here for a moment. Kant has argued that 
time is the form of inner sense and that representations of outer 
appearances require not only outer sense but inner sense as well. 
Now we learn that in connecting the representations A and B the 
mind must be able to distinguish the time in the succession of 
these representations. What does Kant mean by this? If he merely 
wanted to point out that apprehension occurs in time, his choice 
of words would be odd, for distinguishing is something one does. 
At this point we are not yet in a position to understand his point 
fully, but we may note that what Kant seems to imply is that not 
only are A and B represented in a temporal sequence in inner 
sense but that the mind must be active in representing A and B in 
time. There can be no distinguishing of empirical representations 
prior to distinguishing the time in the succession of impressions 
on one another, and prior to it – although the impressions of outer 
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senses do follow upon another whether we apprehend something 
or not – neither these impressions nor time itself can be anything 
to me. 
It may be useful here to consider Tetens’ remark that we 
can feel, or represent, only what is present. When we reproduce a 
representation of an object represented in the past, we in fact feel 
our present representation of this object.
 282
 Kant has just made it 
very clear that all our representations belong to inner sense. Now 
think of the passing impressions (i1, i2, i3…in) of our outer sense. 
Through the mere succession of them, where i1 is represented 
before i2, this manifold will not be represented as a manifold. 
Rather, these impressions must be represented simultaneously, 
and thus representations occurring at different moments of time 
must be represented as present. This, Kant claims, would not be 
possible if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession 
of these representations. 
An objection may be raised against this reading by noting 
that Kant has just said that as contained in one moment no repre-
sentation can ever be anything other than absolute unity.  Howev-
er, I take him to imply by this only that all conscious representa-
tions are temporally extended. The empirical data, through which 
an appearance is represented, is represented as simultaneous but 
the representation does not occur at a single moment. 
In fact, this is how I think Kant would expect a Wolffian 
to read these passages. What we are here dealing with is con-
sciousness, and Wolff’s position was that we can be conscious 
only of composite things. Let us see what he says about con-
sciousness of an outer object: 
 
We therefore find that we are conscious of things when we 
distinguish them from one another. Thus […] I am conscious 
that I see the mirror when I not only distinguish the different 
parts that I perceive in it but also represent to myself the dif-
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ference itself between the mirror and other things that I either 




Consciousness thus depends on the act of distinguishing, 
which presupposes comparing.
284
 This, in turn, presupposes the 
faculty of memory, because the subject must be able to represent 
a past representation in order to compare a present one with it.
285
 
Distinguishing thus occurs in time and the act of distinguishing 
has duration. Wolff thinks that also our thoughts have duration, 
and consciousness of oneself arises from distinguishing (indis-
tinctly) the parts of that time in which the thought occurs.
286
 We 
can thus see that Kant’s line of thought is very familiar to a 
Wolffian here. However, two differences between Wolff and Kant 
require attention. The first is that Kant speaks of mental impres-
sions which do not have a place in Wolff’s philosophy. The other 
difference is that for Kant, distinguishing the time in our repre-
sentations is not only a condition of self-consciousness but all 
consciousness. These differences stem from Kant’s new concep-
tion of time and inner sense, as we shall see. One cannot make the 
sort of change to Wolff’s philosophy that Kant wants to make 
without making the analysis applicable to the prior act as well. 
I explained earlier that according to Tetens, our represen-
tations represent previous modifications of the mind. According 
to this view our consciousness of outer objects is a result of a 
reproduction of our impressions. Although Kant does not adopt 
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Tetens’ use of the word “representation” and although Tetens’ 
empirical analysis of the act of perception does not belong to 
transcendental logic, there is a connection between Kant and Te-
tens here. We might say that Kant extracts from Tetens what does 
belong to transcendental philosophy, and takes his investigation 
to a new level. The impressions of outer sense provide us with a 
manifold in spatial form but this manifold is, of course, not con-
stant. When I sit by the fire I receive varying impressions of light 
and warmth, and these impressions thus occur in a temporal se-
quence in my inner sense. In my example of the perception of the 
Lost Monarch, it is evident that if I first look at its trunk and then 
at its crown, my representation of the trunk has to be reproduced 
in order to connect these two representations. The same applies to 
all apprehension. In the case of the tree, however, the two repre-
sentations A and B are already conscious representations, and 
Kant’s point thus concerns reproduction at a more elementary 
level: any representation of a manifold as a manifold involves 
reproduction and thus requires that the mind is able to distinguish 
the time in the succession of representations. Mere succession of 
outer impressions does not provide us with appearances. This 
point will be elaborated in greater detail shortly. 
Kant also says in the above quote that the manifold must 
be taken together in order for unity of intuition to come from this 
manifold. What this means is that having the representations A 
and B does not amount to a representation of A and B together 
(A+B, one might put it). The latter representation requires an act 
through which these representations are combined into one repre-
sentation. Thus, the synthesis of apprehension is the act of run-
ning through the manifold of an empirical intuition and taking 
together this manifoldness. This yields a representation of the 
manifold as a manifold and it also yields a unity of intuition. The 
empirical intuition gives us the manifold for an appearance, but 
only the manifold, and the synthesis of apprehension is needed in 
order to represent this manifold in one representation. 
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We should now try to clarify further how empirical intui-
tion is related to appearances and how we apprehend them. So far 
we have seen that outer sense gives us impressions in the form of 
space and that representing an appearance requires a mental act 
through which our inner sense is affected. Let us return to the 
Stufenleiter. In it, Kant says that sensations are conscious repre-
sentations, but he does not count impressions among conscious 
representations. Now, I explained in the Introduction that accord-
ing to Reid the act of perception, i.e. consciousness of an object, 
is a prerequisite for the possibility of reflecting on our subjective 
sensations. This may be paraphrased as follows: distinguishing an 
object of perception is a requirement for distinguishing subjective 
sensations. In chapter 1 we saw that according to Tetens, con-
scious sensations require pre-conscious abstraction, because dis-
tinguishing a sensation presupposes representations in which the 
sensation is represented in combination with other representa-
tions. Thus, also Tetens thought that distinguishing an object is a 
requirement for distinguishing sensations, as I explained in sec-
tion 1.2. It seems that representing shapes is for Tetens the most 
fundamental kind of representing and that his empirical method is 
incapable of analysing cognitive action any deeper than this. 
But Kant’s method is transcendental, and now he must 
confront the problem of how we are able to represent shapes. He 
has stated that any representation of an empirical object presup-
poses an empirical synthesis of apprehension through which a 
manifold is represented in one representation, and that this re-
quires that the mind is able to distinguish the time in the succes-
sion of impressions on one another. In the passages above he has 
thus considered synthesis of apprehension in general. But this 
synthesis is not limited to the synthesis of an empirical manifold. 
There is also a pure synthesis of apprehension: 
 
Now this synthesis of apprehension must also be exercised a 
priori, i.e., in regard to representations that are not empirical. 
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For without it we could have a priori neither the representa-
tions of space nor of time, since these can be generated only 
through the synthesis of the manifold that sensibility in its 





We already know that representing an object depends first 
and foremost on a pure synthesis. We do ascribe brown colour to 
an acorn but the acorn is not made of its colour. The sensation, 
i.e. the representation of the colour, is a conscious representation, 
and it is represented in inner sense. The impressions, on the other 
hand, are not conscious representations and we receive them 
through outer sense. Above it was said that apprehension presup-
poses a synthesis of these pre-conscious empirical representa-
tions. This is evident, because without mental action we would 
not become conscious of the empirical matter provided by outer 
sense. How this synthesis works remains hidden from us, howev-
er. As Kant says, we are seldom even conscious of this hidden art, 
which lies in the depths of the human soul.
288
 This is only natural, 
because consciousness presupposes a representation in inner 
sense, and the material for this act does not consist of representa-
tions in inner sense. What we do know is that any conscious rep-
resentation, either sensation or cognition, requires a synthesis, 
because without synthesis we cannot represent a manifold in one 
representation. 
Now, although we cannot observe this synthesis, we can 
know something it. The effect presupposes a distinguishing of 
time. As apprehension depends on a pure synthesis, cognition is 
founded on a synthesis of apprehension of a pure manifold. A 
spatial appearance has a shape, so a pure manifold of space has to 
be run through and taken together. In a like manner, representing 
an event requires that the pure manifold of time is run through 
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and taken together. With this synthesis, time and space become 
something to us, although in mere perceptual awareness we are 
not yet conscious of time and space themselves conceptually but 
only of particular times and spaces in intuition. 
A representation of time presupposes a representation of 
space, so the representations of space are the most fundamental of 
our conscious representations. We have thus taken the first peek 
at the hidden synthesis behind appearances. At the most funda-
mental level it presupposes that the time in the succession of the 
pure manifold of space is distinguished. When we discuss the 
second synthesis, we will understand this point more fully; now it 
will suffice to understand that intuiting objects requires inner 
sense and that it ultimately depends on the synthesis of apprehen-
sion of a pure manifold. 
We may now look back at what Kant said in the Meta-
physical Deduction about the three requirements of cognition of 
objects, namely pure manifold, pure synthesis and pure concepts. 
He there said that pure concepts give unity to cognition proper. 
He also said that the appearances do not need this unity, and I 
explained that this is because sense itself provides the unity re-
quired for the prior act of synthesis. Nevertheless, we see now 
that this unity is not provided by sense alone, because a pure man-
ifold is not by itself represented as a manifold. In other words, 
appearances depend on the prior act of cognition.  
I plan to explain what apprehension is after the discussion 
on the Subjective Deduction, but we can here see that like philos-
ophers from Alhazen to Reid and Tetens, also Kant thinks that 
perception requires an act of apprehension quick as lightning. 
Although this conclusion may prima facie seem odd, the persis-
tence of this view through centuries indicates that it should be 
taken seriously. And in fact, when we look at Kant’s theory, we 
find that the quickness of apprehension in fact poses no problem. 
Remember that time is the form of inner sense and that the act of 
apprehension, which is temporal, can only appear to us through 
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its effect. As our consciousness depends on inner sense, it follows 
that we cannot be conscious of the duration of the most funda-
mental synthesis, where the manifold is not conscious. One 
should also note that something can be quick or slow only as 
compared to something else, and that the synthesis of apprehen-
sion can only be considered quick as compared to something con-
scious. Suppose, then, that the apprehension of an object would 
be made a thousand times slower: it would still appear to us to be 
as quick as lightning. In addition to this, Kant’s account of per-
ception is reminiscent of Alhazen’s theory also in the sense that 
Kant too thinks that in apprehension we will have to reproduce 




5.3. The Synthesis of Reproduction in the Imagination 
 
According to Wolff, the faculty of imagination is the fac-
ulty of reproducing ideas of absent things.
289
 Reproduction was 
thus thought to be the effect of the action of imagination, and it 
was thought that this reproduction occurs according to the law of 
association. Kant begins the section on the second synthesis by 
introducing this law as the empirical law of the imagination: 
 
It is, to be sure, a merely empirical law in accordance with 
which representations that have often followed or accompa-
nied one another are finally associated with each other and 
thereby placed in a connection in accordance with which, 
even without the presence of the object, one of these repre-
sentations brings about a transition of the mind to the other in 
accordance with a constant rule.
290
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Kant, however, does not want to stop here, and he thinks 
that we can continue the analysis of the mind’s workings in its 
use of imagination beyond the level of its empirical use by ana-
lysing the preconditions of this use. The rather obvious fact that 
the empirical use of imagination presupposes that the appearances 
must then be subject to such a rule serves as the starting-point for 
this analysis: 
 
This law of reproduction, however, presupposes that the ap-
pearances themselves are actually subject to such a rule, and 
that in the manifold of their representations an accompani-
ment or succession takes place according to certain rules; for 
without that our empirical imagination would never get to do 
anything suitable to its capacity, and would thus remain hid-





Kant provides us with examples. If, for instance, cinnabar 
were now red, now black, now light, now heavy, our empirical 
imagination would never get the opportunity to think of heavy 
cinnabar on the occasion of the representation of the colour red.
292
 
Given Kant’s conception of the appearances as nothing but modi-
fications of the mind, this fact presupposes an a priori rule. Let us 
try to see what Kant’s examples are supposed to show. 
Our perceptual awareness involves more than mere ap-
prehension: it involves empirical reproduction of appearances. 
Consider Kant’s example of heavy cinnabar. If I am acquainted 
with this appearance I do not necessarily have to feel its weight in 
order to be aware of its heaviness. On the occasion of the colour 
red (of the cinnabar) my empirical imagination can reproduce the 
appearance of heavy cinnabar in accordance with the law of asso-
ciation, and the sensation of its colour can lead me to apprehend a 
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heavy cinnabar. Thus, if someone throws me a piece of this ore, I 
am able to anticipate its weight before catching it. The empirical 
reproduction is therefore not limited to instances where the repro-
duced appearance (e.g. heavy cinnabar) is absent and where the 
mind only imagines it on the occasion of the representation of one 
of its characteristics (e.g. the colour red). Associating appearances 
with each other is thus an integral element of our apprehension in 
that it allows us to apprehend appearances without sensing all 
their characteristics. 
 Now, in the above example the reproduction requires 
prior perception of an object where redness and weight were rep-
resented as combined, i.e. an apprehension of the appearance of 
heavy cinnabar. It also requires that this combination has been a 
constant one. From this Kant can draw the following conclusion: 
 
There must therefore be something that itself makes possible 
this reproduction of the appearances by being the a priori 
ground of a necessary synthetic unity of them. One soon 
comes upon this if one recalls that appearances are nothing in 
themselves, but rather the mere play of our representations, 





What we need to understand here is that in the data of 
outer senses as such there is no accompaniment or succession. 
Representing a piece of heavy cinnabar requires that the imagina-
tion takes the colour red and the weight of the ore together and 
forms a unitary representation of the colour and the weight. If 
these representations have often accompanied each other and if 
this accompaniment thus takes place according to a rule, the em-
pirical imagination gets the opportunity to associate them with 
each other. However, as the appearances are mere modifications 
of the mind and belong to inner sense, the origin of the rule itself 
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has to be a priori. The synthesis of apprehension therefore fol-
lows an a priori rule without which empirical reproduction would 
be impossible.  
In the previous subsection Kant showed that there is both 
an empirical and a pure apprehension. Now we learn that empiri-
cal reproduction presupposes an a priori ground, because an a 
priori condition must ground the necessary synthetic unity of 
appearances. Kant’s next step is to argue that even the apprehen-
sion of pure intuitions contains a combination that is presupposed 
by the empirical reproduction: 
 
Now if we can demonstrate that even our purest a priori intui-
tions provide no cognition except insofar as they contain the 
sort of combination of the manifold that makes possible a 
thoroughgoing synthesis of reproduction, then this synthesis 
of the imagination would be grounded even prior to all expe-
rience on a priori principles, and one must assume a pure 
transcendental synthesis of this power, which grounds even 
the possibility of all experience (as that which necessarily 




Here Kant reveals what he is trying to achieve in the sec-
tion on the synthesis of reproduction. First of all, we must under-
stand that experience, as Kant notes, necessarily presupposes the 
reproducibility of appearances.
295
 Experience is not, of course, 
mere association of appearances, and we shall see in the section 
on the third synthesis that the faculty responsible for the mere 
empirical reproduction is not the empirical faculty of reproduc-
tion required for experience. Nevertheless, empirical reproduci-
bility is a necessary requirement for experience. My cognition 
that during a lunar eclipse, the Sun, the Earth and the Moon are 
aligned, is possible only if I can reproduce my representations of 
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these astronomical bodies. In section 3.1 I argued that Kant thinks 
that only conscious representations are empirically reproducible 
and that conscious representations require synthesis. Here Kant 
intends to prove that the reproducibility of appearances is ground-
ed on a reproduction which he calls transcendental as opposed to 
a merely empirical reproduction. As was discussed in sections 3.3 
and 4.3, our experience is necessarily conceptual and it requires a 
unity which the imagination alone with its synthesis cannot pro-
vide. In the Metaphysical Deduction Kant showed that experience 
is grounded on a priori principles. Now the plan is to show that 
even prior to experience, the synthesis of imagination is grounded 
on a priori principles.  
 Experience presupposes the reproducibility of appear-
ances, so the empirical faculty of imagination is a requirement for 
experience. On the other hand, the thoroughgoing synthesis of 
empirical reproduction, i.e. a reproduction where the reproduced 
representation is itself a unity containing a manifold, rests on an a 
priori condition without which the empirical faculty would re-
main a hidden art. This a priori condition is what now needs to be 
analysed. 
 
Now it is obvious that if I draw a line in thought, or think of 
the time from one noon to the next, or even want to represent 
a certain number to myself, I must necessarily grasp one of 
these manifold representations after another in my thoughts. 
But if I were to lose the preceding representations (the first 
parts of the line, the preceding parts of time, or the succes-
sively represented units) from my thoughts and not reproduce 
them when I proceed to the following ones, then no whole 
representation and none of the previously mentioned 
thoughts, not even the purest and most fundamental represen-
tations of space and time, could ever arise.
 296
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In this passage Kant uses examples of the pure represen-
tations of space, time and number. His examples are acts of 
thought, and as we saw earlier, Wolff would agree with Kant on 
the requirement of reproduction in these acts. However, although 
Kant’s examples are acts of the understanding, their purpose is to 
show that without reproduction no whole representation could 
ever arise. This includes not only the examples Kant gives but 
also “the purest and most fundamental representations of space 
and time”. All empirically reproducible representations necessari-
ly contain a pure manifold, and since they are reproducible repre-
sentations, they are unities containing a manifold. Therefore, em-
pirical reproducibility is grounded on a pure synthesis of repro-
duction, where reproduction cannot follow the empirical laws of 
association. In chapter 1 I explained how Tetens thought that 
empirical reproducibility was grounded on the productive faculty, 
which he called the faculty of feigning. Tetens’ analysis was em-
pirical, and as Kant has argued, the Deduction of the categories is 
not possible through a merely empirical analysis of the faculties. 
Kant therefore needs to find a way to look behind the empirical 
faculty, which produces our reproducible representations, and 
here he has found out how it works: the productive faculty is 
based on reproduction. 
One cannot overemphasize the importance of this discov-
ery. It is also a discovery where Kant’s originality cannot be 
questioned. As we will learn when we move to the third section of 
the Deduction chapter where Kant presents the Objective Deduc-
tion, he claims that he is the first to have discovered that it is the 
imagination that is responsible for the production of our repro-
ducible representations. When we discussed Tetens we found out 
that representing shapes seems to be the end of the line of the 
analysis of experience. Now we see that a transcendental inquiry 
can reveal a condition of representing shapes. The most funda-
mental representations of space are unitary representations that 
contain an a priori manifold, and they must therefore “contain the 
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sort of combination of the manifold that makes possible a thor-
oughgoing synthesis of reproduction”. The empirical synthesis of 
reproduction is therefore grounded on a priori principles even 
prior to all experience, and there is a pure transcendental synthe-
sis of reproduction. 
The conclusion then is: 
 
The synthesis of apprehension is therefore inseparably com-
bined with the synthesis of reproduction. And since the for-
mer constitutes the transcendental ground of the possibility of 
all cognition in general (not only of empirical cognition, but 
also of pure a priori cognition), the reproductive synthesis of 
the imagination belongs among the transcendental actions of 
the mind, and with respect to this we will also call this faculty 




The synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of repro-
duction are inseparable not only because empirical reproduction 
is constantly involved in our apprehension of appearances but 
also because apprehension, as we already anticipated above, is 
altogether impossible without transcendental reproduction. There-
fore, since it was shown that the possibility of all cognition in 
general is grounded on a transcendental synthesis of apprehen-
sion, the reproduction required for the latter is also a transcenden-
tal synthesis. 
At this point it is, I think, useful to consider the distinc-
tion between empirical and transcendental uses of our original 
sources of cognition, which Kant introduced in A 94. Sense, im-
agination and apperception all have a transcendental use. The 
transcendental use of sense was discussed in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic: space and time are conditions of the receptivity of our 
mind. It has now become clear that this use alone is incapable of 
producing appearances. Appearances cannot be represented with-
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out representing pure intuitions (first and foremost shapes), which 
in turn cannot be represented without a synthesis of a pure mani-
fold of intuition. Thus, as Kant concluded in the section on the 
synthesis of apprehension, we have a pure synthesis of apprehen-
sion. Here, in the above quote he says that the synthesis of appre-
hension constitutes the transcendental ground of the possibility of 
all cognition. 
Now, there is a real danger of getting confused here be-
cause of the wealth of distinctions Kant makes. Remember that 
Kant makes a distinction between empirical and transcendental 
uses of our original sources of cognition. Imagination is one of 
those sources, and now Kant has examined two syntheses that are 
inseparably combined with each other (one is yet to be exam-
ined). How, then, is the distinction between the synthesis of ap-
prehension and the synthesis of reproduction related to the dis-
tinction between an empirical and a transcendental use of imagi-
nation? To answer this, we should first remind ourselves that 
there is a distinction also between an empirical and a pure synthe-
sis. Regarding the synthesis of apprehension Kant showed first 
that empirical apprehension involves not only a synthesis of em-
pirical matter but also a pure synthesis of apprehension. Regard-
ing the synthesis of reproduction, however, the situation is some-
what different. Admittedly, when the mind reproduces an appear-
ance, it must reproduce an a priori representation, but this is not 
Kant’s point in the present section. His point is, rather, that a pure 
intuition (which is a product of a pure synthesis of apprehension) 
is possible only through reproduction, and that there is therefore a 
pure transcendental synthesis of reproduction. This means that the 
transcendental use of the faculty of imagination consists in repro-
duction. 
In section 1.2 we saw that according to Tetens, the faculty 
of feigning is responsible for apprehension and that it produces 
our reproducible representations, whereas the faculty of imagina-
tion, which is a reproductive faculty, cannot be the source of 
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combination. What Kant has now achieved – and this will prove 
to be vitally important – is that he has shown that the imagination 
is, after all, the source of combination and that there are two kinds 
of reproduction: one that follows the laws of association, and one 
that provides a transcendental ground of all empirical reproduc-
tion. 
We may now turn our attention back to § 10 where Kant 
introduced synthesis (discussed in section 3.3 of this study). 
There Kant’s purpose was to establish that in subsuming intui-
tions under concepts the categories provide the unity required for 
the synthesis of a pure manifold.  Although his aim was not to 
analyse apprehension, it is now clear that also mere apprehension 
of appearances requires a synthesis of a pure manifold. What, 
then, is the relation of this pure synthesis to the transcendental use 
of our cognitive faculties? Since sensibility isn’t one of our origi-
nal sources of cognition, it must be derivable from those original 
sources. We now have enough evidence to determine what sensi-
bility consists in, but Kant’s terminology can be an obstacle in 
answering the question. Although it should not be too hard to see 
the answer, one can easily get entangled in the web of faculties in 
trying to figure out the answer, so the task requires diligence. 
Consider first that Kant thinks that apprehension neces-
sarily involves combination, which he terms synthesis. Now, in 
Wolff the combination of perceptions is the work of the faculty of 
feigning, which is reducible to the faculty of imagination.
298
 Te-
tens, on the other hand, argued that the faculty of imagination is a 
merely reproductive faculty and that the faculty of feigning is not 
derivable from the faculty of imagination. He also argued that 
without the faculty of feigning the imagination would not have 
anything to reproduce. To borrow Kant’s words, imagination 
would remain hidden in the interior of the mind, like a dead and 
to us unknown faculty. Although Kant agrees with Tetens on the 
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last point, he has now shown that the faculty of feigning is, after 
all, derivable from the faculty of imagination. 
I suggest we now take a look at the empirical use of the 
three original sources. As we are presently concerned with what 
sensibility is, we can at this point ignore apperception and con-
centrate on sense and imagination. If through sense we can have a 
synopsis of the manifold a priori, then based on what has been 
said concerning the synthesis of apprehension, the empirical use 
of sense requires transcendental reproduction. Remember that 
Kant said that we must first “assess not the empirical but the tran-
scendental constitution of the subjective sources that comprise the 





If […] I ascribe a synopsis to sense, because it contains a 
manifold in its intuition, a synthesis must always correspond 





For a synopsis, we therefore need the transcendental use 
of both sense and imagination. The discussion on the first two 
syntheses has thus revealed us the nature of the transcendental use 
of imagination, and we can at last determine what sensibility is: it 
consists in the use – ultimately in the transcendental use – of 
sense and imagination, so that both of these uses are necessary for 
representing appearances. The empirical use of imagination, of 
course, also belongs to sensibility. 
Thus, even prior to all thinking, in the awareness of the 
regularity among our representations towards which our thought 
can subsequently be directed, we have made use of our transcen-
dental faculty of imagination, because without the latter, the regu-
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larity would not be possible. And as there would be no regularity 
among our representations, there would be no experience either. 
Further, since there is a pure synthesis of apprehension, which 
belongs to the transcendental actions of the mind, there is also a 
transcendental synthesis of reproduction, which grounds the pos-
sibility of all cognition in general. This transcendental action of 
the mind is one of the original sources of all our cognition. 
Before we move on to the third synthesis, I would like to 
remind the reader, just to be completely sure that Kant’s argument 
so far is understood correctly, of the fact that the first two synthe-
ses are named according to the empirical use of the imagination. 
Kant instructed us on pages A 95–96 that the three syntheses are 
supposed to uncover the transcendental use of the faculties of 
imagination and apperception. The transcendental use of sense 
was already discussed in the Transcendental Aesthetic. By analys-
ing the empirical use of imagination in apprehension and repro-
duction of appearances Kant has shown that the ability to repre-
sent appearances is grounded on the transcendental reproduction 
of representations, on which all synthesis depends. Thus, when 
cognition, understood as mere intuiting, is grounded on the syn-
opsis of the manifold of sense on the one hand, and on the synthe-
sis of this manifold through imagination on the other, these two, 
in turn, are grounded on the transcendental use of sense and imag-
ination. Receptivity and spontaneity are thus necessarily involved 
in all cognition in general, either merely intuitive cognition or 
cognition in the proper sense. Now it is left for us to examine the 
third original source of cognition, namely the transcendental ap-
perception. 
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5.4. The Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept 
 
According to Wolff, to recognize a reproduced idea is to 
be conscious of having had the idea before.
301
 Recognition thus 
depends on reproduction but these two acts spring from different 
faculties: in Wolff imagination is the faculty of reproducing ideas 
whereas memory is the faculty of recognizing the reproduced 
ideas.
302
 In the third synthesis we are now concerned with the 
distinction between mere reproduction of representations on the 
one hand and recognition of the reproduced representations on the 
other. 
From the title of this subsection we can make a couple of 
preliminary observations. Mere reproduction of a representation 
obviously does not require consciousness of having had the repre-
sentation before, so we should expect – since recognition is con-
sciousness of having had a representation before – that Kant will 
turn his eye on the consciousness involved in recognition. Fur-
ther, we see that in the title of this subsection recognition is paired 
with concepts, suggesting thus that recognition is an act of the 
understanding. We should thus expect to see in this subsection an 
analysis of the faculty of concepts and of consciousness, thus of 
the third requirement of cognition introduced in § 10. 
In order to have a better understanding of the background 
of these issues, it may be useful first to take a look at what Leib-
niz says about recognition: 
 
A notion which is not sufficient for recognizing the thing rep-
resented is obscure, as, for example, if whenever I remember 
some flower or animal I once saw, I cannot do so sufficiently 
well for me to recognize that flower or animal when presented 
and to distinguish it from other nearby flowers or animals 
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[…] Therefore, cognition is clear when I have the means for 




Of course, in order to be able to recognize that a flower I 
now see is the same flower that I saw earlier, I have to have a 
representation of a flower that I can reproduce. We have seen that 
according to Kant, apprehension of the flower requires transcen-
dental reproduction and that my awareness of a flower, once I am 
acquainted with flowers, in fact involves empirical reproduction 
as well, because in being aware of it, what I actually see or smell 
or feel, is amended by representations that I do not actually see, 
smell or feel. 
It is quite obvious that empirical reproduction of appear-
ances is not recognition. It is not an instance of recognizing a 
representation to be the same as a reproduced representation, and 
it does not involve the consciousness needed for recognition. But 
what about the transcendental reproduction that is required for 
apprehension – could that be a case of recognition? Apprehension 
of appearances depends on transcendental reproduction because 
an empirical manifold can only appear in space and time, and the 
apprehension of an empirical manifold consequently requires an a 
priori apprehension of a pure manifold. But in this case the tran-
scendental reproduction is intuitive, not conceptual. Think of a 
very small child becoming acquainted with a ball. The child must 
apprehend the spherical shape of this object by running through 
and taking together a pure manifold of space. The outcome of this 
pure apprehension is a representation of the spherical shape, but 
this representation is an intuition, not a concept. Having the intui-
tion is a requirement for the conceptual representation of this 
shape, which the child may at a later stage of his or her cognitive 
development acquire, but the reproduction involved in the pure 
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apprehension of the shape of the ball is not recognition, and the 
child’s representation of the ball is not conceptual. 
Now, once the child has apprehended the spherical shape, 
he or she will be able to associate it with other representations. 
The child may associate the shape with a distinctive colour, and 
on the occasion of seeing that colour he or she may reproduce the 
representation of the shape, but this reproduction is not recogni-
tion. What, then, are the transcendental requirements of the 
recognition of this shape? In order to answer this question, we 
should ask ourselves what it requires for me to be able to think 
that this shape is the same as the one that was represented before. 
This is the question we should keep in mind when reading the 
third subsection. 
Kant begins the subsection by an explication of how 
recognition requires consciousness: 
 
Without consciousness that that which we think is the very 
same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction 
in the series of representations would be in vain. For it would 
be a new representation in our current state, which would not 
belong at all to the act through which it had been gradually 
generated, and its manifold would never constitute a whole, 





The subject matter is now thinking, whereas in the first 
two subsections it was intuiting. Dyck, who rightly sees the Sub-
jective Deduction against the background of the discussion on the 
fundamental force, has argued that Kant is here attacking the 
Leibnizian view, expressed in the passage I quoted above, accord-
ing to which not all cognition requires recognition.
305
 However, 
with regard to the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy I see here con-
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tinuity rather than divergence. I think that Kant is in agreement 
with Leibniz, and his view is that mere reproduction can yield 
cognition in the broad sense of the term, although, of course, he 
does not see the distinction as a distinction between clarity and 
distinctness vs. obscurity and confusedness, as Leibniz does. 
Even though an intuition can be distinct, without concepts we 
could not be conscious of its sameness with a reproduced repre-
sentation and the reproduction would be merely associative. Dis-
tinctness does not, therefore, in itself secure the recognisability of 
a representation. We must, rather, turn our eye on the conscious-
ness required for recognisability. 
According to the Jäsche Logic cognition can be graded in 
regard to the objective content of our cognition in general. Alt-
hough the content of cognition is represented consciously already 
on the second grade level (in perception), it is not until the fourth 
grade that the content is cognized [erkennen, cognoscere]. Cog-
nizing is the level of cognition in which thinking is involved. The 
third grade is “to be acquainted with something (noscere), or to 
represent something in comparison with other things, both as to 
sameness and to difference”. In this level of cognition, the ac-
quaintance with objects is not yet “with consciousness”, and it is 
reported that animals too are acquainted with objects, although 
they do not cognize them.
306
 Representing the sameness of the 
representations is thus possible without thinking and concepts but 
the consciousness of the sameness is not. 
Now although in the first two subsections the conclusions 
drawn concern the intuitive part of cognition and here the subject 
matter is the conceptual part, the beginning of the third subsection 
is not a beginning of a new argument. In the Leitfaden Kant stated 
that the synthesis of a pure manifold by means of the imagination 
is needed for the cognition of all objects, noting also that this 
synthesis does not by itself yield cognition (in the proper 
                                                     
306
 Logik Jäsche, Ak. 9:64–65. 





 In the second subsection of the Subjective Deduction he 
argued that experience necessarily presupposes reproducibility of 
appearances and that the possibility of all experience is grounded 
on a transcendental reproduction. He also argued that in order for 
experience to be possible our purest and most fundamental repre-
sentations of space and time must contain a combination that 
makes possible a thoroughgoing synthesis of reproduction (i.e. a 
reproduction required for experience).
308
 It has thus already been 
shown that a transcendental synthesis of reproduction is a re-
quirement for conceptual cognition. Now Kant wants to show 
what else, besides this transcendental action of imagination, is 
needed for recognition. We may put the matter as follows: To be 
able to cognize objects requires something over and above the 
mere acquaintance with objects, namely acquaintance with con-
sciousness. Acquaintance itself is consciousness and it requires a 
transcendental synthesis of reproduction of an a priori manifold, 
but as Kant has already stated, this does not yield conceptual cog-
nition and experience. 
What has to be added to mere reproduction is unity. To be 
sure, a reproducible representation itself necessarily is a unitary 
representation, but empirical reproduction itself does not involve 
a unity, if it is not a conscious reproduction. The third subsection 
now shows how the understanding gives unity to the synthesis of 
imagination needed for recognition. It starts with the observation, 
stated in the above quote, that thinking involves not only repro-
duction but recognition, and thus consciousness of reproduction. 
This observation continues the argument from where it was left in 
the second subsection. 
From the examples of the second subsection Kant picks 
out the representation of a number: 
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If, in counting, I forget that the units that now hover before 
my senses were successively added to each other by me, then 
I would not cognize the generation of the multitude through 
which this successive addition of one to the other, and conse-
quently I would not cognize the number; for this concept con-




A small detail is worth noticing here: Kant speaks about 
units hovering before one’s senses. This indicates that the pure 
representation of a number is not his concern here but the count-
ing of appearances, for the former would involve only the inner 
sense, not senses. Thus, the example shows how the pure concept 
of number is applied to empirical data. The empirical data, as we 
have learned, must contain the sort of combination of an a priori 
manifold that makes the thoroughgoing reproduction of the ap-
pearances possible. When I count appearances, these appearances 
must have shapes, and they are reproducible only because they 
are represented as units that I can add to other units. Thus, even 
prior to all experience, as Kant has noted, the synthesis of imagi-
nation (which enables me to count these appearances by combin-
ing the impressions of the senses to appearances) is grounded on 
a priori principles (because this combination involves a synthesis 
of a pure manifold). However, this synthesis does not and cannot 
involve concepts, for we must first be conscious of appearances 
before we can think (be self-conscious of) them. Empirical con-
cepts require the synthesis of recognition of appearances, and for 
that synthesis we need pure concepts, just as we need pure intui-
tions for the synthesis of reproduction. 
The pure concept needed for cognizing an object of 
thought consists solely in the consciousness of the unity of syn-
thesis, as Kant notes by using the concept of number as an exam-
ple. The concept implies a unity of consciousness, because con-
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sciousness of the unity of synthesis presupposes a unity of con-
sciousness: 
 
For it is this one consciousness that unifies the manifold that 





In counting, one consciousness must remember the re-
produced units in order for cognition of a number to be possible. 
The move from the consciousness of the synthesis to the oneness 
of the synthetizing consciousness is a natural one. If I am not 
conscious of the sameness of a reproduced representation with a 
present representation in synthesis, then I cannot become con-
scious of the synthesis itself, and hence I cannot have the concept. 
Already Kant’s teacher Martin Knutzen (1713–1751) had drawn 
attention to the fact that comparing a manifold of representations 
presupposes oneness of the subject that is conscious of the mani-
fold.
311
 This one apperception is what we must look into, when 
we want to understand the source of the unity of conceptual cog-
nition. Apprehension enables us to be conscious of and acquaint-
ed with appearances, but cognizing them requires apperception. 
Thus, apperception is necessarily involved in the use of concepts.  
At this point we may remind ourselves of the question 
Kant posed on page A 93 (B 125), namely “whether a priori con-
cepts do not also precede, as conditions under which alone some-
thing can be, if not intuited, nevertheless thought as object in 
general”. If there are such concepts, then our “empirical cognition 
of objects is necessarily in accord with them, since without their 
presupposition nothing is possible as object of experience.”
312
 The 
agenda of the Subjective Deduction is to investigate the subjec-
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tive side of cognition and thus to analyse pure understanding it-
self regarding its use in cognizing an object. However, even 
though it considers this relation from the subjective side, the 
analysis must concern the use of the understanding in cognizing 
an object, and we must therefore analyse the act of representing 
an object. As I mentioned earlier, it is useful to consider concepts 
as acts. We have now discovered that the act of cognizing an ob-
ject requires concepts and that concepts, in turn, require that one 
consciousness unifies the manifold of intuition into one represen-
tation. 
The analysis of the action of the pure understanding in 
cognizing an object may now begin, and it can begin only with an 
analysis of the expression “an object of representations”. The 
appearances, Kant notes, are nothing but sensible representations, 
not objects outside the power of representation, so the question is: 
“What does it mean, then, if one speaks of an object correspond-
ing to and therefore distinct from the cognition?”
313
 
We saw that according to Tetens' analysis any unitary 
representation of a manifold requires that the mind has the com-
ponent representations at its disposal as appearances and that this 
depends on the ability to distinguish these appearances. The dis-
tinguishing of a partial representation of an appearance, in turn, 
requires that this representation has previously appeared in con-
nection with something else. If, for example, my sensation of 
warmth had always been represented together with the sensation 
of the colour red, and neither of them had ever been represented 
in connection with something else, I could not distinguish the 
warmth from the colour red. But if the warmth would then occur 
in connection with, say, the colour green, the mind would be in a 
position to compare these representations and be able to distin-
guish the warmth as an appearance.
314
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From where Kant stands, there is nothing wrong with Te-
tens’ analysis up to this point. However, Tetens also thought that 
at some point, the human mind will simply be able to distinguish 
the self from the objects it perceives, and this is where Kant 
thought that he erred. The reason for this is that according to 
Kant, the representation of an object outside the power of repre-
sentation cannot arise in the same manner in which a representa-
tion of an appearance arises, because a representation of the ob-
ject that is to be distinguished from the self, cannot arise through 
mere comparison of intuitions. In Reflection 5643 Kant says that 
we know (kennen) an object only as a something in general, for 
which the given intuitions are only predicates, and that how these 
intuitions can be predicates to this third (the object) cannot be 
cognized through the comparison of these intuitions, but only 
through the way that the consciousness of the manifold in general 
can be seen as necessarily combined in one consciousness.
315
 
Thus, the distinguishing between objects and ourselves is not 
reducible to the act of distinguishing objects from each other, and 
apperception cannot arise through the same acts through which 
awareness of objects does. 
We should, then, carry the analysis of the mind’s faculties 
further in order to learn about the requirements of a representation 
of an object of cognition, and for this we first need to consider 
what that object is. Kant argues that since appearances themselves 
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are nothing but sensible representations and since outside of our 
cognition we have nothing that we could set over against our cog-
nition as corresponding to it, the object must be thought of only as 
something in general = X.
316
 Further, our thought of the relation 
of all cognition to its object “carries something of necessity with 
it”,
317
 because our cognitions must agree with each other. Conse-
quently, our cognitions must have a unity that constitutes the con-
cept of an object.
318
 From this fact Kant can begin his analysis of 
the pure use of the understanding in cognition. 
Let us first consider what he has accomplished so far in 
the Subjective Deduction. By using the pure concept of a number 
as an example Kant has shown that a pure concept presupposes a 
unity of consciousness in the reproduction of an a priori mani-
fold. He has also shown that representing an object of cognition 
presupposes a pure concept of an object, which, being a pure con-
cept, requires a unity of consciousness in the reproduction of an a 
priori manifold. Representing an object therefore involves a pure 
synthesis of recognition in the concept of an object. As Kant had 
anticipated on page A 78 (B 103), we have now seen (in subsec-
tions 1 and 2) that synthesis in general is the mere effect of the 
imagination. In the third subsection, we are now about to see how 
this synthesis is brought to concepts. Kant has already informed 
us (on pages A 78–79/B 103–105) that pure synthesis, generally 
represented, yields the pure concept of the understanding. We 
have learned that even the mere synthesis of imagination is 
grounded on a pure synthesis, but in addition to the mere synthe-
sis, a pure concept requires a consciousness of this pure synthesis. 
Under a pure concept the unity in the synthesis of the manifold 
becomes necessary, as the synthesis in accordance with concepts 
is a synthesis in accordance with a common ground of unity. 
                                                     
316





Kant’s Transcendental Deductions 
194 
 
Now, transcendental logic teaches how to bring the pure 
synthesis of representations to concepts. I remind the reader of 
what Kant said in the Leitfaden: 
 
The first thing that must be given to us a priori for the cogni-
tion of all objects is the manifold of pure intuition; the synthe-
sis of this manifold by means of the imagination is the second 
thing, but it still does not yield cognition. The concepts that 
give this pure synthesis unity, and that consist solely in the 
representation of this necessary synthetic unity, are the third 
thing necessary for cognition of an object that comes before 




The concepts that constitute the third requirement are rep-
resentations of unity, and an object of cognition presupposes a 
thought of something as an object, which, in turn, presupposes a 
concept of an object. Now, Kant argues that since that something 
(the X) that is required for cognition of an object, cannot be a 
representation, and therefore is nothing for us, the unity required 
for the concept of an object can be nothing other than the formal 
unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of our 
representations.
320
 Conceptual cognition requires a unity of con-
sciousness in the reproduction of the manifold of intuition, and 
cognizing an object thus means that we have effected synthetic 
unity in the manifold of intuition.
321
 
Analysing this conclusion will reveal us the nature of the 
unity of the pure synthesis. Kant begins this analysis by the fol-
lowing: 
 
But this is impossible if the intuition could not have been 
produced through a function of synthesis in accordance with a 
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rule that makes the reproduction of the a priori manifold nec-





Kant illustrates this with an example: 
 
Thus we think of a triangle as an object by being conscious of 
the composition of three straight lines in accordance with a 





In this example, we have an intuition of a triangle that has 
as its components the intuitions of three straight lines. In order to 
think the triangle as an object the object has to be produced 
through a function of synthesis. By a function Kant means “the 
unity of the action of ordering different representations under a 
common one”.
324
 In the thought of a triangle an a priori manifold 
is ordered under the pure sensible concept of a triangle and the 
unity of this action presupposes a reproduction of the manifold. 
Indeed, it requires a transcendental reproduction, although this is 
left without mention, probably because it should be obvious. It 
also makes the concept possible, because the concept consists in 
the representation of this necessary synthetic unity.
325
  
The intuition that must be produced for cognition (here 
the triangle), thus presupposes a unity of the action of synthesis in 
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accordance with a rule, and according to this rule, this intuition 
“can always be exhibited”. This implies a unity of the rule: 
 
Now this unity of rule determines all the manifold, and limits 
it to conditions that make the unity of apperception possible, 
and the concept of this unity is the representation of the object 




We should pause here, because there are so many unities 
involved that it is getting difficult to keep track of them. In order 
to see where Kant is heading, we should first turn our attention to 
the unity of apperception. The unity of apperception that is made 
possible by the unity of rule is the unity of the empirical apper-
ception of the triangle when I think this object through the predi-
cates of the three straight lines.
327
 The intuited triangle is a modi-
fication of the mind represented in inner sense. Two paragraphs 
later Kant will tell us that although empirical apperception and 
inner sense are customarily taken to be the same, it is vitally im-
portant to understand that they are not. As Kant emphasized at the 
beginning of the first subsection, as modifications of the mind all 
our representations belong to inner sense. On the other hand, our 
acquaintance with appearances does not involve apperception, for 
intuition by no means requires the functions of the understanding, 
as Kant noted on page A 91 (B 123). 
When I think of a triangle I have to produce an intuition 
of a triangle whereby I become conscious of this intuition in me – 
I cognize it – and this consciousness, as the product of my cogni-
tive act, is a unity of apperception. This thought is possible 
through a function of synthesis in accordance with a rule, and the 
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unity of this rule determines the manifold of the a priori intuition 
(the three straight lines). Now that I have the concept of a triangle 
I can use it as a predicate for judgements, e.g. for the judgement 
“Every triangle is a polygon.” In this judgement, the concept of 
polygon is related to various concepts, and here particularly to the 
concept of a triangle: it stands under the concept of a polygon. 
But I can, of course, think something in my empirical in-
tuition as a triangle, say that triangle shaped piece of paper that 
one of my daughters has clipped out of a sheet and left lying on 
the floor. In this case, the piece of paper, i.e. an intuition, stands 
under the concept of triangle. This, that is, the relation of a con-
cept to an appearance, is what interests us here. 
 A concept, Kant continues, is something that serves as a 
rule: 
 
All cognition requires a concept, however imperfect or ob-
scure it may be; but as far as its form is concerned the latter is 





In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant analysed the repre-
sentation of a body by abstracting from all that which the under-
standing thinks about it. There Kant found out that besides that 
which belongs to sensation that representation contains something 
that belongs to pure intuition. Here is the place to take into scruti-
ny that which the understanding thinks about it through the con-
cept of a body. This concept brings with it necessity: 
 
Thus the concept of body serves as a rule for our cognition of 
outer appearances by means of the unity of the manifold that 
is thought through it. However, it can be a rule of intuitions 
only in so far as it represents in given appearances the neces-
sary reproduction of their manifold, hence the synthetic unity 
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in the consciousness of them. Thus in the case of the percep-
tion of something outside of us the concept of body makes 
necessary the representation of extension, and with that of 




In thinking the piece of paper as a triangle I have a 
thought of its shape. But this commits me to the thought that this 
piece of paper has an extension. I think it as a body and this 
brings with it all those concepts that have the concept of body 
under them. If the piece of paper stands under the concept of 
body, it also stands under the concept of divisible. Thus, if I think 
this piece of paper (a body) as triangle-shaped, I also think it as 
divisible, although divisibility is not clearly represented in my 
thought. If I were to tell my six-year-old daughter that there is a 
piece of paper on the floor that is not divisible, she would not 
have to come and inspect the piece of paper to be able to decide 
whether my claim is true. She would know that this object is di-
visible and that I am only kidding. The piece of paper contains a 
manifold of representations that stand under the concept of body, 
and when I represent the piece of paper in my thought, the con-
cept of body represents the necessary reproduction of its manifold 
and thereby its synthetic unity. 
Now, the synthetic unity in the consciousness of outer 
appearances is the empirical apperception of them. But as this 
apperception involves a necessity, it must have a transcendental 
ground: 
 
Every necessity has a transcendental condition as its ground. 
A transcendental ground for the unity of the consciousness in 
the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, hence also 
of the concepts of objects in general, consequently also of all 
objects of experience, without which it would be impossible 
to think of any object for our intuitions; for the latter is noth-
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ing more than the something for which the concept expresses 




This transcendental condition is, according to Kant, the 
transcendental apperception. The empirical apperception, i.e. the 
“consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determinations 
of our state in internal perception”, is forever variable, and cannot 
therefore make experience possible.
331
 There must be a transcen-
dental self-consciousness, because the empirical self-
consciousness presupposes a necessary reproduction of represen-
tations. To see how the transcendental apperception makes empir-
ical apperception possible, we need to see how it makes concepts 
possible: 
 
Now no cognitions can occur in us, no connection and unity 
of them under one another, without that unity of conscious-
ness that precedes all data of the intuitions, and in relation to 




The transcendental unity of apperception is the necessary 
requirement of all conceptual unity because it necessarily grounds 
the action of ordering different representations under a common 
one. It precedes all data of the intuitions in cognizing an object of 
thought in that it is that consciousness that recognises representa-
tions in the reproduction of the manifold of intuition in the act 
that produces the empirical apperception. An intuition, i.e. an 
appearance, must, of course, already be available, i.e. given, for 
thought but in the act of thought the transcendental apperception 
precedes the data of the intuition, because the empirical synthetic 
unity in the manifold of intuition presupposes this transcendental 
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consciousness in the production of the intuition through a func-
tion of synthesis in accordance with a rule. Thus it makes the 
concept in which this manifold is united possible. 
Even the unity of the concepts of space and time, Kant 
adds, is possible only through the relation of the intuitions to the 
transcendental apperception. It was shown in the second subsec-
tion that the pure intuitions of space and time can provide cogni-
tion only through a transcendental reproduction of the a priori 
manifold, and now it has been shown that in addition to this, the 
unity of the concepts of space and time depends on apperception, 
which therefore must be named transcendental.
333
 It was also 
shown in the second subsection that even the most fundamental 
representations of space and time depend on the transcendental 
reproduction. Consequently, as nothing can appear to us except in 
space and time, both our acquaintance with appearances and our 
cognition of them depend on the transcendental use of imagina-
tion.  
The following conclusion can now be drawn: 
 
The numerical unity of this apperception therefore grounds all 
concepts a priori, just as the manifoldness of space and time 




What this passage effectively says is that the transcenden-
tal use of apperception is a condition of all subordination just as 
the transcendental use of sense is a condition of all coordination 
of representations. And as we just noted, both coordination and 
subordination depend on the transcendental use of imagination. 
Kant has thus traced cognitive action back to those three original 
sources of cognition that cannot be reduced to any other capacity 
of the mind. He has also shown that both the acquaintance with 
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appearances in mere intuition and the apperception of them in 
experience depend on the transcendental reproduction. Now we 
still have to examine how subordination and coordination are 
related to each other. 
It has been shown that all concepts depend on transcen-
dental apperception. But its use goes beyond this: 
 
Just this transcendental unity of apperception, however, 
makes out of all possible appearances that can ever come to-
gether in one experience a connection of all these representa-




Thus, not only do the appearances, when they are thought 
as objects of experience, depend on the transcendental unity of 
apperception but also their lawlike interconnection. This point is 
expounded by the following sentences, which I quote at length: 
 
For this unity of consciousness would be impossible if in the 
cognition of the manifold the mind could not become con-
scious of the identity of the function by means of which this 
manifold is synthetically combined into one cognition. Thus 
the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of 
oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an equally nec-
essary unity of the synthesis of all appearances in accordance 
with concepts, i.e., in accordance with rules that not only 
make them necessarily reproducible, but also thereby deter-
mine an object for their intuition, i.e., the concept of some-
thing in which they are necessarily connected; for the mind 
could not possibly think of the identity of itself in the mani-
foldness of its representations, and indeed think this a priori, 
if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its action, 
which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empir-
ical) to a transcendental unity, and first makes possible their 
connection in accordance with a priori rules.
336
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Let me first try to paraphrase the beginning of this quote. 
This connection of possible appearances in accordance with laws 
(i.e., “this unity of consciousness”) would be impossible if the 
mind could not become conscious of the identity of the unity of 
the action by means of which it combines the manifold syntheti-
cally into one cognition, i.e. to a conceptual representation of the 
spatiotemporal world. This necessary transcendental unity of con-
sciousness of the identity of oneself (in the action of synthesis) is 
therefore at the same time a consciousness of a necessary unity of 
the synthesis of all appearances in accordance with concepts. 
The essential point Kant makes here is that the connec-
tion of appearances is a represented connection, not a subjective 
connection of appearances in empirical imagination, which yields 
no representation of the relation. When I represent an appearance 
in mere intuition, this may certainly occasion the reproduction of 
some other appearance in my imagination, which presupposes a 
subjective connection between these appearances, but in mere 
intuition my reproduction cannot result in a representation of the 
connection between these appearances. The connection must be 
conceptual and the unity of consciousness in that representation 
would be impossible without consciousness of the unity of syn-
thesis of all appearances in accordance with a rule that makes 
those appearances necessarily reproducible. Recall that the repro-
ducibility of appearances depends on a pure transcendental syn-
thesis of imagination, which makes the synthesis of apprehension 
possible and implies an a priori rule. 
In the representation of the connection of appearances all 
synthesis of apprehension is subjected to a transcendental unity, 
which first makes possible this connection in accordance with a 
priori rules. This transcendental unity is what gives objecthood to 
the thought, and in this thought the mind must represent the iden-
tity of this action. In order to represent the connection of appear-
ances these appearances must be apprehended, which is possible 
only under an a priori rule. The representation of the identity of 
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the action of the mind that subjects this apprehension to a tran-
scendental unity, is a necessary requirement of the empirical con-
sciousness of the identity of itself (e.g. when I remember a flower 
I once saw).  
What this objecthood consists in, may now be examined: 
 
Further, we are now also able to determine our concept of an 
object in general more correctly. All representations, as repre-
sentations, have their object, and can themselves be objects of 
other representations in turn. Appearances are the only ob-
jects that can be given to us immediately, and that in them 
which is immediately related to the object is called intuition. 
However, these appearances are not things in themselves, but 
themselves only representations, which in turn have their ob-
ject, which cannot be further intuited by us, and that may 





Kant here outlines the conception of sensible representa-
tion which he inherited from Tetens. When I think of the piece of 
paper on the floor as triangle-shaped, I represent an object 
through the appearance. But the appearance, in turn, is an (unde-
termined) object of my empirical intuition, so my cognition (in 
the proper sense) presupposes more than one act of representing 
an object. I remind the reader that Tetens’ conception of inner 
sense enables this. According to that conception the mind is able 
to use its represented objects as representations and represent 
other objects through them. From the side of the object, or rather, 
from the side of the consciousness of the object, this means that 
consciousness can be consciousness of a consciousness, for con-
sciousness is a representation that another representation is in 
me.
338
 Thus, consciousness of an object of experience (i.e. con-
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sciousness of a conceptually determined object of an intuition) 
presupposes consciousness of an appearance. 
However, one should not draw the conclusion that the 
common function that grounds the interconnection of substances 
is responsible for the representation of appearances in mere intui-
tion, for this function grounds subordination, not coordination 
(but as we shall see, these acts are based on the same a priori 
rules of synthesis). Thus, when we look at this process from the 
side of the mind representing an object, we see that the move 
from intuitive synthesis to the synthesis required for thinking 
requires a new kind of representing an object. This is the reason 
why Tetens’ view that consciousness of the self arises from the 
same kind of act of distinguishing from which the consciousness 
of the appearances arises, must be mistaken. The appearances are 
nothing but representations, which in thinking are used for repre-
senting an object, but this object we cannot intuit, and the ground 
of unity for representing an object provided by space and time is 
left behind.  
The objecthood needed for cognition of objects of experi-
ence can now be analysed further: 
 
The pure concept of this transcendental object (which in all of 
our cognitions is really always one and the same = X) is that 
which in all of our empirical concepts in general can provide 
relation to an object, i.e., objective reality. Now this concept 
cannot contain any determinate intuition at all, and therefore 
concerns nothing but that unity which must be encountered in 





The transcendental unity to which all synthesis of appre-
hension is subjected is what makes possible the representation of 
the transcendental object, and the pure concept of this transcen-
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dental object is what provides our empirical concepts with a rela-
tion to an object. The representation of the identity of the action, 
which, as we have seen, follows an a priori rule of synthesis, is 
possible only if the mind can represent the unity of this rule. This 
unity is, according to the Leitfaden, the pure concept which gives 
unity to pure synthesis and which must be given to us a priori for 
the cognition of all objects.
340
 So the a priori concepts that consist 
solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity of the 
a priori manifold depend on the transcendental apperception, 
because the latter is what gives the necessary synthetic unity its 
unity. 
Further, based on the findings of the Leitfaden we know 
that the same function that gives unity to concepts in a judgement 
also gives unity to this synthesis, and that these pure concepts are 
the categories. Thus, as the world of experience is a whole con-
sisting of interconnected substances, my experience would not be 
possible without those a priori concepts – the categories – 
through which the I is conscious of their interconnection. 
I hope that a comparison with the view Kant had held 
three decades earlier will provide some illumination here: In the 
Nova dilucidatio Kant states that finite substances stand in a rela-
tionship with each other and are linked together by interaction 
only “in so far as the common principle of their existence, namely 
the divine understanding, maintains them in a state of harmony in 
their reciprocal relations.”
341
 Kant argues that as all the things in 
the universe are found to be reciprocally connected with each 
other, and since on the one hand each individual substance has an 
existence which is independent of other substances, and on the 
other hand finite beings cannot be the causes of other substances, 
it follows that this reciprocal connection depends on a “commu-
nality of cause”, namely on God.
342
 Kant thinks that he is the first 
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to have established that a community of origin is required for a 
connection between substances. For it does not follow, says Kant, 
 
from the fact that God simply established the existence of 
things that there is also a reciprocal relation between those 
things, unless the self-same scheme of the divine understand-
ing, which gives existence, also established the relations of 
things to each other, by conceiving their existences as corre-
lated with each other. It is most clearly apparent from this that 
the universal interaction of all things is to be ascribed to the 




It is almost stunning to see such consistency of thought 
reaching over decades and persisting through different metaphys-
ical positions. For, mutatis mutandis, Kant’s view has remained 
the same. Kant’s mature view is that it is not God’s (a priori) 
concept of a scheme, as a communality of cause, that grounds the 
reciprocal connection between substances, but the concept of an a 
priori rule, a common function, inherent in the mind of the sub-
ject that does. The mind has “before its eyes the identity of its 
action, which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is 
empirical) to a transcendental unity”. 
It is here important to understand that the empirical syn-
thesis of apprehension takes place independently of this act. In-
deed, if it did not, the common function of the understanding 
“would never get to do anything suitable to its capacity” (if I may 
borrow Kant’s own phrase from the second subsection). For con-
sider the transcendental grounds of empirical imagination and 
empirical apperception. Empirical imagination presupposes that 
the appearances are subject to a rule. In terms of the a priori 
component of cognition we may put the matter as follows: The 
synthesis of apprehension presupposes a transcendental reproduc-
tion of representations. Empirical apperception, on the other hand, 
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presupposes recognition, i.e. consciousness of this transcendental 
reproduction, and therefore transcendental apperception. But we 
could not become conscious of this reproduction without first 
representing appearances. In other words, the empirical use of 
imagination is the only path to the use of a discursive understand-
ing, which must use sensibility for its cognition of objects. 
Now that Kant has determined the concept of an object 
more correctly, I am in a position to explain more clearly my 
claim that Kant did not think that the prior act could be character-
ized by direction toward an object. Unlike Brentano, Kant does 
not think that every mental phenomenon “contains in itself some-
thing as an object”.
344
 The prior act, Kant thinks, is an act of syn-
thesis, and the representation to which it is directed contains both 
an empirical manifold (impressions) and a pure manifold (space). 
That representation is a modification of outer sense but despite 
containing a pure manifold of space it does not contain even the 
most fundamental quality of an object: shape. Shape cannot be 
represented without synthesis, and the act of synthesis produces a 
modification not in outer but in inner sense. The latter modifica-
tion is an undetermined object but the act of representation does 
not contain this object. Rather, the act affects inner sense, and the 
product of that affection is the object. The product is not an idea 
of an object but the object itself. That is what Kant means by 
claiming that appearances are given to us immediately.  There is 
no mediating idea between the act and the appearance. 
But as Kant says, “these appearances are not things in 
themselves, but themselves only representations, which in turn 
have their object.” Appearances can have their object by means of 
the posterior act, and that act can be characterized by direction 
toward an object. I will postpone discussion on the nature of this 
act until chapters 7 and 9, but I emphasize here that although the 
posterior act gives intentionality to cognition, it still does not 
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involve ideas. As Kant says, the object is really always the same, 
so the posterior act merely represents the empirical object as 
something outside the self. It thereby also produces empirical 
apperception of the self, i.e. distinguishes the self from outer ob-
jects. In other words, it does not produce ideas of particular ob-
jects, because those objects are products of the prior act of cogni-
tion. 
But let us return to Kant’s text. We are finally in a posi-
tion to reach the conclusion of the third subsection. The pure con-
cept of the transcendental object, Kant says, 
 
concerns nothing but that unity which must be encountered in 
any manifold of cognition insofar as it stands in relation to an 
object. This relation, however, is nothing other than the nec-
essary unity of consciousness, thus also of the synthesis of the 
manifold through a common function of the mind for combin-




We can see now that the third requirement (discussed 
above) for cognition of all objects, i.e. the concepts that give uni-
ty to pure synthesis, provide the concept of the transcendental 
object, for the latter concerns the necessary unity of the synthesis 
of any manifold of cognition. Kant’s point is that the concept of 
the transcendental object is a necessary requirement of a represen-
tation of the relation of any manifold to an object (e.g. in the rep-
resentation of the flower I once saw). This is because this pure 
concept is that “which in all of our empirical concepts in general 
can provide relation to an object”.
346
 This relation presupposes 
consciousness of the unity of the synthesis of this manifold (and 
thus also unity of consciousness). The conclusion thus is: 
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Now since this unity must be regarded as necessary a priori 
(since the cognition would otherwise be without an object), 
the relation to a transcendental object, i.e., the objective reali-
ty of our empirical cognition, rests on the transcendental law 
that all appearances, insofar as objects are to be given to us 
through them, must stand under a priori rules of their synthet-
ic unity, in accordance with which their relation in empirical 
intuition is alone possible, i.e., that in experience they must 
stand under conditions of the necessary unity of apperception 
just as in mere intuition they must stand under the formal 
conditions of space and time; indeed it is through those condi-




This conclusion is an answer to the question Kant posed 
on page A 89 (B 122): How should subjective conditions of think-
ing have objective validity? However, it seems not to be a full 
answer. Let us see what it does prove. 
Remember how Tetens dealt with Hume’s skepticism. He 
argued that the necessity we experience in the world truly is in 
those objects we perceive and that it is not a mere subjective ne-
cessity. Here Kant has given a proof for that. He has shown that 
in experience the appearances “must stand under conditions of the 
necessary unity of apperception”, and since he has shown that 
those conditions are the categories, he has also shown that the 
appearances, “insofar as objects are to be given to us through 
them”, i.e. given to thought, already contain the necessity we 
think in them through the categories. In other words, if we can 
subsume an empirical intuition under a concept, that intuition 
must necessarily be in accord with the categories, and Tetens’ 
demand for a realization of the basic concepts has been answered: 
the categories (along with our pure sensible concepts) have real 
objects. 
In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant was able to show 
with little effort, as he reports, that space and time are “pure intui-
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tions that contain a priori the conditions of the possibility of ob-
jects as appearances, and the synthesis in them has objective va-
lidity.”
348
 The fact that objects can appear only by means of these 
pure forms of sensibility was enough to prove the objective valid-
ity of the synthesis in them. Now he has shown that those appear-
ances can represent objects of cognition only under the conditions 
of the necessary unity of apperception. These subjective condi-
tions thus have objective reality, because – as Kant has now 
proved – the appearances, insofar as they are given to thought, 
cannot be “so constituted that the understanding would not find 
them in accord with the conditions of its unity”.
349
 This is because 
the common function of the understanding depends on the unity 
of those rules, in accordance with which the relation of appear-
ances in intuition is alone possible. 
It was noted above that the numerical unity of appercep-
tion “grounds all concepts a priori, just as the manifoldness of 
space and time grounds the intuitions of sensibility.” Now it has 
been shown that in experience the appearances “must stand under 
conditions of the necessary unity of apperception just as in mere 
intuition they must stand under the formal conditions of space and 
time”. The formal conditions of space and time consist in those a 
priori rules in accordance with which the relation of appearances 
in intuition is alone possible, and the conclusion is that the a pri-
ori rules of the synthetic unity of appearances in experience are 
those same rules. This shows the unavoidable connection of the 
transcendental apperception with the transcendental imagination 
in empirical cognition. 
But has Kant managed to prove here exactly the same as 
he did in the Transcendental Aesthetic regarding our pure sensible 
concepts? There is reason for doubt. He has proved the objective 
validity of the concepts of space and time and the objective reality 
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of the categories, but perhaps not the full validity of the latter. At 
least Kant’s reader may still have doubts. To be able to explain 
what might not yet have been proved, I must first try to elaborate 
on what the proof of the objective reality is grounded.  
 
 
5.5. Discussion on the Three Syntheses 
 
I have above made use of the distinction between the rela-
tions of subordination and coordination; a distinction Kant does 
not use in the present context. I shall now try to explain how this 
distinction can help us to understand Kant’s mature view of syn-
thesis correctly, and I will begin by making reference to the Inau-
gural Dissertation, where this distinction does play a major role. 
The question that we must find an answer to is how mere ac-
quaintance with appearances differs from experience. In the Inau-
gural Dissertation Kant explains this as follows: 
 
[I]n the case of sensible things and phenomena, that which 
precedes the logical use of the understanding is called ap-
pearance, while the reflective cognition, which arises when 
several appearances are compared by the understanding, is 
called experience. Thus there is no way from appearance to 
experience except by reflection in accordance with the logical 




The logical use of the understanding, Kant has explained 
before the quoted passage, is the use by which concepts are sub-
ordinated to each other and compared with one another in accord-
ance with the principle of contradiction.
351
 We can thus see that 
according to the Inaugural Dissertation, subordination necessari-
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ly pertains to experience. On the other hand, Kant says in the 
same text that 
 
synthesis is either qualitative, in which case it is a progression 
through a series of things which are subordinate to each oth-
er, the progression advancing from the ground to that which 
is grounded, or the synthesis is quantitative, in which case it 
is a progression within a series of things which are co-
ordinate with each other, the progression advancing from a 




Now, at the time Kant wrote these passages he did not 
have in mind the act of synthesis of imagination we are presently 
concerned with, but nevertheless, we can learn something im-
portant from these statements, for although he did not yet have an 
answer to the problem of how a synthetic representation can relate 
to its object, he had already fixed his view on what distinguishes 
experience from mere appearance. Moreover, the form of the 
world of experience was already a central theme in Kant’s 
thought, as we can see from the following: 
 
We are contemplating the world in respect of its form, that is 
to say, in respect of how, in general, a connection between a 
plurality of substances comes to be, and how a totality be-




Here, in the Critique, two conclusions from the third sub-
section of the Subjective Deduction become crucial. The first of 
these conclusions is that the numerical unity of apperception 
“grounds all concepts a priori, just as the manifoldness of space 
and time grounds the intuitions of sensibility”. In other words, the 
transcendental use of sense on the one hand, and apperception on 
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the other, belong among the original sources of cognition. This is 
because the a priori manifoldness of space and time is a condition 
of all co-ordinating synthesis of representations next to each other 
or after one another, and the transcendental apperception is a con-
dition of all subordinating synthesis of representations under each 
other, i.e. of subsumption. But since mere appearances, although 
they necessarily require a synthesis, do not contain any subordi-
nation, whereas experience necessarily does, the objective validi-
ty of the categories cannot be proved on the basis of this conclu-
sion alone. For that, we need to turn our eye on the syntheses 
behind subordination and coordination. 
The second conclusion states that in experience appear-
ances “must stand under conditions of the necessary unity of ap-
perception just as in mere intuition they must stand under the 
formal conditions of space and time”. Paraphrased by Kant this 
conclusion says that in experience all appearances “must stand 
under a priori rules of their synthetic unity, in accordance with 
which their relation in empirical intuition is alone possible”.  The 
a priori rules of subordination are thus the same rules that govern 
coordination, and the difference lies only in the ground of unity: 
space and time on the one hand and the numerical unity of the 
transcendental apperception on the other. In other words, whether 
we understand cognition as mere intuition (in the broad sense) or 
intuition and concept (in the narrow sense), it depends on the 
transcendental use of imagination. As we shall see, this conclu-
sion is vital in proving the objective validity of the categories. 
So what does all this mean in practice? Let me use the 
Lost Monarch as an example. An animal not endowed with ap-
perception but capable of apprehension – let us suppose a squirrel 
is such an animal
354
 – could apprehend this tree, and this appre-
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hension would involve a transcendental reproduction of its a pri-
ori manifold. Contrary to what Leibniz thought, this act would 
not require going through an infinite manifold, because the mani-
fold that must be run through does not consist of ‘petite’ percep-
tions. The empirical matter cannot provide a unity needed for 
acquaintance with appearances, only an a priori manifold can, 
and the latter is not a manifold of simple parts. To see more clear-
ly what Kant means by transcendental reproduction we should 
consider apprehension from the side of its result, i.e. the appear-
ance. In his reply to Eberhard (On a discovery) Kant says that 
 
each thing in space, each alteration in time, as soon as it oc-
cupies a portion of space and time, can be divided into just as 
many things or alterations as are the space or time which it 
occupies. In order to avoid the paradox that is felt in this con-
nection (in that reason, which ultimately requires the simple 
as the foundation of all composites, contradicts what mathe-
matics demonstrates with regard to sensory intuition), one can 
and must admit that space and time are merely things of 
thought and beings of imagination, which have not been in-
vented by the latter, but must underlie all of its combinations 
and inventions because they are the essential form of our sen-
sibility and the receptivity of our intuitions, whereby in gen-
eral objects are given to us, and whose universal conditions 
are necessarily at the same time a priori conditions of the 
possibility of all objects of the senses, as appearances, and so 




From this, Kant concludes that the simple in temporal 
succession, as in space, is absolutely impossible. However, that is 
not all that we can learn from this passage. Space (time can be 
dealt with similar manner) is a being of imagination that must 
underlie all its combinations, and the essential form whereby ob-
jects are given to us. Although each thing in space, “as soon as it 
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occupies a portion of space” can be divided ad infinitum, the 
combination of the imagination that is required for it to occupy 
that portion of space, does not involve an infinite manifold of 
parts combined together.
356
 Apprehension may well involve ap-
prehension of partial representations, but it is not dependent on 
them. For how does one distinguish those parts? The answer is: 
by means of the space they occupy. Recall that the synthesis of 
apprehension begins with distinguishing not the empirical matter 
but “the time in the succession of impressions on one another”. 
On the most fundamental level, then, apprehension depends on 
the ability to combine past representations of space with the pre-
sent representation of space. In other words, it depends on a re-
production that is presupposed by all empirical reproduction. The 
impressions of the senses are represented in space, which is the 
essential form of our receptivity, but the mind must be able to 
reproduce past impressions in one location and combine them 
with present impressions in another location in order to be able to 
represent any object as appearance.
357
 A representation of an ap-
pearance in space (and consequently a representation of space as a 
being of imagination) thus presupposes the ability to distinguish 
time, but through this act, the mind does not yet represent time, 
for the latter representation depends on the ability to represent 
some change in space. 
Now, supposing that a squirrel can represent appearances 
in space, and thus represent shapes, its mind will be capable of 
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empirically reproducing those shapes, the shape of a leaf for ex-
ample. If it can learn to associate a leaf with some other appear-
ance, say a leaf of a Quercus alba with the acorns of the tree, it 
will have to able to have a rule for imagining the shape of the leaf 
of this species. It may thus also be able to distinguish the shape of 
this leaf from that of the leaf of a Quercus rubra. It cannot be-
come conscious of this rule (because we assumed that it has no 
apperception) and hence it has no empirical concept of those 
leafs, but this rule it must have, if it can distinguish between those 
shapes. However, it must also have more fundamental rules. Sup-
pose that the squirrel sees an oak it is familiar with, and that the 
oak suffers from chlorosis causing spotted leaves, which it did not 
have before. The squirrel thus sees spotted leaves with which the 
representation of an acorn has not been associated. In order to be 
able to reproduce a representation of an acorn on the occasion of a 
spotted leaf it must have an a priori rule for representing some-
thing (a yellowish spot) in something (a leaf that persists in 
time).
358
 Representing the leaf as the same leaf that previously did 
not have the spots would require apperception, but the ability to 
keep reproducing a representation of an acorn on the occasion of 
the spotted leaf, even though this reproduction previously oc-
curred on the occasion of a leaf without the spots, does not. In 
conclusion, the squirrel does not, according to our assumption, 
have categories but it must have the a priori rules of synthesis 
behind the categories. 
I should perhaps also note here that apprehension depends 
on circumstances and may differ among individuals and through 
time.
359
 In other words, whether some information is relevant to 
the subject may vary. There may have been yellowish spots in the 
leaf before, and the squirrel just may not have noticed them. Still 
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it could keep the associations it had before, for even though the 
representation of a leaf is a singular intuition, it need not be dis-
tinct. Consider what happens if the squirrel now notices those 
spots. On the one hand, it means that something new is added to 
the representation of this appearance. On the other hand, it also 
means that those spots are apprehended as appearances. This is 
possible because the apprehension of the leaf is not grounded on 
the apprehension of its partial representations but on the appre-
hension of an a priori manifold. 
Suppose now that the squirrel has noticed the spots on the 
leaf. The representation of the leaf has changed but clearly the 
object is the same and the yellow spots inhere in the leaf already 
familiar to the squirrel. If the object were not the same for the 
squirrel, all the subjective associations between the leaf and other 
appearances would be lost and the squirrel would have to learn 
again to associate the leaf with the acorns. In fact, to the squirrel’s 
disadvantage, the ability to do this would also be lost, and the 
capacity for empirical reproduction, if it had one, would remain 
hidden in the interior of its mind. For the leaf is never exactly the 
same: it is viewed from different angles, under different lighting 
conditions, etc. The conclusion then is, not that the squirrel is an 
automaton, but that the synthesis of imagination is grounded on a 
priori principles “even prior to all experience”. Although the 
squirrel’s apprehension of the leaf does not involve apperception, 
the objecthood of the appearance depends on a priori principles. 
Now, what we need to understand in transcendental logic 
is the difference in the synthesis required for apprehension of 
appearances on the one hand and the synthesis required for cog-
nizing an object of experience on the other.  Think of the Lost 
Monarch and the squirrel. The squirrel could, for instance, learn 
to associate the tree with shelter and it could even individuate the 
tree on the basis of its spatial location and thus differentiate it 
from other trees. But it could not recognize the tree because it 
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could not be conscious of the sameness of its present representa-
tion of that particular tree with a reproduced representation of it. 
We, on the other hand, are capable of this and we can as-
sign an object for our appearances. This object, however, is al-
ways the same. Our understanding does not transform the spatio-
temporal world into a world of thought, it merely performs acts of 
thought on the appearances we apprehend. Thus, Kant’s point is 
not of course that there is only one object in the world. The ob-
jects are many, but we can cognize them as objects of thought 
only through an act of apperception, and we cannot simultaneous-
ly perform multiple acts of thought. Moreover, the objecthood of 
our thought consists merely in the unity of apperception. In the 
Reflection 5643, to which I referred above, Kant says that that 
which is determined with regard to the functions of judgements, is 
the object, and that the categories are concepts for determining 
the objects of our cognition in general, insofar as the intuition has 
been given to it.
360
 When I think something in my perceptual 
awareness as, say, a triangle, I have an appearance given for 
thought. My thought of a triangle requires the use of categories, 
e.g. the category of totality (there are three straight lines as predi-
cates of it), and the categories are “principles for making out of 
appearance experience, which is purely objective, i.e. universally 
valid empirical cognition,” by determining an object of cogni-
tion.
361
 The appearance is a modification of the mind and conse-
quently belongs to inner sense but without my thought there is no 
unity of apperception concerning this appearance and no object 
outside my power of representation, i.e. no object of experience.  
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5.6. The Conclusion of the Subjective Deduction 
 
Kant’s view-point in explaining the three syntheses is 
from conceptual cognition. The Subjective Deduction is an analy-
sis of experience. Its starting-point is empirical consciousness and 
it investigates the subjective sources of that consciousness. How-
ever, I argued above that in the first two subsections his purpose 
was not only to show that our conceptual cognition requires a 
transcendental synthesis in intuition but also that the mere intui-
tive cognition, the one a squirrel is capable of, requires such a 
synthesis. Nevertheless, the Subjective Deduction considers ap-
pearances only “insofar as objects are to be given to us through 
them”, and it is supposed to show that in that respect, in other 
words as objects of experience, they are necessarily such that the 
categories apply to them. The categories have real objects in those 
appearances that we can recognize. 
On the other hand, when we take into consideration what 
I discussed in the previous section, the discussion on the three 
syntheses seems to leave open the possibility that the animal in us 
could represent something unexplainable. It might be possible 
that there are appearances and happenings in space and time that 
we can merely reproduce but not recognize, in which case those 
appearances could affect our behaviour without our knowing it. 
There could be events that do not have a cause, for instance. We 
just could not grasp them with our conceptual faculty – we could 
not understand those events. 
Thus, the Subjective Deduction seems not to prove that 
the categories are valid for all possible objects that may come 
before our senses.
362
 It only shows that they are valid for those 
appearances that we can recognize and thus understand. With this 
in mind, we can move on to the fourth subsection where the dis-
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tinction between animal-like acquaintance with objects on the one 
hand, and human perception on the other, becomes important. 
From the discussion so far it, is clear that there is a paral-
lel between the findings of the Transcendental Aesthetic on one 
hand and the Subjective Deduction on the other. We have reached 
the conclusion that in experience the appearances must stand un-
der conditions of the necessary unity of apperception just as in 
mere intuition they must stand under the formal conditions of 
space and time. Kant begins the fourth subsection by comparing 
experience with space and time: 
 
There is only one experience, in which all perceptions are 
represented as in thoroughgoing and lawlike connection, just 
as there is only one space and time, in which all forms of ap-
pearance and all relation of being and non-being take place. If 
one speaks of different experiences, they are only so many 
perceptions insofar as they belong to one and the same uni-
versal experience. The thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of 
perceptions is precisely what constitutes the form of experi-
ence, and it is nothing other than the synthetic unity of the 




In the Dissertation Kant left room for the possibility that 
there might be multiple worlds. In the present context this possi-
bility becomes irrelevant, because we are now concerned only 
with our experience of a world. Through sensible intuition only 
one world can be experienced, and the experience itself cannot be 
dispersed. 
Now let us compare the statement that by different expe-
riences one can only mean perceptions belonging to one and the 
same universal experience, with the statement that different spac-
es (or times) must be understood as parts of one and the same 
unique space (or time). In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant says 
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that “these parts cannot as it were precede the single all-
encompassing space as its components (which would make its 
composition possible), and that these parts are only thought in 
it.”
364
 Now think of different experiences. These perceptions, as 
cognitions, cannot as it were precede the one experience either. 
Think further that the representations of one space and one time 
are conceptual representations whereas the appearances as mere 
intuitions are not. Nevertheless, space and time contain the condi-
tions of the appearances. How is this possible? It is possible be-
cause space and time that ground our intuitions are not represen-
tations of space and time but rather constitute one of the original 
sources of cognition – the transcendental use of sense – which 
provides us (with the help of the original source of transcendental 
imagination and empirical matter, of course) with appearances 
whose relations of being and non-being take place in one space 
and one time. In a similar fashion, the transcendental use of ap-
perception (with the help of transcendental imagination) provides 
us with the reciprocal connection of the objects of experience.  
Thus, as Kant says, the thoroughgoing and synthetic unity 
of perceptions is what constitutes the form of experience. In intui-
tion appearances cannot have a thoroughgoing unity, because 
without apperception we cannot be conscious of the connection 
between appearances: we can only reproduce them empirically. 
The thoroughgoing unity must be a synthetic unity in accordance 
with concepts. As this unity of synthesis according to concepts 
cannot be grounded on empirical concepts (because the unity 
would then be contingent, and experience would be impossible), 
the unity of synthesis that makes experience possible must be a 
unity of synthesis in accordance with pure concepts. The conclu-
sion then is: 
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The a priori conditions of a possible experience in general are 
at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of 
experience. Now I assert that the categories that have just 
been adduced are nothing other than the conditions of think-
ing in a possible experience, just as space and time contain 




Earlier it was said that the thoroughgoing and lawlike 
connection between appearances depends on the conditions of the 
transcendental apperception, so Kant concludes that just as the 
concepts of space and time have objective validity, so do the cat-
egories, for the categories represent the conditions of transcen-
dental apperception. 
Kant indicates here that it has been proved that the cate-
gories have objective validity. Nevertheless, he says in the Pref-
ace that the Subjective Deduction does not belong essentially to 
his chief end and that it is the Objective Deduction that is “sup-
posed to demonstrate and make comprehensible the objective 
validity” of the categories.
366
 It seems that the Subjective Deduc-
tion does not show the full scope of the validity of the categories. 
As Kant indicated in the third subsection, he has proved the ob-
jective reality of the categories, and now, since it has been shown 
that the objects belonging to the world we experience depend on 
the categories, the objective validity of the categories in regard to 
that world has also been proved. However, since the Subjective 
Deduction is an analysis of the faculty of thought, it can only 
analyse the conditions of thinking those appearances that can be 
given to thought. What it cannot prove is that there are no appear-
ances that cannot be thought. 
So this is the way we should read the conclusion of the 
Subjective Deduction: 
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They are therefore also fundamental concepts for thinking ob-
jects in general for the appearances, and they therefore have a 





The categories are concepts for thinking objects in gen-
eral, and by means of them we think objects for the appearances, 
which themselves are undetermined objects and independent of 
the use of the categories. In the Subjective Deduction Kant seems 
to say that the categories are objective valid if they apply to all 
objects of experience, and that since experience is created by 
means of thinking the appearances through the categories, their 
validity has been proved. However, Kant seems to have a differ-
ent conception of the problem of objective validity in § 26 of the 
B Deduction, where he says he wants to explain the “possibility 
of cognizing a priori through categories whatever objects may 
come before our senses”.
368
 Since the appearances are independ-
ent of the categories and they are what come before our senses, 
the Subjective Deduction cannot exclude the possibility of some-
thing incapable of being thought coming before our senses. 
In the remaining part of the subsection four, Kant contin-
ues to elaborate on what human experience is and how it presup-
poses the categories. Here is how he starts this elaboration: 
 
However, the possibility, indeed even the necessity of these 
categories rests on the relation that the entire sensibility, and 
with it also all possible appearances, have to the original ap-
perception, in which everything is necessarily in agreement 
with the conditions of the thoroughgoing unity of self-
consciousness, i.e., must stand under universal functions of 
synthesis, namely of the synthesis in accordance with con-
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cepts, as that in which alone apperception can demonstrate a 




The beginning of this quote can be interpreted in two 
ways. By the word aber (“however”) Kant seems to contrast what 
he says in it with what he has said before, and it could be that he 
is here contrasting his conclusion, which rests on an analysis of 
the faculty of thinking, with the whole cognitive capacity. If that 
is what he intends to do, then what he means to say is that alt-
hough what has been proved so far is the objective validity of the 
categories only in the limited scope, the possibility of those cate-
gories rests on the relation that the entire sensibility and all possi-
ble appearances have to the original apperception. This is true, 
because we would not have the categories without our ability to 
represent appearances, i.e. the animal perception. Interpreted this 
way, Kant is in effect alluding to the Objective Deduction, where 
it will be shown that there are no possible appearances incapable 
of being thought, and to the Schematism where he explains how 
sensibility is connected to the understanding. In fact, how he con-
tinues seems to support this interpretation: 
 
Thus the concept of a cause is nothing other than a synthesis 
(of that which follows in the temporal series with other ap-
pearances) in accordance with concepts; and without that sort 
of unity, which has its rule a priori, and which subjects the 
appearances to itself, thoroughgoing and universal, hence 





In the Schematism Kant will explain how concepts are re-
lated to the rules of productive imagination, and here Kant touch-
es on this issue. A category is a synthesis in accordance with con-
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cepts, and the unity (provided by apperception) of the a priori 
rules subjects the appearances (whose unity belongs to space and 
time) to itself. This is a plausible interpretation because Kant has 
already presented all the material necessary for the Objective 
Deduction. 
On the other hand, a genuine contrast may not be intend-
ed by the word “however”. By the expressions “entire sensibility” 
and “all possible appearances” Kant may mean to refer to the 
possible appearances in experience and hence use the expressions 
in a limited sense. That would seem to be a plausible interpreta-
tion as well. Although I am inclined to think that the former inter-
pretation is correct and that these considerations complete the 
Subjective Deduction, I do not see any significant consequences 
that would force us to make a decision here, because in the Objec-
tive Deduction the matter will be decided. 
The remaining part of the above quote and the whole re-
maining subsection after it deals only with human experience. 
Kant explains that the categories are possible because of the rela-
tion between appearances and the original apperception, so that in 
experience there can be nothing that would not stand under the 
conditions of the synthesis in accordance with concepts. His ex-
ample is the concept of a cause, which is nothing but a synthesis 
in accordance with concepts, without which a thoroughgoing and 
universal, and hence necessary, unity of consciousness in the 
manifold of perceptions would be impossible. In such a case, we 
would not have experience, and our perceptions would be less 
than a dream (for even a dream has a unity).
371
 
Kant explains this further by contrasting his Deduction to 
attempts to derive the basic concepts of the understanding from 
experience. He notes that the necessity found in the concept of a 
cause, for instance, cannot be learned from experience. The point 
is that unless our experience is first made possible by the unity 
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expressed in this concept, we could never be conscious of that 
necessity. Kant clarifies this with the following discussion: 
 
But that empirical rule of association, which one must assume 
throughout if one says that everything in the series of occur-
rences stand under rules according to which nothing happens 
that is not preceded by something upon which it always fol-
lows – on what, I ask, does this, as a law of nature, rest, and 
how is this association even possible? The ground of the pos-
sibility of the association of the manifold, insofar as it lies in 
the object, is called the affinity of the manifold. I ask, there-
fore, how do you make the thoroughgoing affinity of the ap-
pearances (by means of which they stand under constant laws 





Kant’s answer is that the thoroughgoing affinity of the 
appearances is possible on his principles. This is a very interest-
ing conclusion but it can be easily misunderstood, because it may 
be difficult to understand what Kant means by the rule of associa-
tion and the affinity of appearances, so let us take a look at what 
they mean. 
Kant calls the ground of the possibility of the association 
of the manifold “insofar as it lies in the object”, the affinity of the 
manifold. By association he does not therefore refer to mere em-
pirical reproduction of appearances but to the association that is 
thought in appearances, for the ground of the empirical reproduc-
tion of appearances does not lie in the object but in the subject. 
Kant then asks us: how do we make the thoroughgoing affinity of 
appearances comprehensible to ourselves? His purpose is to draw 
attention to the fact that if we ask whether the appearances really 
are subject to, e.g., the laws of causality, we are no longer dealing 
with mere appearances and empirical reproduction, but have ap-
plied our understanding to the appearances. And since this is pos-
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sible only through the application of the concept of causality, the 
appearances stand under the laws of causality. 
Interestingly, this is just the position Tetens had already 
taken. As I mentioned before, he thought that the necessity we 
think in the appearances cannot be a mere subjective necessity. It 
lies in the appearances themselves. In fact, the Subjective Deduc-
tion does not contain any elements that Tetens did not have in his 
hands. Had he accepted Merian’s conception of original apper-
ception, which he discusses in his Versuche, he could have incor-
porated his own conception of inner sense with Kant’s view on 
sensibility expressed in the Dissertation and reached the Subjec-
tive Deduction for the conclusion he already endorsed. This is of 
course mere speculation but it illustrates that Kant’s originality 
lies not so much in making new discoveries but in what he does 
with those discoveries. His originality lies above all in his tran-
scendental method. 
However, there is one important discovery Kant did make 
concerning our cognitive faculties. Whereas Tetens thought that 
the productive faculty, the faculty of feigning, is an independent 
faculty, Kant sided with Wolff and thought that it is derivable 
from the faculty of imagination. However, he had a completely 
new idea of how it is derivable from the faculty of imagination. In 
the Subjective Deduction Kant has already explained what his 
invention is, but it will be used first in the Objective Deduction to 




6. THE OBJECTIVE DEDUCTION IN THE A EDITION 
6.1. Introduction 
 
I claimed above that a mere analysis of the faculty of 
thought cannot refute the possibility that there might be some-
thing in our animal-like awareness that we cannot think. Since 
Kant wants to prove that we can think everything that can come 
before our senses, we should expect the Objective Deduction to 
contain not only an analysis of the object of thought but also an 
analysis of the object of sensibility, and this is indeed the case. 
In the Subjective Deduction, the faculty of understanding 
was analysed in order to illuminate the relation of our cognition to 
its object from the subjective side.  Now, in the Objective Deduc-
tion, Kant approaches this relation from the side of the object. His 
own characterisation of the difference between the two Deduc-
tions is that what has been expounded separately and individually 
in the Subjective Deduction will now be represented as unified 
and in connection, so the material for the Objective Deduction has 
already been presented in the Subjective Deduction. However, we 
should not expect to see a mere reorganisation of words, because 
the change in perspective will change even terminology. The pur-
pose of the Subjective Deduction was to examine “the pure un-
derstanding itself, concerning its possibility and the powers of 
cognition on which it itself rests”.
373
 This analysis of the active 
capacity involved in thinking an object is now left behind, and the 
relation of our thought to the object will be examined by examin-
ing the object. However, because this object is nothing in itself 
but only a unity of empirical apperception represented in inner 
sense, and because we are consequently still examining some-
thing in the mind, the difference between these two Deductions 
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may not be sufficiently clear to the reader. We should thus try to 
clarify this difference before turning our attention to the argu-
ment. 
When we analyse the relation of our thought to its object 
from the side of the object, we must analyse something in our 
empirical apperception. This means that although our capacity to 
be acquainted with appearances does not in itself presuppose ap-
perception, this does not concern us here, as it is not the action of 
our capacities that is being analysed but the object of thought. 
Nevertheless, by analysing the three syntheses Kant has provided 
the reader with an understanding of what cognition presupposes, 
and he can now assume that the reader understands what he has 
said of the cognitive capacities. At the beginning of the Objective 
Deduction, Kant first reiterates that the possibility of experience 
in general and cognition of its objects rest on three subjective 
sources of cognition, namely sense, imagination and appercep-
tion. He then states that each of these capacities can be considered 
as empirical (in application to given appearances) but that they 
are also “elements or foundations a priori that make this empiri-
cal use itself possible.”
374
 The relation between the empirical use 
and the a priori foundations Kant expounds in the following: 
 
Sense represents the appearances empirically in perception, 
the imagination in association (and reproduction), and apper-
ception in the empirical consciousness of the identity of these 
reproductive representations with the appearances through 
which they were given, hence in recognition. 
 But pure intuition (with regard to it as representation, 
time, the form of inner intuition) grounds the totality of per-
ception a priori; the pure synthesis of the imagination 
grounds association a priori; and pure apperception, i.e., the 
thoroughgoing identity of oneself in all possible representa-
tions, grounds empirical consciousness a priori.
375
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Kant has explained in the Transcendental Aesthetic and in 
the Subjective Deduction how these pure elements ground the 
empirical use of these capacities. He has shown that neither the 
empirical use of sense nor empirical apperception is grounded 
solely on the pure use of sense and apperception, respectively, but 
that a pure synthesis is required for both representing appearances 
and for thinking those appearances. 
What Kant now sets out to do is to follow the inner 
ground of representations to the point “in which they must all 
come together in order first to obtain unity of cognition for a pos-
sible experience”.
376
 This “inner ground” needs explaining: alt-
hough Kant refers to the subjective sources of cognition, his in-
tention is not to refer to the action through the faculties but to the 
results of that action. While the reader is expected to have a deep-
er understanding of what lies behind the representations, it is now 
the representations themselves that are being examined, not the 
action that produces those representations. The difference be-
tween the Subjective and the Objective Deduction is difficult to 
express precisely, however, because in the Objective Deduction 
we are still examining something in the mind. The object of 
thought is, of course, represented as outside me, but nevertheless 
it is a modification of the mind and belong to my inner sense, so 
an analysis of the possibility of the object is an analysis of my 
ability to represent it. In the Objective Deduction, we therefore 
need to examine the faculties – we need to examine how it is pos-
sible that they can represent an object of thought. The crucial 
difference between these two Deductions is that in the Subjective 
Deduction we were concerned with how the faculty of thinking is 
possible. Here we are concerned with how the object of thought is 
possible. 
Both of these Deductions are extremely difficult to under-
stand, and before we start examining the Objective Deduction, I 
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want to pose a question: Why are they so difficult? In the Intro-
duction, I explained that my hypothesis is that Kant adopted Te-
tens’ account of inner sense. According to this account, our cog-
nitive action is represented to us through our inner sense. I ex-
plained that Tetens’ method is empirical (although it is not lim-
ited to what is empirical in our cognition but is also concerned 
with what is a priori). Kant’s method, on the other hand, is tran-
scendental and it is concerned with the possibility of our a priori 
cognition. If my hypothesis is correct, then the object of Kant’s 
inquiry – the transcendental element of our cognition – is some-
thing behind our inner sense, and it is impossible for us to observe 
it, because inner sense gives us only the effect of that element. 
This is why the Deductions are so difficult to understand. They 
examine our own consciousness and at the same time transcend 
that very consciousness so that the analysis cannot dismantle it 
into cognizable elements. The mental action required for con-
sciousness lies behind the curtain of inner sense. As we cannot be 
conscious of the action itself of the transcendental use of our fac-
ulties, the only way to examine this use is to see what our a priori 
cognition presupposes. 
The Objective Deduction consists of two easily distin-
guishable parts: one proceeding from the top (pure apperception) 
and one proceeding from beneath (from what is empirical in our 
cognition) towards the point where pure thought and the empirical 
element of cognition meet each other. This two-fold structure is 
present in both editions, although with a slightly different per-
spective, and my purpose is to show that the Objective Deduction 
is compatible with the B Deduction. The section that comprises 
the top-down part in the A Deduction can be easily shown to be 
present in the B Deduction as well, although the argument struc-
ture is somewhat different in the B edition. In the top-down part 
of the A Deduction Kant proceeds from empirical apperception to 
the original faculties of apperception and imagination, and the 
analysis starts from the effect of apperception in cognizing an 
Kant’s Transcendental Deductions 
232 
 
object. In § 16 of the B Deduction Kant discusses the same effect 
but without discussing the role of imagination. Kant’s view on the 
role of imagination has not changed in the B Deduction but we 
will see that the argument is different regarding that role, so I will 
present here what is common to both Deductions by going 
through the text as it is presented in the A edition while simulta-
neously commenting the § 16 of the B edition. § 16 expresses the 
same thought slightly differently, and perhaps better, so I think 
we can gain from comparing these different versions and consid-
ering them as having the same objective. 
However, I must first say something about the preceding 
§ 15 of the B edition. The motivation for rewriting the Deduction 
was to express the argument so that it does not rely on an analysis 
of the faculties at all. This was not because Kant thought that he 
had made an error in the A edition. I think that the reason for 
rewriting the Deduction was that he saw that the aim of convinc-
ing the reader was more likely to be achieved the less the Deduc-
tion contained talk of the faculties. This is why he omitted the 
distinction between the transcendental and empirical use of our 
original faculties (presented in A 94). Because of this new ap-
proach, § 15 is based on the crude distinction between sensibility 
and understanding. The B Deduction does not presuppose the 
analysis of the understanding as a faculty, which the A Deduction 
presupposed, and it seeks to avoid such an analysis altogether – 
not indeed because Kant had changed his mind but because in this 
way the argument should be less likely to be rejected by the 
(Wolffian) reader. 
So let us look at what Kant says in § 15. Regarding sensi-
bility, the B Deduction presupposes nothing but the Transcenden-
tal Aesthetic: 
 
The manifold of representations can be given in an intuition 
that is merely sensible, i.e., nothing but receptivity, and the 
form of this intuition can lie a priori in our faculty of repre-
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sentation without being anything other than the way in which 




In the Deduction we are concerned with cognition proper, 
and Kant’s focus is on the fact that besides intuition, cognition 
necessarily contains a combination which cannot come to us 
through the senses: 
 
Yet the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can 
never come to us through the senses, and therefore cannot al-
ready be contained in the pure form of sensible intuition; for 
it is an act of the spontaneity of the power of representation, 
and, since one must call the latter understanding, in distinc-
tion from sensibility, all combination, whether we are con-
scious of it or not, whether it is a combination of the manifold 
of intuition or of several concepts, and in the first case either 
of the sensible or non-sensible intuition, is an act of the un-
derstanding, which we would designate with the general title 
synthesis in order at the same time to draw attention to the 
fact that we can represent nothing as combined in the object 
without having previously combined it ourselves, and that 
among all representations combination is the only one that is 
not given through objects but can be executed only by the 




Notice Kant’s manner of expression: he does not say 
what the understanding is; he only says that in distinction from 
sensibility, we must call spontaneity understanding. Thus, he con-
tinues, we would designate the act of the understanding with the 
general title synthesis in order to draw attention to the fact that 
we ourselves must have combined everything that we can repre-
sent as combined in the object (of thought). The purpose of this 
introduction is to point out that we cannot receive the representa-
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tion of combination (which is always cognition in the proper 
sense) through sensibility. There is no need (in the B Deduction) 
to analyse the understanding in order to see that it is not an origi-
nal faculty, because Kant has found a new way of presenting the 
Deduction. This new approach will change the bottom-up-part of 
the Deduction, and concerning that part I will go through the two 
versions separately. It does not, however, change the beginning of 
the top-down-part, because that part concerns apperception only. 
To that part we shall now turn our attention. 
 
 
6.2. Starting from the Top 
 
We must begin the Deduction, Kant says, with pure ap-
perception. 
 
All intuitions are nothing for us and do not in the least con-
cern us if they cannot be taken up into consciousness, whether 





Recall my example of the squirrel as a creature that can 
represent appearances without being able to think them. The ap-
pearances it represents and reproduces are nothing for it, because 
it cannot take them up into consciousness and recognize them, 
and it has no cognition in the proper meaning of the word. Of 
course, the cognition we have has its ground in the kind of cogni-
tion the squirrel has in its intuitions, but cognition proper requires 
that we are capable of taking those intuitions up into conscious-
ness. 
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This empirical apperception, which results from the use 
of the understanding on appearances, is dependent on a pure ap-
perception, and this is Kant’s starting-point: 
 
We are conscious a priori of the thoroughgoing identity of 
ourselves with regard to all representations that can ever be-
long to our cognition, as a necessary condition of the possibil-
ity of all representations (since the latter represent something 
in me only insofar as they belong with all the others to one 
consciousness, hence they must at least be capable of being 
connected in it). This principle holds a priori, and can be 
called the transcendental principle of the unity of all the man-
ifold of our representations (thus also in intuition). Now the 
unity of the manifold in a subject is synthetic; pure appercep-
tion therefore yields a principle of the synthetic unity of the 




To the last sentence Kant adds a note where he explains 
that all representations have a necessary relation to a possible 
empirical consciousness and that all empirical consciousness, in 
turn, has a necessary relation to a transcendental consciousness. 
In the note Kant then concludes that the absolutely first and syn-
thetic principle of our thinking in general is the proposition that 
all varying empirical consciousness must be combined in a single 
self-consciousness. Further, he notes that the mere representation 
I in relation to all others is the transcendental consciousness, and 
concludes that “the possibility of the logical form of all cognition 




Here we must remember that in transcendental logic we 
are interested in the origin and content of our representations. We 
should also remember that the Analytic of Concepts is an analysis 
of the faculty of understanding. In the Metaphysical Deduction 
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Kant began the analysis by stating that the understanding is a 
faculty for judging. Judgements, however, are functions of unity 
among representations and they depend on subordination of rep-
resentations. Kant then found out that also concepts depend on 
subordination and that the same function that gives unity to dif-
ferent representations in a judgement also gives unity to the mere 
synthesis of different representations in an intuition. Expressed 
generally, Kant concluded, this function is a pure concept of the 
understanding, and the categories therefore give pure synthesis 
the unity necessary for subsuming intuitions under concepts. 
However, this did not prove that the categories have ob-
jective reality and validity. It only showed that in thinking, the 
same function operates at different levels from the subsumption 
of intuitions all the way up to the inferences of reason. The analy-
sis of the understanding must thus be carried further in order to 
prove the objective validity of the categories. Now, in § 10 of the 
Leitfaden, Kant showed that one of the requirements of cognition 
of all objects is the unity in the synthesis of a pure manifold. Be-
cause concepts, judgements and inferences all involve a synthesis 
of a pure manifold, Kant was able to conclude that the same func-
tion of unity grounds all of them. In order to arrive at that conclu-
sion, he did not have to inspect how the understanding provides 
us with this unity, but now we see that the ground of this unity is 
the faculty of original apperception. Kant’s reasoning is familiar 
to us from the Subjective Deduction. If the world is nothing but 
my experience of appearances, then these appearances in the 
world have a necessary relation to my possible consciousness of 
them. Otherwise they would not belong to the world. Now, there 
can be only one I representing the appearances in different loca-
tions and at different times, and I am conscious of this identity of 
me a priori. All empirical consciousness thus presupposes tran-
scendental apperception. This was explained in the subsection on 
the synthesis of recognition, but whereas in the Subjective Deduc-
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tion the focus was on the unity of synthesis that the transcendental 
apperception effects, it is now on the faculty itself. 
The logical form of cognition thus depends on the tran-
scendental apperception. In other words, we could not perform 
the act required for concepts, judgements and inferences without 
the pure apperception, which grounds our recognition of appear-
ances. 
This same point Kant makes also in the B deduction. In § 
16 Kant begins with empirical apperception, i.e. the recognition 
of appearances (the same applies to pure sensible intuitions, con-
cepts and judgements), by stating that the I think must be able to 
accompany all my representations. The I think is the pure apper-
ception, an act of spontaneity, and its unity is the transcendental 
unity of self-consciousness. The crucial point is that this identity 
of the apperception of a manifold given in intuition presupposes a 
synthetic unity of consciousness. Kant expresses this in the fol-
lowing passage from the B Deduction: 
 
Therefore it is only because I can combine a manifold of giv-
en representations in one consciousness that it is possible for 
me to represent the identity of the consciousness in these rep-
resentations itself, i.e., the analytical unity of apperception is 





Kant explains this further in a note where he says that the 
analytical unity of concepts – of the concept of red, for example – 
presupposes an antecedently conceived possible synthetic unity. 
Kant explains this in the note: 
 
A representation that is to be thought of as common to several 
must be regarded as belonging to those that in addition to it 
also have something different in themselves; consequently 
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they must antecedently be conceived in synthetic unity with 
other (even if only possible representations) before I can think 





If we step down one grade in cognition from cognizing 
something to the mere acquaintance with it, i.e. to the grade Kant 
says animals are capable of,
384
 we see that Kant’s point here is 
similar to the point Tetens made concerning our acquaintance 
with appearances. Acquaintance, Kant says according to the Jä-
sche Logic, is the kind of cognition where the subject can repre-
sent something in comparison with other things, both as to same-
ness and to difference, but not with consciousness. This is the 
level of mere empirical reproduction. Empirical reproduction 
presupposes reproducibility, which is not possible without repre-
senting something in comparison with other things as to sameness 
and to difference. What Tetens pointed out was that representing 
sameness (without consciousness) presupposes that the represen-
tation represented as being the same has been previously repre-
sented in combination with something different. Reproducibility 
thus presupposes synthesis. Here Kant makes the same remark 
concerning representations with consciousness: representing 
something as common to several presupposes that the representa-
tion has been conceived in synthetic unity with other representa-
tions. Stepping up from mere acquaintance to cognition thus in-
volves a new kind of act and the result differs in kind from mere 
acquaintance, just as the latter differs in kind from representations 
produced by mere affection. Both acquaintance and cognition 
depend on the ability to represent a synthetic unity, but the 
ground of the unity in cognition is of a new kind in cognition 
proper: it is the transcendental unity of apperception. 
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The analysis of the faculty of understanding has thus re-
vealed that all our cognition has its origin in the faculty of pure 
apperception. However, it cannot be the sole origin of cognition 
because apperception is mere thinking and cognition involves 
more than what the faculty of thinking can provide. In cognition, 
our understanding must be capable of thinking something in our 
sensible intuition and thus be connected to sensibility, and here 
the two Deductions take different paths. Although Kant’s view on 
the relation between sensibility and understanding has not 
changed in the B edition, he has found a new way of proving, on 
the basis of this relation, that everything that can come before our 
senses stands under the categories. In both of the Deductions Kant 
has begun by an analysis showing what the faculty of thinking 
ultimately is, so even in the B Deduction we cannot do without a 
discussion on the original cognitive faculties. In neither the A nor 
the B Deduction will Kant analyse the action behind those facul-
ties but in the A Deduction his argument rests on what those fac-
ulties are, whereas in the B Deduction the focus will be on what 
they effect. In the Subjective Deduction Kant’s argument rests on 
how the faculties work; in the Objective Deduction his focus is on 
the faculties themselves, and in the B Deduction he considers 
what the faculties produce. 
So far, we have found out that pure apperception yields a 
principle of the synthetic unity of the manifold in all possible 
intuition, and now, in the A Deduction, we will have to investi-
gate the pure synthesis to which pure apperception gives unity: 
 
The synthetic unity, however, presupposes a synthesis, or in-
cludes it, and if the former is to be necessary a priori then the 
latter must also be a synthesis a priori. Thus the transcenden-
tal unity of apperception is related to the pure synthesis of the 
imagination, as an a priori condition of the possibility of all 
composition of the manifold in a cognition.
385
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As Kant said already in § 10 of the Leitfaden and ex-
plained in the second section of the Deduction chapter, synthesis 
is an effect of the imagination. Now we have learned that the 
necessary unity grounding all cognition is the transcendental uni-
ty of apperception, so the transcendental unity of apperception 
must be related to the pure synthesis of imagination, if it is to 
ground cognition. Now we must find out what effects this a priori 
synthesis: 
 
But only the productive synthesis of imagination can take 
place a priori; for the reproductive synthesis rests on condi-
tions of experience. The principle of the necessary unity of 
the pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination prior to ap-
perception is thus the ground of the possibility of all cogni-




The introduction of a productive synthesis of imagination 
may cause confusion. Only the productive synthesis, Kant says, 
can be a priori, and the reproductive synthesis rests on conditions 
of experience. This may seem confusing because in the Subjec-
tive Deduction he argued that there is a reproduction of imagina-
tion that does not rest on conditions of experience. But we are 
now approaching our subject from the side of the object, and by 
reproductive synthesis Kant means the empirical use of imagina-
tion. Based on what we have learned in the Subjective Deduction, 
the productive imagination presupposes a reproduction that is not 
empirical, because in the end, all productive use of imagination 
comes down to the pure a priori use of imagination, which is 
possible only through a reproduction of the a priori manifold. 
Empirical reproduction (and association) thus presupposes a pro-
duction of that which is to be empirically reproduced. Moreover, 
this productive use of imagination is grounded on an a priori use 
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and, ultimately, on a transcendental use. 
387
 However, we are cur-
rently not interested in the action of the imagination behind the a 
priori use. What concerns us here is that reproducibility requires a 
productive synthesis of imagination, and that only it can take 
place a priori. 
The conclusion then is that pure apperception and the re-
lation of the I to all other representations, i.e. transcendental ap-
perception, does not provide the sole a priori ground of conceptu-
al cognition: the a priori ground of pure synthesis of imagination 
is the second element needed for empirical apperception and ex-
perience. 
Kant continues the A Deduction by shifting attention 
from the faculty of productive imagination to the synthesis it ef-
fects: 
 
Now we call the synthesis of the manifold in imagination 
transcendental if, without distinction of the intuitions, it con-
cerns nothing but the combination of the manifold a priori, 
and the unity of this synthesis is called transcendental if it is 
represented as necessary a priori in relation to the original 
unity of apperception. Now since this latter is the ground of 
the possibility of all cognitions, the transcendental unity of 
the synthesis of the imagination is the pure form of all possi-
ble cognition, through which, therefore, all objects of possible 




In this quote, Kant explains what the transcendental unity 
of synthesis is. It is the unity required for pure apperception, 
which we know must accompany all experience. As Kant ex-
plains in § 16 of the B edition, the manifold that any cognition 
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must necessarily contain “can only be given in the intuition, 
which is distinct from the I, and thought through combination in a 
consciousness.”
389
 The transcendental unity of synthesis is thus 
the form of all possible cognition,
390
 and as Kant next states, the 
unity of apperception in relation to the transcendental synthesis of 
imagination, is the pure understanding.
391
 
Kant has thus explained what the faculty of understanding 
is. As he puts it in the B Deduction, the understanding is “nothing 
further than the faculty of combining a priori and bringing the 
manifold of given representations under unity of apperception”.
392
 
The given may be intuitions, concepts or judgements: the function 
is the same in all cases. Similarly, in the A Deduction (in the note 
on page A 117) Kant concluded that the synthetic unity of apper-
ception is the faculty of understanding. However, in this explana-
tion of the understanding Kant abstracted from the faculty that 
effects synthesis, and in the top-down part of the A Deduction 
Kant has now analysed the understanding further: 
 
The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of imag-
ination is the understanding, and this very same unity, in rela-





As synthesis is an effect of the imagination, the under-
standing depends on the original capacities of apperception and 
imagination. The A Deduction is founded on this discovery. 
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In the understanding there are therefore pure a priori cogni-
tions that contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of 
the imagination in regard to all possible appearances. These, 
however, are the categories, i.e., pure concepts of the under-
standing; consequently the empirical power of cognition of 
human beings necessarily contains an understanding, which is 
related to all objects of the senses, though only by means of 
imagination, under which, therefore, all appearances as data 




The pure understanding thus contains, through the catego-
ries, “the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the imagination 
in regard to all possible appearances.”
395
 Now, as we have been 
analysing human cognition, i.e. not mere acquaintance but cogni-
tion in which objects in intuition are cognized, it can be conclud-
ed that this cognition is possible only through the pure synthesis 
of imagination and that all cognized appearances have a necessary 
relation to the understanding. In other words, it can be concluded 
that 
 
the pure understanding, by means of the categories, is a for-
mal and synthetic principle of all experiences, and that  ap-




This conclusion by itself would not be very useful. It 
merely proves that all those appearances that we consciously per-
ceive are necessarily in accord with the categories, but it leaves 
open the possibility that these appearances might be mere fig-
ments of my imagination. To prove that they are not, we need to 
approach the necessary connection of the pure understanding with 
the appearances from what is empirical. 
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6.3. Starting from Beneath 
 
 At the beginning of the Objective Deduction Kant re-
minded us that sense represents the appearances empirically in 
perception, imagination in reproduction, and apperception in 
recognition. In the top-down part, Kant analysed what pure un-
derstanding is. He began the analysis with pure apperception and 
concluded that the pure understanding is the unity of apperception 
in relation to the transcendental synthesis of imagination. In that 
analysis, he abstracted from what is given to us through sense. In 
the bottom-up part, the analysis begins with that empirical part of 
our cognition. In other words, the object of Kant’s analysis in 
both parts is empirical apperception: 
 
The first thing that is given to us is appearance, which, if it is 
combined with consciousness, is called perception (without 
the relation to at least possible consciousness appearance 
could never become an object of cognition for us, and would 
therefore be nothing for us, and since it has no objective reali-





The appearance is the first thing that is given to us, be-
cause as such, the impressions of the senses cannot be objects of 
our representations. This is, as we saw already in the Transcen-
dental Aesthetic, because we can be conscious of the impressions 
only through sensations, which are subjective representations, 
hence not objects. When we first represent an object, we represent 
an appearance containing a manifold in intuition. In the Subjec-
tive Deduction Kant explained how this representation involves 
cognitive action. Here the act of apprehension is not being exam-
ined but the product of the act, which is called perception if the 
appearance is combined with consciousness. In other words, 
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“perception” means cognition of an object in the proper sense. 
Kant thus uses this word in the way Tetens and Reid used it, and 
by “perception” he means human cognition which does not in-
volve mere images of objects. This is why I have been cautious in 
using this word and instead made use of expressions such as “ap-
prehension” and “representing appearances” when it has been my 
intention to refer to mere perception that does not involve func-
tions of the understanding. For Kant “perception” refers to empir-
ical consciousness of appearances, not to mere representing of 
them, and this is what he begins with in the bottom-up part. 
Kant’s aim is to analyse the object of perception: 
 
But since every appearance contains a manifold, thus differ-
ent perceptions by themselves are encountered dispersed and 
separate in the mind, a combination of them, which they can-




Earlier, in analysing judgements, we saw that all acts of 
the understanding can be reduced to judging and that concepts are 
predicates of possible judgements. Here we face a similar situa-
tion. An appearance necessarily contains a manifold and its parts 
can therefore, at least in principle, be perceived. On the other 
hand, appearances can be used as partial perceptions of other 
appearances. It is evident that for cognition a combination of per-
ceptions is necessary because cognition always contains a unity of 
a manifold, and based on the results of the Transcendental Aes-
thetic, senses cannot provide the appearance with this combina-
tion. “There is thus”, Kant says, 
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an active faculty of the synthesis of this manifold in us, which 
we call imagination, and whose action exercised immediately 




To this Kant adds a note where he states that no psy-
chologist has yet thought that the imagination is a necessary in-
gredient of perception itself. He reports two reasons for this. The 
first is that this faculty has been limited to reproduction, and the 
second is that it has been thought that senses are capable of put-
ting the impressions together and producing images of objects. 
Now, Tetens did not fall to the latter delusion but he did think of 
imagination merely in terms of reproduction. However, consider-
ing that also Tetens thought that we need a productive faculty in 
order to form images from mental impressions, the difference 
between Kant and Tetens is marginal. The difference lies merely 
in the fact that for Kant the productive faculty is the faculty of 
imagination. Elsewhere, e.g. in Anthropology from a pragmatic 
point of view, Kant uses the German word “dichtend” as a syno-
nym for “productive”, and he even calls the productive imagina-
tion by the name of facultas fingendi, i.e. the faculty of feigning 
(Dichtkraft in Tetens).
 400
 One could say that in Kant’s theory, the 
action of the faculty of feigning is merely incorporated into imag-
ination and labelled productive imagination, but this would be 
missing his point. When we remember that the productive imagi-
nation is possible only through a transcendental reproduction, 
Kant’s insistence that the faculty of feigning is to be included in 
imagination becomes understandable. This is indeed, as Kant 
says, something no one had thought before, and for Kant’s pur-
poses it is essential that the productive faculty is to be counted as 
belonging to the faculty of imagination, because the transcenden-
tal deduction depends on this discovery. 
Kant clarifies this point further: 
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For the imagination is to bring the manifold of intuition into 
an image; it must therefore antecedently take up the impres-




Note that Kant refers here to the apprehension of impres-
sions instead of perceptions. We may again use the analogy be-
tween judging and perceiving: in the analysis of judging we must 
ultimately face the subsumption of not concepts but intuitions, 
and likewise we must in the analysis of perception ultimately face 
the apprehension of not perceptions but impressions. In both cas-
es, a new kind of representation emerges from the act of cogni-
tion. In the Subjective Deduction where Kant analysed synthesis, 
he was able to explain the requirements of apprehension in greater 
detail, but here he feels no need to go into that. He does not even 
mention the transcendental use of imagination, but on the basis of 
what was said in the second section of the Deduction chapter, we 
know that the empirical faculty of productive imagination is 
grounded on it. 
Although apprehension of impressions is mentioned here 
almost in passing, I see it as a crucial step in the argument. Be-
cause Kant has showed that the synthesis of apprehension is not 
limited to the synthesis of perceptions but also to impressions, he 
will be able to prove that an image not capable of being apper-
ceived is not possible. Our animal-like apprehension is thus nec-
essarily capable of becoming human perception and thus capable 
of being thought. Had Kant left the impressions out of the consid-
eration, he would at best have been able to prove that there are 
perceptions to which the categories apply but not that the catego-
ries are valid for everything that can come before our senses. It 
would, however, be absurd to maintain that apperception is in-
volved in the apprehension of impressions: the appearances, as 
undetermined objects, must already be available for apperception, 
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because impressions are not intuitions, and the first application of 
apperception is to bring unity to the synthesis of intuitions. This is 
also exactly how Tetens thought: the mind must first take the 
impressions into its activity and form images before it can apper-
ceive the images and have perception. 
Now, although Kant is here not discussing cognitive de-
velopment but analysing the object of cognition, and although 
apperception is incapable of reaching the impressions, it is im-
portant to understand that since even human perception is always 
occasioned by impressions, they do pertain to the analysis. We 
will have to keep this in mind when Kant moves from the empiri-
cal faculty of productive imagination to the empirical faculty of 
reproductive imagination: 
 
It is, however, clear that even this apprehension of the mani-
fold alone would bring forth no image and no connection of 
the impressions were there not a subjective ground for calling 
back a perception, from which the mind has passed on to an-
other, to the succeeding ones, and thus for exhibiting entire 
series of perceptions, i.e., a reproductive faculty of imagina-




What Kant says here may seem to contradict my explana-
tion of the role of impressions, because he seems to be saying that 
the ability to call back a perception is a requirement of the con-
nection of impressions, and I just explained that impressions are 
something more fundamental than perceptions. We must under-
stand, however, that Kant is here examining the possibility of 
cognizing an object, not considering what comes first and what 
comes later. When we cognize an object, we have a perception, 
and Kant’s view is that perception presupposes an image. Just like 
Tetens, Kant thought that what distinguishes perception from an 
image is consciousness, and here he argues that the mere image 
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presupposes that the imagination takes up the empirical matter of 
intuition and puts that matter together. This goes back all the way 
to the impressions, which lie behind all empirical cognition. What 
this means is that our imagination must produce an image out of 
empirical matter and that unlike an appearance, the image does 
contain this empirical matter. But although we are now consider-
ing what is empirical and setting aside pure apperception, we are 
still examining human perception, in which consciousness is add-
ed to images and to impressions, and the point is that the mere 
productive imagination is not enough to explain human percep-
tion.  
In the Subjective Deduction Kant analysed the syntheses 
of apprehension and reproduction and argued that there must be 
an a priori use of the synthesis of apprehension (and that this 
empirical use presupposes transcendental reproduction). Here the 
approach is different as we are now considering representations 
and their objects rather than the action of our cognitive faculties. 
Nevertheless, also here Kant’s aim is to show that there is an a 
priori use of imagination, and here he begins the argument from 
the fact that an appearance necessarily contains a manifold. In the 
Subjective Deduction we learned that apprehension involved em-
pirical reproduction, and now Kant argues that empirical appre-
hension could not produce an image without empirical reproduc-
tion. In order to be able to represent a heavy cinnabar or the melt-
ing of an ice cube in a glass of soda, we need empirical reproduc-
tion. Since perception necessarily contains a combination, we can 
conclude that the productive use of imagination by itself could 
not produce perception and that perception must involve the use 
of the reproductive faculty of imagination. 
Now, when we consider this reproduction, we see that it 
must be rule-governed: 
 
Since, however, if representations reproduced one another 
without distinction, just as they fell together, there would in 
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turn be no determinate connection but merely unruly heaps of 
them, and no cognition at all would arise, their reproduction 
must thus have a rule in accordance with which a representa-
tion enters into combination in the imagination with one rep-
resentation rather than with any others. This subjective and 
empirical ground of reproduction in accordance with rules is 




We clearly do have subjective rules for reproducing rep-
resentations. By itself, this is not a very useful conclusion but 
consider the fact that, unlike animals, we are conscious of this 
rule. This consciousness of the rule, the association of appearanc-
es, implies a unity of the rule, the conditions of which we can 
investigate: 
 
But now if this unity of association did not also have an ob-
jective ground, so that it would be impossible for appearances 
to be apprehended by the imagination otherwise than under 
the condition of a possible synthetic unity of this apprehen-
sion, then it would also be entirely contingent whether ap-
pearances fit into a connection of human cognitions. For even 
though we had the faculty for associating perceptions, it 
would still remain in itself entirely undetermined and contin-
gent whether they were also associable; and in case they were 
not, a multitude of perceptions and even an entire sensibility 
would be possible in which much empirical consciousness 
would be encountered in my mind, but separated, and without 
belonging to one consciousness of myself, which, however, is 
impossible. For only because I ascribe all perceptions to one 
consciousness (of original apperception) can I say of all per-




Since in empirical consciousness we are conscious of the 
rule of reproduction of perceptions and since appearances are 
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nothing but determinations of the inner sense, the synthesis that 
produces the images, which ground those perceptions, must have 
a ground in the appearances. Imagination must, therefore, produce 
the appearances in such a way that we can think them. The syn-
thetic unity of this apprehension is provided by a category, which 
consists in the representation of the necessary synthetic unity of 
the pure manifold of intuition.
405
 Hence, the apprehended appear-
ances must contain the pure synthesis of imagination, which is 
represented in the category, because otherwise it would be impos-
sible to be conscious of their association. The point here is not 
that my subjective capacity of associating appearances depends 
on apperception but that it would be impossible for me to become 
conscious of the association between my perceptions without 
their belonging to one consciousness. Further, because it has been 
shown that an appearance must necessarily contain that which 
enables it to be thought, not only these perceptions but the entire 
sensibility with its appearances is apprehended under the condi-
tion of a possible synthetic unity of their apprehension, i.e. that 
they are capable of being thought. In other words, it would be 
impossible to subsume empirical intuitions under empirical con-
cepts if the appearances were not apprehended under the condi-
tion represented in the categories. 
Thus, what Kant means by association is our conscious-
ness of the connection between appearances, and this already 
involves the use of apperception, because in mere intuition, as we 
have observed, such a connection could not be represented. Only 
the subjective connection, which does not pertain to the appear-
ances themselves, can be possible without apperception. Kant 
elaborates on this by considering the possibility that we did have 
the faculty of associating perceptions without their belonging to 
one consciousness. Were we not human this would be the case, 
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but then this ability would be reduced to mere reproduction and 
the associability of appearances would be lost. 
Therefore, there must be not only a subjective but also an 
objective ground of empirical reproduction: a ground that can be 
understood a priori and that is prior to all empirical laws of imag-
ination. On the basis of this ground, all appearances can and must 
be regarded as “data of sense that are associable in themselves 
and subject to universal laws of a thoroughgoing connection in 
reproduction.”
406
 This ground is the affinity of appearances that 
was already introduced in the Subjective Deduction. There this 
affinity was approached from the subjective side of the act of 
synthesis and it was argued that the act presupposes a unity of 
rule which is possible only through original apperception. Here 
the requirement of a unity of rule has been shown by approaching 
the affinity from the side of the object, from the (conscious) per-
ception of appearances. And again, it must be concluded that the 
affinity of appearances presupposes apperception: 
 
But we can never encounter this anywhere except in the prin-
ciple of the unity of apperception with regard to all cognitions 
that are to belong to me. In accordance with this principle all 
appearances whatever must come into the mind or be appre-
hended in such a way that they are in agreement with the uni-
ty of apperception, which would be impossible without syn-





This principle of the unity of apperception was expound-
ed in the top-down part, so we are beginning to see how the two 
parts of the Objective Deduction approach the same point, namely 
the co-operation of apperception and imagination. The affinity of 
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appearances depends on original apperception as well as on an a 
priori synthesis of imagination: 
 
The objective unity of all (empirical) consciousness in one 
consciousness (of original apperception) is thus the necessary 
condition even of all possible perception, and the affinity of 
all appearances (near or remote) is a necessary consequence 





Kant’s statement that all possible perception has a neces-
sary relation to the original apperception is in need of clarifica-
tion. Appearances themselves, of course, in no way depend on 
apperception (if they did, we would apperceive our impressions 
and not intuitions, which, along with space and time, would be-
come redundant), but all empirical unity of consciousness of our 
perceptions presupposes one original consciousness, and the af-
finity of appearances therefore is a necessary consequence of a 
synthesis that involves apperception.
409
  
In this way, the analysis of perception has brought us to 
the productive synthesis that was introduced in the top-down part 
of the Deduction: 
 
The imagination is therefore also a faculty of a synthesis a 
priori, on account of which we give it the name of productive 
imagination, and, insofar as its aim in regard to all the mani-
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fold of appearance is nothing further than the necessary unity 
in their synthesis, this can be called the transcendental func-




The transcendental function of the productive imagination 
is what is needed for the objective unity of all empirical con-
sciousness that was discussed in the preceding paragraph. It can 
then be concluded that experience is possible only by means of 
this transcendental function of imagination. Kant explains that by 
means of this function “the affinity of appearances, and with it the 
association and through the latter finally reproduction in accord-
ance with laws” become possible.
411
 One should note that the 
association does not here refer to the subjective ground of empiri-
cal reproduction but to association that presupposes associability 
and concepts. No concepts of objects at all, Kant concludes, 
would converge into an experience without this transcendental 
function of imagination. 
The productive imagination has thus turned out to be a 
condition of experience. On the other hand, it has been shown that 
the original apperception likewise is a condition of experience. 
The link between these two must now been examined, and Kant 
begins by explaining the parallel between two kinds of objects: 
 
For the standing and lasting I (of pure apperception) consti-
tutes the correlate of all of our representations, so far as it is 
merely possible to become conscious of them, and all con-
sciousness belongs to an all-embracing pure apperception just 
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as all sensible intuition as representation belongs to pure inner 




First of all, we should note that pure apperception is said 
to be the correlate of all of our representations, so far as it is 
merely possible to become conscious of them. This is what meant 
by the claim that the objective unity of all empirical conscious-
ness in one consciousness of original apperception is the neces-
sary condition of all possible perception. The perceptions would 
not be my perceptions if I did not ascribe them to one conscious-
ness. Although I would still represent objects in intuition, these 
objects would not be apperceived. All consciousness thus belongs 
to an all-embracing pure apperception just as all represented ap-
pearances, i.e. all sensible intuition as representation, belong to 
the pure inner intuition of time. Just as the one consciousness of 
the thinking I is the necessary ground of apperceived objects, the 




But apperception by itself could not produce any object 
(and this is why it is the correlate of all of our representations so 
far as it is merely possible to become conscious of them). Conse-
quently, it is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of the ob-
jects of experience: 
 
It is this apperception that must be added to the pure imagina-
tion in order to make its function intellectual. For in itself the 
synthesis of the imagination, although exercised a priori, is 
nevertheless always sensible, for it combines the manifold on-
ly as it appears in intuition, e.g., the shape of a triangle. 
Through the relation of the manifold to the unity of appercep-
tion, however, concepts that belong to the understanding can 
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come about, but only by means of the imagination in relation 




In terms of the distinction between coordination and sub-
ordination that I used in the discussion of the Subjective Deduc-
tion, this means that through the productive imagination alone 
only coordination of representations is possible, and subordina-
tion requires both pure imagination and pure apperception. The 
shape of a triangle can be represented through imagination alone 
but the representation that every triangle is a polygon requires 
pure apperception as well as pure imagination. Objects of experi-
ence thus depend on pure apperception and pure imagination: 
 
We therefore have a pure imagination, as a fundamental fac-
ulty of the human soul, that grounds all cognition a priori. By 
its means we bring into combination the manifold of intuition 
on the one side and the condition of the necessary unity of 
apperception on the other. Both extremes, namely sensibility 
and understanding, must necessarily be connected by means 
of this transcendental function of the imagination, since oth-
erwise the former would to be sure yield appearances but no 





The objective validity of the categories has thus been 
shown through the necessary connection between sensibility and 
understanding. These faculties share a common original capacity, 
the transcendental imagination, which gives the appearances their 
a priori rules. These rules, when they are represented generally, 
are called the categories, and through them, our apperception 
gives unity to the synthesis of imagination. Experience, Kant 
reminds us, “consists in the apprehension, the association (the 
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reproduction), and finally the recognition of the appearances”.
416
 
It thus consists in three different empirical syntheses of the imag-
ination, and in the highest of these, it contains “concepts that 
make possible the formal unity of experience and with it all ob-
jective validity (truth) of empirical cognition.”
417
 Experience is, 
therefore, dependent on the a priori rules of imagination. What 
distinguishes recognition from reproduction is that recognition 
requires a unity of rule, and apperception gives synthesis that 
unity. However, recognition also presupposes reproducibility, and 
reproducibility requires the same rules needed for recognition. 
Thus, although the categories play no role in the production of 
appearances, they are necessarily involved in producing percep-
tion and experience: 
 
These grounds of the recognition of the manifold, so far as 
they concern merely the form of an experience in general, are 
now those categories. On them is grounded, therefore, all 
formal unity in the synthesis of the imagination, and by 
means of the latter also all of its empirical use (in recognition, 
reproduction, association, and apprehension) down to the ap-
pearances, since the latter belong to our consciousness at all 





We should now consider how Kant has accomplished his 
goal in this Deduction. In order to do that, let us look at his clos-
ing remarks: 
 
The pure understanding is thus in the categories the law of the 
synthetic unity of all appearances, and thereby first and origi-
nally makes experience possible as far as its form is con-
cerned. But we did not have to accomplish more in the tran-
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scendental deduction of the categories than to make compre-
hensible this relation of the understanding to sensibility and 
by means of the latter to all objects of experience, hence to 
make comprehensible the objective validity of its pure a pri-




The objects of experience receive their formal possibility 
from the original synthetic unity of apperception, which means 
that the categories make experience possible. However, as I noted 
at the end of the previous section, what Kant has to prove is that 
the appearances themselves stand under the categories. In other 
words, Kant has to prove that the appearances produced by the 
prior act of cognition are necessarily such that the application of 
the posterior act of cognition is valid for them. However, showing 
that the categories make the objects of experience possible does 
not prove the validity of the categories, because the objects of 
experience are products of the posterior act. There is a danger of 
misunderstanding what Kant means by putting emphasis on the 
discovery that the categories make experience possible, because it 
may seem that he is claiming that the categories make the appear-
ances possible. In truth, however, he agrees with the philosophers 
he is writing to: the objects of the senses do not depend on the 
functions of the understanding. This he has expressed in clear 
terms. Thus, his point is not that the objects of the senses are the 
objects of experience, which the categories make possible, but 
that the categories make possible human perception of the objects 
of the senses. He therefore has to “make comprehensible this 
relation of the understanding to sensibility and by means of the 
latter to all objects of experience”. 
In the A Deduction, Kant has examined the relation of the 
understanding to sensibility by analysing what cognitive capaci-
ties these two faculties presuppose. He has shown that the same 
faculty of imagination that makes empirical reproducibility possi-
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ble also makes associability possible, when the imagination is 
combined with the faculty of apperception. Sensibility and under-
standing are thus necessarily connected by means of transcenden-
tal reproduction. In other words, both the prior and the posterior 
act of cognition involve transcendental reproduction, which 





7. THE B DEDUCTION 
 
As I explained in section 6.1, the same argument appear-
ing at the beginning of the top-down part of the A Deduction, is 
presented also in the B Deduction, and essentially in § 16. I also 
explained that the B Deduction includes a bottom-up part as well. 
However, because Kant wanted to present an argument that 
would not be susceptible to the criticism that the Deduction is 
based on an analysis of our faculties, that part differs substantially 
from the one presented in the A Deduction. The bottom-up part 
itself in the B Deduction is very short, but before we can turn our 
attention to it, we will have to go through the rest of the top-down 
part after § 16 where Kant explains those things that were dis-
cussed in the omitted part of the A edition. I will here go through 
the Deduction rather swiftly and consider the most important 
parts of it in more detail in chapter 9, after I have discussed the 
Schematism. 
I see the B Deduction as designed to convince a Wolffian 
reader. It is good to remember that it presupposes the Transcen-
dental Aesthetic where Kant’s purpose was to show that the 
Wolffian account of sensibility was erroneous. According to the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, our sensibility provides us with intui-
tions, and space and time and all their parts are singular represen-
tations containing a manifold. In § 17, Kant begins by asserting 
two supreme principles of the possibility of intuition: 
 
The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in re-
lation to sensibility was, according to the Transcendental Aes-
thetic, that all the manifold of sensibility stand under the for-
mal conditions of space and time. The supreme principle of 
all intuition in relation to the understanding is that all the 
manifold of intuition stand under conditions of the original 
synthetic unity of apperception. All the manifold representa-
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tions of intuition stand under the first principle insofar as they 
are given to us, and under the second insofar as they must be 




These are the principles of all our cognition, and in the 
bottom-up part, to which we will turn our attention in a moment, 
Kant will take the first mentioned principle into scrutiny. In §§ 
15–16 he has shown that the possibility of thinking our intuitions 
depends on the original synthetic unity of apperception, and now, 
in § 17, Kant clarifies this further by explaining what the object of 
cognition is: 
 
Understanding is, generally speaking, the faculty of cogni-
tions. These consist in the determinate relation of given repre-
sentations to an object. An object, however, is that in the con-




In the A edition this was discussed in A 109–110 where 
Kant used the expression “transcendental object”, and there Kant 
explained that the relation of the manifold of intuition to an object 
of thought is the necessary unity of the synthesis of the manifold, 
and he concluded that “all appearances, insofar as objects are to 
be given to us through them”, i.e. appearances in experience, 
“must stand under conditions of the necessary unity of appercep-
tion just as in mere intuition they must stand under the formal 
conditions of space and time”. Cognition, Kant there said, is first 
made possible through these conditions. 
Here Kant makes the same point but now there is no need 
to examine the original faculties of cognition. This makes the 
argument much more straightforward, and if a Wolffian reader 
has accepted Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Aesthetic, he 
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should also accept the conclusion that “the unity of consciousness 
is that which alone constitutes the relation of representations to an 
object”.
422
 In order to see why the Wolffian reader is supposed to 
accept this conclusion, I remind the reader of how Wolff thought 
about cognition. 
In § 48 of Psychologia empirica Wolff explains that 
when the mind represents an object it must perform two acts: the 
act of perception (the prior act) that produces the representation, 
and the act of apperception (the posterior act) through which the 
mind is conscious of the representation and consequently of the 
thing it represents. The representation, insofar as it is taken in its 
relation to the object, is called an idea, which is an image of a 
singular thing. Now, although Kant wants to preserve the two-act 
model of cognition, he has argued that our sensibility is not a 
confused mode of representation and that in cognition, the repre-
sentation to which apperception is directed is an appearance: an 
undetermined object of an empirical intuition. Supposing that this 
much is granted, we can, for the moment, set aside the condition 
of sensibility and examine the possibility of representing an ob-
ject from the perspective of the understanding. For Wolff, this 
was a relatively simple matter: by apperceiving the idea we be-
come conscious of the object it represents. However, Kant’s 
Transcendental Aesthetic makes things more complicated. Alt-
hough the representation produced by the prior act is an image, it 
can no longer be regarded as an idea. That is why Kant labels it 
intuition (an undetermined object represented in inner sense; a 
mere modification of the mind). What remains the same, howev-
er, is that also in Kant’s conception of sensibility the representa-
tion is a unity containing a manifold, and from this fact and the 
results from § 15 and 16 we can get to the root of the action of the 
understanding. Cognition consists, Kant said in the above quote, 
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in the determinate relation of given representations to an object, 
and the object is something the understanding itself makes. 
That it is the understanding that produces the object is a 
crucial point that must be understood if we want to understand the 
Deduction. According to Wolff, the prior cognitive act produces 
an idea of an object of which we can become conscious through 
the posterior cognitive act, while our consciousness of the object, 
(empirical apperception), only brings clarity to the representation. 
Kant, on the other hand, thought that the distinction between sen-
sibility and understanding has nothing to do with clarity, and he 
thought that the object, which is produced by the prior cognitive 
act, is a mere modification of the mind: it does not by itself repre-
sent anything. Kant explained this in the A Deduction as follows: 
 
All representations, as representations, have their object, and 
can themselves be objects of other representations in turn. 
Appearances are the only objects that can be given to us im-
mediately, and that in them which is immediately related to 
the object is called intuition. However, these appearances are 
nothing in themselves, but themselves only representations, 
which in turn have their object, which therefore cannot further 
be intuited by us, and that may therefore be called the non-




If the undetermined object of an empirical intuition is to 
be determined it has to be used as a representation to represent an 
object it does not represent independently of the posterior cogni-
tive act. In other words, apperception produces the object in cog-
nition, and prior to the act of apperception appearances do not 
represent anything. However, as the object is something in the 
concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united, the 
empirical apperception reveals something in the nature of apper-
ception itself: 
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Now, however, all unification of representations requires uni-
ty of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently 
the unity of consciousness is that which alone constitutes the 
relation of representations to an object, thus their objective 
validity, and consequently is that which makes them into cog-





The objective reality of empirical cognition thus rests on 
the original synthetic unity of apperception. Indeed, in the Subjec-
tive Deduction (A 109) Kant asserted that the objective reality of 
empirical cognition depends on the unity of apperception. Cogni-
tion is a determinate relation of a given representation to its ob-
ject, and the unity of apperception constitutes this relation. On 
this unity rests the objective validity of the representation and the 
objective reality of the cognition. The concept of a dog, for ex-
ample, is an objectively real concept only because there are ob-
jects (of thought) to which it can be applied, and these objects 
depend on the unity of apperception. Thus, the principle of the 
synthetic unity of apperception is the ground for the rest of the 
use of the understanding: 
 
The first pure cognition of the understanding, therefore, on 
which the whole of the rest of its use is grounded, and that is 
at the same time also entirely independent from all conditions 





Two things require attention in this quote: this principle is 
a principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception and it is 
entirely independent of all conditions of sensible intuition. It is 
independent because it considers only the relation of intuition to 
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the understanding. In § 13 Kant explained that space and time are 
“pure intuitions that contain a priori the conditions of the possi-
bility of objects as appearances, and the synthesis in them has 
objective validity.”
426
 On the other hand, Kant noted that the ap-
pearances could “be so constituted that the understanding would 
not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity”, in which 
case appearances “would nonetheless offer objects to our intui-
tion, for intuition by no means requires the functions of think-
ing.”
427
 When we now move on to consider the rest of the Deduc-
tion, there is a real danger of confounding the two acts required 
for cognition: the prior cognitive act that produces an intuition, 
and the posterior cognitive act that produces the object of thought. 
Because the unity of original apperception is a synthetic unity, the 
principle is, as Kant notes, a principle only for an understanding 
that merely thinks and does not intuit.
428
 For us then, representing 
an object of thought for an intuition requires an act that is not 
purely intellectual but involves a synthesis of a pure manifold of 
intuition. A divine understanding would produce the intuition 
through its intellectual act; ours must resort to sensible intuition. 
Kant illustrates this weakness with the example of cog-
nizing a determinate space: 
 
But in order to cognize something in space, e.g., a line, I must 
draw it, and thus synthetically bring about a determinate 
combination of the given manifold, so that the unity of this 
action is at the same time the unity of consciousness (in the 
concept of a line), and thereby is an object (a determinate 
space) first cognized. The synthetic unity of consciousness is 
therefore an objective condition of all cognition, not merely 
something I myself need in order to cognize an object but ra-
ther something under which every intuition must stand in or-
der to become an object for me, since in any other way, and 
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The understanding must thus, as we will shortly see, af-
fect our sensibility through inner sense. However, this affection 
has nothing to do with the affection through which the undeter-
mined object of an empirical intuition is given to the understand-
ing. In other words, the affection of inner sense through the act of 
the understanding (the posterior act) is independent of the affec-
tion of inner sense through the act of intuiting (the prior act). Kant 
confirms this in § 18: 
 
The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through 
which all of the manifold given in an intuition is united in a 
concept of the object. It is called objective on that account, 
and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of con-
sciousness, which is a determination of inner sense, through 





The manifold of intuition is empirically given to the act 
of the understanding through inner sense, and it can be given only 
through the prior cognitive act, the act of intuiting. It is important 
to keep in mind this distinction because although we are soon 
about to discuss the synthesis of intuition effected by the under-
standing, it is not until § 26 that we will consider the conditions 
of intuiting the given appearance. 
In cognition (in the proper sense) there are thus two kinds 
of unity: the subjective and empirical unity of consciousness on 
the one hand, and the objective and pure unity of consciousness 
on the other. The former is entirely contingent; the latter is a nec-
essary unity of consciousness. Empirical consciousness depends 
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on empirical conditions, as Kant notes, and the empirical unity of 
consciousness, “through association of the representations, itself 
concerns the appearance”.
431
 Although the empirical unity of con-
sciousness is empirical apperception and although by association 
of representations Kant refers to conscious reproduction, it con-
cerns the appearance, which of course is the basis of empirical 
apperception but not the object of cognition. This is perhaps the 
most difficult part of the Deduction because it concerns some-
thing of which we cannot, as such, be conscious. Inner sense pre-
sents us a subjective unity of consciousness, but the objective 
unity of consciousness transcends this consciousness. Our con-
sciousness consists in the cognition that is already conceptual and 
judgmental, and here we are required to abstract from that ele-
ment of cognition. Discussion on the Schematism will, I hope, 
bring some light to this but here we will have to concentrate more 
on what the objective unity of consciousness is than on how our 
empirical cognition is related to the appearance. 
Although the appearance must be given to the under-
standing through inner sense, the objective unity of consciousness 
grounds the empirical synthesis required for empirical appercep-
tion: 
 
The pure form of intuition in time, on the contrary, merely as 
intuition in general, which contains a given manifold, stands 
under the original unity of consciousness, solely by means of 
the necessary relation of the manifold of intuition to the one I 
think, thus through the pure synthesis of the understanding, 




Therefore, empirical cognition is possible only because of 
the necessary relation of the manifold contained in the pure form 
of intuition in general in time to the original unity of conscious-
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ness. This does not concern the appearance at all but only the pure 
form of intuition in general in inner sense. In § 19 Kant clarifies 
this further by explaining what judgement is: it is ”the way to 
bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception.”
433
 
A judgement in accordance with the laws of association would be 
something like “If I carry a body, I feel the pressure of weight,” 
and it could not give an objective relation between the given cog-
nitions.
434
 The intriguing thing here is that without the capacity to 
judge we could not even reach the point where we would be in a 
position to make such a judgement, because the cognitions them-
selves, the perceptions that are associated with each other, pre-
suppose the very same capacity, for they are not mere intuitions 
but objects of cognition, hence products of the understanding. 
Kant showed already in § 10 that the same function that 
gives unity to cognitions in a judgement also gives unity to mere 
synthesis of different representations in an intuition, and now we 
know that the ground of this unity is the original synthetic unity 
of apperception. In § 20 Kant concludes that as the categories are 
the functions for judging, the manifold in a given intuition neces-
sarily stands under the categories. Again, it must be emphasized 
that this does not say anything about the undetermined object of 
an empirical intuition. It merely states that “all manifold, insofar 
as it is given in one empirical intuition, is determined in regard to 
one of the logical functions for judgment”.
435
 The conclusion thus 
states that all objects of cognition stand under the categories. 
In § 21 Kant says that in this conclusion a beginning of a 
deduction is made. In that Deduction, we need to understand what 
cognition, the act, really requires. Sections 21–23 do not contrib-
ute anything substantial to the argument itself, but in those sec-
tions, Kant draws the distinction between thinking and cognizing 
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– a distinction, which he has already explained in the A Deduc-
tion. 
Understanding this distinction is crucial for understand-
ing the Deduction. Kant said in the proof presented in sections 
15–20 that in it he could not abstract “from the fact that the mani-
fold for intuition must already be given prior to the synthesis of 
understanding and independently from it”.
436
 So far, Kant has 
considered our understanding as a capacity to think. Since our 
understanding does not cognize anything at all by itself, it needs 
an intuition that is given to it prior to its act. We can thus see that 
the proof Kant has presented considers only thinking. What it 
proves is that the manifold in a given intuition – a sensible intui-
tion like ours or some other kind of given intuition – necessarily 
stands under the categories. However, it proves neither the objec-
tive reality of the categories nor their validity in regard to the 
appearances. This is simply because the proof does not say any-
thing about the appearances to which the categories are supposed 
to be applied. In his proof Kant has abstracted from the way in 
which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given and proved 
only that our understanding is such that it needs to produce the 
object it thinks and that all determination of the objects of intui-
tion presuppose that the manifold in the intuition stands under the 
categories, because otherwise this determination would be impos-
sible. 
Now, since the objects of sensibility do not depend on the 
functions of the understanding, it follows from Kant’s position 
that the understanding thinks something in the appearances that 
really does not belong to those objects of sensibility as such. The 
laws of nature are prescribed by the understanding, not by sensi-
bility, and Kant must explain “the possibility of cognizing a pri-
ori through categories whatever objects may come before our 
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 This will explain “the possibility of as it were prescrib-
ing the law to nature and even making the latter possible”,
438
 and 
it will show the validity of the categories in regard to all possible 
objects of our senses. 
In order to attain this goal Kant will have to continue the 
Deduction in two separate steps, which are taken in § 24 and § 26. 
In the beginning of the Deduction Kant could not abstract from 
the fact that our understanding needs an intuition given to it prior 
to its synthesis, and indeed the categories extend to objects of 
intuition in general. They are mere forms of thought which yield 
cognition only through their possible application to empirical 
intuition.
439
 Now, our sensible intuition can be either pure or em-
pirical, and Kant separates these so that in § 24 he considers only 
pure intuition and its relation to the categories. 
The section starts with a difficult paragraph, which we 
can split in two. The first part considers the mere act of thinking 
an object: 
 
The pure concepts of the understanding are related through 
the mere understanding to objects of intuition in general, 
without it being determined whether this intuition is our own 
or some other but still sensible one, but they are on this ac-
count mere forms of thought, through which no determinate 
object is yet cognized. The synthesis or combination of the 
manifold in them was related merely to the unity of appercep-
tion, and was thereby the ground of the possibility of cogni-
tion a priori insofar as it rests on the understanding, and was 
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Up to this point Kant has focused on the intellectual act 
of representing an object of thought. The categories are pure con-
cepts of objects, and without them, we could not perform the pos-
terior cognitive act through which the object of cognition is repre-
sented. In the Subjective Deduction Kant said that the pure con-
cept of the transcendental object (= X) “is that which in all of our 
empirical concepts in general can provide the relation to an ob-
ject”.
441
 Explicating this relation is the core task of transcendental 
logic, which teaches how to bring pure synthesis of representa-
tions to concepts.
442
 In A 109 Kant continued by noting that “this 
concept cannot contain any determinate intuition at all, and there-
fore concerns nothing but that unity which must be encountered 
in a manifold of cognition insofar as it stands in relation to an 
object.” In the Subjective Deduction, he had explained that “ap-
pearances themselves are nothing but sensible representations, 
which must not be regarded in themselves, in the same way, as 
objects (outside the power of representation).”
443
 In other words, 
perceptual awareness does not have intentional content. What 
establishes the relation to an object in cognition is the intellectual 
synthesis. Here Kant’s point is the same, although he does not use 
the term “transcendental object”. 
However, the posterior act of cognition does not consist 
in the intellectual act alone. The categories are concepts of objects 
of thought and although they contain the synthesis that is neces-
sary for thinking an object, they cannot contain any determinate 
intuition at all. In A 97 Kant pointed out that in the thought of an 
object “there is more at work than the single faculty of thinking, 
namely the understanding” and then continued by noting that “the 
understanding, as the faculty of cognition that is to be related to 
objects, also requires an elucidation of the possibility of this rela-
tion” (my emphasis). He then analysed the understanding by ana-
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lysing synthesis. He did so because the posterior act of cognition 
requires a pure sensible synthesis of imagination. This is so de-
spite the fact that imagination (which effects synthesis) belongs to 
sensibility. The intellectual synthesis is merely a ground of the 
possibility of cognition, and for cognizing an object we also need 
to relate the purely intellectual act to sensibility: 
 
Hence we say that we cognize the object if we have effected 




In the Subjective Deduction we learned that this requires 
transcendental reproduction and that recognition includes the 
same pure synthesis that is required for representing appearances. 
Here in the B Deduction Kant wants to avoid analysing our facul-
ties, but the fact remains that our understanding can be considered 
either as a faculty of thinking or as a faculty of cognition. That is 
why Kant said in § 21 that in the beginning of the Deduction he 
could not abstract from the fact that the manifold of intuition must 
be given to the synthesis of understanding independently from it. 
In the A edition Kant had to take the matter of intuition into ac-
count, but now the argument rests on the formal conditions of 
space and time. 
Since our intellect itself is not capable of giving the re-
quired manifold of intuition, our apperception is not a capacity of 
cognition, and the posterior act of cognition, the act of the under-
standing, includes more than an intellectual synthesis. The under-
standing, as a faculty of cognition, must thus contribute some-
thing more to cognition besides the mere intellectual synthesis, 
and this it does through inner sense: 
 
But since in us a certain form of sensible intuition a priori is 
fundamental, which rests on the receptivity of the capacity for 
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representation (sensibility), the understanding, as spontaneity, 
can determine inner sense through the manifold of given rep-
resentations in accord with the synthetic unity of appercep-
tion, and thus think synthetic unity of the apperception of the 
manifold of sensible intuition a priori, as the condition under 
which all objects of our (human) intuition must necessarily 
stand, through which then the categories, as mere forms of 
thought, acquire objective reality, i.e., application to objects 
that can be given to us in intuition, but only as appearances; 




Kant’s claim is that the categories get their objective real-
ity by virtue of the capacity of the understanding to determine 
inner sense. As the inner sense is a genuine sense, the understand-
ing can as spontaneity “determine inner sense through the mani-
fold of given representations”. The appearances, which are unde-
termined objects of intuition, are represented in inner sense and 
they depend on the form of our sensible intuition. The determina-
tion of inner sense, Kant says, takes place “through” the manifold 
of these given appearances. Remember that the appearance, alt-
hough it is a pure intuition, is represented through sensation, 
which is a merely subjective representation. When I think that the 
pen on my desk is brown, the determination of inner sense takes 
place through the empirical intuition and it involves empirical 
concepts. Thus, without an empirical manifold the thought would 
be impossible, but what the understanding determines in inner 
sense is the pure form of intuition (in the Schematism Kant ex-
plains how this determination takes place). Kant can therefore 
conclude that the understanding can “think synthetic unity of the 
apperception of the manifold of sensible intuition a priori, as the 
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In order to understand this conclusion, we need an expla-
nation of what Kant means by saying that all objects of intuition 
must stand under the synthetic unity of apperception. Let us look 
at what Kant said about the transcendental object in the A Deduc-
tion: 
 
Now this concept cannot contain any determinate intuition at 
all, and therefore concerns nothing but that unity which must 
be encountered in a manifold of cognition insofar as it stands 
in relation to an object. This relation, however, is nothing 
other than the necessary unity of consciousness, thus also of 
the synthesis of the manifold through a common function of 




In this passage Kant took the same step he is now taking 
from the synthetic unity of the concept of a transcendental object 
to the synthetic unity of the apperception of the manifold of sen-
sible intuition a priori. In the A Deduction Kant continued by 
concluding that  
 
all appearances, insofar as objects are to be given to us 
through them, must stand under a priori rules of their synthet-
ic unity, in accordance with which their relation in empirical 
intuition is alone possible, i.e., that in experience they must 
stand under conditions of the necessary unity of apperception 
just as in mere intuition they must stand under the formal 
conditions of space and time; indeed, it is through those con-




Here in the B Deduction Kant has conducted an inquiry 
concerning the supreme principle of all intuition in relation to the 
understanding. He has concluded that the cognition of an empiri-
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cal object presupposes that the given object of intuition stands 
under the unity of apperception; otherwise the cognition would be 
impossible. It would be impossible because the posterior act of 
cognition consists not merely in an intellectual synthesis but in a 
synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition, and although the 
prior act of cognition does not involve apperception and the ap-
pearances do not depend on the functions of the understanding, 
the posterior act of cognition would be incapable of producing 
cognition if the appearances, insofar as objects are to be given to 
us through them, did not stand under the unity of apperception. 
But the fact is that we have cognition, so Kant can conclude that 
in experience all appearances must stand under the categories. 
This proves the objective reality of the categories but it 
does not prove their objective validity because in this proof Kant 
has abstracted from the way in which the manifold for an empiri-
cal intuition is given. Although we now know that the understand-
ing can think of an object of intuition only through the categories, 
we do not know whether or not the appearances that our sensibil-
ity offers through the prior cognitive act are necessarily such that 
the categories are valid for them. This is because so far Kant’s 
purpose has been “to attend only to the unity that is added to the 
intuition through the understanding by means of the category.”
449
 
Kant’s purpose in § 24 has thus been to show that the un-
derstanding can determine inner sense.
450
 This is vital to the De-
duction because the appearances are represented in inner sense 
prior to and independently of the posterior act of cognition. Kant 
can now introduce the synthesis included in the posterior act of 
cognition but not included in the category and thereby make a 
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necessary preparation for § 26, where he proves the objective 
validity of the categories: 
 
This synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is 
possible and necessary a priori, can be called figurative (syn-
thesis speciosa), as distinct from that which would be thought 
in the mere category in regard to the manifold of an intuition 
in general, and which is called combination of the understand-
ing (synthesis intellectualis); both are transcendental, not 
merely because they themselves proceed a priori but also be-





In itself this passage does not yet help much, but the fact 
that the posterior act of cognition necessarily involves a figurative 
synthesis leads us to the origin of this synthesis: 
 
Yet the figurative synthesis, if it pertains merely to the origi-
nal synthetic unity of apperception, i.e., this transcendental 
unity, which is thought in the categories, must be called, as 
distinct from the merely intellectual combination, the tran-
scendental synthesis of the imagination. Imagination is the 
faculty for representing an object even without its presence in 
intuition. Now since all of our intuition is sensible, the imagi-
nation, on account of the subjective condition under which 
alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the concepts of 
the understanding, belongs to sensibility; but insofar as its 
synthesis is still an exercise of spontaneity, which is deter-
mining and not, like sense, merely determinable, and can thus 
determine the sense a priori in respect of its form in accord-
ance with the unity of apperception, the imagination is to this 
extent a faculty for determining the sensibility a priori, and 
its synthesis of intuitions, in accordance with the categories, 
must be the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, 
which is an effect of the understanding on sensibility and its 
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first application (and at the same time the ground of all oth-




Kant explains here the peculiar role of imagination in the 
posterior act of cognition. Through imagination the understanding 
is capable of affecting inner sense. For a Wolffian reader this 
conclusion should not be hard to accept, for according to Wolff, 
imagination is the faculty for producing representations (ideas) of 
absent sensible things,
453
 and the posterior act must, according to 
Kant, produce the object of thought without its presence in intui-
tion. The appearances are, of course, intuitions and they are repre-
sented in inner sense independently of the posterior act, but with-
out the posterior act they do not represent objects at all; they are 
objects. Human cognition thus involves an act of using an appear-
ance as a representation of an object. The object itself is produced 
by an intellectual act through the categories, but in order to grasp 
the appearance the human mind needs imagination. We have 
learned above that the understanding can think the synthetic unity 
of the apperception of an a priori manifold of sensible intuition, 
and Kant explains in the latter part of § 24 (B 153) that the under-
standing cannot take intuitions up into itself, even if they were 
given in sensibility. Consequently, the understanding must in-
clude a capacity which in itself belongs to sensibility. This capaci-
ty is imagination, which also in Wolff’s philosophy belongs to 
sensibility. The most peculiar thing about this is that the under-
standing must be capable of using the form of outer sense in the 
production of the representation of the object, because only 
through a spatial representation can we apperceive the product of 
the transcendental imagination. In B 154 Kant illustrates this by 
explaining that not only acts like thinking of a line or a circle but 
also the representation of time requires that we act on the pure 
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form of space. In § 25 Kant explains that cognition of ourselves is 
not possible through mere apperception because it lacks the intui-
tion required for cognition. Inner sense is thus a genuine sense 
which imagination can affect, and the posterior act of cognition is 
dependent on the capacity of imagination to determine sensibility 
a priori. 
This ends the top-down part in which we have arrived at 
the conclusion on which the A Deduction was grounded: the un-
derstanding is not an original faculty but analysable to the facul-
ties of apperception and imagination. However, this time the ar-
gument will not be grounded on the identity of the faculty that 
grounds both the prior and the posterior act of cognition but on 
the identity of the unity required for the objects of those acts. In § 
26 Kant will now complete the argument with a short bottom-up 
part in which he considers how an empirical intuition is given to 
the understanding in sensibility. The change in the argument 
structure will allow Kant to omit discussion on the faculty of im-
agination itself, so that we need not know that the productive 
imagination has its ground in transcendental reproduction. There 
is thus no need to explain how the synthesis of apprehension in 
the intuition and the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination 
are related to each other. Neither does Kant have to make a dis-
tinction between a transcendental and an empirical synthesis of 
apprehension. All he needs to do is to consider, in the light of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, the formal conditions of sensibility in 
our cognition of an object. 
Kant begins by explaining what the synthesis of appre-
hension is: 
 
First of all I remark that by the synthesis of apprehension I 
understand the composition of the manifold in an empirical 
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intuition, through which perception, i.e., empirical conscious-




Kant’s purpose is to explain what our human cognition 
contains by setting aside that which is brought to it by the intel-
lectual synthesis. In the A Deduction, we saw that by “percep-
tion” Kant means the kind of consciousness animals are not capa-
ble of and where the effect of the first application of the under-
standing is already present. The possibility of this consciousness 
rests on a synthesis, because perception presupposes an image 
where a manifold is represented in one representation.
455
 In other 
words, cognition presupposes the prior act of cognition, which 
gives unity to the empirical intuition. However, Kant is not here 
analysing the prior act but the posterior act, and the latter includes 
a synthesis of apprehension. 
Now, as we have already learned, this empirical synthesis 
has its ground in a pure synthesis: 
 
We have forms of outer as well as inner sensible intuition a 
priori in the representations of space and time, and the syn-
thesis of the apprehension of the manifold of appearance must 
always be in agreement with these, since it can only occur in 




Kant said in the Transcendental Aesthetic (A 21/B 35) 
that the form of intuition consists in extension and figure. We 
have learned that mere sense cannot give us these, and in the A 
Deduction Kant showed that besides sense also imagination is 
required for extension and figure. In the bottom-up part of the A 
Deduction (A 120) Kant said that in apprehension the imagination 
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brings the manifold of intuition into an image. In the B Deduction 
Kant does not mention images but in the Schematism they play a 
key role, and I think that it is useful here to consider how the 
above quote fits with Kant’s view on the possibility of represent-
ing images. I have argued that Kant thought that our ability to 
represent images depends on the ability to have representations of 
space and time to which the mere form of sense is inadequate. In 
the above passage Kant says that we have the forms of intuition in 
the representations of space and time. Now, it has been my hy-
pothesis that Kant adopted Tetens’ conception of inner sense, and 
if I am correct in making this hypothesis, then Kant thought that 
an image can be represented only by affecting inner sense, be-
cause images do not consist of a mere manifold of pure intuition. 
An image contains the forms of intuition – representations of 
space and time – and this is possible only through an act that af-
fects inner sense and produces the image. In sections 24 and 25 
Kant’s aim was to convince the reader that inner sense really is a 
sense which can and must be affected by imagination in order to 
perform the posterior act of cognition. In this act, Kant said, the 
understanding must determine inner sense. Presumably, then, the 
undetermined object of an empirical intuition must be represented 
in inner sense prior to the posterior act, for otherwise it would be 
hard to see how this object could be determined by determining 
inner sense.  In the A Deduction we learned that an appearance, a 
modification of inner sense, is in space and time, i.e. that an ap-
pearance is not contained in a single moment. It is thus not only 
spatially extended but temporally extended as well. Since the 
synthesis of apprehension of an empirical manifold can occur 
only in accordance with this pure form, it must always be in 
agreement with the latter. This was explained under the heading 
“On the synthesis of apprehension in the intuition” in the A edi-
tion, and there Kant concluded that there is not only an empirical 
synthesis of apprehension but also a pure one. All this still holds 
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but in the B Deduction Kant has a different strategy, and now we 
should see how it is different. 
Kant first reminds us of what was explained in § 17: 
 
But space and time are represented a priori not merely as 
forms of sensible intuition, but also as intuitions themselves 
(which contain a manifold), and thus with the determination 





To this Kant adds a note where he makes a distinction be-
tween the form of intuition and formal intuition. He explains in 
this note that as geometry shows, space can be represented as 
object, which presupposes a unity of representation. This unity 
precedes all concepts, and it makes all concepts of space and time 




By formal intuition Kant means a conscious representa-
tion of space or time. In the above quote, he says that space and 
time are represented with the determination of the unity of the 
manifold in them. Although the mere image presupposes a unity, 
which is provided by the form of intuition (and by synthesis), the 
unity cannot be represented as determined without apperception. 
Here we must remember what Kant said in § 17: 
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chapter 9. 
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Thus the mere form of outer sensible intuition, space, is not 
yet cognition at all; it only gives the manifold of intuition a 
priori for possible cognition. But in order to cognize some-
thing in space, e.g., a line, I must draw it, and thus syntheti-
cally bring about a determinate combination of the given 
manifold, so that the unity of this action is at the same time 
the unity of consciousness (in the concept of a line), and 




It is important to understand that although a determinate 
space or time cannot be represented without apperception, the 
object of this representation is an intuition, and consequently “the 
unity of this a priori intuition belongs to space and time, and not 
to the concept of the understanding”.
460
 Kant clarifies this in the 
note to § 17: 
 
Space and time and all their parts are intuitions, thus singular 
representations along with the manifold that they contain in 
themselves (see the Transcendental Aesthetic), thus they are 
not mere concepts by means of which the same consciousness 
is contained in many representations, but rather are many rep-
resentations that are contained in one and in the conscious-
ness of it; they are thus found to be composite, and conse-
quently the unity of consciousness, as synthetic and yet as 




In other words, even though a representation of a deter-
minate space or time presupposes apperception, the synthesis is a 
coordinative synthesis and its unity is not provided by the original 
unity of apperception but by the singularity of space and time. 
Now, since the unity of the consciousness of a formal in-
tuition presupposes a synthesis (a line must be drawn etc.), the 
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representation of the unity presupposes a unity of synthesis (be-
cause without it the consciousness of the intuition would be im-
possible): 
 
Thus even unity of the synthesis of the manifold, outside or 
within us, hence also a combination with which everything 
that is to be represented as determined in space or time must 
agree, is already given a priori, along with (not in) these intu-




Remember that combination is, according to § 15, the 
representation of the synthetic unity of a manifold, and it conse-
quently belongs to the understanding. In § 24 Kant showed that 
the posterior act of cognition must, through a figurative synthesis, 
use the appearance as a representation to which the categories 
assign an object. In order to achieve this, the understanding must 
have a representation of the synthetic unity of the appearance, 
which presupposes a unity of synthesis. Kant has now shown that 
everything that can be represented in space and time, presupposes 
this unity of synthesis. Therefore, if we take a look back at the 
supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to 
sensibility, which according to the Transcendental Aesthetic is 
that all the manifold of sensibility stands under the formal condi-
tions of space and time, we see that all synthesis of apprehension 
stands under the condition of the unity of the synthesis of the 
manifold of sensibility. 
Let us now compare this with the principle of the possi-
bility of all intuition in relation to the understanding, according to 
which all the manifold of intuition stands under conditions of the 
original synthetic unity of apperception.
463
 All the manifold repre-
sentations of intuition stand under this principle insofar as they 
must be capable of being combined in one consciousness, and 
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they stand under the previously mentioned principle insofar as 
they are given to us (to the understanding). But now it is clear that 
the unity of the synthesis of the sensible manifold is given to us a 
priori, because there is only one time and one space and because 
all empirical synthesis stands under the formal conditions of 
space and time. Although space and time do not contain any 
combination, combination is given along with them, because eve-
ry given intuition necessarily contains a unity of synthesis, and 
since the understanding can represent the intuition it must also 
represent the synthetic unity (combination is not given in them). 
In the above passage Kant says that the unity of synthesis 
and even the representation of it (combination) is given as condi-
tion of the synthesis of all apprehension. This confirms that by 
apprehension, Kant in fact means the conscious synthesis, which 
produces perception. In the B Deduction Kant does not have to 
consider the empirical synthesis of the prior act of cognition at 
all. The prior act itself is not Kant’s concern. Thus, at the begin-
ning of § 26 he has said that he is about to explain “the possibility 
of cognizing a priori through categories whatever objects may 
come before our senses, not as far as the form of their intuition 
but rather as far as the laws of their combination are con-
cerned”.
464
 Therefore, he is interested in apprehension of objects 
as far as the laws of their combination are concerned, i.e. self-
conscious apprehension.  
According to the interpretation I have here constructed 
based on my hypothesis, Kant thinks that forming perception out 
of the raw data of the senses requires two acts: the act of repre-
senting the appearance, and the act, which uses this appearance as 
a representation in thinking an object for it. One should, however, 
note that in human perception empirical reproduction and associa-
tion constantly aid our apprehension and that there is no clear-cut 
distinction between the two acts, because our associations are 
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conceptual. Once we have entered the world of perception, we 
cease to apprehend our surroundings the way animals do. Never-
theless, perception has its ground in mere images, which do not 
contain anything conceptual, and ultimately our perception re-
quires two cognitive acts. The sensible synthesis itself (of the 
prior act) is an effect of the imagination, which belongs to sensi-
bility. In the figurative synthesis of the understanding this synthe-
sis is self-conscious but its unity is still an intuitive unity, not a 
unity of apperception. 
Now, it is important to understand that the appearance, 
the object of the prior act, is what the posterior act uses as repre-
sentation. Therefore, based on what we have found out in § 24, 
the posterior act includes the same a priori act that in the prior act 
produces the appearance, and the image is made possible by the 
same synthetic unity that makes the figurative synthesis of § 24 
possible. Both the prior and the posterior act of cognition there-
fore include the same a priori act of sensibility. Consequently, we 
can think everything that can come before our senses. On the 
other hand, the intellectual synthesis of the understanding consists 
in the same synthetic unity in which the pure sensible synthesis 
consists, but without the unity of our sensible intuition. It is the 
same pure synthesis generally represented and its unity is provid-
ed by the original apperception. Kant can, therefore, conclude that 
all synthesis stands under the categories: 
 
But this synthetic unity can be none other than that of the 
combination of the manifold of given intuition in general in 
an original consciousness, in agreement with the categories, 
only applied to our sensible intuition. Consequently all syn-
thesis, through which even perception itself becomes possi-
ble, stands under the categories, and since experience is cog-
nition through connected perceptions, the categories are con-
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ditions of the possibility of experience, and are thus also valid 




The pure synthesis of the categories is the same pure syn-
thesis that is required for representing objects in sensible intui-
tion. This allows us to subsume intuitions under concepts and 
proves the objective validity of the categories. 
In this proof, it is important to keep in mind two distinc-
tions. The first distinction is between the prior and the posterior 
act and their products. Appearances are products of the prior act 
of cognition. They are objects of an empirical intuition, but with-
out the posterior act they do not represent objects outside the 
power of representation. They are not ideas and they do not have 
intentional content. In order to represent an object for the product 
of the prior act, we need the posterior act of cognition. 
The second distinction is between the two syntheses re-
quired for the posterior act. In order to represent an object outside 
the power of representation, we need a pure a priori synthesis 
generally represented. However, the posterior act also includes a 
pure a priori synthesis of a sensible manifold without which the 
appearances could not be taken up into human consciousness. By 
means of this figurative synthesis the appearance, which is a mere 
modification of the mind in inner sense, can be used as a repre-
sentation, and by means of the categories this representation can 
represent an object. 
The B Deduction is an inquiry into the unity of represen-
tations. In § 20 Kant concluded that a manifold given in one intui-
tion necessarily stands under the categories. In other words, any 
self-consciously represented given intuition stands under the cat-
egories, because categories give to all self-conscious representa-
tions their necessary unity. However, categories are mere forms 
of thought. The synthesis in them is purely intellectual and it 
                                                     
465
 B 161. 
The B Deduction 
287 
 
alone does not yield cognition. In § 24 Kant argues that the cate-
gories are objectively real, because as a faculty of cognition the 
understanding can determine sensibility a priori through imagina-
tion. In § 26, finally, Kant proves the objective validity of the 
categories by showing that “everything that may ever come be-
fore our senses must stand under laws that arise a priori from the 
understanding alone.”
466
 Kant’s argument rests on the connection 
between sensible and intellectual unity. The synthetic unity of the 
figurative synthesis is the unity of the combination of the mani-
fold of given intuition in general, but applied to sensible intuition. 
In other words, when the understanding determines sensibility 
through imagination, it represents consciously a unity of sensible 
intuition. This unity must be the unity of the intellectual synthesis 
described in § 20, but without the intellectual synthesis the figura-
tive synthesis does not represent an object of cognition. On the 
other hand, the intellectual synthesis does not by itself yield cog-
nition. 
Transcendental imagination and transcendental appercep-
tion are thus both capacities necessary for the understanding as a 
faculty of cognition. However, the B Deduction does not rest on 
an analysis of the understanding but on an analysis of the unity of 
synthesis. Apprehension requires a unity of sensible synthesis, so 
the very same synthetic unity, which is represented generally in 
the categories, is a condition of all apprehension. Further, since 
the unity of the appearances, represented through the prior cogni-
tive act, is the unity of the figurative synthesis, through which that 
unity is self-consciously represented in the posterior cognitive act, 
everything that can come before our senses necessarily stands 
under the categories. 
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8. THE SCHEMATISM 
 
In the Deductions Kant has explained what is common to 
the acts of sensibility and understanding in cognition. He has also 
explained how perception differs from mere images and how the 
ingredient of perception, the thought “There is an object”, which 
according to Tetens is produced by an act reducible to the act that 
produces images, in fact requires the original faculty of appercep-
tion and therefore is not reducible to that act. Nevertheless, the 
transcendental synthesis required for images is the same synthesis 
as the one required for perception. Only the transcendental 
ground of the unity of synthesis in perception is different: in per-
ception it is the unity of apperception, which with the transcen-
dental synthesis of imagination produces the thought “There is an 
object”, as Tetens would say. 
However, on the basis of the Deductions alone it is diffi-
cult to understand how Kant thinks that the first application of the 
understanding produces perception out of mere images, In the 
Schematism he explains this, to the extent it is possible to explain 
an act hidden behind consciousness. An empirical concept, Kant 
says, is “related immediately to the schema of the imagination, as 
a rule for the determination of our intuition in accordance with a 
certain general concept.”
467
 A concept is thus never directly relat-
ed to an image, which is the product of a schema. Therefore, an 
image already presupposes a rule of the imagination, and that 
very same rule is the basis for the corresponding concept. The act 
of the understanding in producing perception is not, therefore, an 
act involved with the image itself but with the schema of imagina-
tion, and when a subject is about to become conscious of appear-
ances he or she is already in possession of the rules required for 
consciousness. Consciousness is, in fact, consciousness of those 
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rules, and apperception is what gives them the unity required for 
concepts. 
Let us return to the discussion presented in section 1.3, 
where I suggested that the Schematism was influenced by Tetens’ 
theory of sensible abstractions. I proposed a reading according to 
which the empirical intuition, which provides the ground for the 
prior act of cognition, is not the object (the appearance), which 
the posterior act of cognition uses as representation. According to 
this reading, an appearance is an object represented in inner sense. 
The content to be subsumed under the categories is thus not in the 
empirical intuition but in the product which the imagination 
makes, i.e. in the appearance. 
We saw at section 3.1 that Pendlebury has accused Kant 
of lax use of the term “subsumption”. Let us return to what Pen-
dlebury says: 
 
Kant equates “the subsumption of intuitions under pure con-
cepts” and “the application of a category to appearances [i.e., 
to empirical objects]” (my emphasis). This is a little mislead-
ing, for subsumption and application are different kinds of re-
lation. Notwithstanding Kant’s frequently lax use of the term 
(as in the first sentence of the Schematism), subsumption is a 
relation between representations and representations (where 
“representations” are ideas, which include both concepts and 
intuitions). Application, on the other hand, is a relation be-




 Now we can see that this accusation is groundless. There 
is nothing wrong with Kant’s use of the terms “subsumption”. 
Both the application of concepts and the subsumption of appear-
ances under concepts are relations between the products of intuit-
ing and concepts.
469
 Pendlebury’s accusation is a result of the 
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common misconception according to which Kant thought that our 
empirical representations are ideas. 
My reading also explains how Kant thought that a third 
thing can help to fulfil the homogeneity-requirement. This has 
puzzled commentators, and also Pendlebury, whose reading is 
otherwise compatible with my reading, finds Kant’s solution un-
acceptable.
470
 The issue is most pressing with the categories 
(since they are totally heterogeneous with spatiotemporal appear-
ances), and we should now consider their relation to appearances. 
Concepts consist, according to Kant, in the consciousness 
of the unity of synthesis, and the unity depends on one conscious-
ness.
471
 We must pay attention to the fact that schemata are rules 
for synthesis in one time. If transcendental schemata consist in 
those a priori rules that are required for perceiving spatiotemporal 
objects and if the categories consist in the consciousness of those 
rules, then not only the categories but also the appearances are 
homogeneous with the schemata, because they are produced 
through those very same rules that are represented in the catego-
ries. In representing an appearance, one time (and one space) 
provides the unity for synthesis, and the synthesis is a mere effect 
of the imagination. In thought, by contrast, the unity of synthesis 
depends on one consciousness, as the product is no longer an 
intuition. Thus we can arrive at the following conclusion: 
 
Now a transcendental time-determination is homogeneous 
with the category (which constitutes its unity) insofar it is 
universal and rests on a rule a priori. But it is on the other 
hand homogeneous with the appearance insofar as time is 
                                                                                                           
(A 108). The object of an empirical intuition thus is a representation, 
and, indeed, an intuition. 
470
 Pendlebury, “Making Sense of Kant’s Schematism”, 782. 
471









However, the appearances themselves are not homogene-
ous with the categories, because they do not consist in rules and 
they are singular representations. Time itself is of course hetero-
geneous with the categories but the time-determination that every 
appearance presupposes rests on a rule that a category represents 
in general.
473
 Hence a third thing does indeed solve the problem 
of heterogeneity. 
Krausser sees a problem with Kant’s statement that time 
is contained in every empirical representation, because according 
to the Transcendental Aesthetic, time is a form of intuiting and it 
therefore cannot, according to Krausser, be contained in any rep-
resentation.
474
 According to my reading, however, there is no 
such problem. I agree with Pendlebury when he notes that “a 
momentary thing, however dog-like it may be, cannot be a 
dog.”
475
 Time as the form of inner sense does not by itself make 
an appearance persist in time, just as space as the form of outer 
sense does not by itself give appearances their shape. When a dog 
moves, its shape changes, but the dog remains the same. It would 
be impossible to perceive this change if time was not contained in 
the appearance of the dog. The perceiver must represent the dog 




Allison is thus on the right track when he says that “a 
transcendental schema is to be construed as a pure intuition”.
477
 In 
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my opinion, Allison is right in holding the view that the distinc-
tion between the form of intuition and formal intuition is relevant 
to schematism.
478
 However, I see a problem with Allison’s ac-
count, because although I think he is right in claiming that a for-
mal intuition produced by synthesis is a sensible “presentation” of 
a concept,
479
 I do not think that a formal intuition needs a concept 
to be produced. It is the imagination alone that produces the intui-
tion. Allison’s failure to understand this is connected to his mis-
guided conception of Tetens’ theory of inner sense, in which Alli-
son seems to rely on the interpretation given by T. D. Weldon and 
Robert Paul Wolff.
480
 Ironically, the major reason Allison gives 
for not accepting that Kant was influenced by Tetens’ theory of 
inner sense, is that the latter “ignores the sharp contrast that Kant 
draws between apperception and inner sense.”
481
 As we have 
seen, however, this contrast is at the very heart of Tetens’ philos-
ophy. 
A formal intuition can of course be construed in accord-
ance with a concept, e.g. in geometry, but the intuition itself is 
always a product of imagination. It should here be noted that a 
formal intuition is not only independent of concepts: it does not 
necessarily require a schema either, for in apprehension of an 
unknown object there is no schema of its shape, (the same applies 
to the apprehension of an event regarding time). The apprehen-
sion nevertheless requires action of the faculty of imagination. 
Here we arrive at an interesting conclusion, which also 
Pendlebury realizes to the extent it is possible on the assumption 
that intuitions are ideas. An appearance cannot be apprehended 
without a transcendental schema, and an object cannot be thought 
without a category. Consequently, an empirical schema must con-
tain a transcendental schema. The Schematism thus explains how 
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appearances can be subsumed under concepts, because by means 
of pure imagination we bring into combination the manifold of 
intuition and the condition of the necessary unity of apperception. 
Kant explains this by the following: 
 
Both extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must 
necessarily be connected by means of this transcendental 
function of the imagination, since otherwise the former would 
to be sure yield appearances but no objects of an empirical 




The transcendental imagination thus connects intuition 
and apperception. On the one hand, this is because a representa-
tion of an object requires a transcendental schema, and on the 
other hand because the thought of an object requires the same 
schema (in addition to transcendental apperception, which gives 
the synthesis the unity that it would otherwise be lacking, as the 
object of thought is no longer an intuition). If the transcendental 
imagination did not connect our apperception with intuitions, we 
would represent appearances but “nothing would be given that 
could be subsumed under a concept”. In that case we would have 




This interpretation explains why we do not need apper-
ception for representing objects, although we do need it for what 
Kant calls perception. In cognition, the function of transcendental 
apperception is to give unity to synthesis. When the representa-
tion produced by synthesis is an intuition, the transcendental use 
of sense provides synthesis with its unity, and thus objective intui-
tions are always by themselves representations of a manifold in 
one representation. These intuitions are coordinative representa-
tions, and it is only when we come to think of our intuitions, i.e. 
                                                     
482
 A 124. 
483
 A 247/ B 304, my emphases. 
Kant’s Transcendental Deductions 
294 
 
in subordination, that we need the unity of apperception to give 
synthesis its unity. This is effected through a transcendental 
schema, and the fact that we manage to think about appearances 
already proves the objective validity of the categories in regard to 
our appearances. This is what Kant means in the Preface to the A 
edition, when he says that what is said in pages A 92–93 “should 
even be sufficient by itself for accepting the validity of the cate-
gories.
484
 The ground for Kant’s statement that only by means of 
the categories can an object of experience be thought at all, is not 
the view that apperception is a requirement of representing ap-
pearances, but rather the view that the objects to which the cate-
gories can be applied are already thought objects.
485
  
This interpretation avoids problems other interpretations 
have encountered. Although Kant says that appearances do not 
require the functions of the understanding and although he says 
that synthesis is the effect of the imagination, the majority of 
commentators have been forced to conclude that he thought that 
apperception is involved already in mere intuiting. Interpreted 
that way, Kant seems to be contradicting himself. My claim is 
that we can avoid that problem if we are more sensitive to the 
context in which Kant wrote. I have here concentrated on the 
connection between Kant and Tetens with the aim of showing that 
the A Deduction can be made intelligible by assuming that Kant’s 
conception of inner sense was influenced by Tetens. On the other 
hand, I have claimed that the B Deduction, although it is perfectly 
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compatible with the A Deduction, can be best understood through 
Wolff’s philosophy, so my claim is not so much that the Critique 
relies on Tetens’ work – my claim is that understanding the his-
torical context is the key to avoiding the problems that commen-
tators have encountered. In the final chapter, I will now consider 
three interpretations of the B Deduction with the aim of showing 








At the end of the chapter on the Metaphysical Deduction I 
explained how I think my interpretation allows us to view that 
section as an independent argument, and I compared this with the 
views presented by two commentators, Henry Allison and Béa-
trice Longuenesse, both of whom, as we saw, think that the Meta-
physical Deduction needs support from elsewhere. Both of these 
commentators have proposed an interpretation of the B Deduction 
as well. They have also commented on each other’s interpreta-
tions, and since the B Deduction is the more accessible one of the 
two objective versions, the views of these two well-known com-
mentators provide a good background against which to compare 
my own view. 
Longuenesse’s book Kant and the Capacity to Judge is an 
extremely thorough investigation into Kant’s Transcendental An-
alytic, and it is sensitive to the historical context of Kant’s Cri-
tique. She rightly puts emphasis on Kant’s epigenesis of reason, 
according to which the categories are acquired concepts. Further, 
she maintains, as also I do, that this model extends not only to the 
categories but to the form of intuition as well.
486
 Thus, she con-
tends that the act of judging is prior to the categories as reflected 
concepts, or as full-fledged categories, as she puts it.
487
 I think 
that Longuenesse’s insight is remarkable, and she has been able to 
find important aspects of Kant’s thought that have been generally 
neglected. Unfortunately, however, she runs into difficulties when 
trying to connect those findings, and in my opinion, this is be-
cause she has not understood correctly the role that inner sense 
plays in Kant’s theory. 
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Longuenesse thinks that rather than Baumgarten or Te-
tens, it is Locke who influenced Kant in his conception of inner 
sense.
488
 The reason she gives for holding this view is that Locke 
had correlated outer sense with space, and inner sense with time. 
Locke may indeed have influenced Kant either directly or indi-
rectly in this, but I think that the decisive influence on Kant’s 
theory comes from Tetens. Tetens’ new conception of inner sense 
allows Kant to depart from the way of ideas while still rescuing 
mental impressions from the threat of skepticism. When this is 
understood, I think that we can understand his view on the acqui-
sition of both pure sensible concepts and pure intellectual con-
cepts without the excessive complexity that I find in Longue-
nesse’s interpretation. It is certainly true that time plays the lead-
ing part in this epigenetic theory, but how time plays its role is, in 
my opinion, best understood by looking at how Wolff’s and Te-
tens’ thoughts on reproduction as a requirement for conscious-
ness. Kant had to change the Wolffian conception of sensibility 
and he concluded that the transcendental use of inner sense (the 
pure manifold of time) must precede consciousness of composite 
things. By doing this he could preserve Wolff’s two-stage theory 
of cognition the roots of which can be traced all the way back to 
Alhazen’s theory of vision. 
When we interpret Kant in this way, we can free appear-
ances from the supposed tyranny of apperception and see the ac-
quisition of the categories in its true light. The appearances do 
indeed depend on those a priori rules that are generally represent-
ed in the categories, but those rules, represented in the transcen-
dental schemata, by no means depend on apperception, because a 
schema is always a product of the imagination. Along with the 
pure manifold of space and time, the rules of the transcendental 
schemata are what is innate in us, and their first application ef-
fects appearances in space. Through apperception those appear-
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ances then become phenomena and we gradually become aware 
of those schemata and ultimately reflect them as categories. 
Longuenesse realizes that the transcendental schemata are 
prior to the categories but she is unable to divorce the schemata 
from apperception.
489
 She then tries to explain the original acqui-
sition through the distinction between judgements of perception 
and judgements of experience, which Kant makes in the Prole-
gomena. Here is how Allison summarises Longuenesse’s posi-
tion: 
 
[J]udgments of perception, on her view, are genuine judg-
ments involving the logical functions rather than mere associ-
ations (though they are based on merely associative connec-
tions) and, as such, conform to the conditions of the objective 
unity of apperception. Nevertheless, they do not involve an 
application of the categories, at least not the ‘full-fledged’ 
categories or, as she also puts it, a full-fledged application of 
them. The latter occurs only in judgments of experience, 




Allison considers how Longuenesse’s view fits the first 
part of the B Deduction and concludes that her way of reading § 
19 through this distinction is at odds with both § 20, where Kant 
says that the categories are “nothing other than these functions of 
judging”, and with § 21, where he explains that in the first part of 
the Deduction he abstracts “from the way in which the manifold 
for an empirical intuition is given, in order to attend only to the 
unity that is added to the intuition through the understanding by 
means of the category.”
491
 
This is indeed true. Kant’s purpose in § 19 is to draw at-
tention to the act of thinking. He asks us to consider how the rela-
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tion of given representations in a judgement differs “from the 
relation in accordance with laws of the reproductive imagina-
tion”.
492
 In other words, we should consider what it would be like 
if we tried to perform an act of thinking based on the relation in 
accordance with which our empirical imagination reproduces 
appearances. When we do this, we understand that the act of 
thinking is not reducible to a subjective relation. It is the act of 
thinking of an object. As Kant says in § 20, regardless of whether 
the given representations are intuitions or concepts, this act in-
volves the logical function of judgements through which the man-
ifold of given representations is brought under an apperception in 
general. These functions are the categories, “insofar as the mani-
fold of a given intuition is determined with regard to them”.
493
 As 
I explained in chapter 7, the application of transcendental schema-
ta is prior to the act of thinking, but the first application of the 
understanding is an application of the categories. This application 
is not, however, an application of reflected concepts, so in that 
regard Longuenesse is right, but her way of interpreting the role 
of inner sense in Kant’s theory does not allow her to accept 
Kant’s claim that appearances (and their empirical reproduction) 
do not depend on the functions of the understanding. 
In my view, then, Longuenesse is unable to build a con-
vincing interpretation of the B Deduction, although she finds as-
pects of Kant’s philosophy that I think are correct. I shall here 
argue that the problems that her interpretation faces can be re-
moved if we accept my hypothesis. 
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9.1. The Division of the B Deduction 
 
Let us first see how the Deduction works. Allison and 
Longuenesse both agree, as do I, that in the beginning of the De-
duction, Kant’s argument concerns sensible intuition in general. 
They also agree that the Deduction is a single proof in two steps. I 
too think that it is a single proof in two steps but where exactly 
the parts lie is another story. I have explained above how I think 
that the division of the proof is comparable to the A Deduction so 
that it contains a part starting from the top and a part starting from 
below. Longuenesse notes in her book that this kind of parallel-
ism has been suggested by Benno Erdmann and Herman de 
Vleeschauwer, but she rejects this interpretation on the grounds 
that “both moments deal from the outset with the sensible mani-
fold and the original synthetic or objective unity of self-
consciousness, without presenting either of the progressions of 
the A Deduction”.
 494
 Also Allison comments on the view en-
dorsed by Erdmann and de Vleeschauwer and claims that Dieter 
Henrich has shown conclusively that their model is not applicable 
to the structure of the B Deduction.
495
 However, all of these 
commentators see the first part as culminating in § 20 and the 
second in § 26, whereas I think that the first part ends in § 24 and 
the second in § 26. In fact, I think that we need to take a fresh 
look at the role of inner sense in Kant’s theory in order to under-
stand that his theory of cognition is a two-act theory and that § 20 
is, as Kant says, only the beginning of a deduction. In that section 
Kant is still considering the top element, namely the unity of ap-
perception, from which the first step of the Deduction commences 
to the transcendental synthesis of imagination. 
In considering how to divide the Deduction into parts, it 
is again vitally important to pay attention to what Kant actually 
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says. In § 21 Kant says that at that stage the beginning of a deduc-
tion has been made, and he continues that in this deduction, 
 
since the categories arise independently from sensibility mere-
ly in the understanding, I must abstract from the way in which 
the manifold for an empirical intuition is given, in order to at-
tend only to the unity that is added to the intuition through the 
understanding by means of the category. In the sequel (§ 26) 
it will be shown from the way in which the empirical intuition 
is given in sensibility that its unity can be none other than the 
one the category prescribes to the manifold of a given intui-
tion in general according to the preceding § 20; thus by the 
explanation of it’s a priori validity in regard to all objects of 





Notice how Kant speaks as if the Deduction itself is still 
ahead of us at this stage. In reading the above passage, we must 
remember that the subject matter of the inquiry is cognition in 
which concepts must be related to intuitions. In § 24 Kant will be 
in a position to explain how the “categories, as mere forms of 
thought, acquire objective reality”.
497
 At the beginning of § 24 
Kant reminds us that the categories are “mere forms of thought, 
through which no determinate object is yet cognized.”
498
 The 
synthesis in them, Kant continues, was (in the beginning of a 
deduction) “merely purely intellectual”.
499
 Through this intellec-
tual synthesis alone a discursive understanding can never perform 
the posterior act of cognition. Now, the objective reality of the 
categories is based on the result of § 20 and the fact that the un-
derstanding “can determine inner sense through the manifold of 
given representations in accord with the synthetic unity of apper-
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 Thus, the beginning alone cannot prove the objective 
reality of the categories, let alone their validity, because it does 
not establish a link between sensibility and understanding. § 20 
only tells us that we use the categories in combining the manifold 
in intuition – it does not reveal anything about the appearances, so 
it does not answer skepticism. In proving the objective reality, 
Kant first abstracts “from the way in which the manifold for an 
empirical intuition is given” and then shows, in § 24, that the 
imagination is “a faculty for determining the sensibility a priori, 
and its synthesis of intuitions, in accordance with the categories, 
must be the transcendental synthesis of imagination”.
501
 This 
synthesis, Kant adds, is the first application of the understanding. 
Finally, in § 26 he will prove, as he says in the above quote, the 
objective validity of the categories. 
So Kant says very clearly that the objective reality is 
proved in § 24 and the objective validity in § 26. This is one way 
of looking at the Deduction as consisting of parts. On the other 
hand, we may view the Deduction as consisting of a top-down 
and a bottom-up part. There is thus more than one way in which 
we can see the Deduction as consisting of two parts. In fact, we 
can see it as consisting of two or three parts depending on wheth-
er we want to see §§ 15–20 as belonging to the Deduction or 
merely providing preliminary considerations for the Deduction. 
Determining the division is in itself unimportant. What matters is 
that we correctly understand Kant’s objective and how he thinks 
he has reached his objective. It is beyond doubt that his objective 
lies in proving the objective reality and validity of the categories, 
and in terms of this objective, the Deduction can be divided into 
two parts. I will here concentrate first on the part where Kant 
proves the objective reality of the categories and then continue to 
the part where their objective validity is shown (which includes 
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the latter part of § 24). I shall refer to these parts by calling them 
the Reality-Part and the Validity-Part. 
 
 
9.2. Objective Reality 
 
As I said earlier, Longuenesse points out that even the 
beginning of the Deduction (§ 20) deals with both the synthetic 
unity of apperception and the sensible manifold. However, Kant 
says that in the Reality-Part he must abstract from the way in 
which the sensible manifold is given, and the reason why § 20 
deals with a sensible manifold is simply because human cognition 
always requires a sensible manifold. So prior to the first applica-
tion of the understanding a manifold must be given through sen-
sibility, and as Henrich rightly points out, the result of § 20 con-
tains a restriction. To put it in Henrich’s words, Kant “established 
that intuitions are subject to the categories insofar as they, as intu-
itions, already possess unity (B 143).”
502
 To paraphrase, Kant’s 
conclusion in § 20 is that the manifold given in one intuition nec-
essarily stands under the categories. Therefore, the conclusion is 
“valid only for those intuitions which already contain unity.”
503
 
Henrich’s interpretation is compatible with the explana-
tion I have given for Kant’s use of the expressions ‘objective 
validity’ and ‘objective reality’. To see how, let us take a look at 
how Henrich continues. According to Henrich, consciousness 
must be understood as an activity, and he draws the following 
conclusion: 
 
Thus our consciousness can be found only together with a 
“passive” receptive faculty, which is distinct and in certain re-
spects opposed to the spontaneity of consciousness; it can en-
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counter intuitions only as given “before all consciousness.” 
Kant reformulates the task of the transcendental deduction 
with reference to this very distinction: it must demonstrate 
that categories are capable of taking up something given into 
the unity of consciousness. “Appearances might very well be 
so constituted that the understanding should not find them to 
be in accordance with the conditions of its unity” (B 123). If 
that is possible, then it can also be asked whether such a dis-
proportion between consciousness and givenness can be ex-




This is precisely how I understand Kant, and what I have 
suggested in this study is that proving the objective reality of the 
categories amounts to what Tetens had called the realisation of 
basic concepts. In other words, it means proving that these con-
cepts have real objects. On the other hand, in order to prove the 
objective validity of these concepts Kant would have to show that 
all possible appearances stand under the categories. In terms of 
the structure of the B Deduction this would be the opposite of 
how Allison sees the Deduction, because he thinks that the first 
part (culminating in § 20) is concerned with the objective validity 
and the second part with the objective reality of the categories.
505
  
In my opinion then, Henrich understands correctly what 
needs to be proved in the B Deduction. However, after a promis-
ing start Henrich is forced to conclude, with so many other com-
mentators, that Kant confused things. Henrich accuses Kant of 
being unable to see with sufficient clarity that sensibility is dis-
tinct from consciousness.
506
 Thus, Kant was, according to Hen-
rich, “able to assert propositions which anticipate the result of the 
proof of the deduction and at the same time make the deduction 
dependent on the mere semantic analysis of the word “mine””
507
. 
                                                     
504
 Henrich, “Proof-Structure”, 646–647. 
505
 Allison, Idealism, 134. 
506
 Henrich, “Proof-Structure”, 654. 
507




Henrich also concludes that there is a substantial difference be-
tween the proof of the first and the second editions, which Kant 
was unable to see.
508
 
As I said in the Introduction, I think that this kind of self-
complacency, although understandable, is misplaced in Kant 
scholarship. Instead of putting the blame on Kant one should try 
to see whether the text could be so interpreted that the apparent 
confusion vanishes. In Henrich’s case, this can be easily 
achieved. All we need to do is to pay attention to the passive fac-
ulty distinct from consciousness. This faculty is inner sense and it 
is indeed passive. However, if my hypothesis is correct, then Kant 
thought that the mind is both in a passive and in an active relation 
to inner sense. When we add this hypothesis to Henrich’s position 
that consciousness must be understood as an activity that “always 
presupposes that something is present in the first place which is to 
be made conscious”, we get a two-stage theory of cognition 
where givenness presupposes a prior act of cognition. From my 
analysis of the B Deduction it can be seen that if we accept this 
hypothesis, then contrary to what Henrich says, the B Deduction 
turns out to be similar in structure to the A Deduction. Moreover, 
we can see that Kant did not rely on a mere semantic analysis of 
the word “mine”. In my view then, the reason why Henrich thinks 
that Kant confuses things is that he has not understood correctly 
inner sense is for Kant. 
In order to see how Kant proves the objective reality of 
the categories, we need to understand how the sensible given is 
given to us. Under my hypothesis, it is given through an act that 
does not involve the use of apperception. In fact, I think that 
when Kant wrote the Deduction it probably did not even cross his 
mind that the reader might interpret him otherwise. So how is it 
possible in Kant’s theory that the sensible given is given inde-
pendently of apperception? It is possible because synthesis in 
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space and time necessarily produces a unitary representation.
509
 
Therefore, a representation given in space and time is a represen-
tation containing unity, and what Kant first proves in the Deduc-
tion is that the understanding can be applied to it. However, the 
question Kant is ultimately concerned with is whether the applica-
tion is valid. In other words, the ultimate question is whether the 
object thought through the posterior act of cognition necessarily 
conforms to the objects given through the prior act of cognition. 
This interpretation of the aim of the Deduction is in conflict with 
Allison’s view, so let us see how he defends his interpretation of 
what objective validity means. 
Allison thinks that objective validity and objective reality 
are connected with different conceptions of an object.
510
 In dis-
cussing this vie, he gives a very clear-headed analysis of what a 
subjective unity of consciousness is as compared to an objective 
unity of consciousness. In his analysis Allison arrives at the same 
conclusion I made in section 5.5 concerning the subjective unity 
of consciousness. As Allison puts it, “if I had merely the disposi-
tion to associate and not also the capacity to think, I could not 
even become aware of the fact that I associate.”
511
 However, Alli-
son is unable to connect this view with § 19 where Kant explains 
what the objective unity of apperception is. He then concludes 
that 
 
Kant conflates the contrast between the objective unity of 
self-consciousness that occurs in judgment and the subjective 
unity of consciousness produced by association with the quite 
different contrast between judgments which refer to objects in 
the “weighty” sense (judgments of experience) and those 
which refer to the state of the subject (judgments of percep-
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tion). Incredibly enough, he does this in the very paragraph in 
the Critique in which he attempts to articulate his conception 
of judgment. Given this conception, and the contrast between 
an objective and a subjective unity that goes with it, Kant 
should have distinguished here between the mere association 
of the impression of weight with the impressions of body (a 
subjective unity) and the thought “If I support a body, I feel 
an impression of weight.” He should also have noted that this 
thought is as much a judgment possessing objective validity 
as its counterpart, “The body is heavy.” Both involve the rela-
tion of representations to an object. The difference between 
them is not relevant to the conception of judgment which 




Again, I think that instead of accusing Kant of confusing 
things we should try to find a way to make Kant intelligible, and 
if we accept my hypothesis, we find that Allison has missed 
Kant’s point. The reason for this is that Allison has chosen the 
wrong path in detecting what the distinction between two kinds of 
objects is. Allison does indeed consider the possibility that this 
distinction could be explained (as I think it should) through what 
Kant says in the A edition in A108: “All representations, as repre-
sentations, have their object, and can themselves be objects of 
other representations in turn.” He then notes that interpreted this 
way the distinction “corresponds to Kant’s own distinction be-
tween objects of outer and inner sense” but that it does not corre-
spond to the distinction relevant in the B Deduction.
513
 However, 
if we accept my interpretation according to which the objects of 
outer sense are represented in inner sense, we can make sense of 
what Kant means to say in § 19. It is perfectly consistent for Kant 
to claim that of the two thoughts considered in the above passage 
only the thought “It, the body, is heavy” is a judgement. Allison 
rightly claims
514
 that the subjective unity of consciousness formed 
                                                     
512
 Allison, Idealism, 158. 
513
 Allison, Idealism, 136. 
514
 Allison, Idealism, 154. 
Kant’s Transcendental Deductions 
308 
 
according to the laws of association does not as such represent an 
object, but he is unable to incorporate this into what Kant says in 
§ 19. What Kant wants to say there is that a judgement is an act of 
representing an object. This same act, when applied to the sensi-
ble given, produces an object by determining inner sense, in 
which the subjective unity is represented. This posterior act of 
cognition is the first application of the understanding and through 
it arise empirical concepts that can be connected in judgements. 
Under my hypothesis then, Kant does not confuse things 
in § 19 but Allison misinterprets his theory of the epigenesis of 
reason. Thus, in my view, Henrich is correct in saying that the 
Deduction “must demonstrate that categories are capable of tak-
ing up something given into the unity of consciousness”.
515
 This 
means demonstrating the objective reality of the categories, and 
Kant is in a position to do this only by explaining how the under-
standing is capable of affecting inner sense, which he does by 
introducing the faculty of figurative imagination. 
In reading that part of § 24 where Kant explains the role 
of figurative imagination, it is extremely important to understand 
how low the top-down part descends. In § 21 Kant said that he 
must abstract from the way the manifold for intuition is given and 
that he will attend to this in § 26. Thus, the figurative synthesis 
introduced in § 24 does not explain how the manifold is given in 
sensibility. As I explained in the previous chapter, the figurative 
synthesis belongs to the posterior act of cognition and the top-
down part does not say anything about the way in which the man-
ifold is given. Kant clearly says this. If we do not accept this fact, 
we are forced to conclude with Henrich that Kant was confused 
and did not understand that sensibility is distinct from conscious-
ness. In that case his attempt to prove the objective validity of the 
categories failed miserably before he even got started. Further, we 
will have to conclude that the B Deduction is not related to the A 
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Deduction in the way Kant says it is. As we saw, this led Allison 
to conclude that even though Kant says that he will prove the 
objective validity of the categories after he has proven their objec-
tive reality, he did in fact prove it already in the beginning of the 
Deduction. Longuenesse tries to rescue Kant from this embar-
rassment by introducing the distinction between judgements of 
perception and judgements of experience, which Kant does not 
even make in the Critique, but as we saw at the beginning of the 






9.3. Objective Validity 
 
In § 26 Kant presents the Validity-Part, or, viewed from 
another perspective, the bottom-up part of the Deduction. That it 
begins from beneath is easy to see, because it begins by consider-
ing what is empirical, namely the given appearance “which, if it is 
combined with consciousness, is called perception”, as Kant says 
in the A Deduction.
517
 However, because of the different manner 
of presenting the Deduction, Kant does not here have to consider 
how the empirical matter is put together, and this makes the part 
much shorter than the one in the A Deduction. 
Let us first take a look at what Kant says about the aim of 
the Validity-Part at the beginning of § 26. He says that the possi-
bility of the categories as a priori cognitions of objects of an intu-
ition in general was exhibited in §§ 20 and 21. We saw above that 
in § 24 he showed the objective reality of the categories (with 
respect to human intuition), and now, he says, he will explain “the 
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possibility of cognizing a priori through categories whatever 
objects may come before our senses”.
518
 
So what can come before our senses? We should consider 
this question with respect to the form of sensibility. Only some-
thing in the form of space and time can come before our senses, 
and the synthesis of apprehension must thus always be in agree-
ment with space and time. In order to understand Kant’s argument 
in § 26 we need to understand what exactly Kant thought that 
these forms are. Perhaps the best way to understand this is to con-
sider how empirical consciousness of appearances arises. At the 
end of the previous chapter, I mentioned that I think that the B 
Deduction can be best understood through Wolff’s philosophy. In 
section 5.2, I explained how Wolff thought that time is required 
for consciousness of objects. According to Wolff, our concept of 
time arises when we cognize that composite things can come to 
be gradually and when we notice that our thoughts follow one 
another.
519
 In Wolff’s view then, the concept of time arises from 
representing something coming to be in space. The representation 
of space, on the other hand, arises from representing separate 
things as simultaneous.
520
 Space is thus the order of simultaneous-
ly existing composite things and it does not exist independently of 
the things that fill space.
521
 
For Kant, the story does not end here, because he thinks 
that space is the form of outer sense, and although Kant agrees 
with Wolff that it is ideal, he thinks that it is prior to the things 
that fill space. The important thing here is to understand how it is 
prior to the things that fill space. We need to understand what 
kind of space it is that awaits the impressions in our receptivity. 
According to my hypothesis, this form of outer sense is nothing 
more than the pure manifold in which we can sense impressions. 
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Indeed, this is not a mere hypothesis. Kant says very clearly in his 
reply to Eberhard that there are no innate representations.
522
 In 
order to get a fuller grasp of how Kant thinks he can prove the 
objective validity of the categories, I will explain Kant’s disa-




9.3.1 KANT’S DISAGREEMENT WITH WOLFF 
 
In the B Deduction, Kant’s argument for the objective va-
lidity of the categories rests on proving that the unity of represen-
tation in representing something in space and time is the very 
same unity required for representing a given manifold of intuition 
in general in an original consciousness, but applied to our sensible 
intuition. Thus, we will be able to understand Kant’s argument 
only if we can understand his solution to the question of the unity 
of representation in sensible intuition. 
What, then, is the question of the unity of representation 
in sensible intuition? As there are no innate representations, there 
is no unity in space as such. Although space itself is prior to the 
things that fill space, no unity is prior to the things that fill space. 
The prior act must, therefore, produce the unity of representation. 
What we have to find out is how Kant thinks that the mind can 
accomplish this. The clue to answering this question is that the 
sensing subject is necessarily one. If the impressions required for 
representing an appearance were dispersed among various sensing 
subjects, it would render appearances altogether impossible. It is 
important to note that this claim is not identical with the claim 
made in the Reality-Part that the transcendental apperception is 
necessarily one, nor does it amount to the claim that the soul is a 
simple substance. The latter of these claims is beyond our 
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knowledge while the former concerns only the intellectual syn-
thesis of the posterior act of cognition. One consciousness, the 
original apperception, makes unity possible in the posterior act 
but not in the prior act to which we must turn our attention if we 
wish to understand what Kant wants to say in the Validity-Part. 
Concerning the prior act, Wolff thought that the simplici-
ty of the soul grounds the unity of the image produced by the 
soul. Kant cannot accept this, and he thinks that we must look 
behind the concepts of space and time in order to see the origin of 
their unity. Interestingly though, there is a common ground be-
tween Wolff and Kant even in their conception of the origin of 
the concepts of space and time, and we can learn much from 
comparing their views. 
Kant’s position is that an intuition necessarily contains a 
manifold. An empirical intuition depends on impressions, but 
those impressions themselves cannot enter consciousness, be-
cause the mind cannot grasp them as a manifold in one represen-
tation without a synthesis in the form of space. Consciousness of 
any kind requires both a manifold and unity. 
There is nothing surprising here, since also Wolff thought 
that we can be conscious only of composite things.
523
 Conscious-
ness thus always requires a manifold. Wolff contrasts the repre-
sentable composite with the unrepresentable simple, but in Kant 
the contrast is with the manifold as such. This difference reflects 
their different views on the role of sense in cognition. For Wolff, 
the simple substances of which reality consists, lack spatial prop-
erties. Space is thus subjective for Wolff. An idea of a composite, 
extended object is a result of a confused perception of the non-
sensible, simple things. In Kant’s view, this is not so. Sense is not 
a confused mode of representation and space is a condition of 
composite things. It is not abstracted from the co-existence of 
things. 
                                                     
523




Kant thinks that a manifold is representable only by vir-
tue of outer sense. As Kant says in his Introduction to the B-
edition (B 1), the cognitive faculty can be awakened into exercise 
only through our senses. Outer sense is thus the source of an em-
pirical manifold. The manifold of outer sense is twofold: there is 
both an empirical and a pure manifold. Kant of course thinks that 
it is the empirical manifold, i.e. impressions, that awaken the 
cognitive faculty into exercise as a result of outer affection. This 
empirical manifold does not, however, produce cognition without 
inner action, i.e. without synthesis. Synthesis, on the other hand, 
is always successive, so it takes place in time, which is the form 
of inner sense. Consequently, consciousness of any kind requires 
inner sense and inner affection. A mere manifold without unity 
cannot be consciously represented. This has been my leading 
thought in this monograph, and now my aim is to show how 
Kant’s view on the interplay between outer and inner sense 
changes the way a Wolffian should think about cognition. This 
will, I hope, also cast some light on that leading thought. 
I use the word ‘interplay’, because Kant’s idea is that ac-
quiring the concepts of space and time involves multiple synthe-
ses affecting inner sense. The key to understanding the difference 
between Wolff and Kant is that in Kant’s view, there is a differ-
ence between space and time as forms of our sensibility on the 
one hand, and as representations of space and time on the other. 
According to Kant, we cannot represent space or time without 
affecting inner sense. There are no innate representations, but the 
pure manifolds of space and time are prior to the appearances and 
prior to both inner and outer affection. 
The crucial question is this: how can one represent space? 
The first step in answering this question is to consider what a 
representation of space is. According to Wolff, space is the order 
of simultaneously existing things.
524
 Does Kant agree with this? 
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The answer depends on whether by “space” we refer to the pure 
manifold of outer sense or to a representation of space. Wolff 
considers only the latter, but for Kant there is a crucial difference 
between the two. He thinks that space as a pure manifold is inde-
pendent of time, but regarding the representations of space, Kant 
agrees with Wolff. Space is the order of simultaneously existing 
things. I will explain what this means. 
In the awakening of our cognitive faculty, the first kind of 
representations of space is undoubtedly the particular space an 
appearance occupies. At the beginning of the First Analogy of 
experience, Kant writes: 
 
All appearances are in time, in which, as substratum (as per-
sistent form of inner intuition), both simultaneity as well as 




In the Analogies, the subject-matter is experience, i.e. the 
posterior act of cognition, but the Analogies teach us a lot about 
the prior act as well, because also the prior act depends on an a 
priori synthesis. Although the Analogies are “principles of the 
determination of the existence of the appearances in time”,
526
 the 
appearances are in time even prior to any determination, and the 
relations of time are the same whether we are self-consciously 
aware of them or not. Consequently, Kant’s examination of the 
relations of time in experience will help us to understand his view 
on what time and space are. Kant discusses simultaneity and suc-
cession in the Second and Third Analogy, and they are the rela-
tions we need to study in order to understand Kant’s disagreement 
with Wolff. 
We should begin with the Third Analogy and work our 
way back to the conditions of representing spatially extended 
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appearances. In the Third Analogy Kant examines simultaneity. 
He writes: 
 
Things are simultaneous if in empirical intuition the percep-
tion of one can follow the perception of the other reciprocally 
(which in the temporal sequence of appearances, as has been 




Kant agrees with Wolff that represented space is the order 
of simultaneously existing things. In the Third Analogy Kant 
explains that in experience, the possibility of representing simul-
taneously existing things requires “a concept of the understanding 
of the reciprocal sequence of the determinations of these things 
simultaneously existing externally to each other”.
528
 An objective 
representation of simultaneous existence of things external to 
each other thus depends on succession. The Second Analogy, on 
the other hand, tells us that an objective representation of succes-
sion requires the concept of causality. Since we cannot perceive 
time itself, this concept gives us the conscious representation of 
succession. Kant’s example is the perception of a ship driven 
downstream.
529
 In this event, the concept of causality makes the 
order of perceptions in apprehension necessary. 
On first sight, it might appear that this is all Kant has to 
say about simultaneity and succession. That is not the case, how-
ever. One should remember that in each class of the categories, 
the third category arises from the combination of the first two, 
and so the category of community arises from the combination of 
those of causality and dependence on the one hand and of inher-
ence and subsistence on the other. Therefore, for the representa-
tion of simultaneity of things existing externally to each other, we 
need representations of succession and persistence. In order to 
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understand how persistence is related to simultaneity and succes-
sion, we need to turn our attention to the First Analogy. 
The First Analogy is about representing time. In it Kant 
explains how we can be conscious of time, and this can help us to 
understand Kant’s disagreement with Wolff. Kant and Wolff 
agree that we cannot be conscious of time prior to our conscious-
ness of succession and simultaneity. Yet Kant thinks that simulta-
neity and succession can only be represented in time. The under-
lying idea of the First Analogy is that the time in which simulta-
neity and succession can be represented must be represented in 
appearances. In other words, community presupposes both causa-
tion and substance. From this we can see Kant’s disagreement 
with Wolff. Kant agrees with Wolff that we cannot be conscious 
of simple things. If, then, time itself is represented in appearanc-
es, it must be represented in a manifold. Now, both Kant and 
Wolff think that apprehension is always successive, so Kant disa-
grees with Wolff only on this: time, as the form of inner sense, is 
the condition of all experience. The following comment from the 
Second Analogy presents one way to express this disagreement: 
 
Understanding belongs to all experience and its possibility, 
and the first thing that it does for this is not to make the repre-
sentation of the objects distinct, but rather to make the repre-




This quote is from the Second Analogy, and there Kant 
continues by saying that the understanding makes the representa-
tion of an object possible through conferring temporal order on 
the appearances. However, Kant thinks that the understanding has 
an even more fundamental task in representing time itself in sub-
stance, because he thinks that without that which persists there is 
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 Through representing the form of inner 
sense – time – the understanding is first in a position to represent 
temporal relations. 
Therefore, if a Wolffian accepts what Kant has to say in 
the Transcendental Aesthetic, he or she should make the follow-
ing logical conclusion: the relations of time and the concept of 
time presuppose a representation of spatial extension. In other 
words, when our cognitive faculty is awakened into exercise, the 
ability to represent temporal relations presupposes a representa-
tion of an appearance with spatial extension. Let me explain why. 
The consciousness of succession presupposes a representation of 
persistence – a representation of time in which the succession 
takes place. A representation of that time will necessarily contain 
a manifold, because a simple thing cannot persist (a simple thing 
cannot be in time). Wolff would agree with Kant that in order for 
something to persist in time, it will have to come to be gradually 




Two things require attention here. First, since the appear-
ance that represents time through persistence, is a composite 
thing, it is a spatial representation. Second, since it contains a 
manifold, the representation requires successive apprehension. In 
other words, the representation of time is a spatial representation 
apprehended in time. This might at first appear contrary to reason, 
but it is not. Remember that we started our analysis from con-
sciousness of simultaneously existing things in space (communi-
ty) and proceeded to consciousness of succession (causality). I 
noted that the category of community presupposes not only the 
category of causality and dependence but the category of inher-
ence and subsistence as well. Consciousness of the existence of 
several simultaneous things thus presupposes consciousness of 
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persisting individual things. Since representable things necessari-
ly have a simultaneously existing manifold, the persisting thing 
must be represented in space.
533
 On the other hand, since appre-
hension is always successive, consciousness of the persisting 
thing requires succession. 
Now, Wolffians thought that inner sense is just another 
word for apperception, but Kant thought that inner sense is a gen-
uine sense. It is a capacity for inner affection. Its form is time, as 
Kant declared in the Transcendental Aesthetic.  As we saw from 
the above passage, Kant also thought that the posterior act of 
cognition does not make the representation of the objects distinct. 
It makes the representation of an object possible. It is a mental 
act, so it affects the mind through inner sense. Since time is the 
form of inner sense, the posterior act consists in a successive syn-
thesis, although the most fundamental product of the act – an 
appearance representing time itself through persistence – contains 
simultaneously existing parts. Further, as Kant thinks that the 
appearances themselves do not depend on the functions of the 
understanding, the same must be true of the prior act as well. The 
prior act makes the appearances possible. An appearance neces-
sarily contains simultaneously existing parts, so the prior act must 
be successive and it must affect inner sense. Inner sense is there-
fore affected by both the prior and the posterior act. Both acts are 
temporal. However, as can be easily seen, the succession required 
for the prior act cannot be conscious in any way. The criterion for 
the most elementary kind of consciousness is empirical reproduc-
ibility, and the succession required for the prior act is a require-
ment for empirical reproducibility. The succession requires re-
production, to be sure, but that reproduction is transcendental, not 
empirical. 
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We may now sum up the analysis of simultaneity and 
succession. Consciousness of the simultaneity of things external 
to each other requires succession in the apprehension of those 
things. The a priori rule represented in the category of communi-
ty makes this consciousness possible. Consciousness of succes-
sion, on the other hand, requires a persisting thing whose parts 
exist simultaneously, and the rule represented in the category of 
causality and dependence makes this consciousness possible. The 
simultaneity of the parts of a thing differs from the simultaneity 
of things external to each other, because they are made possible 
by different categories (or different transcendental schemata, to 
be more precise). The category of community arises from the 
combination of the first two categories. The simultaneity of the 
parts of a thing is the ground of both conscious succession and 
conscious simultaneity, but also it requires succession. It is made 
possible by the rule represented in the category of inherence and 
subsistence, and it requires a successive synthesis (and transcen-
dental reproduction). Ultimately, however, we cannot be con-
scious of the time in which this succession takes place, except in 
the product of the act: in persistence. Hence, one could say that 
the simultaneity of the parts of a thing is a representation of the 
succession in the transcendental synthesis that makes possible 
conscious representations of the two modes of time: succession 
and simultaneity. One should note, however, that here the expres-
sion ’representation of’ is not used in the meaning in which Kant 
uses it in the Analytic. In cognition, the mind represents an object 
by acting on a representation. The representation is then a repre-
sentation of an object – either an undetermined or a determined 
object – produced by the mind. However, the impressions can be 
said to be representations of things in themselves, and in that case 
the direction of the relation between the representation and the 
represented is reversed. In cognition, the representation makes the 
represented possible, in affection the represented makes the repre-
sentation possible. Now, simultaneity is represented through af-
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fection, and succession makes it possible. Impressions and simul-
taneity are the two cases where noumena can be said to be repre-
sented through a sensible representation. The self is a noumenon, 
and the simultaneity in an appearance represents through inner 
affection the acting self. Thus, although space is the order of sim-
ultaneously existing things, simultaneity requires not only a pure 
manifold of space but a pure manifold of time as well, and the 
appearances are represented in inner sense by means of a succes-
sive act. 
We should carefully note that although Kant’s discussion 
in the Analogies concerns the posterior act of cognition (recogni-
tion), the same a priori rules of the transcendental schemata that 
make recognition possible are in work in the prior act as well. The 
difference is that in the prior act they make empirical reproduc-
tion, not recognition, of appearances possible. Spatially extended 
appearances, their changes and their interaction must be reproduc-
ible if we are to become conscious of them, so the same analysis 
applies also to the prior act. Although the conclusion that a repre-
sentation of simultaneity requires succession may seem odd at 
first sight, it is a direct consequence of the Transcendental Aes-
thetic. One could compare this view with the distinction between 
cardinal and ordinal numbers that Georg Cantor introduced a 
century later: 
 
We will call by the name “power” or “cardinal number” of M 
the general concept which, by means of our active faculty of 
thought, arises from the aggregate M when we make abstrac-
tion of the nature of its various elements m and of the order in 




What is of interest to us in this connection is that Cantor 
means by an aggregate M any collection into a whole (a unity 
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containing a manifold), and he thinks that we arrive at its cardinal 
number (quantity) by abstracting from the quality and order (suc-
cession) of its elements. Although the cardinal number is a con-
cept, it is a representation of the quantity of the elements m as 
simultaneous. In the Schematism Kant says that the pure schema 
of magnitude ”as a concept of the understanding, is number, 
which is a representation that summarizes the successive addition 
of one (homogeneous) unit to another.”
535
 All intuitions, on the 
other hand, are extensive magnitudes, and the transcendental 
schema, which as a concept of the understanding represents 
number (unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous 
intuition in general), is needed for representing the synthetic uni-
ty of the manifold of a sensible intuition. Thus, the extensive 
magnitude of the simultaneous manifold of an appearance in 
space is represented by means of the same a priori rule, which 
generally represented yields the concept of number.
536
 Like Can-
tor, Kant thinks that this representation of magnitude presupposes 
a succession of elements and an abstraction from the quality of 
those elements.
537
 A representation of an extensive magnitude in 
space requires a succession of impressions, but that representation 
does not contain any impressions and it does not depend on the 
order their succession. And since a representation of an extensive 
magnitude in space is the most fundamental requirement of the 
empirical reproducibility of appearances, it follows that the im-
pressions cannot be empirically reproducible. Empirical reproduc-
tion requires simultaneity, and simultaneity requires a succession 
of impressions. 
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We are now in a position to understand how Kant thought 
that Wolff’s account of time and space is incorrect. Wolff’s error 
lies solely in the view that sensibility represents simple substanc-
es confusedly. Kant corrects this mistake in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic by claiming that space is the form of outer sense and 
that time is the form of inner sense. These forms are prior to the 
representations of sensibility. This is the crucial change Kant 
wants to make to Wolff’s account. 
Although these forms are prior to the representations of 
sensibility, they become representable only through a synthesis 
that gives unity to the a priori manifold. Time can be represented 
only by means of the manifold of outer sense. A unity of space 
(simultaneity of the parts of an appearance) is thus the first repre-
sentable unity, and it is represented by affecting inner sense 
through a successive a priori synthesis. This synthesis, however, 
is occasioned by outer affection, so empirical cognition of any 
kind – self-conscious or not – necessarily involves both outer and 
inner affection. 
In this way, Kant has made the necessary changes to 
Wolff’s account of sensibility. Like Wolff, he thinks that imagi-
nation belongs to sensibility. Like Wolff, he thinks that the imag-
ination includes a productive faculty. However, Kant points out 
that the empirical use of the productive faculty grounds percep-
tion and is itself grounded in a transcendental use, which is repro-
ductive. This conclusion follows logically from the change Kant 
has made to the Wolffian system in the Transcendental Aesthetic. 
Let us see how. 
According to Wolff, the prior act of cognition is a means 
for distinguishing objects. Kant’s view is that sensible representa-
tions cannot be simple, so an appearance is necessarily a compo-
site object. A composite object needs to have simultaneously ex-
isting parts, so distinguishing objects is impossible without dis-
tinguishing a region of space, i.e. the shape of an object. The rep-




because it cannot arise at a single moment. This line of thought is 
thoroughly Wolffian. In order to understand what new Kant has to 
say about the succession, let us look at what he says about succes-
sion, synthesis and distinguishing in the Second Analogy: 
 
In the synthesis of the appearances the manifold representa-
tions always follow one another. Now by this means no object 
at all is represented; since through this sequence, which is 





The sequence is common to all apprehensions, so Kant’s 
point is not limited to causality. His point is that through the suc-
cession itself nothing is distinguished from anything else. Distin-
guishing requires an a priori rule, by means of which we antici-
pate in the “sequence a relation to the preceding state”.
539
 De-
pending on the rule, we get as a result of apprehension persis-
tence, causality or community of substances. In perception, these 
rules are self-consciously represented through original appercep-
tion. In the prior act, on the other hand, the same rules produce 
appearances without apperception. In both cases the rule provides 
a relation to the preceding state in the succession. The synthesis 
therefore requires reproduction but this reproduction cannot be 
empirical. It must be transcendental. By means of transcendental 
reproduction, therefore, successive synthesis can distinguish a 
particular space, which is a requirement for distinguishing ob-
jects, and in this way the productive faculty is ultimately ground-
ed on transcendental reproduction.
540
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 Kant thinks that the empirical use of the productive imagination pre-
supposes a pure but sensible use, which, in turn, presupposes a transcen-
dental use of the same faculty. See Ak. 23:18–20. 
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This is where Kant’s account breaks off from Wolff’s 
philosophy. Wolff based his dogmatic philosophy on the principle 
of sufficient reason, and he argued that composite things could 
not exist without simple things as their ground.
541
 In Kant’s view 
Wolff’s reasoning is not valid, since we represent mere appear-
ances, which are made possible through transcendental synthesis 
affecting inner sense. Sensibility is not a confused mode of repre-
senting simple things. Although the prior act depends on an a 
priori synthesis, it depends just as much on affection through 
outer and inner sense. Sensibility thus consists in sense, which 
provides an a priori manifold, and imagination, which provides 
its synthesis, and composite things depend on the pure forms of 
time and space. It is true that the appearances are prior to our 
conscious representations of time and space, but the pure mani-
folds must be prior to the appearances. 
 
 
9.3.2. KANT’S DISAGREEMENT WITH LOCKE 
 
In the preceding section, my aim was to show how Kant 
disagreed with Wolff on the question of the unity of sensible rep-
resentations. Kant thought that a sensible representation contains 
a manifold in one representation, and the key question of the B 
Deduction is how sensibility can produce a unity out of a mani-
fold. Kant objects to Wolff’s claim that sensibility represents 
simple substances confusedly, and he argues that the Wolffians 
need to change their view on the nature of the prior act of cogni-
tion. Before considering the consequences of this change, we 
should consider the alternative to Wolff’s account of sensibility, 
namely the view that the mind can represent things in themselves 
through simple ideas. 
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 This rivalling view was endorsed by Locke. Locke 
thought that the mind can represent the properties of extra-mental 
things through simple ideas. He sees the extra-mental world as 
consisting of atoms that have certain properties. They are extend-
ed and solid, they have a particular shape and they are in motion 
or rest. These atoms affect the senses and we are acquainted with 
them through simple ideas that sensibility offers us. The mind 
then operates on those simple ideas, and Locke thinks that while 
the secondary qualities (e.g. colour and taste) that we perceive in 
bodies are mind-dependent, they are based on primary qualities of 




The disagreement between Wolff and Locke can be put as 
follows: as Wolff thinks that sensibility cannot offer simple repre-
sentations, he thinks that all sensible properties are secondary 
qualities. The prior act of cognition produces sensible ideas but 
those ideas necessarily contain a manifold and they cannot re-
semble things in themselves. This makes even spatial properties 
mind-dependent. We saw above how Kant thought that Wolff’s 
account of sensibility is in error. Kant holds that space must be 
prior to the things that fill space but unlike Locke, he does not 
think that primary qualities resemble things in themselves. 
On the face of it, rejecting Wolff’s view on sensibility 
seems to leave no option than to resort to Locke’s view which, 
however, had led to skepticism. Still, Kant thought that there is a 
middle way, but even the commentators who are sympathetic to 
Kant see him as contradicting himself in trying to find that way. I 
have argued that this is because of a widespread misconception 
among scholars about Kant’s account of perceptual awareness. 
That misconception concerns the role of inner sense in Kant’s 
theory and it manifests itself in the view that for Kant perceptual 
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awareness has intentional content. I hope I can now explain this 
more clearly by considering Kant’s disagreement with Locke. 
The objection Kant raises against Locke is that mere af-
fection cannot produce unity of representation. For Locke, the 
simple ideas are passively received unities out of which the un-
derstanding constructs complex unities. Kant, by contrast, agrees 
with Wolff that sensibility cannot represent unities without acting. 
As we have learned from Wolff, the fundamental reason 
why the mind needs sensible unities is that sensible unity makes 
distinguishing an object of sense possible. Without sensible uni-
ties, the understanding could not apply its operations to sensible 
representations. Hoke Robinson has noted that one of the reasons 
why Kant rejects the Lockean concept of the sensory given is that 
in order to be able to combine the sense-data the mind “must be 
able to determine similarity (perhaps even identity) and difference 
between them.”
543
 I agree. If sense-data unity is found and not 




Robinson argues that Kant in fact rejects Locke’s whole 
view of human cognition. In particular, Robinson challenges the 
interpretation that for Kant the necessary temporal order of outer-
sense representations is based on an immediately introspected 
temporal order of subjective representations in inner sense.
545
 He 
instead proposes an interpretation of the distinction between inner 
and outer sense by using terms borrowed from Brentano and Hus-
serl. 
Robinson’s interpretation bears similarities to my own. I 
agree with him on the point that “Kant’s own argument for the 
priority of outer sense turns on the position that the determination 
of time in inner sense depends on, and thus presupposes, outer 
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 By distinguishing the process of consciousness, noesis, 
from the intentional object of consciousness Robinson draws a 
distinction between inner sense as noesis and inner sense com-
posed of intentional inner objects. He argues that if the temporal 
order of inner-sense objects is to be introspectable, the mind has 
to be able to differentiate those objects from one another. On 
Robinson’s interpretation, Kant thought that the “determination of 
temporal order requires, in addition to causality (and perhaps 
reciprocity), also substance.”
547
 Outer sense is thus prior to inten-
tional inner sense. By intentional inner sense Robinson means 
inner sense as it appears, i.e., consciousness of the sequence of 
thoughts. As we have seen, this is compatible with how I read the 
Analogies: consciousness of simultaneity is required for con-
sciousness of succession. 
Robinson argues further that differentiation must occur in 
noetic inner sense as well. We cannot observe this differentiation, 
however. It falls behind the veil of appearance, so we cannot ob-




These claims are well supported by what Kant says and I 
agree on them. However, I see two serious problems. According 
to Robinson’s interpretation the categories are involved in pro-
ducing the appearances.
549
 This contradicts Kant’s claim that ap-
pearances would offer objects to our intuition even if they were 
not in accord with the conditions of the unity of the understand-
ing.
550
 Robinson also thinks that for Kant, the hidden act of the 
imagination produces a representation of an object of outer sense, 
which representation then can be the basis of intentional inner-
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 This interpretation is not supported by Kant’s 




I have argued for an alternative interpretation: what the 
imagination produces out of the sensible manifold is not a repre-
sentation of an object but the (undetermined) object itself. On this 
interpretation, the categories are not involved in producing that 
object. Although I think Robinson is right in making a distinction 
between the hidden temporal succession of inner sense and the 
accessible and observable temporal succession that presupposes 
outer objects, I do not think we should use terminology borrowed 
from Brentano and Husserl in making that distinction. Robinson’s 
reason for doing so is that Kant’s usage of the terms ‘apprehen-
sion’ and appearance’ is “notoriously inconsistent”,
553
 but I don’t 
think it is inconsistent at all. 
Remember that when the imagination applies its hidden 
act on a passively received manifold of outer sense, it produces an 
appearance. The appearance is not (by itself, without an act of the 
understanding) a representation of an object. Contrary to how 
Robinson thinks, outer sense cannot be characterized as a “system 
of intentional objects projected into a single spatio-temporal ma-
trix.”
554
 Outer sense is indeed prior to inner sense but appearanc-
es, as I have explained, are not modifications of outer sense but of 
inner sense. Let us consider how we could describe Kant’s criti-
cism against Locke in terms of intentionality. 
Robinson ascribes to Kant the view that Locke “failed to 
see that without the understanding’s application of the categories 
to sensation, there can be no relation to an object.”
555
 I have no 
quarrel with this. The understanding does indeed produce the 
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relation to an object. It does not, however, produce all unity, and 
this is where Robinson gets things wrong. 
“Unity”, Robinson says, “is another concept about which 
Kant is less than crystal clear.”
556
 He thinks that the expression 
“Das Mannigfaltige in einer Anschauung Gegebene” (used in § 
20) is less misleading than the expression “das Mannigfaltige in 
einer gegebenen Anschauung”, because on his interpretation, 
Kant thinks that the understanding produces all unity, and the 
latter expression suggests that the manifold is given in an intui-
tion which already has unity.
557
 Robinson argues that there cannot 
be intuition without unity and he thus rejects Henrich’s claim that 
the conclusion in § 20 is valid only for those intuitions which 
already contain unity.
558
 Instead, he thinks that § 20 should be 
interpreted as saying that the mere manifold – a Protoanschauung 
– stands under the unity of apperception.
559
 
I understand his reasons, but I think we can do better. The 
inconsistencies and obscurities vanish if we interpret Kant in the 
way I have proposed. As I explained in chapter 7, in § 20 Kant is 
concerned with thinking. As Robinson correctly points out, Kant 
thinks that without the understanding’s application of the catego-
ries, there can be no relation to an object. An object, Kant has told 
us, is that in the concept of which the manifold of given intuition 
is united.
560
 Cognitions, he says, consist in the determinate rela-
tion of given representations to an object.
561
 But mere thinking is 
not cognition. The conclusion in § 20 is not enough to establish 
that the intellectual act of the understanding is capable of produc-
ing a determinate relation of a given sensible representation to an 
object. As Kant says in § 24, the categories are mere forms of 
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thought through which no determinate object is yet cognized.
562
 
Thus, the unity required for a relation to an object is a unity that is 
“added to the intuition through the understanding by means of the 
category”,
563
 and only the posterior act of cognition is character-
ized by intentionality. 
What does this mean with respect to the structure of the 
Deduction? The application of the categories to objects of the 
senses in general is discussed in § 24. The objective reality of the 
categories is proved by showing that the understanding can de-
termine inner sense. Inner sense is the capacity of the mind to 
represent unities, and since Kant has shown in § 20 that a given 
intuition that possesses unity necessarily stands under the catego-
ries, he can conclude that all those sensible unities we can be 
conscious of, stand under the categories. The understanding is 
thus a capacity for cognition, because it can, by means of the cat-
egories, add the unity of the understanding to sensible unities and 
thereby give the latter a relation to an object. 
When the understanding gives the sensible unities the re-
lation to an object, it uses them as representations representing an 
object of experience. But as Kant says in A 108, representations 
can be objects of other representations in turn, and those sensible 
unities are indeed objects of other representations. They are unde-
termined objects – appearances. The understanding produces the 
objects of experience by means of the transcendental function of 
the imagination. As Kant says in A 124, without that function 
sensibility would “to be sure yield appearances but no objects of 
an empirical cognition, hence there would be no experience.” 
Robinson is right in claiming that this act of imagination 
is hidden from consciousness and he is also right in claiming that 
it produces a representation of an object of outer sense.
564
 But 
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claiming that it produces appearances not only runs against com-
mon sense but also contradicts what Kant says. Producing the 
representation of an object of outer sense is an act of apprehen-
sion. It requires imagination because imagination “is the faculty 
for representing an object even without its presence in intui-
tion”.
565
 An object of experience is not present in intuition. Imag-
ination does not, however, produce the appearance itself that is 
used for representing an object of experience. Rather, the appear-
ance becomes a representation of an object of experience through 
the function of the transcendental imagination (through the fig-
urative synthesis). 
The appearance itself is thus produced prior to the figura-
tive synthesis and prior to apprehension. But on the other hand, 
imagination itself belongs to sensibility and it is true that Kant 
thinks that the appearance could not be produced without imagi-
nation, although they are produced independently of the under-
standing. Appearances are sensible unities in inner sense, and 
since the form of inner sense is time, a sensible unity is possible 
by means of simultaneity produced by succession. That succes-
sion falls behind the veil of appearance, because only unities can 
be given to our understanding, and a sensible unity is a product of 
inner affection, which is successive. Neither the act of imagina-
tion affecting inner sense nor the manifold it uses is available for 
introspection. Even the pure manifold of outer sense, and thus 
outer sense itself, remains hidden from us. This conclusion may 
seem strange but it is perfectly understandable. Space is the form 
of outer sense, and we know the self only as it appears. Only 
shapes (unities) can be given to the understanding, not space (the 
manifold) itself. The true nature of space – e.g., if it’s Euclidean 
or not – we have to infer from the objects of outer sense (from the 
space we know), and that, it would seem, is always open to er-
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 Indeed, even the form of inner sense is accessible to us 
only as it appears. As Kant says, we represent the temporal se-
quence through a line and “infer from the properties of this line to 
all the properties of time”.
567
 
Kant therefore agrees with Locke that the unities given to 
the understanding through sensibility are passively received, but 
Locke was wrong in assuming that they are simple unities. And 
because they are not simple, the mind must itself give them their 
unity. The unities contain a manifold and they are possible only 
through an inner act affecting our sensibility. But the mind must, 
of course, have the manifold independently of that act, and that 
manifold serves as the representation of which an appearance is 
the object. That manifold consists of both a pure and an empirical 
element, and the latter is received through outer affection. The 
operations of distinguishing and comparing presuppose unity, so 
the mere manifold produced by outer affection does not allow of 
those operations, and since the empirical manifold itself cannot be 
given to the understanding, we cannot have empirical cognition of 
things in themselves. Thus, in regard to the latter, all sensible 
properties are secondary qualities. On the other hand, since the 
appearances are real objects in space and time given independent-
ly of the understanding, we can draw a distinction between prima-
ry and secondary qualities. Some sensible properties belong to 
physical things; others do not. 
 
 
9.3.3. FROM IMAGES TO PERCEPTION 
 
The conclusion that composite things depend on the pure 
forms of our sensibility has an important consequence. In Wolff, 
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the prior cognitive act produces a mental image, which is a repre-
sentation of a composite in simple.
568
 For Wolff the soul is a sim-
ple substance but Kant thought that we are conscious of the self 
only as appearance. As compared to Wolff, this puts Kant in a 
completely different situation, because it compels him to take a 
new perspective on what images are. According to Wolff, the 
simple soul represents simple substances confusedly through a 
composite image. For Kant, on the other hand, neither the soul 
nor a simple substance outside it can be an object of experience, 
so for him Wolff’s definition of an image is useless. 
If an image is a representation of a composite in simple, 
that representation has both a manifold and unity. According to 
Kant, outer affection provides us with impressions ordered in 
space, and through it the mind has a manifold but not a unity of 
representation. The impressions themselves cannot be conscious, 
because they are not composite representations. Sense cannot put 
them together, and they lack reproducibility. This is obvious, 
because (as Wolff would agree) a composite representation re-
quires succession, and outer affection is prior to inner affection. 
Since time is the form of inner sense, the succession required for 
a composite representation cannot precede the reception of im-
pressions. Hence, the impressions themselves cannot be images. 
Now we must investigate how Kant thinks that the prior act can 
produce images out of impressions and how the posterior act can 
produce perception out of mere images. 
The transcendental use of outer sense thus provides a 
pure manifold in which a unity can be represented through the 
transcendental use of imagination. If a Wolffian reader has ac-
cepted Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Aesthetic, he or she 
should accept this conclusion. Apart from the claim that time and 
space are forms of intuition, Kant’s reasoning fits the Wolffian 
framework perfectly, and given the interplay between time and 
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space in Wolff’s account of our consciousness of objects, a 
Wolffian should admit that the act of producing the representation 
of a composite object depends on the pure manifold of time, for 
simultaneity can only be represented through successive synthe-
sis. A Wolffian reader should thus have no trouble accepting this 
crucial claim from the Subjective Deduction: 
 
Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however 
would not be represented as such if the mind did not distin-
guish the time in the succession of impressions on one anoth-
er; for as contained in one moment no representation can ever 
be anything other than absolute unity. Now in order for unity 
of intuition to come from this manifold (as, say, in the repre-
sentation of space), it is necessary first to run through and 
then take together this manifoldness, which action I call the 
synthesis of apprehension, since it is aimed directly at the in-
tuition, which to be sure provides a manifold but can never ef-
fect this as such, and indeed as contained in one representa-




Wolff would agree that the product of the prior act of 
cognition is necessarily a unity containing a manifold. On the 
other hand, Wolff thought that a conscious representation of an 
object (the posterior act of cognition) would be impossible if the 
mind did not distinguish (obscurely) the time in the succession of 
the material elements of the thought.
570
 There is, therefore, a clear 
connection between Wolff’s philosophy and Kant’s claim in the 
above passage from the Subjective Deduction: both Wolff and 
Kant think that in the posterior act the mind must distinguish the 
time in the succession of the material elements. In the Reality-
Part (in § 24) Kant explained that even a pure conscious represen-
tation, e.g. thinking of a line in thought, is a successive determi-
nation of inner sense. It depends on distinguishing the time in this 
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succession. However, if the pure manifolds of space and time are 
ideal and prior to the things in space and time, as Kant claims in 
the Transcendental Aesthetic, the Wolffian reader should con-
clude with Kant that even the prior act requires a pure synthesis 
(in time) and that without a synthesis of a pure manifold “we 
could have a priori neither the representations of space nor of 
time”.
571
 Wolff’s analysis of empirical apperception must there-
fore be taken further, and when we do this, the analysis reveals a 
connection between the a priori syntheses of the prior and the 
posterior acts of cognition. 
Based on the Subjective Deduction we know that there is 
a pure synthesis, by virtue of which we have the representations 
of space and time. In the Subjective Deduction Kant examined the 
nature of this pure synthesis, but now we need to concentrate on 
the unity of the representations of space and time. Let us first take 
a look at how the Subjective Deduction is related to the beginning 
of the B Deduction. 
Since synthesis is an act, a unity is always represented in 
inner sense. Indeed, just before the above passage from the Sub-
jective Deduction, Kant says that the appearances are modifica-
tions of the mind and belong to inner sense. The product of the 
prior act of cognition therefore is a modification of the mind but it 
is not an idea of an object. It is the object represented in inner 
sense. This object (an appearance) is represented in space and 
time, and it is, as Kant says, independent of the functions of the 
understanding. Nevertheless, it depends on distinguishing the 
time in the succession of impressions on one another. Time is 
therefore a condition of both the prior and the posterior act, and a 
represented unity is always subjected to the formal condition of 
inner sense. 
In Wolff’s philosophy, the image produced by the prior 
act of cognition is called an idea, when it is considered objective-
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ly. An idea is an image of a singular thing. For Kant, neither the 
image nor the appearance is an idea. The appearance is an object, 
not an idea of an object. It does not have intentional content. 
Nevertheless, Kant does think that the prior act produces an im-
age. In order to understand how Kant thinks that the prior act 
produces an image, we must see what Kant thinks images are. 
In the A Deduction Kant says that in order to bring the 
manifold of intuition into an image, it must “antecedently take up 
the impressions into its activity”.
572
 In the Schematism, on the 
other hand, he explains that placing five points in a row is an im-
age of the number five.
573
 An image can thus be either pure or 
empirical. I have argued that an appearance is an a priori repre-
sentation, so the prior act produces not only appearances but em-
pirical images, which are made possible through producing ap-
pearances. Similarly, the posterior act produces empirical apper-
ception (perception), which is made possible through the intellec-
tual synthesis. Nevertheless, the act of representing an object – 
either an undetermined or a determined object – is a necessary 
requirement of having an empirically reproducible or recogniza-
ble representation, i.e. an empirical image or perception. In other 
words, although the impressions received through outer sense 
awaken the cognitive capacity into play, an a priori act is needed 
for representing an empirical image. 
This transcendental use of productive imagination gives 
images their necessary unity. Sense cannot put the impressions 
together and neither can empirical imagination. Even subjective 
representations (sensations) can be empirically reproducible only 
by means of this a priori act. Thus, in order to be able to associate 
the colour red with heavy cinnabar, the subject needs the rule 
represented in the category of inherence and subsistence. The 
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colour could not be empirically reproduced if it were not repre-
sented as inhering in something. 
Now, the posterior act necessarily includes an act of pro-
ducing an image, but in addition to this, it also distinguishes the 
self from the object represented in the image. The prior act, on the 
other hand, merely distinguishes an object.
574
 It produces a mere 
image, and although the image is made possible by an appear-
ance, the latter is nothing outside the power of representation, and 
the image cannot be considered as an idea. In the beginning of the 
B Deduction Kant has analysed the purely intellectual act by 
means of which the subject can distinguish itself from the object 
it thinks. However, the prior act must also include an act through 
which the object is represented, and in order to understand why 
he thinks that everything that can come before our senses stands 
under the categories, we need to understand how mere images can 
become perception. 
In the Schematism Kant says that “the image is a product 
of the empirical faculty of productive imagination”
575
 On the oth-
er hand, Kant thinks that the empirical use of productive imagina-
tion is grounded in a transcendental use of the same faculty.
576
 
Further, a schema is a “representation of a general procedure of 
the imagination for providing a concept with its image”,
577
 and a 
transcendental schema is a representation of that transcendental 
procedure in which the empirical use of productive imagination is 
grounded. Let us take a look at what Kant says about the schema 
of a category: 
 
The schema of a pure concept of the understanding, on the 
contrary, is something that can never be brought to an image 
at all, but is rather only the pure synthesis, in accord with a 
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rule of unity according to concepts in general, which the cate-
gory expresses, and is a transcendental product of the imagi-
nation, which concerns the determination of the inner sense in 
general, in accordance with conditions of its form (time) in 
regard to all representations, insofar as these are to be con-





As Kant says in this passage, a transcendental schema is a 
product of the imagination, and it makes possible the application 
of the category to an appearance. Further, it concerns the determi-
nation of inner sense in general. It is thus the representation by 
means of which the posterior act can perform the figurative syn-
thesis. One should note, however, that as it is a representation of 
that procedure, the procedure itself can give unity to sensible 
representations in the prior act, i.e. prior to any determination. 
This procedure is sufficient for distinguishing objects, but for 
distinguishing the self from objects, one needs to establish a rela-
tion of the self to the object. For this, one needs a representation 
of that procedure which gives unity to the sensible representation 
(the image). However, the figurative synthesis made possible 
through this representation is not enough. One also needs an intel-
lectual synthesis represented in the category. In the above passage 
Kant says that the category expresses a rule of unity with which 
the schema is in accord. A category is a pure synthesis generally 
represented, so perception (the posterior act) is possible only by 
representing generally the pure synthesis which is required for 
producing an image. A mere image can thus become perception 
through representing the a priori rule which makes the image 
possible and representing that sensible synthesis generally. In 
other words, perception is possible through a combination of two 
syntheses: figurative and intellectual. 
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9.3.4. KANT’S ARGUMENT 
 
From the above analysis, we can see that if a Wolffian 
has accepted Kant’s claim in the Transcendental Aesthetic, he or 
she should conclude that a unity of a sensible manifold necessari-
ly stands under the formal condition of inner sense. In the Reali-
ty-Part of the Deduction Kant has explained how in the posterior 
act of cognition the original apperception effects the unity of the 
thought manifold. He has also shown that in the act of thinking an 
object, the given unity necessarily stands under the categories. 
Finally, he has explained that the mere intellectual synthesis is 
incapable of producing cognition by itself. Thus, the posterior act 
of cognition always requires a figurative synthesis affecting inner 
sense. 
This is what Kant’s proof for the objective reality of the 
categories consists in, but how does the Validity-Part work in 
light of these considerations? How is he able to show that all pos-
sible appearances stand under the categories? What we know is 
that the appearances are unities given in intuition, so all appear-
ances to which we apply the posterior act, stand under the catego-
ries. However, Kant now needs to rule out the possibility of rep-
resenting appearances not capable of being thought. 
How can Kant prove the objective validity of the catego-
ries without considering the synthesis of imagination required for 
the prior act of cognition, as he did in the A edition? The answer 
is simple. In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant has already prov-
en the objective validity of the concepts of space and time. Thus, 
everything that comes before our senses comes in the forms of 
space and time. In the Reality-Part Kant’s focus was on the su-
preme principle of all intuition in relation to the understanding, 
and he explained how the manifold of intuition can be combined 
in one consciousness. In § 21, after the beginning of the Deduc-
tion, he described the purpose of § 26 as follows: 
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In the sequel (§ 26) it will be shown from the way in which 
the empirical intuition is given in sensibility that its unity can 
be none other than the one the category prescribes to the man-
ifold of a given intuition in general according to the preceding 
§ 20; thus by explanation of it’s a priori validity in regard to 
all objects of our senses the aim of the deduction will first be 
fully attained. 
 
What Kant must now show is that although the appear-
ances do not depend on the functions of the understanding, their 
unity is the same unity as the one the category prescribes to the 
manifold of a given intuition in general. In § 24 Kant explained 
that the posterior act of cognition does not consist in an act of 
original apperception alone but necessarily involves an act of 
imagination. This figurative synthesis determines sensibility, and 
it is distinct from the intellectual synthesis that “would be thought 
in the mere category in regard to the manifold of an intuition in 
general”
579
 Consequently, contrary to how the Wolffians thought, 
apperception is not the same as inner sense. In the posterior act, 
the understanding exercises its action on the passive subject, 
whose faculty it is, and the understanding consists in the coopera-
tion of two original faculties: apperception and imagination. The 
beginning of the Deduction (§ 15–§ 20) proves neither the objec-
tive reality nor the objective validity of the categories, because in 
it Kant analyses only the purely intellectual element of the under-
standing, which by itself is incapable of producing cognition. 
Imagination is thus an essential faculty for producing 
cognition. As Kant says in § 24 (B 154), inner sense contains the 
mere form of intuition without combination of the manifold in it. 
We can be conscious of a unity in intuition, such as a line or a 
circle, only by determining inner sense. However, imagination 
belongs to sensibility, and we cannot represent simultaneity with-
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out successive synthesis affecting inner sense. This is, as we have 
seen, where Wolff’s philosophy needs to be revised. 
Kant still agrees with Wolff that empirically considered, 
the mind must first distinguish objects outside the self before it 
can distinguish the self from those objects. He also agrees that the 
latter distinguishing depends on an obscure distinguishing of 
time, but he insists that we must go further in the analysis of em-
pirical apperception, and when we do this, we see that also the 
former distinguishing depends on an obscure distinguishing of 
time. Mere reproducibility requires a unity produced by a succes-
sive synthesis affecting inner sense, and recognisability requires a 
successive synthesis by means of which those unities can be used 
as representations of objects distinct from the self, which in turn 
is a precondition of distinguishing the self from those objects. 
Thus, as we saw in the previous subsection, the Subjective De-
duction is fully compatible with the B Deduction 
Now, in the Validity-Part Kant must attend to the su-
preme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to 
sensibility, according to which all the manifold of sensibility 
stands under the formal conditions of space and time. In order to 
see how the Validity-Part is connected to the Reality-Part, let us 
take a look at the difference between formal intuitions and the 
form of intuition. Space and time are represented as formal intui-
tions through figurative synthesis. In other words, our conscious-
ness of space and time requires something over and above the 
mere unity of a pure manifold by means of which appearances are 
given to us: it requires a conscious synthesis of an a priori mani-
fold. We therefore acquire the formal intuitions only through the 
first application of the understanding, i.e. through applying the 
posterior act of cognition to appearances. Only after this con-
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Thus, the pure manifolds of space and time are innate but 
this first formal ground is not yet the form of intuition, and the 
form of intuition is not yet a formal intuition. One can only imag-
ine Kant’s frustration in having to explain this to Eberhard, who 
was either incapable of understanding or unwilling to understand 
something that should, after what has been said in the Transcen-
dental Aesthetic, be quite obvious to a Wolffian. 
When we understand this, we see that the acquisition of 
our pure sensible concepts is connected to the acquisition of the 
categories, and we may return to Longuenesse’s interpretation of 
the epigenesis of pure reason that was discussed at the beginning 
of this chapter. I noted that my hypothesis is compatible with 
Longuenesse’s view that the transcendental schemata are prior to 
concepts but that it is contrary to her view that the transcendental 
schemata nevertheless depend on apperception. In other words, if 
my hypothesis is correct, then Kant’s revision of Wolff’s philoso-
phy is less radical than Longuenesse suggests, and the revision 
concerns first and foremost the origin and content of our cogni-
tion but not the view on cognition as consisting of two stages. 
Understanding the B Deduction depends on understand-
ing what figurative synthesis and formal intuitions are. Since 
Longuenesse’s interpretation of the distinction between form of 
intuition and formal intuition seems to be similar to how I inter-
pret the distinction, and since there are similarities also in our 
interpretations of the acquisition of pure concepts, we should see 
if the more radical interpretation she presents is to be preferred 
over the one I have here presented based on my hypothesis. 
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Let us begin by considering what Allison calls the objec-
tifying function of the categories. The relevant passage is from § 
10 of the Transcendental Analytic: 
 
The same function that gives unity to the different representa-
tions in a judgement also gives unity to the mere synthesis of 
different representations in an intuition, which, expressed 
generally, is called the pure concept of the understanding. The 
same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of the 
very same actions through which it brings the logical form of 
a judgement into concepts by means of the analytical unity, 
also brings a transcendental content into its representations by 





In order to understand what Kant means here we need to 
understand what he means by analytical unity and synthetic unity. 
Allison is puzzled by Longuenesse’s interpretation of the role of 
analysis in this quote, and here is how she responds to his criti-
cism: 
 
There is, admittedly, something puzzling about the fact that 
forms of synthesis are supposed to originate in forms of anal-
ysis. Allison expresses just such puzzlement when he says: ‘I 
fail to see how forms of analysis (the logical forms of judg-
ment) might be equated with forms of synthesis (the catego-
ries).’ But actually, this tells only part of the story. The whole 
story is this: it is insofar as they are themselves forms of syn-
thesis (forms of synthesis, or combination, of concepts) that 
forms of judgment are also forms of analysis (analysis of the 
sensible given with a view to forming concepts of objects to 
be combined – synthesized – in judgments). 
[…] 
‘By means of analytic unity’ means: by means of a unity 
reached by way of analysis. Judgment is a synthesis (of con-
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cepts) by means of analysis (of the sensible given). Categories 
are concepts of the synthesis of intuition necessary for the 
analysis of this same intuition that allows concepts of objects 
to be formed and synthesized in judgments. So if you like, the 
full process is: synthesis (of intuition) for analysis (into con-




What particularly concerns us here is that what Longue-
nesse calls the “full process” is a self-conscious process. Accord-
ing to her view then, § 26 shows that the appearances stand under 
the categories by virtue of the fact that the categories guide sensi-
ble synthesis, although not as reflected concepts but as logical 




 clarifies her view 
by considering the judgement (of experience): ‘The sun warms 
the stone.” According to her view, we arrive at this judgement by 
first perceiving the repeated conjunction of light of the sun and 
warmth of the stone. Then we form the hypothetical judgement 
(of perception): ‘If the sun shines on the stone, then the stone 
becomes warm.’ Finally, we subsume the hypothetical connection 
under the concept of cause. The category of cause thus guides the 
sensible synthesis of our perceptions, which makes possible the 
analysis of the repeated experience into a hypothetical judgement, 
which in turn makes subsumption possible. 
Longuenesse’s interpretation is similar to the interpreta-
tion I have proposed in that also I think that the rules represented 
in the schemata of the categories govern the synthesis that makes 
possible the comparison of sensible manifolds. Empirical rules 
are generated in this way, so those rules precede both empirical 
concepts and the categories. As I explained in the introduction, 
this view links Kant to the tradition starting with Alhazen’s theo-
ry, according to which even our sensations require distinguishing 
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and comparing. However, on one crucial point I disagree with 
Longuenesse. Whereas according to my hypothesis, the distin-
guishing and comparing action required for mere reproduction 
does not involve awareness of the rule, Longuenesse thinks that 
there is not much sense in distinguishing between rule and aware-
ness of a rule.
585
 Therefore, Longuenesse thinks that although 
appearances do not depend on categories as full-fledged concepts 
they do depend on self-conscious a priori rules. To put it differ-
ently, Longuenesse sees Kant as breaking away from the Wolffi-
an view of cognition as consisting of two acts.  
The fact that Kant explicitly says that the appearances do 
not depend on the functions of the understanding does not support 
her interpretation. Since Kant also agrees with Wolff that animals 
are conscious but not self-conscious creatures, the interpretation 
Longuenesse offers would have to have superior textual support 
from the Deduction itself in order to gain the upper hand over my 
interpretation. As I already noted at the beginning of this chapter, 
her interpretation is based on the distinction between judgements 
of perception and judgements of experience. As we saw, this 
ground is questionable and it is at odds with Kant’s statement that 
at the beginning of the Deduction he has abstracted from the way 
appearances are given to us. Thus, what Kant says in the first part 
of the Deduction does not support Longuenesse’s interpretation. 
Now we should see how well her interpretation fits what Kant 
says in the second part. 
I agree with Longuenesse that the second part of the ar-
gument is to be found in § 26. Broadly speaking, I also agree with 
what she says concerning the distinction between form of intui-
tion and formal intuition. However, her interpretation of Kant’s 
account of inner sense does not allow her to take seriously Kant’s 
claim in the footnote on page B 160, according to which formal 
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intuition precedes all concepts. Here is how Longuenesse inter-
prets Kant: 
 
[T]he unity of apperception, as a capacity to judge, generates 
the representation of the unity and unicity of space and time, 
as the condition for any specific act of judging at all, thus pri-
or to any specific synthesis according to the categories, let 




However, when the unity of apperception generates a rep-
resentation of unity, the resulting representation is no longer an 
intuition. As Kant explains in the A Deduction (A 108–9), the 
unity of apperception is needed for representing the transcenden-
tal object. The pure concept of a transcendental object, Kant says, 
 
concerns nothing but that unity which must be encountered in 
any manifold of cognition insofar as it stands in relation to an 
object. This relation, however, is nothing other than the nec-
essary unity of consciousness, thus also of the synthesis of the 
manifold through a common function of the mind for combin-




It is this act of synthesis that is at issue in §§ 19–20. 
Through this common function an object is represented both in 
the act of forming a judgement and in the act of thinking an object 
for an intuition. On page A 107 Kant says that even the unity of 
the concepts of space and time is possible only because of the 
relation to the transcendental unity of consciousness. Now, if the 
unity of apperception generates both the formal intuitions and the 
concepts of space and time, then there is no difference between 
them, and yet Kant says that formal intuitions precede all con-
cepts. So, while it is certainly true that the act of thinking an ob-
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ject for our intuitions is not a case of subsumption under a catego-
ry, it is nevertheless a case of using a category, because according 
to § 10 the third thing that gives unity to the synthesis of a pure 
manifold is concepts, and without such a synthesis a pure mani-
fold cannot be represented as one representation. 
What, then, is the difference between the unity of formal 
intuitions on the one hand and the unity of the concepts of space 
and time on the other? I think the answer is simple. The differ-
ence is that since formal intuitions are intuitions, not concepts, 
they do not get their unity from concepts (from the categories). In 
other words, their synthesis is not a synthesis generally represent-
ed even though it is a conscious synthesis. Therefore, although in 
the figurative synthesis apperception must represent space and 
time through the schema of a category, it is not the unity of ap-
perception that generates the unity of space and time. 
If we reject my hypothesis, it becomes impossible to in-
terpret Kant in this way, and because Longuenesse has chosen a 
different way of interpreting what inner sense is in Kant’s theory, 
she is unable to make sense of Kant’s examples of the synthesis 
of apprehension in § 26 (the apprehension of a house and the ap-
prehension of the freezing of water). Longuenesse is troubled by 
these examples: 
 
[W]ith these two examples we are faced with two different 
temporalities. One is the temporal character of our act of rep-
resentation, the other the temporal character of the empirical 
object. It is not at all clear how the synthesis speciosa of sec-




As Longuenesse notes, in the two examples space and 
time are treated as two distinct intuitions, one synthesized in 
space, the other synthesized in time. However, she thinks that in § 
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24 “Kant describes the pure intuition of space and the pure intui-
tion of time as jointly produced, for example, in the act of draw-
ing a line.”
589
 She admits that this discrepancy cannot be ex-
plained by what Kant says in the Analytic of Concepts but she 
thinks that it can be explained by taking into account what he 
does say in the Analytic of Principles. So, if Longuenesse is right, 
the Metaphysical Deduction depends on what Kant says later in 
the Transcendental Deduction, and the Transcendental Deduction 
depends on what Kant says later in the Analytic of Principles. In 
other words, the Metaphysical Deduction cannot be understood 
until one reads the Transcendental Deduction, which, in turn, 
cannot be understood until one reads the Analytic of Principles. 
Fortunately, this is not so, if my hypothesis is correct. In 
§ 24 Kant is not trying to show that space and time are jointly 
produced. The examples in § 24 are examples of conceptual rep-
resentations of space and time that depend on formal intuitions. 
The example of drawing a line in thought illustrates how the con-
ceptual representation of a line requires a temporal act the effect 
of which is a modification of inner sense. However, drawing a 
line in thought does not produce a representation of time, alt-
hough it requires an obscure distinguishing of time. It is only after 
one has a representation of space that one can arrive at a concep-
tual representation of time: 
 
Motion, as action of the subject (not as determination of an 
object), consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space, 
if we abstract from this manifold in space and attend only to 
the action in accordance with which we determine the form of 
inner sense, first produces the concept of succession at all. 
The understanding therefore does not find that sort of a com-
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In other words, time is the form of inner sense, and a 
formal intuition of space requires an act affecting inner sense. 
Thus, the formal intuition of space requires time as a formal 
ground of intuition. A formal intuition of time, on the other hand, 
requires a formal intuition of space and another act represented in 
inner sense. In the act of drawing a line in thought, therefore, 
space and time are not jointly produced, and there is no discrep-
ancy between the examples in § 24 on the one hand and § 26 on 
the other. According to my reading, then, Longuenesse’s claim 
that the temporal character of the freezing of water “seems not to 
depend on our act of apprehension, but on the (empirical) object 
itself”,
591
 is simply a misunderstanding. The temporal character of 
the freezing of water does depend on the act of apprehension be-
cause it depends on the apprehension of a change taking place in 
the formal intuition of space, which in turn depends on an act of 
apprehension. 
It is now time to consider the conclusion of the B Deduc-
tion, which Kant is ready to present after explaining the differ-
ence between the form of intuition and formal intuition: 
 
Thus even unity of the synthesis of the manifold, outside or 
within us, hence also a combination with which everything 
that is to be represented as determined in space or time must 
agree, is already given a priori, along with (not in) these intu-




The unity of the synthesis of the manifold is given along 
with the intuitions but not in them, because sense itself does not 
give a representation of unity without the figurative synthesis of 
imagination. Kant continues:  
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But this synthetic unity can be none other than that of the 
combination of the manifold of a given intuition in general in 
an original consciousness, in agreement with the categories, 




In the Subjective Deduction Kant explained that the unde-
termined object of an empirical intuition, the appearance, must 
not in itself be regarded as an object outside the power of repre-
sentation.
594
 The posterior act must therefore produce the relation 
to an object. In the above sentence, Kant refers to two unities: the 
unity of a formal intuition and the unity of the combination of the 
manifold of a given intuition in general in an original conscious-
ness. According to § 10, the synthetic unity of the manifold in 
intuition in general brings transcendental content to our represen-
tations. This unity is the product of the intellectual synthesis, by 
means of which cognition relates to an object, and it would not be 
possible without the unity of apperception. The unity of a formal 
intuition, by contrast, is not a unity of a given intuition in general 
in an original consciousness. Admittedly, it is a conscious unity 
and it would not be possible without apperception, but its unity 
nonetheless is a unity of intuition and belongs to space and time. 
It is a product of the figurative synthesis, which is “an effect of 
the understanding on sensibility and its first application (and at 
the same time the ground of all others) to objects of the intuition 
that is possible for us.”
595
 Thus, the unity of a formal intuition is 
the unity of an intellectual synthesis but applied to our sensible 
intuition, and the figurative synthesis stands under the categories. 
Not only figurative synthesis, however, but all synthesis:  
 
Consequently all synthesis, through which even perception it-
self becomes possible, stands under the categories, and since 
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experience is cognition through connected perceptions, the 
categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and 




In this passage Kant makes two claims. The latter of these 
is very straightforward and presents no problem. At the beginning 
of § 26 Kant said that he will explain the possibility of “cognizing 
a priori through categories whatever objects may come before 
our senses, not as far as the form of their intuition but rather as far 
as the laws of their combination are concerned”.
597
 Now, the laws 
of their combination are prescribed by the understanding. We can 
cognize the order and regularity of nature a priori, because we 
ourselves have originally put it there. In other words, experience 
is a synthesis of perceptions,
598
 and we cognize the objects of 
experience a priori through categories, because the categories 
make possible the combination of perceptions. However, in order 
to explain the possibility of cognizing a priori through categories 
whatever objects may come before our senses, Kant needs to 
show that not only the synthesis of perceptions but also the syn-
thesis through which perception itself becomes possible, stands 
under the categories. Consequently, in order to understand the 
argument, we need to understand how it is that perception be-
comes possible. 
In the previous subsection we saw that an empirical im-
age is a representation of a simultaneous empirical manifold in 
space. As a pure manifold, space is prior to an image, and simul-
taneity cannot be represented without a successive synthesis. 
Therefore, outer sense only affords us impressions without put-
ting them together, and at the most elementary level the unity of 
the image is a spatial unity produced by an a priori act affecting 
inner sense. Further, simultaneity cannot be represented as con-
                                                     
596
 B 161. 
597
 B 159. 
598
 B 217. 
Kant’s Transcendental Deductions 
352 
 
tained in one moment, and time is contained in every empirical 
representation of the manifold.
599
 
In the Schematism Kant says that an empirical concept is 
always related immediately to the schema of the imagination, not 
to an image of an object. Images become possible only through 
pure a priori imagination, as we can see from Kant’s example of 
the empirical concept of a dog. What the schema of this concept 
represents is the rule in accordance with which the empirical fac-
ulty of productive imagination can exhibit an image of a four-
footed animal. However, the schema itself is a product of pure 
imagination: the shape of a dog is a pure representation. Conse-
quently, an empirical concept signifies a rule for producing an 
empirically reproducible representation, i.e. an appearance, and 
the schema is a representation of this rule. Now, an appearance 
cannot be a momentary thing, so although the form of outer sense, 
space, is the pure form of outer intuitions, time is the a priori 
formal condition of all appearances in general.
600
 The dog’s 
movement changes its shape – it changes the image of the dog – 
but regardless of this change, the rule allows the mind to keep 
reproducing the same representations that were previously associ-
ated with the dog. Reproducibility thus requires an a priori syn-
thesis affecting inner sense. 
The prior act of cognition, therefore, represents an unde-
termined object of an empirical intuition by means of this rule, 
and the posterior act of cognition determines that object through 
consciousness of the same rule. The posterior act includes a fig-
urative synthesis, which has as its aim the unity in the determina-
tion of sensibility. This unity is a condition of the combination of 
perceptions, and the synthesis generally represented is called a 
category. On the other hand, this same synthesis is a condition of 
everything that can come before our senses, because it gives em-
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pirical representations their unity without which they would not 
be reproducible. Consequently, all synthesis, through which per-
ception itself becomes possible – even the synthesis of the prior 
act of cognition in producing an image – stands under the catego-
ries. In the Subjective Deduction Kant explained that this same a 
priori synthesis is responsible for both reproduction and recogni-
tion. In the Objective Deduction of the A edition he explained 
that the same faculty of pure imagination, which is required for 
perception, is also required for representing appearances. Now he 
has explained that the unity required for the latter is also required 
for the former, and that it is the unity of a pure concept of the 
understanding but applied to our sensible intuition. Neither tran-
scendental apperception nor the simplicity of the soul can provide 
the ground of unity in producing an image, but there is no need 
for them either, for synthesis in space and time effects unity of 





In this study, I have examined whether we can understand 
the Transcendental Deductions by making the hypothesis that 
Kant got his conception of inner sense from Tetens. I started by 
arguing that would be a reasonable hypothesis and that it would 
place Kant within a well-established tradition of thinking about 
perception. It has been my aim to show that both the Subjective 
Deduction and the Objective Deduction of the A edition could be 
made intelligible by making this hypothesis. I have also argued 
that even though commentators have had trouble accepting Kant’s 
claim that the B Deduction is compatible with the A Deduction, 
that hypothesis makes the B Deduction equally intelligible. 
In the present chapter, I have concentrated on the B De-
duction and shown that even though the argument does not rest on 
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an analysis of our basic cognitive faculties – an analysis that I 
have shown to have connections to Tetens’ philosophy – my hy-
pothesis can make Kant intelligible where other commentators 
have seen him as falling into error and obscurity. In fact, it has 
been my intention to show that we do not even need to speculate 
about the origin of Kant’s account of inner sense. All we need to 
do is to take seriously what Kant says. First, we should take it 
seriously that our receptive capacity is twofold: we have inner 
and outer sense. Secondly, we should take seriously the claim that 
space is the form of outer sense and time is the form of inner 
sense. And thirdly, we should take seriously the claim that our 
sensible cognition does not involve ideas. If we take these claims 
as a revision of Wolff’s philosophy and consider them in conjunc-
tion with other things Kant says – most importantly that appear-
ances do not depend on the understanding and that perception is 
consciousness of appearances – we arrive at the very same inter-
pretation to which my hypothesis led us. Therefore, although I 
think it is clear that Tetens influenced Kant, my interpretation of 
the Deductions does not depend on the hypothesis that there was 
such an influence, so if the reader wonders why Kant has said 
nothing about Tetens’ analysis, the answer is simple: there is no 
need for it. Kant does not have to mention Tetens in the Tran-
scendental Aesthetic any more than men like Newton or Berke-
ley. Both Tetens and Kant present a critique of Wolff’s philoso-
phy and those critiques are built on the same conception of inner 
sense. Tetens’ inquiry is empirical, Kant’s is transcendental, and 
he has said everything that he needs to say for making his case. 
For Kant’s argumentation Wolff is more important than Tetens. 
Nevertheless, it has proven to be difficult for commentators to 
understand the connection between Wolff and Kant correctly, and 
I hope that this connection can be seen more clearly through what 
I have said about Tetens’ philosophy. As far as Kant’s contempo-
raries are concerned, I suppose that familiarity with Tetens’ phi-




acquisition of empirical concepts, but it can also be understood 
through Alhazen’s theory, which was well known at Kant’s time. 
We can thus set aside the hypothesis and evaluate the 
credibility of the interpretation itself. In this chapter, one of my 
aims has been to show why the Deductions have been so difficult 
to understand. By considering three well-known interpretations I 
have argued that the reason why these interpretations have failed 
is that they are based on a wrong interpretation of inner sense 
(Pendlebury’s analysis of the Schematism can be seen as falling 
into the same category). There is still one more thing to do, how-
ever. The readings I have here discussed are all conceptualist 
readings, and we should see if a non-conceptualist reading differ-
ing from the one I have presented could be successful. Hannah 
Ginsborg has argued that although ”conceptualism seems to get 
the relation between conceptual activity on the one hand, and 
perception on the other, the wrong way round”,
601
 non-
conceptualist interpretations of Kant are unable to show how 
“human imagination can produce perceptual images of objects in 
which those objects are intentionally represented without being 
brought under concepts.”
602
 In her view then, if the strategy of the 
Transcendental Deduction is to have any hope of success, the 
spontaneity of imagination must for Kant be a spontaneity of un-
derstanding.
603
 Ginsborg sees Kant’s strategy in responding to the 
Humean worry about the causal connection as follows: 
 
Kant’s strategy […] is to claim that even though we have no 
sensory impression corresponding to the concept of causality, 
causality as necessary connection nonetheless figures in the 
context of perception. It does so because perceptual content is 
arrived at through a synthesis of sensible impressions which 
accords with the rules of the understanding, and one of these 
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rules is, or corresponds to, the concept of causality. Now it is 
hard to see, on the nonconceptualist reading, how anything 




I agree with Ginsborg about Kant’s strategy, and I agree 
that this strategy would not be available to Kant if it were his 
view that we have pre-conceptual representations with intentional 
content. Thus, a necessary requirement for a successful non-
conceptual reading is that it does not claim that our perceptual 
awareness involves representations with intentional content. On 
the other hand, we saw that of the conceptualist readings dis-
cussed here the most promising one was bordering on non-
conceptualism (and could be made more intelligible by accepting 
my hypothesis). Ginsborg suggests a conceptualist reading that 
would accommodate the considerations she mentions as support-
ing the non-conceptualist view. For her, conceptualism is, so I 
gather, a view she accepts only grudgingly, because she sees no 
alternative. 
In light of these considerations I have to conclude with 
McLear
605
 that the extremely widespread view that for Kant per-
ceptual awareness is made possible by representations having 
intentional content is false. I have here presented an alternative to 
that view, and my reading places Kant’s theory between concep-
tualism and non-conceptualism. It is a non-conceptual reading to 
the extent that it claims that for Kant the appearances are products 
of sensibility (sense and imagination), but it may be viewed as 
conceptual in the sense that it claims that human perception (con-
sciousness of appearances) requires the use of categories. This 
reading allows us to view the structure of the Critique as logical 
and the two editions as compatible with each other. It also fits the 
historical context quite nicely. 
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10. CLOSING WORDS 
 
In his famous letter to Marcus Herz, Kant addressed the 
problem of the ground of the relation between a representation 
and its object.
606
 The problem was that he could not understand 
how a concept of the understanding could represent an object. 
Unlike God, we cannot be the cause of the objects through our 
understanding, and neither can the objects be the causes of our 
intellectual concepts. In order to find a solution to this problem 
Kant had to internalize this relation. 
In this study, my aim has been to explain how I think we 
should interpret the internalization of the relation between repre-
sentation and its object so as to make sense of Kant’s proofs for 
the objective validity of the pure concepts of the understanding. 
In my view, a correct understanding of the distinction between 
outer and inner sense is the key to understanding Kant’s solution 
to the problem. For us it is natural to think that outer sense repre-
sents objects in space, but this is not how Kant thinks. For Kant, 
outer sense is a capacity of the mind through which it can be af-
fected by the noumenal reality. That capacity does not by itself 
yield consciousness of objects. If we think of the modifications of 
outer sense as representations having a relation to an object, then 
that object belongs to the noumenal world. Although these repre-
sentations are in space, they do not represent anything in space. 
Our impressions are thus the only kind of representations 
that are caused by an object in such a way that the ground of the 
relation between representation and object is understandable 
through the capacity of affection alone. They “contain only the 
way in which the subject is affected by the object”,
607
 but since 
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they are not cognitions, their relation to the object (to an object in 
itself) is of no interest to us in considering the question of the 
validity of our pure concepts. 
Cognition requires not only outer affection but mental ac-
tion as well. Outer affection is the occasion for the awakening of 
the cognitive faculty. However, the representation to which this 
action is directed at the awakening of our cognitive faculty con-
tains more than merely the way in which the subject is affected by 
noumena. It contains not only impressions but also an a priori 
form: a pure manifold of space. Thus, the representation to which 
cognitive action is directed is neither an impression nor a heap of 
impressions but an intuition which contains those impressions. 
This intuition, however, still does not contain an object of outer 
sense. An object of cognition is never a modification of outer 




The change in the conception of inner sense is insepara-
bly connected with a change in the view on the nature of our per-
ceptual awareness. The possibility of proving the objective validi-
ty of the pure concepts of the understanding rests on finding a 
connection between the objects of the senses and those pure con-
cepts. Such a connection is possible only if the mind is active in 
perceptual awareness, because an object of a passively caused 
representation would be beyond the reach of our intellectual con-
cepts. Now, one viable option for constructing a deduction of the 
categories would be to assume that those concepts are required 
for the act of representing the objects of our perceptual aware-
ness. However, one cannot escape the feeling that that would be 
an absurd position. If we reject this option, as Kant does, we face 
a difficulty. How can a pure concept of the understanding have a 
relation to an object, which is produced by the mind independent-
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ly of the understanding? A successful answer to this question 
requires that we do not consider the product of the inner act re-
quired for perceptual awareness as an idea. There is, of course, a 
relation between a sensible representation and its object, but the 
new conception of inner sense allows us to rethink this relation. 
The representation can now be thought as being a modification of 
outer sense and containing empirical impressions ordered in an a 
priori form. When we consider the act in this way, we do not 
think of it as producing a representation having a relation to an 
object but rather as producing the object itself. According to this 
conception, the representation is a modification of outer sense, 
and the a priori act produces an object, which is a modification of 
inner sense. An act of the understanding can now be thought to be 
directed at an object of the act of sensibility instead of a represen-
tation of an object, and in this act of the understanding that object 
serves as a representation representing an object outside the pow-
er of representation. The latter object is what Kant calls an object 
of experience, and unlike the act of representing an object of per-
ceptual awareness that act does require the use of categories. 
The new conception of inner sense thus enables a reversal 
of the relation between a representation and its object. An impres-
sion is in a relation to a noumenal object, but an act of sensibility 
builds its own object by using the intuition of outer sense as its 
representation. That undetermined object of perceptual awareness 
can then be determined through an act of the understanding, and 
this act requires a representation of a transcendental object, which 
is always one and the same. 
My aim in this study has been to explain how Kant thinks 
that the new conception of the distinction between outer and inner 
sense enables him to prove the validity of the categories. Kant 
puts emphasis on his new conception of the role of imagination in 
producing appearances, and that conception is connected with the 
reversal of the relation between representation and its object. 
They are two sides of the same coin. My purpose has been to 
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show that once we understand Kant’s view on the origin and con-
tent of our representations correctly, we can understand his De-
ductions. Kant thought that the use of imagination is ultimately 
grounded on a priori rules, and those rules are the common origin 
of the objects of perceptual awareness on the one hand, and the 
objects of experience on the other. This common origin makes a 
deduction of the categories possible. 
Kant thus thinks that he has been able to prove the objec-
tive validity of the categories in regard to the objects of the sens-
es, but only at the cost of revealing the limits of human cognition. 
The intellectual act of representing an object requires a given 
representation in order to yield cognition. In other words, when 
we do not have a sensible object which we can use as a represen-
tation, the categories cannot help us to produce an object of cog-
nition. Thus, although we can use the categories for thinking ob-
jects of the noumenal world, we are then playing with mere ideas, 
and a transcendental deduction of an idea, i.e. a concept of reason, 
is possible only as a deduction of a regulative principle, not a 
constitutive one.
609
 However, although we cannot have cognition 
of noumena, we are immediately conscious of the moral law 
which is the form of the noumenal world.
610
 This law serves as 
the principle of the deduction of the faculty of freedom,
611
 whose 
logical possibility is shown in the Transcendental Dialectic. The 
practical concept of freedom is grounded on a transcendental 
idea,
612
 and the moral law provides objective reality to this con-
cept. Kant thinks that in order to act morally we have to bring the 
form of the intellectual world into the world of sense. Pure reason 
thus has, after all, a capacity to be through its representation the 
cause of an object, if only in its practical use. The concept of rea-
son does not yield cognition of the object to which the causality 
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through freedom is attributed, but the moral law gives it signifi-
cance for practical use.
613
 Perhaps Kant could concede that it can 
be called a transcendent concept, because it can be applied to 
objects whether they are given sensibly or not sensibly. The only 




Any other conception of the distinction between outer and 
inner sense in Kant’s philosophy would lack the simplicity char-
acteristic of the conception here described. On the basis of that 
distinction the question of the origin and content of our represen-
tations can be understood in clear terms, and when we do under-
stand that question, understanding Kant’s Deductions becomes a 
relatively simple matter of understanding the connection between 
subordination and coordination of representations. 
                                                     
613
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